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

nahopadhyaya Dr Satischandra Vidyabhushan.

A HISTORY OF
INDIAN LOGIC

Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools

Mahāmahopādhyāya
SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA
M A, PH D, M R A S, F A S B

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त्रिपिटकवागीश्वर – एम,ए,– पि,एच्,डि,–
एम,आर,ए,एस,– एफ,ए,एस्,बि,
इत्युपाधिधारिणा

श्रीसतीशचन्द्र आचार्य्येण सम्पादितः।

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TO

THE HON'BLE SIR ASUTOSH MOOKHERJEE, KT.,
C.S.I., M.A., D.L., D.Sc., PH.D., F.R.A.S., F.R.S.E.,
Saraswati, Sastra-Vachaspati, Sambuddhagama-Chakravarti, Offg. Chief Justice, High Court of Judicature, Fort William, Calcutta,

THE FOREMOST EDUCATIONIST OF HIS COUNTRY,
WHO HAS, FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, SUCCESSFULLY
GUIDED THE POLICY OF HIGHER EDUCATION
IN BENGAL,
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
AS A TOKEN OF PROFOUND ESTEEM
BY
HIS HUMBLE ADMIRER,
THE AUTHOR

10527
28.12.89

प्रदीपः सर्व्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्व्वकर्म्मणाम् ।
आश्रयः सर्व्वधर्म्माणां शश्वदान्वीक्षिकी मता ॥

(KAUṬILYA)

"Ānvīkṣikī (Logic) has ever been esteemed as the lamp of all sciences the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues"

न्यायाम्बुधिर्दीधितिकारयुक्तिकल्लोलकोलाहलदुर्विगाहः ।
तस्यापि पातुं न पयः समर्थः किं नाम धीमत्प्रतिभाम्बुवाहः ॥

"Modern Logic is a veritable ocean whose water is saline and which is unapproachable owing to the tumults and uproars of the commentators Is not then the water of that ocean capable of being drunk? Why not? Intelligent people, like clouds, can easily approach the ocean and drink its water pure and sweet."

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PREFACE

It pleased His Excellency the Earl of Ronaldshay, G C I.E , the Governor of Bengal, to utter these memorable words while [illegible] idealism further than any other thinker of any other age or country, or of the subtleties of the Nyāya system which has been handed down through immemorial ages, and is to-day the pride and glory of the *tols* of Navadvīpa, does, indeed, appear to me to be a profound anomaly "

Words like these coming from one who is himself a keen and ardent student of Indian Philosophy and a scrupulous and sympathetic ruler, came upon me, who have the good fortune to belong to Navadvīpa, "with double sway" and supplied the inspiration which sustained me in this my humble attempt to present a history of Indian Logic or Nyāya Darśana before the English-knowing public

It was my revered preceptors Mahāmāhopadhyaya Mohesh Chan[illegible] and [illegible] who [illegible] *mukt*[illegible] *Ātma-tattva-viveka*) first awakened in me an interest in the study of Indian Logic. That was about the year 1892. Subsequently I read Modern Logic, viz *Tattvacintāmani* and *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā* under Pandit Bāmācharan Nyāyāchārya and Raghunātha Śiromani's *Didhiti* under Pandit Jibanāth Miśra, both of Benares College.

I searched out and studied most of the books and manu[illegible] some acquaintance with Indian Logic and from time to time published several books and articles on Nyāya

With regard to Jaina Logic, I derived valuable help from my teacher [illegible]

he left for England, the work of revision was very kindly undertaken by Dr W S Urquhart, of the Scottish Churches College, to whom I offer my thanks My special thanks are due to Dr [illegible]

[illegible]

from that Macenas of letters—I mean the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mukherji, Sarasvati, whose name is inseparably associated with every form of educational work in Bengal, who has spent the best years of his life in effecting various improvements in the status of the Calcutta University and who above anything else is the typical man of action—a great *Karmayogin*—unswerving in his aim and fixity of purpose, selfless in his devotion to work pursuing it through life regardless of malediction or benediction, praise or blame

CALCUTTA,
21st April, 1920

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

The late Mahāmahopādhyaya Dr Satis Chandra Vidyābhūsana had seen this book through up to p 384 After his rather sudden death the work of seeing the remainder of the book [illegible]

[illegible]

express my thanks The Index has been prepared by my old pupil Prof. Surendranath Bhattācārya, M A, of the Behar National College and for the Tibetan Index I have to thank Mr Johan Van Manen Librarian, Imperial Library, Calcutta

I am well aware of my unfitness to undertake such a task requiring years of patient study But I was tempted to do so, among other reasons, on account of the feeling of esteem and regard which I always entertained for my late friend, and I look upon this slight service to his memory as going a little way towards repaying the many kindnesses he had always shown to me ever since I first knew him

CALCUTTA,
December, 1920

I J S TARAPOREWALA

Azimganj, Arrah, Bhavnagar, etc. I also used
Jaina manuscripts, of the Asiatic Society of Ben
Poona, etc , besides those in the possession of t
rable Vijayadharma Sūri

As regards Buddhistic Logic, I could not g
Pali sources, because neither in the Buddhisti
duced into Ceylon in 254 B C by Mahendra,
in the Buddhistic books recorded in writin
Vatta-gāmini, is there any trace of a systematic
Even during my visit to Ceylon in 1909 (Ap
not come across in that island any evidence
On this subject I have derived materials to
Chinese, but mostly from Tibetan sources
occasionally helped me in dealing with Chines
cerning the Tibetan sources almost all the mat
from *B̲stan-ḥgyur* some volumes whereof were
India office through the courtesy of Dr F W
the kindness of Lord Curzon, the then Vicero
enabled to retain temporarily for my use some
B̲stan-ḥgyur brought down from Gyantse during
of 1904 To secure further materials bearing
Buddhistic Logic I visited Labrang and Pamya
in June 1907 and October 1908, respectively (Ap
and came across a world of facts for observati
Since the opening of increased intercourse be
Tibet consequent upon the Tashi Lama's visit
(of which an account is given in Appendix H),
traders have been pouring into India and from
of, *B̲stan-ḥgyur* have been obtained since 191
with me, one in the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, o
copy) in the Sāhitya-Parishad Library, and o
University Library

In regard to the chapters on modern Log
consulted some [illegible]
Pramatha Nath [illegible]
Tarka-darśana-ti [illegible]
Mahāmahopādhy [illegible]
vāgīśa may be gratefully mentioned.

My thanks are due to Hon'ble Mr W. W
of Public Instruction, Bengal, who very kindly
the first batch of manuscripts and made many
have stood me in great stead in preparing the vo
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for having revised manuscripts as well as the pro
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he left for England, the work of revision was very kindly undertaken by Dr W S Urquhart, of the Scottish Churches College, to whom I offer my thanks My special thanks are due to Dr H Stephen of the Calcutta University for the interest and thoroughness with which he examined all the proofs of the present volume

The book however could not have seen the light nor assumed its present form were it not for help of various kinds received from that Macenas of letters--I mean the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mukherji, Sarasvati, whose name is inseparably associated with every form of educational work in Bengal, who has spent the best years of his life in effecting various improvements in the status of the Calcutta University and who above anything

CALCUTTA,
21st April, 1920

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

The late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Satis Chandra Vidyā-
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pupil Prof. Surendranath Bhattacārya, M A, of the Behar National College and for the Tibetan Index I have to thank Mr
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ew.

OREWALA

Azimganj, Arrah, Bhavnagar, etc. I also used a large number of Jaina manuscripts, of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Deccan College, Poona, etc., besides those in the possession of the aforesaid Venerable Vilavadharma Sa[illegible] [illegible] from [illegible] intro- [illegible] [illegible]a, nor [illegible] Buddhistic books recorded in writing in 88 B.C. by Vatta-gāmini, is there any trace of a systematic culture of Nyāya. Even during my visit to Ceylon in 1909 (Appendix K), I did not come across in that island any evidence of Nyāya study. On this subject I have derived materials to some extent from Chinese, but mostly from Tibetan sources. Professor Kimura occasionally helped me in dealing with Chinese materials. Concerning the Tibetan sources almost all the materials were deri from B̲s̲tan-ḥgyur some volumes whereof were lent to me by India office through the courtesy of Dr. F. W. Thomas. Throu the kindness of Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India, I w enabled to retain temporarily for my use some other volumes B̲s̲tan-ḥgyur brought down from Gyantse during the Tibet Missio of 1904. To secure further materials bearing on the subject of Buddhistic Logic I visited Labrang and Pamyangchi monasteries in June 1907 and October 1908, respectively (Appendices I and J, and came across a world of facts for observation and comment. Since the opening of increased intercourse between India and Tibet consequent upon the Tashi Lama's visit to Ind[illegible] (of which an [illegible] traders hav[illegible] of, B̲s̲tan-ḥ[illegible] with me, or [illegible] copy) in th[illegible] University I [illegible]

In regard to the chapters on modern Logic I occasionally consulted some scholars among whom [illegible] Pramath[illegible] Tarka-d[illegible] Mahāma[illegible] vāgīśa m[illegible]

My [illegible] [illegible]ornell, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, who very kindly looked through the first batch of manuscripts and made many suggestions which have stood me in great stead in preparing the volume. I am also grateful to Rev. A. Johnstone, M.A., Principal, C.M.S. College, for having revised manuscripts as well as the proofs of the portion dealing with ancient Logic. Mr. F. J. Monahan, I.C.S., Commissioner, Presidency Division, looked through a few galleys and when he left for England, the work of revision was very kindly undertaken by Dr W S, Urquhart, of the Scottish Churches College, to whom I offer my thanks My special thanks are due to Dr H Stephen of the Calcutta University for the interest and thoroughness with which he examined all the proofs of the present volume

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ank Mr

INTRODUCTION.

My object in this volume is to write the history of what is called *Nyāya*, one of the six schools into which orthodox philosophy in India is divided The word 'logic,' although it is in common parlance held synonymous with Indian Nyāya, is not exactly identical with it. Logic covers some of the subjects of Nyāya as well as Vaiśesika and is not co-extensive with either

Indian Logic has been differently defined in different ages but the definition generally accepted is the science which

The Mediæval School of Indian Logic

Text

1 Pramāna samuccaya by Dignāga

Commentaries

2 Pramāna-samuccaya-vrtti by Dignāga
3. Pramāna-vārtika-kārikā by Dharmakīrti
4 Pramāna-vārtika-vrtti by Dharmakīrti
5 Pramāna-vārtika-pañjikā by Devendrabodhi
6 Pramāna-vārtika-pañjikā-tīkā by Śākyabodhi
7 Pramāna-vārtika vrtti by Ravi Gupta
8 Pramāna-samuccaya-tīkā (Viśālāmalavatī nāmā) by Jinen
bodhi
9 Pramāna vārtikālaṅkāra by Prajñākara Gupta
10 Pramāna-vārtikālaṅkāra-tīkā by Jina
11 Pramāna-vārtikālaṅkāra by Yamāri
12 Pramāna-vārtika-tīkā by Śaṅkarānanda

The Modern School of Indian Logic

Text

1 Tattva-cintāmani by Gaṅgeśa

Commentaries

2. [illegible]
3 [illegible]
4 [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6 [illegible]
7 [illegible]
8. [illegible]
9 [illegible]
10 [illegible]
11 [illegible]
12 [illegible]
13 [illegible]
14 [illegible]
15 [illegible]
laṅkāra
16. Tattva-cintāmani-vyākhyā by Gadādhara Bhattācārya

Sub-Commentaries

17 Āloka-darpana by Maheśa Thakkura
18 Tattva-cintāmani āloka pariśista by Devanātha Thākura
19 Tattva-cintāmani āloka kantakoddhāra by Madhusūd

21. Didhiti-rahasya by Mathūranātha Tarkavāgisa
22. Tattva-cintāmani-didhiti-prasārini by Krsnadāsa Sārvabhauma
23. Anumānāloka-prasārini on Paksadhara by Krsnadāsa
24. [illegible]
25. [illegible]
26. [illegible]
27. [illegible]
28. Tattva-cintāmani didhiti-prakāsikā by Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgiśa
29. Tattva cintāmani-didhiti-parikṣā by Rudra Nyāyavācaspati
30. Didhiti-ṭikā by Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra
31. Tattva cintāmani-didhiti-prakāśikā by Gadādhara
32. Tattva-cintāmani-didhiti ṭikā by Rāmarudra Tarkavāgisa

Glosses

33. Tattva kālīśaṅkari-patrikā by Kālīsaṅkara
34. Tattva cāndri-patrikā by Candra Nārāyana
35. Tattva-raudri patrikā by Rudra Nārāyana, etc

Of all the nations of the world the Hindus and the Greeks appear to have developed systems of logic to a large extent independently of each other. Hindu Logic in its rudimentary stage can be traced as early as the 6th century before Christ Greek Logic assumed a definite form in the fourth century B C though its germs can be traced a little earlier in the controversies of the Sophists and Socrates. But so far as the five limbed syllogism of Hindu Logic is concerned the Hindu logician may have been indebted some way or other to the Greeks While the syllogism was definitely formulated as a logical doctrine by Aristotle in his Rhetoric, Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics in the 4th century B C., the Hindu logician shows but a vague conception of it as late as the 1st century B C. It is not inconceivable that the knowledge of Aristotle's logic found its way through Alexandria, Syria and other countries into Taxila (*vide* Appendix A). This is rightly corroborated by the Hindu tradition that Nārada who visited Alexandria (Svetadvīpa) and became an expert in the handling of the five limbed syllogism. So simple is syllogistic structure that it does not seem to require any theory of gradual development to explain its growth. And Aristotle might have conceived the idea of syllogistic form into which all reasoning could be put as a complete whole

I am inclined, therefore, to think that the syllogism did not actually evolve in Indian Logic out of inference, and that the Hindu logician owed the idea of syllogism to the influence of Aristotle (*vide* Appendix B) To me it is one of the most important enquiries in the history of Indian Logic to ascertain at what stage the doctrine of inference, which was an indigenous growth, was happily amalgamated with the borrowed art of syllogism into a common structure of logical thought. The Buddhist work Kathāvatthu furnishes several logical terms, e.g. upanayana, nigamana, etc., of syllogistic reasoning. But we find not a single instance where these terms have been methodically combined so as to form a syllogism proper. An attempt has been made to discuss the point at issue in the Appendix B, and I leave it to the reader to take my views for what they are worth.

Ancient logic was called Ānvīkṣikī or the science of debate, but with the introduction of syllogism or proper reasoning it came to be called Nyāya from the 1st century A.D. The Nyāya-śāstra in its earliest age flourished in Mithilā with Gotama but it attained its high development in Prabhāsa with Akṣapāda. The mediaeval logic from the 4th century A.D. was called Pramāṇa-śāstra, inasmuch as it dealt with pramāṇa, the means of valid knowledge, viz. perception and inference. Ujjain in Malwa and Valabhi in Gujarat were the scenes of activity of the Jaina logicians of the Śvetāmbara sect. The Digambaras flourished principally in Pāṭaliputra and Draviḍa (including Karnāṭa) about the 8th century A.D. Buddhist logicians flourished in universities such as Kāñcīpura, Nālandā (vide Appendix C), Odantapurī, Śrī-dhanyakaṭaka, Kāśmīra and Vikramaśilā (vide Appendix F). In Bengal Buddhist logic attained its great development during the reign of the kings of the Pāl dynasty (vide Appendix D). Mediaeval logic came to an end in the 12th century A.D. and was in its latter stage a kind of Prakaraṇa or the Manual of Logic. But the modern logic began from the 13th century A.D., since when it has been known as Navya-nyāya or the new school of Dialectics. Its home was at first the University of Mithilā (vide Appendix E), during the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries, and afterwards that of Nadia (vide Appendix G) [illegible] on the 16th century [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

[illegible]

FOREWORD.

Mahâmahopâdhyâya Dr. Satischandra Vidyabhushan came of a respectable Brahmana family of Faridpore. He was the third son of the well-known Pandit Pitambar Vidyâvâgîśa and was born on the 30th July, 1870, in the village of Khalkula in Faridpore Satischandra was an infant four years old when he lost his father The family was large and yet had no earning member, and the eldest son Biswamber Jyotisârnava who was then only sixteen maintained the family under circumstances of great difficulty

Satischandra first went to the village school at the early age of five and rapidly made his mark amongst his fellow students He stood first in the Minor Vernacular Examination from his Division and secured a scholarship which enabled him to proceed to Navadvip and take admission into the Hindu School He passed the Entrance Examination of the Calcutta University in 1888, and obtained a scholarship which helped him to come to Calcutta and take his admission into the City College In due course he passed the F.A. Examination and then [illegible] to the

[illegible]

subject. Some years later his services were lent by the Government of Bengal to the Buddhist Text Society under whose auspices he edited a number of useful Pali Texts and published several original papers which attracted the attention of scholars in Europe and America. About this time he came into contact with Rai Saratchandra Das, Bahadur, C I.E., the distinguished Tibetan Explorer at whose request his services were again lent by

The first six months of the year 1910 he spent at Benares where, under the guidance of Dr A Venis, then Principal of the Queen's College, he studied under Subrahmanya Sastri, Bhagavatāchāryya, Sibakumar Sastri, Jibanath Jha and Bamacharan Nyāyāchāryya After his return to Calcutta from Benares he studied for six months under the guidance of Dr George Thibaut and acquired a good working knowledge of French and German On the 1st December, 1910, he assumed charge of the Principalship of the Sanskrit College In 1912 and 1916, he passed with great distinction the Preliminary and Final Examinations in Tibetan held by the Government, and carried off the sanctioned prizes on both occasions. He also acted as Lecturer on Pali and Tibetan in the University. His fame as a profound scholar of versatile attainments had rapidly spread and he was eagerly sought after in literary conferences. In 1913, he was the first President of the All India Digambar Jain Conference held at Benares In 1914, he was President of the All India Svetambar Jain Conference held at Jodhpur and of the All India Sanskrit Conference held at Hardwar. In 1916, he was President of the Bengal Literary Conference held at Jessore, and of the District Literary Conference at Krishnagar. In 1919, he was a Vice-President of the First Oriental Conference held at Poona and President of the section on Pali and Buddhism. During all this period he worked strenuously as a scholar, and the value of his contributions to Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan studies cannot be easily appraised by a single individual. In the University itself he was a leading figure, and from 1912, acted as a Member of the Syndicate. His services were invaluable in reorganising Sanskrit studies of the indigenous type and his work as Secretary to the Sanskrit Board and the Sanskrit Association founded by the Government will be gratefully remembered by Pandits of the present generation all over this Presidency. There can be little doubt that he overworked himself, and in 1919 the first signs of failing health were indicated by a mild stroke of paralysis. Friends and well-wishers implored him to spare himself, but he was deaf to their entreaties, for as he

interest for me. In 1901 I had come across a monograph on "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan" by Sadajiro Sugiura who had offered it as a dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania The work seemed to me of fascinating interest as opening up a

the Government for three years to assist in the p
of a Tibetan-English Dictionary He was in Darj
this purpose from 1897-1900 and utilised the oppo
acquire a thorough mastery over the Tibetan lang
the help of the celebrated Lama Funchhog Wangdan
then resident at Darjeeling In December, 1900, Sa
came to Calcutta as a Professor in the Sanskrit College
this period he acquired a thorough knowledge of
Sramanas of Ceylon and Burma In November, 1901, h
a second time at the M A. Examination of the Calcutta

years been connected with the University arranged with
T W Rhys Davids to conduct the examination Sa
achieved high distinction and his attainments were
praised by the distinguished examiner In March, 19
transferred to the Presidency College as Professor of
In December, 1905, the Tashi Lama came to India
visit the places sacred to Buddhists Satischandra wa
by the Government to accompany him, to act as Inter
to explain to him the histories and customs at the old
holy places. The Tashi Lama was highly pleased and

Philological Secretary. In 1908, the University conferr
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded him t
Prize for original research. About this time the q
Principalship of the Sanskrit College had come
[illegible] of the Government of Bengal and the

of the University I expressed my emphatic disa
the course proposed and expressed the opinion
Satischandra Vidyabhushan would be found admirabl
for the Principalship if he were offered facilities f
training. This view prevailed and during 1909 and

A LIST OF THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE MAHĀMAHŌPĀDHYĀYA DR SATISCHANDRA VIDYABHUSHAN[1]

A. Works, original or edited

1 [illegible]
2 [illegible]
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7 [illegible]
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11 [illegible]
12 [illegible]
13 [illegible]
14 [illegible]
15. [illegible]
16 [illegible]
17. [illegible]
18 The *Nyāya sūtras* of Gotama, translated into English (Sacred Books of the Hindus Vol 8)—Allahabad, 1913
19 Sāhitya-Pariṣat-Patrikā—Edited by Mm S C Vidyabhushan from (1913-1916?)
20 Nyāyabindu a Bilingual Index of Sanskrit and Tibetan words (Bib Ind, Tib Ser—1917)
21. A Report on the Revival of Buddhism—1917
22 A History of Indian Logic—1922

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5 Diṅnāga and his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*
6 Sarvajña-mitra, a Tāntrika Buddhist author of Kashmira in the 8th cent. A.D.
7 A Tibetan Almanac for 1906-07
8 The Gyantse Rock Inscription of [illegible], a Ruler under Sakyapa Hierarch in the 14th cent. A.D.
9 Romaka, or the City of Rome, as mentioned in the Ancient Pali and Sanskrit Works (N.S., ii.)
10 *Hetu-cakra-ḍamaru*, or Diamond Wheel of Reason, recovered from Labrang in Sikkim
11 Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet—
12 " " " —2
13 " " " —3
14 Nyāya praveśa (N.S., iii.)
15 Sāṅkhya Philosophy in the *Land of the Lamas*
16 Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and *Lexicography* as preserved in Tibet
17 A Descriptive List of Works on the Mādhyamika Philosophy
18 Some rare Sanskrit works on *Grammar*, Lexicography and *Prosody recovered from Tibet*
19 Two Tibetan Charms obtained by Lt. Col. Stuart H. Godfrey in Ladakh, one for chasing away Evil Spirits and the other *for* compelling Fortune (N.S., iv.)
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14. History of the Mādhyamika Philosophy of Nāgārjuna (v, 4)
15. The Story of Mahākāśyapa (vi, 1)
16 Nirvāna
17 The Influence of Buddhism on the Development of Nyāya Philosophy
18 The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—8 (vi, 3)
19. [illegible]
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2. Life of Diṅnāga
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4. Buddhism in India
5 The History of Saṃkhya Philosophy
6 Alexander Csoma de Körös
7. Ratanasutta
8. Prajñāpāramitā or Perfection of Wisdom
9 Conversion of the People of Lankā by Buddha
10 *Upasampada*, or Ordination ceremony of the Buddhist (1902)
11 Influence of Buddhism on the Development of the Hindu Nyāya Philosophy
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13 Nāgarjuna

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1 [illegible]
2. [illegible]
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2 [illegible]
3 [illegible]
4 [illegible]
5 [illegible]

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Anuruddhasthavira (1901)
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4. Presidential Address (Sāhitya Sammelan at Jessore)
5. Presidential Address (Literary Section, Sāhitya Sammelan at Jessore)

Page

18 *Tantra Yukti, the Terms of Scientific Argument* .. 24

19 *Medhātithi Gautama's Doctrines as recorded in the Carakasaṁhitā* .. 25

- i *Kāryābhinivṛtti, the Aggregate of Resources for the Accomplishment of an Action* . 27
- ii *Parīkṣā, the Standard of Examination* .. 28
- iii *Sambhāṣā-vidhi, the Method of Debate* 29

Chapter II

Reception accorded to Ānvīkṣikī

20 *Ānvīkṣikī* condemned in certain circles .. 34

21 *Ānvīkṣikī* held in high esteem in some quarters . 37

SECTION II

NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA—THE SCIENCE OF TRUE REASONING

Chapter I

The Growth of Nyāyaśāstra

22 Origin of the name *Nyāya* . 40

23 The Antiquity of *Nyāyaśāstra* 41

24 The Early Teachers of *Nyāyaśāstra* 42

25. Nārada, an Expert in *Nyāyaśāstra* 43

26 *Nyāya sūtra*, the first systematic work on *Nyāyaśāstra* .. 46

27 Akṣapāda, the Author of the *Nyāya-sūtra* 47

28 Subjects of the *Nyāya-sūtra* 50

29 The Arrangement of Categories in the *Nyāya sūtra* 52

30 The Process of Treatment of the Categories 53

Chapter II

Contents of the Nyāya-sūtra

31. The Categories their Enunciation 54

32. The Categories their Definition 54

- 1. The means of Right knowledge (*pramāna*) .. . 54
- 2 The Objects of Right knowledge (*prameya*) . .. 56
- 3 Doubt (*saṁśaya*) 58
- 4 Purpose (*prayojana*) 59
- 5 Example (*dṛṣṭānta*) 59
- 6 Tenet (*siddhānta*) 59
- 7. Members of a Syllogism (*avayava*) 60
- 8. Confutation (*tarka*) 61
- 9 Ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) 62
- 10 Discussion (*vāda*) 63

Page
11. Wrangling (*jalpa*) . 63
12. Cavil (*vitaṇḍā*) 63
13. Fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*) 63
14 Quibble (*chala*) 65
15 Analogue (*jāti*) 65
16 A Point of Defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) 66
33 The Varieties of Analogue .. 67
1 Balancing the homogeneity .. 67
2 Balancing the heterogeneity . 68
3 Balancing an excess .. 68
4 Balancing a deficit 69
5 Balancing the questionable 69
6 Balancing the unquestionable 70
7 Balancing the alternative 70
8 Balancing the question 71
9 Balancing the [illegible] 71
72
73
73
74
74
75
75
76
77
78
78
79
79
80
81
81
82
34 Varieties of the points of the Defeat 84
1 Hurting the proposition . 84
2. Shifting the proposition .. 85
3 Opposing the proposition 85
4 Renouncing the proposition 86
5. Shifting the reason 86
6 Shifting the topic 86
7. The meaningless 87
8 The unintelligible . 87
9 The incoherent 87
10 The inopportune 8
11. Saying too little .. 8
12 Saying too much . 8
13. Repetition .. 8
14 Silence 8

89
:e 89
enuity . .. 89
15. Ignoran . .. 89
16 Non-ing)n of an opinion . . . 89
17. Evasion ing the censurable .. 89
18 Admissi g the non censurable 90
19. Overloo g from a tenet 90
20. Censurin
21. Deviatin cies of reason also furnish points of defeat or
on for rebuke 90
22 The falla beir Examination (parīksā) . 90
occasi is of Right Knowledge (pramāna) . 90
35 Categories ' t . 90
1. The Mea . 92
The means 93
Perception . 93
Inference mony . 94
Comparisons 95
Verbal testi ts of right knowledge (prameya) 97
Other mean . . 97
2 The objec . 99
The Soul . 99
Body .. nse . 100
Senses . 101
Objects of se 101
Intellect . 101
Mind . on . . . 101
Faults .. n 102
Transmigrat nsaya) 103
Emancipatio (vāda) 104
3. Doubt (sai and Cavil (jalpa-vitandā) 104
4. Discussion tally Examined 105
5 Wrangling Whole (avayava and avayavin) 105
36 Topica Inciden ramānu) 105
1. Parts and Times (kāla) 106
2. Atoms (pa their Meanings (sabdārtha) . 106
3 The Three .. 107
4 Words and la) . 109
5. The Veda s) 110
6 Sound (sabaksah) . . 111
7. Word (padauddhi) . . 112
8. The eyes (cnrti) 112
9 Intellect (signification of numbers (samkhyaikānta) .. 114
10. Memory (n
11. The fixed n

Chapter III

mmentaries on the Nyaya-sūtra

Co mmentaries 115
hor of the Nyāya-l 115
36a Nature of the C
37. Vātsyāyana, aut

Page

38. [illegible] 117
39. [illegible] 120
40 [illegible] 121
41. [illegible] 123
42 [illegible] 125
43 [illegible] 127
44 [illegible] 129
45 [illegible] 130
46 [illegible] 130
47. [illegible] 131
48 [illegible] 132
49 [illegible] *ṭīkā* [illegible] 133
50 [illegible] 135
51. [illegible] 136
52 [illegible] 137
53. [illegible] 138
53*a*. [illegible] 140
53*b* [illegible] 140
53*c* [illegible] 141
54 [illegible] *pariśuddhi* [illegible] 141
55. [illegible] 142
56 [illegible] 143
57 [illegible] 143
58. [illegible] 145
59 Jayanta, Author of the *Nyāya-mañjarī* .. . 146
60 Jayanta's Explanation of Verbal Knowledge 147
61 Jayanta criticises the Doctrines of Kalyāna Rakṣita and Dharmottara 149
62 Jayanta's Review of several other Buddhistic Doctrines 150
63. Srīkantha 151
64. Abhayatilaka Upādhyāya . 151
65 Other commentators on the *Nyāya-sūtra* . 151

Chapter IV.

The Nyāya recognized as a Branch of Orthodox Learning. 152

66. A comparative Estimate of the *Ānvīkṣikī* and the *Nyāya* 152
67. The Nyāya included in Ṣaddarśana 152
68 The Nyāya supports the Veda 153
69. The Nyāya adapts itself to Śaivism 154
70. The Popularity of Nyāya established 155

PART II

THE MEDIAEVAL SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC

CALLED *Pramānaśāstra*, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

SECTION I

JAINA LOGIC

Chapter I.

Topics of Logic mentioned in the Jaina Canons

Page

1 The special Features of Mediaeval Logic
Formation of the Mediaeval school
2 [illegible] 158
3 [illegible] 159
4 [illegible] 159
5 [illegible] 160
6 [illegible] 161

Chapter II

Early Jaina Writers on Logic

Bhadrabāhu the Senior 164
Bhadrabāhu the Junior 164
7 Bhadrabāhu's Syllogism 165
8 Bhadrabāhu's Explanation of *Syādvāda* 167
9 Umāsvāti 168
10 Umāsvāti's Doctrine of *Pramāna* (Right Knowledge) 169
11 Umāsvāti's Explanation of *Naya* (the Mood of Statements) 170

Chapter III

Jaina Writers on Systematic Logic

12 The written Records of the Jainas 172
13 Systematic Jaina Logic 172
14 Siddhasena Divākara *alias* Ksapanaka 173
15 Siddhasena's *Nyāyāvatāra* 174
Pramāna, Right knowledge 174
Naya, the Method of Descriptions 181
16 Jinabhadra Gani Ksamāśramana 181
17 Siddhasena Gani 182
18 Samantabhadra. 182
19 Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāmsā* 184
20 Akalaṅkadeva 185
21. Vidyānanda 186
22 Mānikya Nandi 188
23 Mānikya Nandi's *Parīksāmukha-sūtra* 188
Valid Knowledge, *pramāna* 189
Syllogism, *vyāpti* 189

Page
Reason, *hetu* 190
Example, *dṛṣṭānta* 191
Inference, *anumāna* 192
Verbal Testimony, *āgama* 192
Scope of valid Knowledge, *viṣaya* 192
Fallacy, *ābhāsa* 192
References to Philosophers 193
24 Prabhācandra 193
25 Rabhasānanda 194
26 Mallavādin 194
27 Amṛtacandra Sūri 195
28 Devasena Bhaṭṭāraka 195
29 Pradyumna Sūri 196
30 Abhayadeva Sūri 196
31. Laghusamantabhadra 197
32 Kalyānacandra 198
33 Anantavīrya 198
34. Deva Sūri 198
35 Deva Sūri's *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālankāra* 200
Fallacies of Naya 203
The Soul, *ātmā* 204
The Method of Debate 204
36 Hemacandra Sūri 205
37 Candraprabha Sūri 206
38 Nemicandra Kavi 207
39 Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri, nicknamed Tiger-cub and Lion-cub 207
40 Haribhadra Sūri 208
41 Pārśvadeva Gani 210
42 Śrīcandra 210
43 Devabhadra 211
44 Candrasena Sūri 211
45 Ratnaprabha Sūri 211
46 Tilakācārya 212
47. Mallisena Sūri 212
48. Rājaśekhara Sūri 213
49 Jñānacandra 213
50 Gunaratna 214
51. Śrutasāgara Gaṇi 215
52 Dharma Bhūṣana 215
52a Vinayavijaya 516
53. Yaśovijaya Gani 217
54 Yaśovijaya's Works 218

Chapter IV

Continuity of Jaina Logic

55 The conciliatory Character of Jaina Logic 221
56 Royal Patronage and Persecution 222

57. Support of the Jaina Community
58 Jaina Logic will not be extinct

SECTION II

THE BUDDHIST LOGIC

Chapter I

Topics of Logic mentioned in the old Buddhist Literature

59 Buddha Gautama
60 Origin of the Pāli Buddhist Literature
61 Logical Topics in the Pāli Literature
62 Suttapiṭaka Dīgha nikāya Brahmajāla Sutta
63. Suttapiṭaka Majjhimanikāya Anumāna Sutta
64 Suttapiṭaka Khuddaka Nikāya Udāna
65 Vinaya piṭaka Parivāra
Four kinds of Cases for Settlement (adhikaraṇa)
Seven Rules for the Settlement of Cases (adhikaraṇasamatha dhamma)
[illegible]
The Judge or Umpire (anuvijjaka) [illegible] (saṅgāmāvacarabhikkhu)
66 Vinaya piṭaka pātimokkha
67 Abhidhamma piṭaka kathā
68. [illegible]
[illegible] Reasoning of the Disputant to his own Case (upanaya)
Conclusion (niggamana)
A Case presented through [illegible]
[illegible] Comparison (vaddhi [illegible]
[illegible] on an Analogy [illegible] sodhana)
A Case presented through the four fold Method (atthapanasodhana) (opamma saṁsandana)
[illegible] of Impermanence (khaṇika kathā) 234
[illegible] alias the Bṛihat-Sūtra 239
the Mahāyāna 240
Sanskrit Buddhist Literature 241
[illegible] in the Sanskrit Literature 242
[illegible] re 242
243
243
246
247

Jir
Sid
Sam
Sama
Akala
Vidvān
Mānikya
Mānikya
Valid K
Syllogi

Chapter II.

Early Buddhist Writers on Logic

Page
77 Rise of Buddhist Logic 251
78 Ārya Nāgārjuna 251
79 Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-kārikā* 253
80 Nāgārjuna's References to the Logical Doctrines of Akṣapāda 255
81 Nāgārjuna's *Vigraha-vyāvartanī-kārikā* 256
82 Nāgārjuna's *Pramāṇa-vihetana* or *Pramāṇa vidhvaṃsana* 257
83 *Upāya-kauśalya hṛdaya-śāstra* 259
84 Ārya Deva 261
85 Maitreya 262
86 Maitreya's *Abhisamayālankāra-kārikā* 262
87 Maitreya's Treatise on the Art of Debate 263
  1. [illegible] 263
  2 [illegible] 263
  3 [illegible] 264
  4 [illegible] 264
  5 [illegible] 264
  6 [illegible] 264
  7 [illegible] 264
88 Ārya Asaṅga 265
89 Vasubandhu 266
90 Vasubandhu's *Tarka-śāstra* 267

Chapter III

Systematic Buddhist Writers on Logic

91. The Commencement of Mediaeval Logic 270
92 [illegible] 270
93 [illegible] 272
94. [illegible] 274
[illegible] 276
[illegible] 280
[illegible] 282
[illegible] 286
[illegible] 287
[illegible] 288
95 [illegible] 289
[illegible] 289
  The Minor Term 290
  The Middle Term and the Major Term 291
  Fourteen Fallacies 293
  The example 295
  Perception and Inference 298
96. Dignāga's *Hetu-cakrahamaru* 299
  Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti 299
  Pramāṇa-śāstra-nyāya-praveśa 300

99 Ālambana parīkṣā
100 Ālambana parīkṣā vṛtti
101 Trikāla parīkṣā
102 [illegible]
103 [illegible]
104 [illegible]
105 Ācārya Śīlabhadra
106 Ācārya Dharmakīrti
107 Pramāṇa vārttika kārikā
108 Pramāṇa vārttika vṛtti
109 Pramāṇa viniścaya
110 Nyāya bindu
Perception
Inference for one's self
Inference for the sake of others
Dharmakīrti's relation with Dignāga 312
111 Hetu bindu vivaraṇa 313
112 Tarka nyāya or Vāda nyāya 316
113 Santānāntara siddhi 316
114 Sambandha parīkṣā 319
115 Sambandha parīkṣā vṛtti 319
116 Devendrabodhi 319
117 Śākyabodhi 319
118 Vinīta Deva 320
119 Ravi Gupta 320
120 Jinendrabodhi 322
121 Śānta Rakṣita 323
122 Kamalaśīla 323
123 Kalyāṇa Rakṣita 327
124 Dharmottarācārya 328
125 Muktakumbha 329
126 Arcaṭa 331
127. Aśoka 331
128 Candragomin (Junior) 332
129 Prajñākara Gupta 333
130 Ācārya Jetāri 336
131. Jina .. 337
132 Ratna Kīrti 338
133 Ratna Vajra 338
134 Jina Mitra 339
135 Dānaśīla 340
136 Jñānaśrī Mitra . 340
137 Jñānaśrī Bhadra 341
138 Ratnākara Śānti 342
139 Yamāri 342
140 Śaṅkarānanda .. 343
141 Subhākara Gupta 344
142 Mokṣākara Gupta 346

Chapter IV

The Decline of Buddhist Logic

Page
143 Contentious Spirit of Buddhist Logic . 348
144. Loss of Royal Patronage 349
145 Advent of the Mahomedans . . 350
146 The Brāhmanic Preachers . 351
147 Shelter in Foreign Countries . 351
148 Extinction of the Buddhists and their Doctrines in India.. 353

PART III

THE MODERN SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC

SECTION I

Prakarana—MANUAL OF LOGIC

Chapter I

The Nyāya-prakarana reduces its categories to one

1 [illegible] 355
2 [illegible] 355
3 [illegible] 356
4 [illegible] 357
5 Bhāsarvajña . 357
6 Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāya-sāra* . 358
Nyāya-sāra follows no particular Work . 358
7 Contents of the *Nyāya-sāra* .. . 359
Perception, *pratyaksa* . 359
Inference, *anumāna* . 361
Hetvābhāsa, Fallacy of Reason . . 362
A Unproved (*asiddha*) 362
B. The Contradictory (*viruddha*) . 363
C The Uncertain (*anaikāntika*) . . 365
D Non-tried or Non conclusive (*anadhyavasita* or *anupasamhārī*).. 366
E. Mistimed or Incompatible Reason (*kālātyayopadista* or *bādhita*) 367
F Balancing the Controversy (*prakarana-sama*) . 367
G Non-erroneous Contradiction (*viruddhāvyabhicārī*) 368
Example, *udāharana* 368
Verbal Testimony, *āgama* 370
Emancipation, *moksa* 370
8 Commentaries on the *Nyāya-sāra* 371

Chapter II

Nyāya-prakaranas embodying Vaiśesika categories

9 The Nyāya incorporates the Vaiśesika 373
10 Varadarāja 373

99 [illegible]
100 [illegible]
101 Trikāla parīkṣā
102 [illegible]
103 [illegible]
104 [illegible]
105 [illegible]
106 [illegible]
107 Pramāṇa-vārttika-kārikā
108 Pramāṇa-vārttika-vṛtti
109 Pramāṇa viniścaya
110 Nyāya bindu
Inference
Inference for one's own self
Inference for the sake of others
[illegible]
111 Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa
112 Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya
113 Santānāntara-siddhi
114 Sambandha-parīkṣā
115. Sambandha-parīkṣā-vṛtti
116 Devendrabodhi
117 Śākyabodhi
118 Vinīta Deva
119 Ravi Gupta
120 Jinendrabodhi
121 Śānta Rakṣita
122 Kamalaśīla
123 Kalyāṇa Rakṣita
124 Dharmottarācārya
125. Muktākumbha
126 Arcaṭa
127 Aśoka
128 Candragomin (Junior)
129 Prajñākara Gupta
130 Ācārya Jetāri
131. Jina
132 Ratna Kīrti
133. Ratna Vajra
134 Jina Mitra
135. Dānaśīla
136 Jñānaśrī Mitra
137 Jñānaśrī B
138 Ratnākara
139 Yamāri

SECTION II.

Tarka-Śāstra—THE SCIENCE OF DIALECTICS

Chapter II

Formation of the Tarka-śāstra

Page
33. The Nyāya cannot be combined with Vaiśesika 402
34. Adoption of *Pramāna* alone . . 402
35. Adoption of the Vaiśesika Principles 402
36. Subtlety of Meanings aimed at 403
37 Fine Definition of Terms . 403
38 The Use of Technical Terms 403

Chapter II

Tattva-cintāmani—the Earliest work on Tarka śāstra

39 Importance of *Tattva-cintāmani* 405
40 Gangeśa, the Author of the *Tattva-cintāmani* . 405
41. The Text of *Tattva-cintāmani*
[illegible] 407
[illegible] 408
[illegible] 408
[illegible] 409
[illegible] 411
[illegible] 412
Inference *Samanāyā-vāda* .. 414
The Invalidity of Non-perception *Anupalabdhi* or *prāmānya vāda* .. 414
[illegible] 415
[illegible] 416
[illegible] 417
[illegible] 418
[illegible] 418
[illegible] 419
[illegible] 419
[illegible] *pana* 419
Inference distinct from Perception 420
Five Provisional Definitions of Invariable Concomitance, *Vyāpti-pañcakam* 421
[illegible] 423
[illegible] 423
Other objectionable Definitions of Invariable Concomitance, *Pūrvapaksah* 424

Page

The conclusive Definition of Invariable Concomitance, *Siddhānta-laksanam* .. 424
425
āpti .. 426
itance,
426
Conclusion as to the Means of appending Invariable Concomitance, *Vyāpti grahopāya-siddhānta* . 428
Reasoning (or Confutation), *Tarka* . 429
Comprehensiveness of Invariable Concomitance, *Vyāpty-anugamah* .. 429
Intercourse whose Character is General, *Sāmānya-lakṣana* . 429
Conclusion about the Intercourse whose Character is General *Sāmānya-laksana siddhāntah* 430
431
432
433
num .. 434
An Exclusively Negative Inference, *Kevalavyatirekyanumanam* . 434
An Affirmative—negative Inference . 435
Presumption, *Arthāpatti* 435
435
435
436
436
438
Fallacies are serviceable as they point out Inefficiency 442
Inference of God, *Īśvarānumānam* . 442
443
. 444
444
444
445
Expectancy, *Akānkṣā-vādah* 447
Consistency, *Yogyatā* 447
Contiguity, *Āsattih* .. 447
Intention, *Tātparayam* . 448
The Non-eternity of Sound . 448
Injunction, *Vidhi-vādah* 448
Merit and Demerit, *Apūrva vādah* . 449
Potentiality, *Śakti-vādah*

Chapter III

Commentaries on the Tattva-cintāmaṇi

Page
42 The Popularity of *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* . 454
43. The Mithilā School . 454
44 Vardhamāna Upādhyāya 454
45 Pakṣadhara Miśra . 455
46 Vāsudeva Miśra 456
47 Rucidatta Miśra . . 457
48 Bhagīratha or Megha Ṭhakkura 457
49 Maheśa Thakkura . 457
50 Śaṅkara Miśra . 458
51 Vācaspati Miśra (the Younger or Junior) . 459
52. Misaru Miśra . . . 460
53 Durgādatta Miśra . 460
54 Devanātha Thakkura . . 460
55. Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura . 461
56. The Nadia School .. . 461
57. Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma 461
58. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi . 463
59 Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhattācārya 465
60 Jānakīnātha Śarma . . 466
61. Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa 466
62 Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhattācārya Chakravarti 466
63. Mathurānatha Tarkavagīśa . 467
64 Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma Bhattācārya 468
65 Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa . .. 468
66 Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma 468
67 Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra , . 469
68 *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā* . 470
69 Rudra Nyāyavācaspati .. . 476
70. [illegible] Nyayapañcānana 477
71 [illegible] 478
. . 479

Page

88 Dharmarājādhvarın .. 485
89 Gopīnātha Maunı 485
90 Krsna Bhatta Āde .. 486
91 Mahādeva Puntamkar . . 486
92 Raghunātha Śāstrı (Parvata) 487

Chapter IV

Present State of the Science of Dialectics

93 Patronage of the Maharajas of Nadia .. 488
94 [illegible] . 488
95 [illegible] .. 490
96 [illegible] .. 492
97 The Universities on the Western Model 492

Appendices

Appendix A The University of Taxila .. . 494
Appendix B Influence of Aristotle on the Development [illegible] 497
[illegible] 514
[illegible] ıasty of [illegible] 517
[illegible] 519
[illegible] 521
[illegible] 523
[illegible] 528
[illegible] Pamı- [illegible] 530
[illegible] ·chı 537
[illegible] 540

INDEXES

Index of Subjects 542
Index of Books 579
Index of Authors 595
Index of Quotations 599
Index of Sanskrit Terms . 611

Tibetan Indexes

I Logical Terms 634
II Tibetan Quotations . 629
III Books . 635
IV Proper Names 644
V. Place Names ..
VI Residuals
VII Errata

A HISTORY
OF
INDIAN LOGIC.

PART I.
THE ANCIENT SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

SECTION I.
Ānvīkṣikī—the Science of Inquiry (650 B.C.—100 A.D.).

CHAPTER I
The growth of Ānvīkṣikī into an Art of Debate.

1. THE EARLY LITERATURE OF INDIA
(CIRCA 1500 B C —600 B C.)

The Vedas

The Brāhmanas maintain that their religion is eternal (*sanātana*) It is based on scriptures which are said also to be eternal but revealed in different cycles of time to seers or sages called *Rsis* These scriptures are called the Vedas which comprise the Samhitās (Hymns) and the Brāhmaṇas (Rituals etc.) The Vedas are regarded even by modern scholars, who do not admit the perpetuity of their existence, to be the oldest records not only of India but of the whole Aryan world The Samhitā of the Ṛgveda which is the oldest part of the Veda is said by them to have come down to us from about 1500 B.C, while the Brāhmanas such as the Aitareya, Kauśītakī, etc. are supposed to have belonged to a period between 900 B C. and 600 B C The Āraṇyakas (Forest-treatises), which are theosophic *in character, form the closing section of the Brāhmaṇas* The Upaniṣads which deal mainly with metaphysical questions are included in the Āraṇyakas and are as such older than 600 B C.[1]

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[1] Compare Macdonell's "History of Sanskrit Literature," p. 47, and my "Grimm's Phonetic Law of the Indo-European Languages."

2. PROBLEMS OF THE VEDAS
(CIRCA 1500 B C —600 B C)

Prayer, Rituals and Knowledge

From the standpoint of subject-matter the Vedas (composed between 1500 B C and 600 B C.) may be divided into three sections (kāṇḍas), viz *upāsanā* (Prayer), *karma* (Rituals) and *jñāna* (Knowledge) Under *upāsanā* come the Samhitās which embody expressions of wonder and awe at the Powers of Nature such as Light, Darkness, Wind, Water, Rain, etc The Brāhmanas which treat mainly of the sacrificial rites come under the head *karma* The *jñāna*-kānda as represented by the Āranyakas is concerned mainly with the nature of soul and its destiny

3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL
(900 B C.—600 B C).

As already suggested, the Brāhmanas hold that the doctrine of the soul and its destiny propounded in the Āranyakas (Upaniṣads) has existed in India from the beginning of time. Their view, which seeks to place the Brāhmanic religion on a firm basis unshaken by the influences of time, does not however find favour with modern scholars according to whom all human civilizations, including even the civilizations of the Indian people, grew up by a process of evolution The conception of the soul and its destiny, like every thing else, has undergone stages of development in the course of ages These stages may be clearly seen if we examine the doctrine of the soul as given in the Samhitās, Brāhmanas and Upanisads

Evolution in the Doctrine of Soul

Spirit in the Vedas.

The Samhitās of the Rg-veda[1] and Atharva-veda[2] tell us that when a person dies his spirit (called *prāna*, breath, *asu*, breathing, or *manah*, intelligence, characterised as *ajo bhāgo*, the unborn part), which leaves behind on earth all that is uncomfortable, is conveyed by the messenger of Yama (the Lord of Death) to the world of his forefathers where it obtains a delectable abode and enters upon a perfect life which will never cease

Soul in the Śatapatha-Brāhmana.

The Śatapatha Brāhmana[3] and other later vedic works, which mention the soul as *ātman* lay much stress on its good work called *dharma* (righteousness) which is described as the strength of strengths (*kṣatrasya kṣatram*)[1] According to them all persons are after death reborn into another world where they enjoy pleasures or suffer pains according to their good or evil deeds

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[1] Rg-veda Samhitā ix 113, 9, 11, x 14 8–10, x 15, 14; and x 16 2, 5

[2] Atharva itā xviii. 2, 27 Vide also Muir's Sanskrit Texts, Vol V, pp 300–335.

[3] Śatapa vi. 2, 2, 27; x 6, 3, 1, xi 7, 2, 23 Vide Muir's Sanskrit T 300–335.

Soul in the Upanisads

The upanisads offer a subtle treatment of the soul distinguishing carefully between *jñāna* (knowledge) [illegible]

[illegible] who has merely done useful work passing through the path of his forefathers (*pitṛ-yāna*) reaches the moon whence he, after the exhaustion of his merits, comes back to this world and a person who has neither acquired knowledge nor has done any useful work traverses a third path—the path of transmigration (*saṃsāra*)—which leads him to continual births and deaths

Soul in the Kathopanisad

The third path is more fully expounded in the Kathopanisad[4] which gives a clear exposition of the nature of the soul called *ātman* The soul is described as being distinct from the body It is not born, it does not die, it sprang from nothing and nothing sprang from it It is eternal and everlasting and is not killed though the body is killed The wise man who knows the soul as bodiless within the body, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent, never grieves The soul is comparable to a person who moves in a chariot, the body is the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, the mind the reins, the senses are the horses and the surrounding objects their spheres of operation The soul is called the enjoyer when it is in union with the body, the mind and the senses Fools run after outward pleasures and fall into the snare of death, but wise men cognizant of the imperishable nature of the soul never hanker after unstable things [illegible] the soul [illegible] ter the [illegible] go into [illegible] Such [illegible] e heart [illegible] Brahman.

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[1] तदेतत् क्षत्रस्य क्षत्रं यद्धर्मः । तस्मात् धर्मात् परं नास्ति (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 1-4-14)

[2] Chāndogyopaniṣad 4-15, 5, 16, 5-10-3 5-10-8

[3] Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4-4-5; 6-2-15, and 16.

[4] Kathopaniṣad 1-1-20, 1-2-18, 19, 1-2-22, 1-3-3, 4, 2-1-4; 2-3-6, 7; and 2-6-14, 18 *Vide* also Max Müller's translation of the Kathopaniṣad in the S B E. series

4. *Ātmavidyā*—THE SCIENCE OF SOUL
(CIRCA 900 B C—600 B C)

The Upaniṣads (composed between 900 B C. and 600 B C) which dealt with the soul and its destiny constituted a very important branch of study called *Ātma-vidyā*, the science of soul, *Adhyātma-vidyā*, the spiritual science or *Brahma-vidyā*, the Divine Science, which is the foundation of all other sciences In the previous paragraph there has been given some idea of the nature of the soul—a concrete substance—as it was understood in the ages of the Upaniṣads as well as in those of the Saṃhitās and Brāhmanas In the ages of the Upaniṣads there arose another idea—an abstract conception—regarding the soul which developed *pari passu* with the first idea Thus in the Śatapatha Brāhmana,[1] Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad,[2] etc, we find that *ātmā*, which referred not only to the human soul but to the soul of other objects as well, signified the essence of an object as distinguished from its outward form, and as such was often designated as *Brahman* the pervading essence, that is, the essence which permeated the object in all its forms and changes This second idea of the soul, which gave birth to the Vedānta system of philosophy, began to exercise considerable influence on the first idea which was supported in other systems of philosophy, and a compromise between the two ideas was effected when the soul belonging to our practical condition (*vyāvahārika daśā*) was stated to be of the first description while the soul belonging to our transcendental condition (*pāramārthika daśā*) was stated to be of the second description

Two ideas regarding the Soul

5 *Ānvīkṣikī*—WHICH INCLUDES A THEORY OF REASONS
(CIRCA 650 B C—100 B.C)

Ātma-vidyā was at a later stage called *Ānvīkṣikī*, the science of inquiry Manu[3] uses Ānvīkṣikī as an equivalent for ātma-

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[1] Śatapatha Brāhmana 10-3-4 (Weber's edition)

[2] Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad (3rd chapter, 7th Brāhmana), Mundakopaniṣad, 1 1, 1, Bhagavadgītā 10-32

[3]
त्रैविद्येभ्यस्त्रयीं विद्याद्
दण्डनीतिं च शाश्वतीम् ।
आन्वीक्षिकीं चात्मविद्यां
वार्तारम्भांश्च लोकतः ॥ (Manu Samhitā 7—43)

Kāmandaka too in his Nītisāra writes —
आन्वीक्षिक्यात्मविज्ञानं धर्माधर्मौ त्रयीस्थितौ ।
अर्थानर्थौ च वार्तायां दण्डनीत्यां नयानयौ ॥

The distinction between Ānvīkṣikī and Ātma-vidyā.

vidyā, and his followers, the Mānavas,[1] describe it—evidently considering it synonymous with the Upaniṣad—as a branch of the Vedas Ānvīkṣikī while comprising the entire function of Ātma-vidyā was in fact different from it, and consequently from the Upaniṣad too Kauṭilya[2] (about 327 B C) recognized Ānvīkṣikī as a distinct branch of study over and above the three, *viz* *Trayī* (the Vedas), *Vārttā* (Commerce) and *Daṇḍa-nīti* (Polity) enumerated in the school of Manu. The distinction between *Ātma-vidyā* and *Ānvīkṣikī* lay in this, that while the former embodied certain dogmatic assertions about the nature of the soul, the latter contained reasons supporting those assertions Ānvīkṣikī dealt in fact with two subjects, *viz* *ātmā*, soul, and *hetu*, theory of reasons Vātsyāyana[3] observes that Ānvīkṣikī without the theory of reasons would have like the Upaniṣad been a mere *ātma-vidyā* or *adhyātma-vidyā* It is the theory of reasons which distinguished it from the same. The Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata, in so far as they treated of reasons affirming or denying the existence of soul, were included by Kauṭilya in the Ānvīkṣikī[4] The formation of Ānvīkṣikī must have commenced in the period of the Upaniṣad in which some of its technical terms were forestalled, but it did not take any definite shapes until about 650 B.C. when it was recognized as a distinct branch of learning

6. ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ BIFURCATES INTO PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC (ABOUT 650 B C.).

The theory of soul and that of reasoning

Ānvīkṣikī, as previously pointed out, treated of two subjects, viz the soul and the theory of reasons. In so far as it was mainly concerned with the soul, Ānvīkṣikī was developed into Philosophy called *Darśana*[5], and in so far as it dealt largely with the theory of reasons it was developed into Logic called pre-eminentl the *Ānvīkṣikī* or *Ānvīkṣikī par excellence*. This bifurcation o Ānvīkṣikī into Philosophy and Logic commenced with the ver formation of the science but specially about 550 B.C. when Medhātithi Gautama expounded the logical side of the Ānvīkṣikī. Th Ānvīkṣikī continued however for many centuries to be used in th *general sense* of a science which embraced both the subjects o Philosophy and Logic.

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[1] त्रयी वार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति मानवाः । त्रयीविशेषो ह्यान्वीक्षकीति ।
(Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya, 1—2, p 6, Sham Śāstri's edition).

[2] आन्वीक्षकी त्रयी वार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति विद्याः ।
(Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya, 1-2, p 6)

[3] इमास्तु चतस्रो विद्याः पृथक् प्रस्थानाः प्राणभृतामनुग्रहाय उपदिश्यन्ते यासां चतुर्थीयम् आन्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या । तस्याः पृथक् प्रस्थानाः संशयादयः पदार्थाः । तेषां पृथग्वचनमन्तरेण अध्यात्मविद्यामात्रमियं स्यात् यथोपनिषदः (Nyāyabhāṣya, 1-1-1).

[4] सांख्यं योगो लोकायतं चेत्यान्वीक्षिकी (Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya, 1-2, p. 6)

[5] In Sanskrit दर्शन, in Pāli दस्सन, in Prākṛta दंसण, and in Tibetan ལྟ་བ ।

7. ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT CALLED *Darśana*

An explanation of the term *darśana*.

As already observed, Ānvīkṣikī treating of the soul was called *Darśana* (philosophy). "Darśana" literally signifies *seeing*: it is in fact the science which enables us to see our soul. The Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad[1] says that 'the soul is verily to be seen,' and the Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā[2] declares that 'the highest virtue consists in seeing the soul through meditation'. In the Muṇḍakopaniṣad[3] we find that "when the soul is *seen* the knot of the heart is untied, all doubts are dispelled and all act-forces are exhausted." It was about the first century B.C. that the Ānvīkṣikī dealing with the soul was replaced by the word 'Darśana.' The Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata which were incorporated in Ānvīkṣikī were designated as Darśana or branches of philosophy. The word Darśana in this special sense occurs in the Mahābhārata,[4] Bhāgavata Purāṇa,[5] Nyāya bhāṣya,[6] Vedānta-bhāṣya,[7] etc.

---

[1] आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्य (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, ii 4-5)

[2] अयन्तु परमो धर्मो यद् योगेनात्मदर्शनम् (Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā book i verse 8)

[3] भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थि छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ॥ (Muṇḍakopaniṣad, ii, 2-8)

[4] तुल्यं गोत्रं तपोयुक्ता दया भूतेषु चानघ।
ज्ञातीनां धारणं तुल्यं दर्शनं न समं मतौ ॥ (Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 110-45)

[5] स्तूयमानो जनैरेभि. मायया नामरूपया।
विमोहितात्मभिर्नाना दर्शनैर्न च दृश्यते ॥ (Bhāgavatapurāṇa, 8-14-10)

[6] यत् पुनरयं प्राणम् आत्मकल्पकं दृष्ट्वा देवपदकर्तृ चाति धर्मा इति कश्चिद् दर्शनं तत् प्रतिषिध्यते। (Nyāya bhāṣya, 3-2-35)

[7] Śaṅkara bhāṣya on the Vedānta sūtra 2-2-1

8 VARIOUS NAMES FOR ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ IN ITS LOGICAL ASPECT (FROM 650 B.C ONWARDS)

The Ānvīkṣikī.

As already observed, Ānvīkṣikī dealing with the theory of reasons was developed into Logic designated specially as *the Ānvīkṣikī—or Ānvīkṣikī par excellence* We find the term Ānvīkṣikī[1] used in this *special sense* of Logic in the Manusaṁhitā,[2] Gautama-dharma-sūtra,[3] Rāmāyana,[4] Mahābhāratr,[5] etc. In about 327 B C Kautilya[6] characterised the Ānvīkṣikī (evidently Logic) as a highly useful [illegible]

Hetu-śāstra

The Ānvīkṣikī, in virtue of the theory of reasons predominating it, was called *Hetu-śastra* or *Hetu-vidyā*,[7] the science of reasoning, as is evident from the Manusaṁhitā,[8] Mahābhārata,[9] etc

Tarka-vidyā or Vāda-vidyā

It was also called *Tarka-vidyā*,[10] the art of debate, or *Vāda-vidyā*, the art of discussion, inasmuch as it dealt with rules for carrying on disputations in learned assemblies called *pariṣad*

---

[1] The *Ānvīkṣikī* is called in Tibetan རྟོག་ rtsod pa (*Vide* the Amarakoṣa. Svargavarga, verse 155, edited in Sanskrit with Tibetan version by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta)

[2] Manusaṁhitā 7–43

[3] Gautama-dharma sūtra, adhyāya 11

[4] Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, sarga 100, verse 36

[5] Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya, 180, verse 47

[6] धर्माधर्मौ त्रय्याम्। अर्थानर्थौ वार्तायाम्। नयानयौ दण्डनीत्याम्। बलाबले चैतासां हेतुभिरन्वीक्षमाणा लोकस्योपकरोति, व्यसनेऽभ्युदये च बुद्धिमवस्थापयति, प्रज्ञावाक्यक्रियावैशारद्यं च करोति—

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम्।
आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शश्वदान्वीक्षिकी मता॥

(Artha śāstra of Kautilya, p 1–2, 7)

[7] The Hetu śāstra or Hetu-vidyā is called in Tibetan གཏན་ཚིགས་རིག་པ Gtan-tshigs rig-pa (*vide* the Mahāvyutpatti, part I, p 20, edited in Sanskrit, Tibetan and [illegible] he Bibliotheca [illegible]

[illegible] adhyāya 210,
[illegible] 91-92, pp. 1-39,

[10] *Tarka-vidyā* is called in Tibetan རྟོག་གེ་རིག Rtog-ge-rig (*vide* Amarakoṣa. Svargavarga, verse 155, Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's edition)

Tarka-vidyā or Vāda-vidyā is referred to in the Manus
Mahābhārata,[2] Skandapurāṇa,[3] Gautama-dharma-sūtra,[4]
yāṇa,[5] Yājñavalkya saṁhitā,[6] etc
Ānvīkṣikī was, as we shall see late
called *Nyāya-śāstra*, the science of true reasoning.

Nyāya-śāstra

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[1] Manusaṁhitā 6 50, 8 267 12 106, 111
[2] Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva adhyāya 180 verse 47 and adhyāya 24
18
[3] Skandapurāṇa Kāśīkhaṇḍa, adhyāya 17
[4] Gautama-dharma-sūtra adhyāya 11
[5] Rāmāyaṇa 1-13 23 7-53-15
[6] Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā, 3 292 etc
[7] The *Nyāya* is called in Tibetan [illegible] Rigs-pa (*vide* the Mahāvy
part II p. 133 edited in Sanskrit-Tibetan-English by Dr. E. D. Ross an
Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series Calcutta, also
bgyur, Mdo Go, folios 223-377)

CHAPTER II

The Teachers of Ānvīkṣikī (Philosophy and Logic).

9 CĀRVĀKA—HIS MATERIALISTIC DOCTRINE (CIRCA 650 B C).

The Vedic literature[1] refers to a class of men who did not [illegible]

comixture of rice, molasses, etc.

The Lokāyata doctrine of soul

The dissolution into those elements is our death, after which our consciousness disappears In the Rāmāyana[3] the same doctrine is elucidated by Jāvāla when he says that our parents are our progenitors, that there is no future life and that we should not believe in anything which cannot be proved through perception This doctrine, which is referred to also in the Caraka-saṃhitā,[4] etc, and which attracted a very large number of adherents, is widely known as *Lokāyata* or that which prevails in the world[5]

10. KAPILA—HIS DOCTRINE OF MATTER AND SOUL (ABOUT 650–575 B C)

The earliest orthodox writer on Ānvīkṣikī (Philosophy) as mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara[6] Upaniṣad was Kapila who is tradition-

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[1] *Vide* Ṛgveda, 10–38–3, 6–70–7; 8–71–8, etc

[2] अरेऽयमात्माऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव
एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति ।
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 4-5-13)

[3] स नास्ति परमित्येतत् कुरु बुद्धिं महामते ।
प्रत्यक्षं यत् तदातिष्ठ परोक्षं पृष्ठतः कुरु ।
(Rāmāyana, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, sarga 109, verse 17)

[4] Caraka-saṃhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, chap XI

[5] For a history of the Lokāyata compare Prof T. W Rhys Davids' Introduction to the Kūṭadanta Sutta in "Dialogues of the Buddha, vol. II."

[6] ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे
ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत् । (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 5-2)

11. DATTĀTREYA: HIS PARABLE OF A TREE
(ABOUT 650 B.C.)

A sage named Dattātreya,* who was the sixth incarnation of Viṣṇu, was junior to Kapila, is stated in the Bhāgavata purāṇa to have taught Ānvīkṣikī to Alarka, Prahlāda and others. The proper name of the sage was Datta while his family name was Ātreya. He lived on the Girnar hills in Kathiawar where a temple associated with his name still exists. It appears from the Mārkaṇḍeya purāṇa[6] that the Ānvīkṣikī-vidyā expounded by him consisted of

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[2] Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 70.

[3] Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 215.

[4] अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां
बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते
जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥ (Śvetāśvatara, 4-5)

[5] षष्ठमत्रेरपत्यत्वं वृतः प्राप्तोऽनसूयया ।
आन्वीक्षिकीमलर्काय प्रह्लादादिभ्य ऊचिवान् ॥
(Bhāgavata purāṇa, 1-3-12)

[6] [illegible] तात यथा योगो दत्तात्रेयेण धीमता ।
अलर्काय पुरा प्रोक्तं सम्यक् पृष्टेन विस्तरात् ॥
(Mārkaṇḍeya purāṇa, 16-12)

A sage named Ātreya is mentioned in the Kauśika sūtra of the Ath
Vide Weber's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 153.

a mere disquisition on soul in accordance with the *yoga* philosophy *He preached the doctrines of transmigration* and emancipation under the parable of a tree To identify a gross object with "I" or to look upon it as "mine" is, according to him, the germ of selfishness which grows up into a large tree bearing the fruits of pleasure and pain He in whom the tree of selfishness has not grown is freed from all bondage for ever Things when looked upon in their true nature do not cause affliction but they become sources of great woes when we consider them as our own

The yoga doctrine of soul.

From this summary we may conclude that Dattātreya expounded the philosophical side of Ānvīkṣikī and not its logical aspect

12 PUNARVASU ĀTREYA HIS DISSERTATION ON THE SENSES

(CIRCA 550 B C)

In the Caraka-saṁhitā, the original author of which was Punarvasu Ātreya,[1] there is a dissertation on the senses (*indriya*)[2] which seems to belong to the Ānvīkṣikī system The Caraka-saṁhitā, originally called the Āyurveda, is said to have been delivered by a sage named Punarvasu better known as Ātreya who resided at the side of the Himālayas The sage was perhaps the same Ātreya[3] who is mentioned in the Tibetan books as a Professor of medicine under whom Jīvaka the physician of Buddha studied for several years at Taxila about 550 B C Ātreya was

Professor Ātreya of Taxila

to the use of the word Punarvasu in the singular number shows that Ātreya whose proper name was Punarvasu was a Vedic sage

It is not known whether the Caraka-saṁhitā, as it exists at present, contains any genuine teachings of Ātreya, but the most elementary doctrines of each book of the saṁhitā are by common consent ascribed to him The eighth chapter of sūtra-sthāna

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[1] Ātreya is called in Tibetan རྒྱུན་ཤེས་ཀྱི་བུ Rgyun-śes kyi-bu (*vide* Mahāvyutpatti, p 22, Bibliotheca Indica)

[2] अथात इन्द्रियोपक्रमणीयमध्यायं व्याख्यास्यामः इति ह स्माह भगवानात्रेयः ।
(Caraka saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, adhyāya 8)

[3] Bkah-hgyur, Dulva III *Vide* Rockhill's Life of Buddha p 64 Cf Pali Mahāvagga, Khandhakas I, VIII in which there occurs the name Atthaka

[4] छन्दसि पुनर्वस्वोरेकवचनम् (Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, 1-2-61)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Brahmanda purana, 1-3 [illegible])

[illegible]

(Markandeya purana, 16-13)

A sage named Atreya is mentioned in the Kaushika sutra of the Atharva-veda
Vide Weber's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 153

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(Caraka saṁhitā, Sūtra sthāna, adhyāya 8)

[3] Bkah hgyur, Dulva III *Vide* Rockhill's Life of Buddha, p 61 Cf Pali Mahāvagga, Khandhakas I, VIII in which there occurs the name Āthaka.

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[1] Sāṅkhya-kārikā, verse [illegible]

[2] Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature p. [illegible]

[3] अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां
बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
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[4] षष्ठमत्रेरपत्यत्वं वृतः प्राप्तोऽनसूयया ।
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(Bhāgavata purāṇa, 1-3-12)

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[illegible] ॥
(Mārkaṇḍeya purāṇa, 16-12)

[6] A sage named Ātreya is mentioned in the Kauśika sūtra of the Atharva-veda. Vide Weber's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 153

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(Caraka-saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, adhyāya 8)

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[1] Sāṅkhya-kārikā, verse 7?.

[2] Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 21?.

[3] अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां
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(Bhāgavata purāṇa, 1-3-11).

[5] प्राप्य ज्ञानं यथा योगी दत्तात्रेयेण धीमता ।
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It is not known whether the Caraka-saṁhitā, as it exists at present, contains any genuine teachings of Ātreya, but the most elementary doctrines of each book of the saṁhitā are by common consent ascribed to him The eighth chapter of sūtra-sthāna

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[1] Ātreya is called in Tibetan རྒྱུན་ཤེས་ཀྱི་བུ Rgyun-śes kyi-bu (*vide* Mahāvyutpatti, p 22, Bibliotheca Indica)

[2] अथात इन्द्रियोपक्रमणीयमध्यायं व्याख्यास्याम इति ह स्माह भगवानात्रेयः ।
(Caraka-saṁhitā, Sūtra sthāna, adhyāya 8).

[3] Bkah-hgyur, Dulva III. *Vide* Rockhill's Life of Buddha, p 64 Cf Pali Mahāvagga, Khandhakas I, VIII in which there occurs the name Atthaka

[4] छन्दसि पुनर्वस्वोरेकवचनम् (Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī 1-2-61)

A good speech is (1) fraught with sense, (2) unequivocal, (3) fair, (4) not pleonastic, (5) smooth, (6) determinative, (7) not bombastic, (8) agreeable, (9) truthful, (10) not harmful, (11) refined, (12) not too laconic, (13) not abstruse, (14) not unsystematic, (15) not far-fetched, (16) not superfluous, (17) not inopportune, and (18) not devoid of an object.

Characteristics of a sound speech.

A speech, if it is to be freed from the faults of judgment, should not be prompted by lust wrath, fear, greediness, abjectness, crookedness, shamefulness, tenderness or conceit

A speech is said to be lucid if there is agreement between it on one hand and the speaker and hearer on the other A speech which, though clear to the speaker himself, is uttered without any regard for the hearer, produces no impression in the latter That speech again, which does not convey the meaning of the speaker himself but is uttered solely out of regard for the hearer, is disingenuous and faulty. He alone is a speaker who employs words which, while expressing his own meaning, are also understood by his hearer.

14 AṢṬĀVAKRA—A VIOLENT DEBATER HOW HE DEFEATED A SOPHIST

(ABOUT 550-500 B C)

In the [illegible] Aṣṭāvakra [illegible]

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[1] Mahābhārata, Vanaparva, Chaps. 132-134.

of the work contains a dissertation
which is given below

There are five organs of sense
and skin. The five elements of wh
earth, water and air. The five objects of
smell, taste and touch. The five kinds
visual, the au
tory and the ta
different from
such cannot attend to them simultane
perceive more than one thing at a time

The doctrine of the senses

Dissertations on the senses like th
buted not a little to the development of
formed a part of the Anvikshiki

(15) not far-fetched, (16) not superfluous, (17) not inopportune, and (18) not devoid of an object.

Characteristics of a sound speech

A speech, if it is to be freed from the faults of judgment, should not be prompted by lust, wrath, fear, greediness, abjectness, crookedness, shamefulness, tenderness or conceit.

A speech is said to be lucid if there is agreement between it on one hand and the speaker and hearer on the other. A speech which, though clear to the speaker himself, is uttered without any regard for the hearer, produces no impression in the latter. That speech again, which does not convey the meaning of the speaker himself but is uttered solely out of regard for the hearer, is disingenuous and faulty. He alone is a speaker who employs words which, while expressing his own meaning, are also understood by his hearer.

14. AṢṬĀVAKRA—A VIOLENT DEBATER: HOW HE DEFEATED A SOPHIST

(ABOUT 550-500 B.C.).

[illegible] Aṣṭāvakra while a [illegible] came to attend a sacrificial ceremony at the palace of King [illegible] in Mithilā. Being prevented at the gate Aṣṭāvakra [illegible] king and said: "A road while there is no Brāhmaṇa [illegible] to the blind, the deaf, women, carriers of burden [illegible] pectively, but when a Brāhmaṇa is there it be[illegible] Hearing these words the king gave him perm[illegible] warder in offering an apology said, that Aṣṭāvakra [illegible] cause he was still a lad, and, under orders of [illegible] permitted to enter the sacrificial [illegible]

Aṣṭāvakra's debate with Vandin.

[illegible] this be the [illegible] is opened only [illegible] enter, I am [illegible] vows and am in possession of [illegible] lore. A person is not old because [illegible] hooks, thou heedest them not'" Janaka replied "Your words are excellent and superhuman As you have defeated Vandin in debate, I place him at your disposal"[1]

15 AṢṬĀVAKRA SOLVES PUZZLES

At Mithilā King Janaka to test the ingenuity of Aṣṭāvakra[1] once made a statement as follows —

"He alone is a learned man who knows the thing which is possessed of 360 spokes (i e days) 12 parts (i e months) of 30 subdivisions (days) each, and 24 joints (i e new moons and full moons)"

Aṣṭāvakra who fully understood the significance of the statement replied as follows --

Aṣṭāvakra's ingenuity elicits applause

"May that ever-moving wheel (i e the sun) that has 24 joints (i e new moons and full moons), six naves (i e seasons), 12 peripheries (i e. the signs of the zodiac or months) and 360 spokes (i e degrees or days) protect thee"

Janaka asked "Who amongst the gods beget those two which go together like two mares yoked to a car and swoop like hawks?"

Aṣṭāvakra said "May God, O King, forfend the presence of these two (i e thunder and lightning) in thy house, yea even in the house of thy enemies He (i e the cloud), whose charioteer is the wind, begets them"

Thereupon the king said "What is it that does not close its eyes even while sleeping, what is it that does not move even when born, what is it that has no heart and what does increase even in its own speed"?

Aṣṭāvakra said "It is a fish that does not close its eye-lids while sleeping, it is an egg that does not move when produced, it is a ston ses in its own spe

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—

[illegible]

Medhātithi Gautama's age

which "Gotamakā"[3] was one This order referred most probably to the followers of Gotama or Gautama the founder of Ānvīksikī The Brahmajāla-sutta[4] describes a sage designated as *takki* (argumentationist) and *vimamsi* (casuist) who maintained that certain things were eternal and other things were non-eternal [illegible]

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[1] [illegible] with the [illegible] he well- [illegible] "Yō [illegible] na, Pāli Text Society [illegible]

We thus find that Medhātithi, Gotama, Gautama and Medhātithi Gautama were the names for one and the same person, who founded the Ānvīkṣikī *par excellence* His work on Ānvīkṣikī has not come down to us in its original form We do not therefore know whether he treated of the soul and reasoning together in one volume, or dealt with them separately. His theory of reasoning has reached us in a crude form through the Caraka-samhitā [illegible] while we may [illegible] rces as [illegible] sutta. [illegible] e term [illegible]

Medhātithi's work on Ānvīkṣikī

Nyāya was prevalent in the day of Bhāsa, and by "Nyāya śāstra" he really meant its prototype the Ānvīkṣikī. In the Śānti parva of the Mahābhārata,[2] there is mention of a Medhātithi who, along with certain other sages revealed to the world the Upaniṣad-doctrine of emancipation This Medhātithi seems to have been the same as our Medhātithi Gautama

Gautama mentioned in the old Persian scripture

Medhātithi Gautama is more often called simply Gautama As previously noticed, Gautama was the name under which the founder of Ānvīkṣikī was best known in the Padmapurāṇa Matsya purāṇa, etc , and his art of debate is still designated as *Gautamī Vidyā* (Gotamide science) The fame of Gautama as a great master of the art of debate seems to have spread as far as Persia In one of the yashts[3] of the Khorda Avesta edited[4] during the reigns of the Sasanian Kings Ardashīr (A D 211-241) and Shapūr I (A D 242-272), we read[5] "how the Fravashis cause

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[1] Bhāsa's Pratimā nāṭaka, Act V, p 79, M M Ganapati Śāstri's edition

[2] चतुर्थोपनिषदो धर्मं साधारण स्मृत ।
वानप्रस्थाद् गृहस्थाच्च ततोऽन्यः सम्प्रवर्तते ॥
अस्मिन्नेव युगे तात विप्रैः सर्वार्थदर्शिभिः ।
मेधातिथिर्वै । .. एवं धर्मो ह्यनवमः ॥
(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva Mokṣadharma, adhyāya 243, verses 14-17)

[3] *Vide* the 13th yasht, para 16

[4] According to Arda-viraf nāma, the Avesta written on cow hides with golden ink and given to the Persians by Zaratusht (Zoroaster), existed in its original form for 300 years until it was burnt by Iskander Rumi (Alexander the Great) who destroyed Persepolis about 325 B C The fragments that survived were put together by Zoroastrian priests under the name of Avesta, which was edited and proclaimed canonical during the reigns of Ardashīr and Shapūr of the Sasanian dynasty It is suggested that it was in the Sasanian period that Indian traditions entered the scripture of the Persians Cf Dr K Geldner's "Persia" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica

[5] *Vide* the 13th yasht, para 16; and Early Religious Poetry of Persia, by J H Moulton, p 141

- 28 12 59)

people might ask their advice. The debates or dialogues, such as [illegible]

the councils, constituted the technical terms of the Ānvīkṣikī

17. THE TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THE COUNCILS OF DEBATE
(900–500 B C)

Some of the terms used in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads.

Some of the technical terms used in the councils of debate had grown up along with the Upaniṣads. For instance in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka[1] we meet with four terms, viz (1) *Smṛti* (scripture), (2) *pratyakṣa* (perception), (3) *aitihya* (tradition), and (4) *anumāna* (inference) These terms recur in the Rāmāyana[2] with a little alteration as (1) *aitihya* (tradition), (2) *anumāna* (inference), and (3) *śāstra*, scripture Three of these terms, are used in the Manu saṁhitā,[3] as (1) *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śāstra*

Similarly in the Aitareya Brāhmana, Kathopaniṣad, etc, there occur such terms as *tarka*[4] (reasoning), *vāda*[5] (debate), *yukti*[6] (continuous argument), *jalpa*[7] (wrangling) *vitaṇḍā*[8] (cavil), *chala*[9] (quibble), *nirṇaya*[10] (ascertainment), *prayojana*[11] (purpose), *pramāṇa*[12] (proof), *prameya*[13] (the object of knowledge), etc

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[1] स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्ष मैतिह्यम् । अनुमानश्चतुष्टयम् । एतैरादित्यमण्डलम् । सर्वैरेव विधास्यते ॥
(Taittirīya āraṇyaka, 1-2)

[2] ऐतिह्यमनुमानञ्च प्रत्यक्षमपि चागमम् ।
यो हि सम्यक् परीक्षेत [illegible] ॥ (Rāmāyana, 5-87-23)

[3] प्रत्यक्षञ्चानुमानञ्च शास्त्रञ्च विविधागमम् ।
त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ॥ (Manu-saṁhitā, 12-105)

[4] *Tarka* occurs in Kathopaniṣad, 2-9, Manusaṁhitā, 12-106; Mahābhārata, 2-453; and Bhāgavata purāṇa, 8-21-2

[5] *Vāda* occurs in Manu-saṁhitā, 6-50, Rāmāyana, 1-13-23 and 7-53-15, and Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā, 3-292

[6] *Yukti* occurs in Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, 6-23, Rāmāyana, 2-1-13, Bhāgavata purāṇa, 3-31-15; and Kāmandakiya nītisāra, 1-49

[7] *Jalpa* occurs in Mahābhārata, [illegible]

[illegible]

[12] *Pramāṇa* occurs in Manu saṁhitā, 2-13; Rāmāyana, 2-37-21, and Mahābhārata, 13-5572, Kauṭilya 3-1

[13] *Prameya* occurs in Rāmāyana, 1-52-13, Mahābhārata, 1-157 and 8-1449

CHAPTER III

The Doctrines of Ānvīkṣikī

16. A Council of Debate (Pariṣad) (circa 650 B.C.)

The theory of reasons (hetu), which formed an importa subject of Ānvīkṣikī grew out of debates in councils of learned men. In the Chāndogya[1] and Bṛhadāraṇyaka[2] upaniṣads the are references to councils for the discussion of metaphysical su jects e.g. the nature of the soul and the Supreme Being. Th Praśnopaniṣad[3] reports the proceedings of a council in wh Sukeśā Bhāradvāja, Śaivya Satyakāma, Sauryāyaṇī Gārg Kauśalya Āśvalāyana, Bhārgava Vaidarbhi and Kabandhī Kāt yāna approach the sage Pippalāda and ask him a series of que tions such as "how has this world been produced," "how is i sustained" and "how does the life-breath come into our bod Such a council was called *samsad*, *samiti*, *sabhā*, *pariṣad* or *paris*

A Council of learned men.

In the socio-religious institutes of Manu Parāśara[5] Yājñavalkya[6] and others, w find that the council consisted generally of four, ten or twenty one Brāhmaṇas, who were learned in the Ved and secular literatures and could give decisions in matters on whic a debater can establish his own points and set aside those of his opponents who indulge in unfairness. In the department of Hetu-śāstra (Logic) there is indeed no work older than the Tantra-yukti which is a little manual on the systematization of arguments or debates.

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[1] श्वेतकेतुर्हारुणेय पञ्चालानां समितिमेयाय
(Chāndogyopaniṣad, 5-3-1)

[2] श्वेतकेतुर्ह्वारुणेयः पञ्चालानां परिषदमाजगाम
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka 6-2-1)

Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, pp. 128-132

[3] Praśnopaniṣad, Praśna 1-6

[4] त्रैविद्यो हैतुकस्तर्की नैरुक्तो धर्मपाठकः ।
त्रयश्चाश्रमिणः पूर्वे परिषत् स्याद्दशावरा ॥
(Manu-saṃhitā, 12-110, 111)

[5] अनाहिताग्नयो विप्रा वेदवेदाङ्गपारगाः ।
पञ्च त्रयो वा धर्मज्ञाः परिषत् सा प्रकीर्तिता ॥
(Parāśara-saṃhitā, 8-19)

[6] चत्वारो वेदधर्मज्ञा पर्षत् त्रैविद्यमेव वा ।
सा ब्रूते य स धर्मः स्यादेको वाध्यात्मवित्तमः ॥
(Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā, 1-9)

The technical terms constituting the Tantra yukti are the following :—

(1) *Adhikarana* (a subject), (2) *vidhāna* (arrangement), (3) *yoga* [illegible]

[illegible] thirty two terms [illegible]

and (32) *ūhya* (ellipsis)

In the Caraka-samhitā the *Tantra-yukti*, which consists of thirty-fo [illegible]

(1) [illegible] *ane-* [illegible] epeti- [illegible] *sam-*

The list differs fro Caraka sa

19. MEDHĀTITHI GAUTAMA'S DOCTRINES AS REPRODUCED IN THE CARAKA-SAMHITĀ (ABOUT 78 A.D.)

Who was Caraka?

The Caraka-samhitā[1] gives a summary of the principal doctrines of Ānvīkṣikī possibly as propounded by Medhātithi Gautama. Caraka is a general name for the ancient *sākhās* (branches) of the Yajurveda as well as for the teacher of those śākhās. The word "Carakāh" signifies, according to Pāṇini,[2] the persons who study the Veda (i.e.

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[1] As Ātreya communicated his Āyurveda samhitā at first to Agnivesa, the Caraka-samhitā is also called the Agnivesa-tantra. Agnivesa is called in Tibetan [illegible] Me-bzhin hjug (vide Mahāvyutpatti, part I, p. 23, Bibliotheca Indica series)

[2] [illegible] (Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-3-107)

Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 2nd edition, pp. 225, 350, 364, 369

a debater can establish his own points and set aside those of his opponents who indulge in unfairness In the department of Hetu-śāstra (Logic) there is indeed no work older than the Tantra-yukti which is a little manual on the systematization of arguments or debates

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[2] कठचरकाल्लुक् (Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-3-107)

Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 2nd edition, pp. 225, 350, 364, 369.

As regards *Kāryābhinirvṛtti*, it does not appear to have been part of the Ānvikṣikī of Medhātithi Gautama Perhaps it was part of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in an early stage *Parīkṣā* re-

[illegible]

manated from Medhā-
thi Gautama ?

pratyakṣa, *anumāna* and *aupamya* under the sub-head *vādamārga* of *sambhāṣā vidhi* It is uncertain as to whether the first four or the last four were included in the Ānvikṣikī of Medhātithi Gautama *Sambhāṣā-vidhi* or *vāda vidhi* was undoubtedly the principal topic of Ānvikṣikī-vidyā Some of the terms coming under the sub head *vāda-mārga* did not however form a part of the original *sambhāṣā vidhi* For instance the terms *dravya guna karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* were borrowed from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in its first stage and incorporated into the *vāda-mārga* by Caraka himself There are other terms such as *pratijñā*, *sthāpanā pratisthāpanā*, *hetu upanaya*, *nigamana*, *uttara*, *dṛṣṭānta* and *siddhānta* which in their technical senses were perhaps unknown to Medhātithi Gautama and were introduced into the *vāda mārga* by Caraka while he compiled and redacted the Āyurveda samhitā in the first century A D

The terms coming under the three heads are explained in the Caraka-samhitā as follows —

1 Kāryābhinirvṛtti—the aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of an action

A person who is determined to accomplish an action successfully should examine the following resources —

(1) *Kārana* or *hetu*—the actor or agent who accomplishes an action.
(2) *Karana*—the instrument which co-operates with the actor to accomplish the action
(3) *Kārya-yoni*—the material cause which while undergoing modification is developed into the action
(4) *Kārya*—the action for the accomplishment of which the actor moves.
(5) *Kārya phala*—the effect for the attainment of which the action
(6 [illegible]
(7) *Deśa*—the place of the action
(8) *Kāla*—the time of the action
(9) *Pravṛtti*—the activity or exertion put forth for achieving the action
(10) *Upāya*—a favourable circumstance or that condition of the actor, instrument and the material cause in which they can well render facilities and aids to the action being accomplished

already studied it removes that misapprehension, and if there was no misapprehension in the subject it produces zeal for its further study. It also makes debaters familiar with certain matters which were unknown to them Moreover some precious mystic doctrines, which a preceptor imparted to his favourite pupil, come out in essence from the pupil who, owing to a temporary excitement and ambition for victory is impelled to expound them in the course of the debate Hence wise men applaud debate with fellow scholars

Two kinds of Debate (dvividhā sambhāṣā)

A congenial debate

A debate with a fellow-scholar may be carried on either (1) peacefully (sandhāya) or (2) in a spirit of opposition (vigrhya) The first is called a congenial debate (anuloma sambhaṣā), and the second a hostile debate (vigrhya sambhāṣā) The congenial debate takes place when the respondent (or opponent) is possessed of erudition, wisdom, eloquence and readiness of reply, is not wrathful or malicious, is

are irrelevant While using persuasion with gentleness, one should keep in view the subject of debate This kind of debate is called a peaceful or congenial debate.

A hostile debate

Before entering upon a hostile debate with a person one should examine one's strength through a casual

bility, shallowness, shyness and inattentiveness

Three classes of respondents (trividhah parah)

In consideration of the merits and demerits mentioned above the respondent (or opponent) may be of three kinds, viz superior, inferior, and equal

A Council of Debate (pariṣad)

should be defeated by being thrown into a state of nervous exhaustion. An opponent who is timid should be defeated through the excitement of his fear. An opponent who is inattentive should be defeated by being put under the restraint of a certain rule. Even in a hostile debate one should speak with propriety, an absence of which may provoke the opponent to say or do any thing.

How to influence a Council.

Influencing the assembly one should cause it to name that as the subject of debate with which one is perfectly familiar and which presents an insurmountable difficulty to one's opponent. When the assembly meets one should observe silence after saying to one's opponent "it is not now permissible for us to make any suggestions. Here is the assembly which will fix the subject and limits of debate agreeably to its wishes and sense of propriety."[1]

The Limits of Debate (*vada-maryāda*)

The limits of debate consist of such directions, as "This should be said, this should not be said, if this occurs defeat follows, etc."[2]

The Course of Debate (*vāda-mārga*)

The following are the categories[3] which should be studied for a thorough knowledge of the course of debate :—

(1) *Debate* (*vāda*)—a discourse between two parties agreeably to the scriptures and in a spirit of opposition on a subject such as "whether there is rebirth, or there is no rebirth." It is of two kinds, viz. (1) wrangling (*jalpa*) which is a debate for the purpose of defence or attack, and (2) cavil (*vitaṇḍā*) which is a perverse debate for the purpose of a mere attack.

(2) *Substance* (*dravya*)—that in which actions and qualities inhere and which can constitute a material cause, e g ether, air fire, water, earth, soul, mind, and space.

(3) *Quality* (*guṇa*)—that which inheres in a substance and is inactive, e g colour, taste, odour, touch, sound, heavy and

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[1] This trick, the knowledge of which is useful in guarding oneself against a cunning debater, should never be adopted in a fair debate.—S. C. Vidyabhusana.

[2] Udayanācārya (10 h century A.D.) following the old laws of debate observes that an objection may be removed by debate, but on no account should it proceed beyond the limit of practical absurdity.

व्याघातावधिराशङ्का तर्कःशङ्कावधिर्मतः । (Kusumāñjali, 3-7).

[3] [illegible]

it is non produced, the re-interrogation will be "why it is non-produced?"

(33) *Defect of speech* (*vākya-doṣa*)—consisting of inadequacy, redundancy, meaninglessness, incoherence, contradiction, etc

(a) "Inadequacy" or saying too little which occurs when there is an omission of the *reason, example, application* or conclusion

(b) "Redundancy" or saying too much which consists of (i) "irrelevancy" e g a person talks of the polity of Vrhaspati or Śukra while the subject of discourse is medicine or (ii) "repetition," e g when a person repeats [illegible]

(c) [illegible]

(f) "[illegible] vey a connected meaning, e g whey, wheel, race thunder, morning etc

(e) "Contradiction"—consisting of opposition to the example tenet or occasion e g on the occasion of sacrifices, animals should be offered up Any thing uttered inconsistently with the occasion is contradiction

(34) *Excellence of speech* (*vākya-praśaṃsā*)—when a speech is freed *from inadequacy etc is fraught with well expressive words* and is otherwise uncensurable it is applauded as excellent, perfect or meritorious

(35) *Quibble* (*chala*)—a speech consisting of mere words fraught with cunning plausibility and diversion of sense It is of two kinds viz (1) 'quibble in respect of a word,' e g a person uses the word 'navatantra' to signify a man who has studied nine scriptures though he really intends to signify a man who has studied his scripture recently or (2) 'quibble in respect of a generality' e g the medicine which cures phthisis should also cure bronchitis as both come under the

in respect of their questionable character, e g the intellect is non-eternal, because it is intangible, as a sound Here the eternality of the intellect is as questionable as that of the sound

(37) *Mistimed* (*atīta-kāla*)—a fallacy which arises when that which should be stated first is stated afterwards

(38) *Attribution of censure* (*upālambha*)—imputation of defect to the reason adduced

(39) *Avoidance of defect* (*parihāra*) which occurs when the defect is corrected or amended, e g when the soul resides in the [illegible] able, but when the soul [illegible] no longer noticed hence [illegible]

[illegible] ijñā-hāni)—which occurs when a disputant, being attacked abandons the proposition first advanced by him, e g

A person advances first a proposition viz
the soul is eternal,
and being attacked by an opponent he abandons it saying,
the soul is not eternal

(41) *Admission* (*abhyanujñā*)—the acceptance by a person of what is attributed to him by his opponent, whether agreeable or disagreeable, e g [illegible]

[illegible] curs when one instead of advancing the proper reason adduces a different one

[illegible]

CHAPTER II

Reception accorded to Ānvīkṣikī

(From c 650 B.C. onwards)

20. ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ CONDEMNED IN CERTAIN CIRCLES

Ānvīkṣikī opposed to the Vedas.

Ānvīkṣikī known as *Hetu-vidyā* or *Tarka-vidyā*, the general principles of which might be applied to test the validity or otherwise of the injunctions and prohibitions laid down in the Vedas and Dharma-sūtras, was not received with favour by a certain section of the Brāhmaṇas, who could never think of calling in question the authority of those injunctions and prohibitions. We are therefore not surprised to find Manu[1] enjoining excommunication upon those members of the twice-born castes who disregarded the Vedas and Dharma-sūtras relying upon the support of *Hetu-śāstra* or Logic. Similarly Vālmīki[2] in his Rāmāyaṇa discredits those persons of perverse intellect who indulge in the frivolities of *Ānvīkṣikī*, the science of Logic, regardless of the works on Sacred Law (*Dharma-śāstra*) which they should follow as their guide. Vyāsa[3] in the Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, relates the doleful story of a repentant Brāhmaṇa who, addicted to *Tarka-vidyā* (Logic), carried on debates divorced from all faith in the Vedas and was on that account turned into a jackal in his next birth as a penalty. In another passage of the Śāntiparva, Vyāsa[1] warns the followers of the Vedānta philosophy against communicating their doctrines to a *Tārkika* or Logician. Vyāsa[2] does not care even to review *Hetu-śāstra* in the Brahma-sūtra seeing that it has not been recognized by any worthy sage. Stories of infliction of penalties on those given to the study of *Tarka vidya* are related in the Skandapurāṇa[3] and other works, and in the Naiṣadhacarita[4] we find Kali satirising the founder of *Ānvīkṣikī* as "Go-tama" the most bovine among sages.

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[1] योऽवमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद् द्विजः ।
स साधुभिर्बहिष्कार्यो नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ॥
(*Manu-saṃhitā, adhyāya 2, verse 11*)

[2] धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः ।
बुद्धिमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते ॥ 38–39 ॥
(*Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyā kāṇḍa, sarga 100*)

[3] अहमासं पण्डितको हैतुको वेदनिन्दकः ।
आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थिकाम् ॥ 47 ॥
हेतुवादान् प्रवदिता वक्ता संसत्सु हेतुमत् ।
आक्रोष्टा चाभिवक्ता च ब्रह्मवाक्येषु च द्विजान् ॥ 48 ॥
नास्तिकः सर्वशङ्की च मूर्खः पण्डितमानिकः ।
तस्येयं फलनिर्वृत्तिः सृगालत्वं मम द्विज ॥ 49 ॥
(*Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya 180*)

In the Gandharva tantra we find :—
गौतमप्रोक्तशास्त्रार्थनिरताः सर्व एव हि ।
शार्गालीं योनिमापन्नाः सन्दिग्धाः सर्वकर्मसु ॥
(*Quoted in Prāṇatoṣiṇī tantra*)

21. ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM IN SOME QUARTERS

On the other hand Ānvīkṣikī, while it attached due weight to the authority of the Vedas, was held in very high esteem. There were also people who could appreciate the value of reasoning for ascertaining truths. Thus the Gautama-dharma-sūtra[5] prescribes a course of training in *Āntīkṣiki* (Logic) for the king, and acknowledges the utility of *Tarka* (reasoning) in the administra-

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[1] यातकामानिदं ज्ञानं वाच्यं पुत्रानुशासनम् ।
* * * * * * * *
न तर्कशास्त्रदग्धाय तथैव पिशुनाय च ॥ 18 ॥
(Mahābhārata Śāntiparva, adhyāya 246).

[2] अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥ 17 ॥ (Vedānta-sūtra, 2-2)

[3] गौतमः क्षेम सकल [illegible] तव तव दि ।
मत्तोऽथ मुक्तिमिच्छन् मार्गाणां योनिमथवति ।
पुनश्चानुयशीतोऽसौ कृतिविज्ञानतर्कतः ।
यच्च लोकोपकाराय मत शास्त्रं भविष्यति ॥
(Skandapurāṇa, Kālikākhaṇḍa, adhyāya 17).

[4] मुक्तये यः शिलात्वाय शास्त्रमूचे सचेतसाम् ।
गोतमं तमवेत्यैव यथा वित्थ तथैव सः ॥ 75 ॥
(Naiṣadhacarita, canto xvii)

[5] राजा सर्वस्येष्टे ब्राह्मणवर्जं, साधुकारी स्यात् साधुवादी, त्रय्याम् आन्वीक्षिक्यां चाभिविनीतः ।...... न्यायाधिगमे तर्कोऽभ्युपायः । तेनाभ्यूह्य यथास्थानं गमयेत् । विप्रतिपत्तौ त्रैविद्यवृद्धेभ्यः प्रत्यवहृत्य निष्ठां गमयेत् ॥
(Gautama dharma-sūtra, adhyāya 11).

Ānvīkṣikī useful for ascertaining truths.

tion of justice, though in the case of conclusions proving incompatible, the ultimate decision is directed to be made by reference to persons versed in the Vedas. Manu[1] admits that dharma or duty should be ascertained by logical reasoning (*tarka*), but the reasoning should not, according to him, be opposed to the injunctions of the Vedas. He recommends Ānvīkṣikī (Logic) as a necessary study for a king[2] and a *Tarkī*[3] (logician) as an indispensable member of a legal assembly. Kauṭilya[4] in his Arthaśāstra characterises *Ānvīkṣikī* (Logic) as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the permanent shelter of all virtues.

Yājñavalkya[5] counts Nyāya or Logic among the fourteen principal sciences while Vyāsa[6] admits that he was able to arrange and classify the Upaniṣads with the help of *Ānvīkṣikī* or Logic. In the Padmapurāṇa[7] Nyāya (Logic) is included among the fourteen principal branches of learning promulgated by God Viṣṇu while in the Matsyapurāṇa[8] Nyāya-vidyā (the science of Logic) together with the Vedas is said to have emanated from the mouth of [illegible]

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[1] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[2] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[3] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[4] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[5] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[6] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[7] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[8] [illegible]
[illegible]

Sāntiparva[3] refers to numerous tenets of *Nyāya* supported by reasoning and scripture, while in the [illegible][4] we find that [illegible] d by logicians [illegible] r-arguments to vanquish one another. Similar other instances of the popularity of *Nyāya* (Logic) may be cited from the Mahābhārata and other works which were composed in their present forms about the beginning of the Christian era

It seems that the unfavourable criticism to which Ānvīkṣikī (the science of Logic) had long been exposed, terminated practically in the first century A D when, under the name of *Nyāya śāstra*, it accepted the authority of the Vedas and propounded the doctrine of syllogistic reasoning the validity of which was never challenged

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[1] न्यायशिक्षा चिकित्सा च दानं पाशुपतं तथा ।
हेतुनैव समं जन्म दिव्यमानुषसंज्ञितम् ॥ 67 ॥
(Mahābhārata, Ādiparva adhyāya 1)

[2] न्याय तत्त्वात्मविज्ञानसम्पन्नैर्वेदपारगैः ॥ 42 ॥
स्थापनाक्षेपसिद्धान्तपरमार्थज्ञतां गतैः । 44 ॥
(Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, adhyāya 70)

[3] न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस्तैरुक्तानि वादिभिः ।

unknown nor with regard to things that are definitely known, but it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful" Vātsyāyana defines,[1] no doubt, *nyāya* as an examination of objects by evidences, but he takes evidences to signify a syllogism which consists of a 'proposition' based on verbal testimony, a 'reason' based on inference, an 'example' based on perception, an 'application' based on comparison, and a 'conclusion' based on all the previous four Viśvanātha[2] explains *nyāya svarūpa* as the essential form of a syllogism which consists of its five parts, and Mādhavācārya[3] understands by the term *nyāya* an inference for the sake of others in which a syllogism is specially employed In view of this technical meaning we may interpret *Nyāya-śāstra* as the science of syllogism or the science of inference for the sake of others, that is, the science of demonstration

23 THE ANTIQUITY OF NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA
(FROM CIRCA 1 A D)

Nyāya did not formerly signify Logic

The term "Nyāya" in the sense of Logic does not appear to have been used in literature before the first century A D Pāṇini[4] (about 350 B C) did not know the word "Nyāya" in the sense of Logic, and even Patañjali[5] (about 150 B.C) does not seem to have been conversant with the word, which does not occur in his Bhāṣya on *ukthādi-gaṇa* It does not find place, in this sense,[6] in the Arthaśāstra[1] of Kautilya (about 327 B C) The term "Nyāya" which previously signified "right," "method," "analogy" or "maxim," is used in the sense of Logic for the first time in the Mahābhārata,[2] Visnu purāna,[3] Matsya purāna,[4] Padma purāna,[5] Yājñavalkya-samhitā[6] etc, in passages which are presumed to have been written after the beginning of the Christian era

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[1] प्रमाणैरर्थपरीक्षणं न्यायः (Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-1)

[2] *Vide* Viśvanātha's Nyāya sūtra vṛtti, 1-1-25, 1-1-31, 1-138 and 1-1-40 in which *nyāya-svarūpa*, *nyāya pūrvāṅga*, *nyāyottarāṅga* and *nyāyāśraya* are defined The five parts of *nyāya* (syllogism) will be explained later

[3] Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, under the head Akṣapāda-darśana, p 114, Calcutta edition

[4] Goldstucker in his Panini, p 157, says that both Kātyāyana and Patañjali knew the Nyāya-sutra There is however no proof for the statement

There is no doubt that Pāṇini derives the word *nyāya* (evidently in the sense of justice) from the root *ni* in his Aṣṭādhyāyī, 3-1-122 as follows,—अध्यायन्यायोद्यावसंहाराश्च His Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-2-60 क्रतूक्थादिसूत्रान्तात् ठक् does not, however, presuppose *nyāya* in the sense of 'Logic"

[5] Patañjali did not use the word *naiyāyika* (logician) as *nyāya* was not included in the *ukthādigaṇa* in his Bhāṣya The Ganapātha, which includes it, is a later work. For *nyāyya* vide Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-4-92

[6] *Nyāya* signifies just or justice, equitable or equity

शास्त्रं विप्रतिपद्येत धर्मन्यायेन केनचित् ।
न्यायस्तत्र प्रमाणं स्यात् तत्र पाठो हि नश्यति ॥

(Artha śāstra, adhikaraṇa 3, chap. 1, p 150)

Nyāya used in the sense of Logic from about the 1st century A D

The Nyāya-śāstra was not so called before the subject of "Nyāya" (syllogism) was introduced into it As the Caraka-samhitā,[7] so far as we know, contains for the first time an exposition of the doctrine of syllogism under the name of *sthāpanā* (demonstration), it is presumed that the word *Nyāya* as an equivalent for Logic came into use about the composition of that Samhitā, that is about the opening of the Christian era The word became very popular about the second century A D when the Nyāya-sūtra was composed Vātsyāyana (about 400 A D) uses the expression "*parama nyāya*"[8] for the conclusion (*nigamana*) which combines in itself all the five parts of a syllogism Dignāga (about 500 A D) explicitly mentions the five parts or members of a syllogism as *Nyāyāvayava*[9]

24 THE EARLY TEACHERS OF NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA (ABOUT 100 A D)

Nothing is definitely known about the early teachers of Nyāya-śāstra In the Ādiparva of the Mahābhārata[10] we find that the hermitage of Kaśyapa was filled with sages who knew the true meanings of demonstration, refutation and conclusion. As *sthāpanā*, *ākṣepa* and *siddhānta*, which are the Sanskrit equivalents for demonstration, refutation and conclusion, are the technical terms of Nyāya śāstra as used in the Caraka samhitā, it may be reasonably inferred that the sages who dealt with them in the hermitage of Kāśyapa were the early exponents of that śāstra. Kāśyapa[1] lived on the river Mālinī in the district of Saharanpur midway between Delhi and Hardwar.

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[1] [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Artha śāstra of Kautilya adhikarana II adhyāya 1, p 379, Sham Śāstri's edition)

[2] Mahābhārata Ādiparva adhyāya 1 verse 67 adhyāya 70 verses 42-44 and Śāntiparva adhyāya 210 verse 22

[3] Visnu purāna, third part adhyāya 6

[4] Matsya purāna 3 2

[5] Padma purāna, Uttarakhanda chap 263

[6] Yājñavalkya-samhitā 1-3 etc

[7] Caraka-samhitā Vimāna sthāna, adhyāya 8

[8] [illegible] ।

(Nyāya bhāsya 1-1 1)

[9] Nyāyāvayava called in Tibetan 'rigs pahi yan lag' occurs in the Pramāna-samuccaya, chap VI, as follows:—[illegible]

(Tshad ma kun las btus pa, chap vi, Bstan-hgyur, Mdo Ce)

[illegible]

[10] [illegible] ।

25. NĀRADA—AN EXPERT IN NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA (ABOUT 100 A.D.).

In the Sabhāparva of the Mahābhārata we find that a sage named Nārada[2] was an expert in Nyāya-śāstra.[3] He was skilful in distinguishing unity and plurality, conjunction and co-existence (inherence), genus and species, etc., capable of deciding questions through evidences (*pramāṇa*), and clever in ascertaining the validity and invalidity of a speech of five parts (*pañcāvayava-vākya*). The "speech of five parts" refers undoubtedly to a syllogism of five members, and it is interesting to note that Nārada,

Nārada's skill in syllogistic reasoning

विशेषकार्यविद्भिश्च मोक्षधर्मपरायणैः ॥ 43 ॥
स्थापनाक्षेपसिद्धान्तपरमार्थज्ञतां गतैः ।
शब्दच्छन्दोनिरुक्तज्ञैः कालज्ञानविशारदैः ॥ 44 ॥
द्रव्यकर्मगुणज्ञैश्च कार्यकारणवेदिभिः ।
(Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, adhyāya 70)

[1] मालिनीमभितो राजन् नदीं पुण्यां सुखोदकाम् ॥ २८ ॥
तस्यास्तीरे भगवतः काश्यपस्य महात्मनः ।
आश्रमप्रवरं रम्यं महर्षिगणसेवितम् ॥ २९ ॥
(Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, chap. 70).

[2] Nārada is called in Tibetan མིག་སྦྱིན་གྱི་བུ Mig sbyin-gyi-bu (*vide* Mahāvyutpatti, part I, p. 23, edited by Dr. E. D. Ross and Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

[3] वेदोपनिषदां वेत्ता ऋषिः सुरगणार्चितः ।
इतिहासपुराणज्ञः पुराकल्पविशेषवित् ॥ 2 ॥
न्यायविद्धर्मतत्त्वज्ञः षडङ्गविदनुत्तमः ।
ऐक्यसंयोगनानात्वसमवायविशारदः ॥ 3 ॥
वक्ता प्रगल्भो मेधावी स्मृतिमान्नयवित् कविः ।
परापरविभागज्ञः प्रमाणकृतनिश्चयः ॥ 4 ॥
पञ्चावयवयुक्तस्य वाक्यस्य गुणदोषवित् ।
उत्तरोत्तरवक्ता च वदतोऽपि बृहस्पतेः ।
धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु यथावत् कृतनिश्चयः ॥
(Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 5)

who, as we shall presently see, travelled in Śvetadvīpa (perhaps Alexandria), was one of the earliest experts in judging the merit and demerit of such a speech

Nārada was perhaps a fictitious person of the 1st century A D

This Nārada represents the philosophical culture of the 1st century A D No work on Nyāya-śāstra written by him has come down to us But Jayanta[1] in the Nyāya-mañjarī quotes a verse attributed to him which gives an ex position of a logical "point of defeat" (nigraha-sthāna) technically known as "the abandonment of a proposition (pratijñā-hāni)

The personality of Nārada is shrouded represented in the very quarre people Cur wandered over earth without staying at any fixed habitation He was of an imposing figure with flowing braids of hair and a long grey beard—wearing a mendicant's garment, holding in one hand a staff of gold and in the other a beggar's bowl together with a lute of tortoise shell, and chanting always the name of Hari the Lord He carried messages of gods to men and vice versa

Legends regarding Nārada.

Once he left heaven for a pleasant ramble on earth and repaired to the court of Sṛñjaya who ordered his daughter Sukumārī of unrivalled beauty to attend upon him Nārada fell in love with her, and they were married; but owing to a curse he looked like a monkey to his bride He however worked off the curse by severe austerities, and Sukumārī could with difficulty be reconciled to him when he appeared on the removal of the curse, in his resplendent beauty Nārada studied music fo two years under two wives of Kṛṣṇa Jāmbavatī and Satyabhāmā but had to prolong his studies for another two years under the third wife of Kṛṣṇa named Rukminī to attain mastery over the notes of the musical scale

He visited Śvetadvīpa[3] supposed to be identical with the ountry of which the capital was Alexandria where he became the uest of a merchant in a town called Dvaidal-nāyaka, and where e saw Viṣṇu (God) worshipped with fervour by devotees who ttained their suitable end through His grace

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[1] यथाह नारदः—

[illegible]
[illegible]
(Nyāya-mañjarī, chap XII, p 140 Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

[2] For legends about Nārada consult the Mahābhārata, Bhāgavata purāṇa, Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa Viṣṇu purāṇa Varāha purāṇa, Bhaviṣya purāṇa, Adbhuta Rāmāyana, etc

[illegible] (Viṣṇu purāṇa 1-15, 1768)
[illegible]
(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 335-8)

[3] with Syria. Cf "Comparative studies in
Calcutta.

In the Varāha purāna[1] Nārada is stated to have in a previous irth been a *Brāhmana, Sārasvata by name in the city of Avantī,* 'ho offered oblations of water to his dead ancestors in the lake of 'uskara at Ajmere

Nārada's work on Smṛti.

There is extant a work on Smṛti[2] dated about the 4th century A D, which is said to have been written by the sage Nārada Other works such as he Nārada-pañca-rātra are also attributed to him

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[1] Varāha purāna, adhyāya 2, verses 63-83, and adhyāya 3, verses 3-7, in the ibliotheca Indica series)

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(Nārada-smṛti pariśiṣṭa 60, edited by Dr J Jolly, Bibliotheca Indica series, alcutta)

Vide also Dr J Jolly's Introduction to the Nārada-smṛti (Minor Law books), n the S B E series, p xviii

Nārada smṛti, the real author of which is unknown represents the theories of Smṛti and Nyāya of the early centuries of Christ.

[3] Sāyana's commentary on the Rgveda, 8-3-11 and 9-104-6 Kanva was an ncestor of Kāśyapa already mentioned

[4] Chāndogyopaniṣad, prapāthaka 7, khanda 1 verse 2, and "The Upanishads" translated by F Max Müller, S B E series, p 110

[5] *Vāko-vākya* may signify grammar, rhetoric or debate Śaṅkara interprets it s Logic

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The personality of Nārada is shrouded in mystery. He[2] is represented in the Mahābhārata and Purānas to have been himself very quarrelsome and clever in exciting quarrels among other people Cursed by Brahmā he wandered over earth without staying at any fixed habitation He was of an imposing figure with flowing braids of hair and a long grey beard—wearing a mendicant's garment, holding in one hand a staff of gold and in the other a beggar's bowl together with a lute of tortoise shell and chanting always the name of Hari the Lord He carried messages of gods to men and *vice versa* Once he left heaven for a pleasant ramble on earth and repaired to the court of Srñjaya who ordered his daughter Sukumārī of unrivalled beauty to attend upon him. Nārada fell in love with her, and they were married; but owing to a curse he looked like a monkey to his bride He however worked off the curse by severe austerities, and Sukumārī could with difficulty be reconciled to him when he appeared on the removal of the curse, in his resplendent beauty Nārada studied music for two years under two wives of Krsna Jāmbavatī and Satyabhāmā, but had to prolong his studies for another two years under the third wife of Krsna named Rukminī to attain mastery over the notes of the musical scale

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[1] यदाह नारदः —

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तत्रात्मो यौवने वादी नरं सामगतो भवेत् ॥

(Nyāya-mañjarī, chap XII, p 640 Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

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मत्सलोकेषु वै सूत न भवेद् धवन पदम् । (Visnu purāna, 1-15, tīkā)

[3] क्षीरोदधेरुत्तरतो हि द्वीपः । श्वेतः स आस्ते प्रथितो विशालः ।
(Mahābhārata, Śānti)

Śvetadvīpa may also be identified with Syria Cf ' Vaisnavism and Christianity," by Dr B N Seal, attained their suitable end through His grace

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[3] Sāyana's commentary on the Rgveda, 8-3-11 and 9-104-6 Kanva was an ancestor of Kāśyapa already mentioned

[4] Chāndogyopanisad, prapāthaka 7, khanda 1, verse 2, and "The Upanishads" translated by F Max Müller, S B E. series, p 110

[5] Vāko-vākya may signify grammar, rhetoric or debate Śankara interprets it as Logic

26. Nyāya-sūtra, the first systematic work on Nyāya-śāstra.

The Nyāya-sūtra has some interpolated portions.

The first regular work on the Nyāya-śāstra is the Nyāya-sūtra [illegible]. It is divided into five books, each containing two chapters called Āhnikas. [illegible] Perhaps the Nyāya-sūtra in its present form is not entirely the work of one person, but has been enlarged by interpolations from time to time. It contains references to the Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta and Buddhist systems of philosophy. There are in it passages which were quoted almost verbatim from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,[1] Mādhyamika-sūtra[2] and other Buddhist works which were composed about the third or fourth century A.D. It seems that these passages were interpolated by Vātsyāyana who is said to have written the first commentary called Bhāṣya on the Nyāya-sūtra about 400 A.D. The Nyāya-sūtra contains in itself the principles both of Logic and Philosophy.

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[1] बुद्ध्या विवेचनात् भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिः (Nyāya-sūtra, 4.2.26).
"There is no essence in things inasmuch as they are discerned by our intellect."

बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते । (Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, chap. II, 81).
"We cannot ascertain the essence of things which are discerned by our intellect."

स्फटिकेऽपि अपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वात् व्यक्तीनामहेतुः (Nyāya-sūtra, 3.2.11).
"Even in the case of a crystal there is no cause for the production of one after another, because all individuals are momentary."

अनुत्पत्तिं क्षणार्थं क्षणिकार्थं वदाम्यहम् । (Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, chap. VI).
"By saying that a thing is momentary I mean that it is not produced."

[2] न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् (Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-37).
"Things cannot be self-existent owing to their inter-relations."

नहि स्वभावो भावानां प्रत्ययादिषु विद्यते (Mādhyamika-sūtra, chap. I).
"There is no self-existence of things owing to their mutual relationship."

न सत् नासत् न सदसत् सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात् (Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-48)
"A thing is neither existent nor non-existent nor both, owing to the mutual incongruity of existence and non-existence."

न सन् नासन् न सदसन् धर्मो निर्वर्तते यदा (Mādhyamika-sūtra, chap. VII)
"There cannot be production of a thing which is existent, non-existent or both."

मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावद् वा (Nyāya-sūtra, 4-2-32)
"The concept of things is like a trick of jugglery, the city of the celestial quire or a mirage."

Akṣapāda credited as the author of the Nyāya-sūtra.

In the early commentaries on the Nyāya-sūtra the author of the Sūtra is distinctly named as Aksapāda[1] Vātsyāyana[2] in the Nyāya-bhāsya (about 400 A D) says that the Nyāya philosophy manifested itself (in a regular form) before Aksapāda the foremost of the eloquent, while Uddyotakara[3] in his Nyāya-vārtika (about 600 A D) affirms that it was Aksapāda the most excellent of sages that spoke out the Nyāya-śāstra in a systematic way In the Nyāya vārtika tātparya-tīkā[4] (81 A D) and the Nyāya-mañjarī,[5] Akṣapāda is stated to have been the promul

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यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।
तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानम् तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतम् ॥

(Mādhyamika-sūtra, chap VII)

"The origination, continuance and cessation of a thing are said to be like a trick of jugglery, a dream or the city of the celestial quire"

वर्त्तमानाभावः पततः पतित-पतितव्य कालोपपत्तेः (Nyāya sūtra, 2-1-39)

"The present time is non-existent because the falling down of an object relates to the time during which the object fell down and to the time during which it will fall down"

गतं न गम्यते तावत् अगतं नैव गम्यते ।
गतागत विनिर्मुक्तं गम्यमानं न गम्यते ॥

(Mādhyamika-sūtra, chap II).

"We are not passing a path which has already been passed, nor are we passing that which is yet to be passed, the existence of a path, which has neither been passed nor is yet to be passed, is beyond comprehension."

[1] Akṣapāda is called in Tibetan རྐང་ མིག་ ཅན Rkan-mig-can, "with eyes on his feet" (*Vide* Mahā-vyutpatti, part I, p 22, edited in Sanskrit Tibetan English by Dr Sir E D Ross and Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta.)

[2] योऽक्षपादमृषिं न्यायः प्रत्यभाद्वदतां वरम् ।
तस्य वात्स्यायन इद भाष्यजातमवर्त्तयत् ॥
(Nyāya-bhāsya, colophon, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

[3] यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनां शमाय शास्त्रं जगतो जगाद ।
कुतार्किकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतोः करिष्यते तस्य मया निबन्धः ॥

fourth and fifth subjects, and possibly also the first subject in it systematic form, were introduced by Akṣapāda into the *Ānvīkṣikī vidyā* which in its final form was styled the Nyāya-sūtra Akṣapāda was therefore the real author of the Nyāya sūtra which derived a considerable part of its materials from the *Ānvīkṣikī-vidyā* of Gautama Just as Caraka was the redactor of the [illegible] was the

Aupamya or *upamāna* (comparison) included in the Tantra-yukti and mentioned in the Jaina works is accepted here as a means of knowledge (*pramāna*). The term "pramāna" in the sense given here was not widely used even in the days of Caraka (about 78 A.D.) inasmuch as he employed three terms, viz. *parīkṣā*, *hetu*, and *pramāna*, to signify the means of knowledge.

(2) *Prameya*—the object of knowledge, [illegible]

(3) *Vāda*—a disc[illegible]
for *kathā* [illegible]
(cavil) T[illegible]
samśaya ([illegible]
of which [illegible]

Caraka-samhitā. The [illegible]

rebuke) was a technical term in the Caraka-samhitā. The doctrine of "nigraha sthāna" attained a high development in the Nyāya-sūtra.

(4) *Avayava*—consists of [illegible]

systems of philosophy. There is in the Nyāya-sūtra an examination of various philosophical doctrines, e.g. in Book III, chap. II there is a criticism of the Sāmkhya doctrine of intellect (buddhi) and the Saugata doctrine of momentariness (kṣanika vāda); in Book IV, chap. I there is a review of the Buddhist doctrine of voidness (śūnyatā) and the Vedānta doctrine of the transformation of Brahma (Brahma pariṇāma vāda) etc.

29. THE ARRANGEMENT OF CATEGORIES IN THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA.

The categories represent the stages of a debate

The Nyāya-sūtra treats of sixteen categories which comprise all the topics of vāda-mārga (the course of debate) as enumerated in the Caraka-saṁhitā. While there is apparently no order among the topics of the Caraka-saṁhitā, there exists evidently a regular arrangement among the categories of the Nyāya-sūtra. The categories are, according to the commentaries[1] on the Nyāya-sūtra, supposed to represent stages in the course of a debate between a disputant and his respondent. The first of the categories is (1) *pramāṇa*, which signifies the means of knowledge, and the second is (2) *prameya*, which refers to the objects of knowledge. These two categories, which constitute the basis of a debate, supply the thesis or case which a disputant is to prove. The third category, (3) *saṁśaya* (doubt), having roused a conflicting judgment about [illegible] of his (4) *prayojana* (purpose) [illegible] which [illegible] rest on [illegible] That [illegible] to five parts called (7) *avayava* (members). Having carried on (8) *tarka* (confutation) against all contrary suppositions the disputant affirms his case with (9) *nirṇaya* (certainty). If his respondent, not being satisfied with this process of demonstration, advances an antithesis, he will have to enter upon (10) *vāda* (discussion) which [illegible] will necessarily assume th [illegible] (12) *vitaṇḍā* (a cavil). Fa [illegible] employ (13) *hetvābhāsa* (fa [illegible] and (15) *jāti* (analogues), [illegible] his (16) *nigrahasthāna* (defeat).

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[1] [illegible] a sūtr [illegible]

as pointed out by

Enunciation, definition and examination.

mere mention of the categories by name

of the categories.

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[1] Vātsyāyana observes —
त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः । उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति ।
(Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-2)

CHAPTER II

Contents of the Nyāya-sūtra.[1]

31 THE CATEGORIES THEIR ENUNCIATION.

As the Nyāya-sūtra is the foremost work on Nyāya-śāstra, a full summary of its doctrines is given here. Akṣapāda says that supreme felicity, *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*) is attained by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories treated in his Nyāya-sūtra. The categories[2] are enumerated as follows —

(1) The means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), (2) the object of right knowledge (*prameya*), (3) doubt (*saṁśaya*), (4) purpose (*prayojana*), (5) example (*dṛṣṭānta*), (6) tenet (*siddhānta*), (7) members (*avayava*), (8) confutation (*tarka*), (9) ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), (10) discussion (*vāda*), (11) wrangling (*jalpa*), (12) cavil (*vitaṇḍā*), (13) fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*) (14) quibble (*chala*), (15) analogue (*jāti*) and (16) the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*)

32. THE CATEGORIES THEIR DEFINITION

Definitions of the sixteen categories are given below —

(1) The Means of Right Knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

Perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and word or verbal testimony (*śabda*), are the means of right knowledge.

---

[1] *Vide* "The Nyāya-sūtras of Gotama" translated by Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the "Sacred Books of the Hindus" series, Allahabad, also Dr Ballantyne's translation of the Nyāya sūtras, first four books, Benares.

[2] In Tibetan the sixteen categories, *ṣoḍaśa padārthāḥ* (ཚིག་གི་དོན་བཅུ་དྲུག tshig-gi don bcu-drug), are designated respectively as follows —

(1) ཚད་མ tshad-ma (source of right cognition), (2) གཞལ་བྱ gshal-bya (object of right cognition), (3) ཐེ་ཚོམ the-tshom (doubt) (4) དགོས་པ dgos pa (motive), (5) དཔེ dpe (example), (6) ཆ་ཤས cha-śas (member of a syllogism), (7) གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ grub-pahi-mthah (established tenet), (8) རྟོག་གེ rtog-ge (corroborating a proposition

of a sense with its object, being determinate, unnameable, and non-erratic

Sense—includes the mind The knowledge of the soul, pleasure, pain, etc, is produced by their intercourse with the mind which, according to the Bhāṣya 1-1-4 of Vātsyāyana, is a sense-organ

Determinate—this epithet distinguishes perception from indeterminate (doubtful) knowledge, as for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust His knowledge, which is of a doubtful character, is not perception

Unnameable—signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears It arises in fact without the aid of language

Some say that there is no perception entirely free from verbal representation [illegible] our fellow men. They cannot comprehend our perception unless we give a name to it. It is therefore concluded that the name of a thing is not necessarily present and operative at the time when the thing is perceived

Non-erratic—In summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly heat (vapour) quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception To eliminate such cases the epithet non erratic has been used

[The Sanskrit Sūtra defining perception may also be translated as follows ·—

Perception is knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is non erratic, being either indeterminate ("nirvikalpaka" as "this is something") or determinate ("savikalpaka" as "this is a Brāhmaṇa")]

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[1] In Tibetan the definition is stated as follows —

དབང་པོ་དང་དོན་འཕྲད་པ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་མངོན་སུམ་གཏན་དུ་མེད་པ་འཁྲུལ་པ་མེད་པ་རྟོག་པའི་བདག་ཉིད Dwaṅ-po-daṅ-don ḥphrad pa-las-byuṅ-waḥi śes pa-mṅon-sum gtan du med-pa-ḥphrul-pa-med pa-rtog-paḥi-bdag ñid It has been translated by Alexander Csoma de Koros as follows: Perception is cognition [which is] produced through contact between an organ of sense and its object, [which is] not contained in the word, not discrepant from its object, and the essence of which is certainty Mahāvyutpatti, part II, p 134, Bibliotheca Indica series Calcutta, also Bstan ḥgyur Mdo, Go, folios 233-377.

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[illegible]

of right cognition), (3) [illegible] the-tshom (doubt), (4) [illegible] dgos pa (motive) [illegible] dpe (example), (6) [illegible] cha-śas (member of a syllogism), (7) [illegible]

[illegible]

(11) [illegible] (wrangling) (12) [illegible] (cavil or reducing a proposition ad absurdum without caring to establish one's own view) (13) [illegible] gtan-tshigs ltar snaṅ-wa (fallacious middle term) (14) [illegible] tshig-dor (quibble), (15) [illegible] ltag-chod (evasive answer), and (16) [illegible] chad pahi gnas (a reason why one may be declared unfit to continue the controversy) —Vide Mahāvyutpatti part II p 133 (Bibliotheca Indica series) also Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Go, folios 233-277

of a sense with its object, being determinate, unnameable, and non-erratic

Sense—includes the mind The knowledge of the soul, pleasure, pain, etc, is produced by their intercourse with the mind which, according to the Bhāṣya 1-1-4 of Vātsyāyana, is a sense-organ

Determinate—this epithet distinguishes perception from indeterminate (doubtful) knowledge, as for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust His knowledge, which is of a doubtful character, is not perception

Unnameable—signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears It arises in fact without the aid of language

Some say that there is no perception [illegible]

Non-erratic—In summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly heat (vapour) quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.

[The Sanskrit Sūtra defining perception may also be translated as follows:—

Perception is knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is non erratic, being either indeterminate ("nirvikalpaka" as "this is something") or determinate ("savikalpaka" as "this is a Brāhmana")]

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[1] In Tibetan the definition is stated as follows —

དབང་པོ་དང་དོན་འཕྲད་པ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་མངོན་སུམ་གཏན་དུ་མེད་པ་འཁྲུལ་པ་མེད་པ་རྟོག་པའི་བདག་ཉིད། Dwaṅ po-daṅ-don-ḥphrad-pa las byuṅ-waḥi śes pa-mṅon sum-gtan-du med-pa-ḥphrul pa-med pa-rtog-paḥi-bdag ñid It has been translated by [illegible]

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Unnameable—signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears It arises in fact without the aid of language

Some say that there [illegible] verbal connotation [illegible]

Non-erratic—In summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly heat (vapour) quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used

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(*duhkha*), and emancipation (*apavarga*), are the (principal) objects of right knowledge.

Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are the marks of the soul

These are the qualities of the substance called soul

Desire is a sign which proves the existence of "soul" A soul [illegible]

[illegible]

is completely exhausted, our soul, freed from transmigration, attains emancipation or release (*mokṣa*)

The body is the site of gestures, senses and sentiments

Body is the site of *gestures* inasmuch as it strives to reach what is desirable and to avoid what is hateful It is also the site of *senses* for the latter act well or ill, according as the former is in good or bad order *Sentiments* which comprise pleasure and pain are also located in the body which experiences them

The nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear are the senses, which are produced from elements.

Earth, water, light, air, and ether—these are the elements The *nose* is of the same nature as earth, the *tongue* as water, the *eye* as light, the *skin* as air, and *ear* as ether

Smell (odour), taste (savour), colour, touch and sound which are qualities of the earth, etc , are objects of the senses

[illegible]

Intellect is the same as apprehension or knowledge.

The mark of the mind is that there do not arise in the soul more acts of knowledge than one at a time

It is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously Perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object, but it requires also a conjunction of the mind Now, the mind,

[illegible]

Activity is that which [illegible] body begin [illegible]

There are [illegible] and [illegible]

- Bodily actions which are bad are (1) killing, (2) [illegible] and (3) adultery.
- Bodily actions which are good are (1) giving, (2) [illegible] and (3) serving.
- Vocal actions which are bad are (1) telling a lie, (2) using harsh language, (3) slandering, and (4) indulging in frivolous talk.
- Vocal actions which are good are (1) speaking the truth, (2) speaking what is useful, (3) speaking what is pleasant, and (4) reading sacred books.
- Mental actions which are bad are (1) malice, (2) covetousness and (3) scepticism.
- Mental actions which are good are (1) compassion, (2) generosity and (3) devotion.

Faults are those which cause activity.

They are affection (attachment), aversion and stupidity.

Transmigration means rebirth.

As already explained, it is a series of births and deaths. *Birth* is the connection of a soul with a body which includes the sense-organs, mind, intellect and sentiments. Death is the soul's separation from them.

Fruit is the thing produced by activity and faults.

It is the enjoyment of *pleasure* or suffering of *pain*. All activity and faults end in producing pleasure which is acceptable and pain which is fit only to be avoided.

Pain is that which causes uneasiness.

It is affliction which every one desires to avoid. The Sanskrit Sūtra defining "pain" may also be translated as follows: *Pain is the* mark of hindrance to the soul.

Emancipation or release is the absolute deliverance from pain.

[illegible]

(3) Doubt (*saṁśaya*)

Doubt, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties ception and non-perception.

(1) *Recognition of common properties*—e g seeing in the twilight a tall object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both

(2) *Recognition of properties not common*—e g hearing a sound, one questions whether it is eternal or not, for the property of soundness abides neither in man beast, etc , that are non-eternal nor in atoms which are eternal

(3) *Conflicting testimony*—e g merely by study one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does, while another system states that it does not

(4) *Irregularity of perception*—e g we perceive water in the tank where it really exists, but water appears also to exist in a mirage where it really does not exist

A question arises, whether water is perceived only when it actually exists or even when it does not exist

(5) *Irregularity of non perception*—e g we neither perceive water in the radish where it really exists, nor on dry land where it does not exist

A question arises, whether water is not perceived only when it does not exist, or also when it does exist

(4) Purpose (*prayojana*)

Purpose is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act.

It refers to the thing which one endeavours to attain or avoid A man collects fuel for the purpose of cooking his food

(5) Example (*dṛṣṭānta*).

An example is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion

With regard to the general proposition "wherever there is smoke there is fire," the example is a kitchen in which fire and smoke abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary man as well as an acute investigator

(6) Tenet (*siddhānta*)

A tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication

The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between 'a dogma of all the schools' (*sarva-tantra*), 'a dogma peculiar to some school' (*prati tantra*), 'a hypothetical dogma' (*adhikaraṇa*), and 'an implied dogma' (*abhyupagama*)

A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not school and is claimed by at least one which is an atomic substance, cannot be conjoined with more than one sense-organ at a time, hence there cannot occur more acts of perception than one at a time

Activity is that which makes the voice, mind and body begin their action

There are three kinds of action, viz *bodily*, *vocal* and *mental* each of which may be subdivided as good or bad

Bodily actions which are *bad* are —(1) killing, (2) stealing, and (3) committing adultery

Bodily actions which are *good* are —(1) giving, (2) protecting, (3) and serving

Vocal actions which are *bad* are —(1) telling a lie (2) using harsh language, (3) slandering and (4) indulging in frivolous talk

Vocal actions which are *good* are —speaking the truth, (2) speaking what is useful, (3) speaking what is pleasant, and (4) reading sacred books

Mental actions which are *bad* are —(1) malice, (2) covetousness, and (3) scepticism

Mental actions which are *good* are —(1) compassion, (2) generosity, and (3) devotion

Faults are those which cause activity

They are affection (attachment), aversion, and stupidity

Transmigration means rebirths

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It is the enjoyment of *pleasure* or suffering of *pain* All activity and faults end in producing pleasure which is acceptable and pain which is fit only to be avoided

Pain is that which causes uneasiness

It is affliction which every one desires to avoid The Sanskrit Sūtra defining "pain" may also be translated as follows *Pain* is the mark of hindrance to the soul

Emancipation or release is the absolute deliverance from pain.

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[illegible]

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... on "wherever there is smoke ... which fire and smoke abide ... nary man as well as an acute

(6) T.

... of a certain

... n between 'a ... to some

a ... ia' ... *karana*), and 'an

... which is not opposed by any ... st one school

The existence of five elements or five objects of sense is a tenet which is accepted by all the schools

A dogma peculiar to some school is a tenet which is accepted by similar schools but rejected by opposite schools

"A thing cannot come into existence out of nothing"—this is a peculiar dogma of the Sāmkhyas

A hypothetical dogma is a tenet which if accepted leads to the acceptance of another tenet

"There is a soul apart from the senses because it can recognize one and the same object by seeing and touching" If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following —(1) That the senses are more than one, (2) that each of the senses has its particular object, (3) that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses, (4) that a substance which is distinct from its qualities is the abode of them etc

An implied dogma is a tenet which is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows from the examination of particulars concerning it, e g the discussion whether sound is eternal or non-eternal presupposes that it is a substance

(7) Members of a Syllogism (*avayava*)

The members (of a syllogism) are signalised by a proposition (*pratijñā*), a reason (*hetu*), an explanatory example (*udāharana*), an application of the example (*upanaya*), and a statement of the conclusion (*nigamana*).

A *proposition* is the statement of what is to be proved e g the hill is fiery

A *reason* is the means for proving what is to be proved through the homogeneous or heterogeneous (affirmative or negative) character of the example, e g

because it (the hill) is smoky

Here "smoke" is the reason

A *homogeneous* (or *affirmative*) *example* is a familiar instance which is known to possess the property to be proved, and which implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given e g

whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen

Here "kitchen" is a familiar instance which possesses fire, and implies that fire invariably goes with smoke which is the reason given

N B —*An affirmative example* may according to the Nyāya-bhāsya, 1-1-36, be defined as a familiar instance, which being similar to the minor term (subject) possesses the property of that term as copresent with the reason

A heterogeneous (or *negative*) *example* is a familiar instance which is devoid of the property to be proved, and which implies that the absence of this property is incompatible with the reason given, e g

whatever is not fiery is not smoky, as a lake

Here the lake is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of fire, and implies that absence of fieriness is incompatible with the smoke, which is the reason

Application is the winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be proved as being so or not so.

[illegible]

example is of a negative character

Affirmative application—"So" is this hill (smoky)
Negative application—This hill is "not so" (not smoky)
Conclusion is the re-statement of the proposition after the reason has been mentioned

It is the confirmation of the proposition after the reason and the example have been mentioned
Conclusion—Therefore the hill is fiery

The five members may be fully set forth as follows:—

(i) *Proposition*—This hill is fiery
(ii) *Reason*—Because it is smoky
(iii) *Example*—Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen (*homogeneous* or *affirmative*)
(iv) *Application*—"So" is this hill (smoky)—(*affirmative*)
(v) *Conclusion*—Therefore this hill is fiery

(8) Confutation (*tarka*)

Confutation,[1] which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters

Is the soul eternal or non-eternal? Here the real character of the soul, viz whether it is eternal or non eternal, is not known In ascertaining the character we reason as follows If the soul were non-eternal it would be impossible for it to enjoy the fruits of its own actions, to undergo transmigration, and to attain final emancipation But such a conclusion is absurd such possibilities are known to belong to the soul: therefore, we must admit that the soul is eternal

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[1] *Tarka* may be rendered also as 'argumentation,' 'reasoning,' 'hypothetical reasoning,' 'reductio ad absurdum,' etc

(9) Ascertainment (*nirṇaya*).

Ascertainment is the determination of a question through the removal of doubt, by hearing two opposite sides.

A person wavers and doubts if certain statements advanced to him are supported by one of two parties but opposed by the other party. His doubt is not removed until by the application of reason he can vindicate one of the parties. The process by which the vindication is effected is called ascertainment. Ascertainment is not, however, in all cases preceded by doubt, for instance, in the case of perception things are ascertained directly. So also we ascertain things directly by the authority of scriptures. But in the case of investigation (inference) doubt must precede ascertainment.

(10) Discussion (*vāda*).

Discussion is the adoption, by two parties, of two opposite theses which are each analysed in the form of five members, and are supported or condemned by any of the means of right knowledge and by confutation, without deviation from the established tenets.

A dialogue, disputation or controversy (*kathā*) is the adoption of a side or thesis by a disputant and its opposite one by his opponent. It is of three kinds, viz., discussion (*vāda*) which aims at ascertaining the truth, wrangling (*jalpa*) which aims at gaining victory, and cavil (*vitaṇḍā*) which aims at finding mere faults. A *discutient* is one who engages himself in a disputation as a means of seeking the truth.

An instance of discussion is given below:

Discutient—There is soul.
Opponent—There is no soul.
Discutient—Soul is existent (proposition),
Because it is an abode of consciousness (reason),
Whatever is not existent is not an abode of consciousness, as a hare's horn (negative example),
Soul is not so, that is, soul is an abode of consciousness (negative application),
Therefore soul is existent (conclusion).
Opponent—Soul is non-existent (proposition),
Because it is not perceptible by any of the senses (reason),
Whatever is not perceptible by any of the senses is non-existent, as a hare's horn (example),
Soul is not perceptible by any of the senses [illegible]
[illegible]
Therefore [illegible]
Discutient—The [illegible] which is a means [illegible] of the [illegible] of soul.
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
cognitions

Discutient—The doctrine of soul harmonises well with the various tenets which we hold, viz that there are eternal things, that everybody enjoys pleasure or suffers pain according to his own actions, etc Therefore there is soul

(11) Wrangling (*jalpa*)

Wrangling, which aims at gaining victory, is the defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid by quibbles, analogues, and other processes which deserve rebuke

A *wrangler* is one who, engaged in a disputation aims only at [illegible]

(12) Cavil (*vitandā*)

Cavil is a kind of wrangling which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side

A *caviller* does not endeavour to establish any thing, but confines *himself to mere carping at the arguments of his opponent*

(13) Fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*)

Fallacies of reason are the erratic (*savyabhicāra*), the contradictory (*viruddha*), the controversial (*prakarana-sama*), the counter-questioned (*sādhyasama*), and the mistimed (*kālātīta*).

The *erratic* is the reason which leads to more conclusions than one

An instance of the *erratic* reason is given below —
Proposition—Sound is eternal
[illegible]

by the major term, that is, when there is no connection between the major term and middle term, as pervader and pervaded Intangible' is pervaded neither by 'eternal' nor by 'non-eternal'

The *Contradictory* is the reason which opposes what is to be established

Proposition—A pot is produced

Contradictory reason—Because it is eternal

Here the reason is contradictory because that which is eternal is never produced

The *controversial* or *balancing the point at issue* is a reason which is adduced to arrive at a definite conclusion while it is really one which can give rise to mere suspense as to the point

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal

Reason—Because it is not possessed of the attribute of eternality

The reason that sound is not possessed of the attribute of eternality " does not throw any new light but keeps the parties in suspense as before

The *counter-questioned* or *balancing the question* is a reason which not being different from what is to be proved stands in need of proof for itself

Proposition—Shadow is a substance

Reason—Because it possesses motion

That which possesses quality and motion is a substance To say that shadow possesses motion is the same as to say that it is a substance Hence the reason stands as much in need of proof as the proposition itself This is a counter-questioned reason or a reason which balances the question

The *mistimed* is the reason which is adduced when the time is past in which it might hold good

Proposition—Sound is durable

Mistimed reason—Because it is manifested by union, as a colour

The colour of a jar is manifested when the jar comes into union with a lamp but the colour existed before the union took place, and [illegible] has ceased Similarly, the sound [illegible] into union with a rod, [illegible] colour be presumed to [illegible] continue to exist after [illegible] The reason adduced [illegible] sound does not take place *at the time when the drum comes into union* with the rod but it takes place at a subsequent moment when the union has ceased In the case of colour however the manifestation takes place just at the time when the jar comes into union with the lamp As the time of their manifestation is different the analogy between colour and sound is not complete, therefore the reason is mistimed

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[1] Some interpret the aphorism as follows The mistimed is a reason which is adduced in a wrong order among the five members, for instance if the reason is stated before the proposition This interpretation according to Vātsyāyana is wrong

tence) even if they are placed at a distance from each other, and, on the other hand, even the closest proximity is of no use if the words are disconnected in their sense Moreover the placing of members in a worng order is noticed in the Nyāya sūtra as a *nigraha-sthāna* called *aprāpta-kāla* (inopportune)]

(14) Quibble (*chala*)

Quibble is the opposition offered to a proposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning.

It is of three kinds, viz quibble in respect of a term (*vāk chala*), quibble in respect of a genus (*sāmānya-chala*), and quibble in respect of a metaphor (*upacāra-chala*)

> *Quibble in respect of a term* consists in wilfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by the speaker who happened to use it ambiguously
>
> A speaker says "this boy is *nava kambala* (possessed of a new blanket)
>
> A quibbler replies "this boy is not certainly *nava-kambala* (possessed of nine blankets) for he has only one blanket

Here the word *nava* which is ambiguous was used by the speaker in the sense of "new," but has been wilfully taken by the quibbler in the sense of "nine"

> *Quibble in respect of a genus* consists in asserting the impossibility of a thing which is really possible, on the ground that it belongs to a certain genus which is very wide
>
> A speaker says "this Brāhmana is possessed of learning and conduct"
>
> An objector replies "it is impossible, for how can this person be inferred to be possessed of learning and conduct from his being merely a Brāhmana? There are little boys who are Brāhmanas, yet not possessed of learning and conduct"

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knew well that possession of [illegible] e an attribute of the whole [illegible] to "this" particular Brāh- [illegible] to render it possible for him [illegible]

[illegible]

> [illegible] for they are inanimate objects"

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knew well that the word "scaffolds" was used to signify those standing on the scaffolds

(15) Analogue (*jāti*)

Analogue, also called an analogous rejoinder or far-fetched analogy, consists in offering opposition founded on mere similarity or dissimilarity.

A disputant says "the soul is inactive because it is all perv ing as ether"

His opponent replies "if the soul is inactive because it be similarity to ether as being all pervading, why is it active because it bears similarity to a pot as being a sul union"?

The reason of the opponent is futile, because it bears only a f fetched analogy to that of the disputant[1]

or again:

Disputant—Sound is non-eternal, because, unlike ether, it product

Opponent—If sound is non-eternal because, as a product, dissimilar to ether, why is it not eternal because, as object of auditory perception it is dissimilar to a pot?

The reason employed by the opponent is futile because the logy which it bears to that of the disputant is far fetched[2]

(16) A Point of Defeat (*nigrahasthāna*)

A point of defeat, also called a clincher, an occasion for rel or a place of humiliation, arises when one misunderstands or not understand at all

If a person begins to argue in a way which betrays his utter rance, or wilfully misunderstands and yet persists in showing the understands well it is of no avail to employ counter arguments quite unfit to be argued with and there is nothing left for his oppo but to turn him out or quit his company rebuking him as a block or a knave

An instance of the point of defeat —

Whatever is not quality is substance
because there is nothing except colour etc (quality)

A person who argues in the above way is to be rebuked as a for his reason (which admits only quality) opposes his propos (which refers to both quality and substance)

Another instance

Disputant [illegible]
Opponent—But the existence of touch disproves such a st ment

---

[1] The answer is [illegible]

[2] [illegible]

ys — O learned audience, listen, I do not say that fire is not hot, to

It is only meet that the opponent should quit the company of a man who argues in this way

33 THE VARIETIES OF ANALOGUE

The analogues are as follows (1) Balancing the homogeneity (sādharmya-sama), (2) balancing the heterogeneity (vaidharmya-sama), (3) balancing an excess (utkarsa-sama), (4) balancing a deficit (apakarsa sama), (5) balancing the questionable (varnya sama), (6) balancing the unquestionable (avarnya sama), (7) balancing the alternative (vikalpa sama), (8) balancing the ques-

balancing t [illegible] the non-reason [illegible] hā-patti-sama), [illegible] 19) balancing t [illegible] the perception [illegible] ion (anupalabdhi-sama), (22) balancing the non-eternal (anitya-sama), (23) balancing the eternal (nitya-sama) and (24) balancing the effect (kārya-sama).

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition —

eternal,
is incorporeal,
ether

non-eternal, is based on the homo- pot, on the ground of both being und is eternal, is said to be based sky, on the alleged ground opposition, futile as it is, is

called "balancing the homogeneity," which aims at showing an equality
of the arguments of two sides only in respect of the homogeneity of
examples employed by them [1]

(2) **Balancing the heterogeneity.**—If against an argument
based on a heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based
merely on the same kind of example, the opposition, futile as it
is, will be called "balancing the heterogeneity."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as
follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is a product,
whatever is eternal is not a product, as the ether

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal
whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot

The argument, viz sound is non-eternal, is based on the heter
geneity of sound from the eternal ether The opposition, viz sou
is eternal is said to be based on the heterogeneity of sound from t
not-incorporeal pot This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is cal
"balancing the heterogeneity," which aims at showing an equality
the arguments of two sides merely in respect of the heterogeneity
examples employed by them [2]

(3) **Balancing an excess.**—If against an argument based o
certain character of the example, one offers an opposition ba
on an additional character thereof, the opposition, futile as it is,
be called "balancing an excess"

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argue
follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

Sound is non-eternal (and must be corporeal),
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal as well as corporeal)

---

[1] The opposition is futile because it is based on a mere homogeneous exa
In the argument—" sound is non eternal because it is a product, like a po
the homogeneous example " pot " exhibits a universal connection betwee
ductivity and non-eternality all products being non eternal, but in the oppo
" sound is eternal because it is incorporeal like the sky " the homogeneous exa
" sky " does not exhibit a universal connection between incorporeality and ete
ity, because there are things such as intelligence or knowledge, which are i
poreal but not eternal

[2] In the opposition " sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, whatev
not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot " the heterogeneous example " pot "
not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of
nality, because there are things, such as intelligence or knowledge, which a

It is based on the false supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the example. Though there is no denial of an equality of the subject and the example in certain characters, there is indeed a great difference between them in other characters. Thus the equality supposed to exist between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality, is not warranted by the reason (viz. being a product) because there are things such as intelligence or knowledge, which are products but not corporeal.

(4) Balancing a deficit.—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example, one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing a deficit."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition:—

Sound is non-eternal (and cannot be audible),
[illegible] duct,
[illegible] h is non-eternal and not audible)

at if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it
ot is not audible; and if sound is still held
also not non-eternal. This sort of futile
balancing a deficit," which aims at showing an
ents of two [illegible] respect of a certain character
ple ([illegible] ently to be wanting

d" and "pot" is not

one opposes an argument
f an example is as ques-
pposition, futile, as it is, will
"

eternality of sound argues as

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

A pot is non eternal
because it is a product
like sound

The opponent alleges that if the non eternality of sound is call in question why is not that of the pot too called in question, as pot and sound are both products? His object is to set asid argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable char ter This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the questi able" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of sides in respect of the questionable character of the subject as wel of the example It puts an end to all kinds of inference by igno the difference between the subject and the example altogether.

(6) **Balancing the unquestionable** —If one opposes an a ment by alleging that the character of the subject is as unq tionable as that of the example, the opposition, futile as it is, be called "balancing the unquestionable"

A certain person, to prove the non eternality of sound, argue follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound

[illegible] of a pot is t

ple is not one (the pot) non-eternal and the other (sound) eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the alternative," which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the alternative characters attributed to the subject and the example

It introduces an equality between the pot and sound in respect of a character (viz being eternal) which is not warranted by the reason (viz being a product)

(8) Balancing the question.—If one opposes an argument by alleging that the example requires proof as much as the subject does, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the question"

A certain person, to prove the non eternality of sound, argues as follows —

> Sound is non-eternal,
> because it is a product,
> like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

> A pot is non-eternal,
> because it is a product,
> like sound

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound [illegible]

It is based on the false supposition that the example stands exactly on the [illegible]e footing as the subject The example does not in fact stand [illegible] of proof as to its characters, a "pot" being known to all [illegible]duct and non-eternal Hence the opposition is [illegible]le.

(9) [illegible]

co-[illegible]

[illegible] it [illegible] reason being non-distin[illegible]

[illegible] lancing the co-presence"

[illegible] is fire in the hill, argues as

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke
because it has fire
like a kitchen

The arguer has taken the smoke to be the reason and the fire to be the predicate. The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke is present at the same site which is occupied by the fire or absent from that site. If the smoke is present with fire at the same site there remains, according to the opponent, no criterion to distinguish the reason from the predicate. The smoke is as much a reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the co-presence" which aims at stopping an argument on the alleged ground of the co-presence of the reason and the predicate.

Seeing that a potter cannot produce a jar without getting clay within his reach, it is affirmed that a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cause being present at its site. "Balancing the co-presence" which attaches an undue importance to the proximity of sites is therefore a totally futile opposition.

(10) Balancing the mutual absence. If against an argument based on the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of mutual absence, the opposition, futile as it is, will, on account of the reason being non-conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the mutual absence."

A certain person to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire
because it has smoke
like a kitchen

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke
because it has fire
like a kitchen

The opponent asks: "Is the smoke to be regarded as the reason because it is absent from the site of the fire?" "Such a supposition is indeed absurd." The reason cannot establish the predicate without being connected with it, just as a lamp cannot exhibit a thing which is not within its reach. If a reason unconnected with the predicate could establish the latter, then the fire could be as much the reason for the smoke as the smoke for the fire.

This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the mutual absence" which aims at bringing an argument to a close on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate.

Seeing that an exorcist can destroy persons by administering spells from a distance, it is affirmed that a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cause being absent from its site "Balancing the mutual absence," which attaches too much importance to remoteness of sites is therefore a totally futile opposition

(11) **Balancing the infinite regression.**—If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example not having been established by a series of reasons, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the infinite regression"

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound argues as follows.—

Sound is non eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

If sound is proved to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, how is the pot again to be proved as non-eternal? The reason which proves the non-eternality of the pot is itself to be established by further [illegible]

series of reasons to reveal its character

Hence the opposition called "balancing the infinite regression" is not founded on a sound basis

(12) **Balancing the counter-example.**—If one opposes an argument on the ground of the existence of a mere counter example, the opposition futile as it is, will be called "balancing the counter-example"

A certain person, to prove the non eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Proposition—Sound is non eternal
Reason—because it is a product
Example—like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

Proposition—Sound is eternal,
Example—like the ether

[illegible]

an argument by the introduction of a mere counter-example

A mere counter example without a reason attending it cannot be conducive to any conclusion We can rely on an example attended his reason, but [illegible] a counter-example plus [illegible] the reason. For the opposition which is founded on a mere counter-example is rejected as futile.

(13) Balancing the non-produced. — If one opposes an argument on the ground of the property connoted by the reason being absent from the thing denoted by the subject while it is not yet produced, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the non-produced."

A certain person, to prove that sound is non-eternal, argues as follows: —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus: —

Sound is eternal,
because it is a non-effect of effort,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that the property connoted by the reason, viz. being an effect of effort, is not predicable of the subject, viz. sound (while it is not yet produced). Consequently sound is not non-eternal, it must then be eternal. There is, according to the opponent, an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being eternal on account of its being a non-effect-of-effort. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-produced," which pretends to show an equality of the arguments of two sides assuming the thing denoted by the subject to be as yet non-produced.

It is futile because the subject can become such only when it is produced, and that there is then no obstacle to the property of the reason being predicated of it. The opposition, viz. "sound (while non-produced) is eternal because it is not then an effect of effort," carries no weight with it, since we do not take the sound to be the subject before it is produced. Sound, while it is produced, is certainly an effect of effort, and as such is non-eternal.

(14) Balancing the doubt. — If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal, consequent on the example and its general notion being equally objects of perception, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the doubt."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows: —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as potness inasmuch as both are objects of perception, but the pot being non-eternal and potness (the general notion of all pots) being eternal, there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the doubt," which aims at discarding an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal

It is futile because sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere [illegible]

can however, on the score of heterogeneity pronounce it undoubtedly to be non eternal In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing unless we weigh it in respect of its homogeneity with, as well as heterogeneity from, other things If even then there remains any doubt as to its true nature, that doubt will never end

(15) Balancing the point at issue, or the controversial.—It is an opposition which is supposed to be conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or heterogeneity from) both sides

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows.—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

Sound is eternal,
because it is audible
like soundness

The opponent alleges that the proposition, viz sound is non-eternal, cannot be proved because the reason, viz audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is eternal), serves only to give rise to suspense for the removal of which it was employed This sort of opposition is called "balancing the point at issue" which hurts an argument by giving rise to suspense which was to be removed

It is futile and cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a point which happens to support one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side

(16) Balancing the non-reason. It is an opposition which is supposed to be based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product
like a pot

Here " being a product " is the reason for " being [illegible] which is the predicate

(a) The reason does not precede the predicate [illegible] former is called a reason only when it establishes [illegible] latter It is impossible for the reason to be called [illegible] before the establishment of the predicate

(b) The reason does not succeed the predicate because [illegible] would be useless if the predicate could be established without it

(c) The reason and the predicate cannot exist simultaneously for they will then be reciprocally connected like the [illegible] and left horns of a cow A reason which is [illegible] the predicate cannot establish the latter The [illegible] opposition is called 'balancing the non-reason' [illegible] aims at setting aside an argument by showing the [illegible] reason is impossible at all the three times

There is in fact no impossibility for the reason to operate [illegible] knowledge of the knowable and the establishment of that which [illegible] be established take place from reason which must precede that [illegible] is to be known and established If the reason is held to be [illegible] why then is not the opposition itself which depends on reason [illegible] be so [illegible] In the event of the

If by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the reason, we could from the opposition cited above draw the following conclusion —

Sound is presumed to be non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

case opposed to it, and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow Hence the opposition called "balancing the presumption" is untenable

(18) Balancing the non difference —If the subject and example are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of a certain property on account of their possessing in common the property connoted by the reason, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property inasmuch as they are all existent: this sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product
like a pot.

there being no difference between the eternal and the non-eternal, sound may be treated as eternal This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference," which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non-different.

It is futile because the property possessed in common by the subject and the example, happens in certain instances to abide in the reason, while in other instances it does not abide in the same

Sound is non eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

Here the pot and sound possessing in common the property of being a product, are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of non-eternality On the same principle if all things are treated as non different in consequence of their being existent, we should like to know in what respect they are non-different If they are treated a non-different in respect of non-eternality, then the argument woul stand thus —

All things are non-eternal,
because they are existent
like (?)

In this argument "all things" being the subject, there is no left which may serve as an example. A part of the subject ca be cited as the example because the example must be a well establ thing, while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established argument, for the want of an example, leads to no conclusion fact all things are not non-eternal since some at least are et In other words, non eternality abides in some existent thing does not abide in other existent things Hence all things a mutually non-different and the opposition called "balancing th difference" is unreasonable

(19) **Balancing the demonstration** —If an opposition is o by showing that both the demonstrations are justified by re the opposition will be called "balancing the demonstration"

A certain person demonstrates the non-eternality of sou follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product
like a pot

A certain other person offers an opposition by the alleged stration of the eternality of sound as follows —

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the ether

The reason in the first demonstration supports the non-eternality of sound while that in the second demonstration supports the eter nality of sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance against the first to create a dead lock This sort of oppos tion is called "balancing the demonstration"

It is futile because there is an admission of the first demonstra tion The opponent having asserted that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, has admitted the reasonableness of the first demonstration which supports the non-eternality of sound If to avoid the incompatibility that exists between the two demonstrations he now denies the reason which supports non eternality we would ask why does he not deny the other reason which supports the eternality of sound for he can avoid incompatibility by denying either of the reasons Hence the opposition called "balancing the demonstration" is not well founded

) **Balancing the perception** —If an opposition is offered on nd that we perceive the character of the subject even without the intervention of the reason, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the perception."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound can be ascertained to be non-eternal even without the reason that it is a product, for we *perceive* that sound is produced by the branches of trees broken by wind. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the perception," which aims at demolishing an [illegible]

[illegible] is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot," implies that sound is proved to be non-eternal through the reason that it is a product. It does not deny other means, such as perception, etc., which also may prove sound to be non-eternal. Hence the opposition called "balancing the perception" does not set aside the main argument.

(21) **Balancing the non-perception**.—If against an argument proving the non-existence of a thing by the non-perception thereof one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-perception of the non-perception, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the non-perception."

[illegible]

founded

[illegible] existence [illegible] as there [illegible] "balanc-

(22) **Balancing the non-eternal**.—If one finding that things which are homogeneous possess equal characters, opposes an argu-

of eternality of the non-eternal you have admitted sound to be *always* non-eternal, and cannot now deny its non-eternality The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other by admitting that sound is non eternal you are precluded from asserting that it is also eternal Hence "balancing the eternal" is not a sound opposition

(24) **Balancing the effect** —If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effects of effort, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the effect"

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

> Sound is non-eternal,
> because it is an effect of effort

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

[illegible]

It is futile because in the case of sound effort does not give rise to the second kind of effect. We cannot say that sound is revealed by [illegible]

[illegible]

Application of the Analogues.

In showing the futility of analogues we may test them in the ligh of the following principles —

(i) If a special meaning is to be attached to a word in the opposi tion, the *same meaning* will have to be attached to the word in th original argument, e g the word "effect" should be used in one and th same sense by a disputant and his opponent

(ii) Defect attaches to the *opposition of the opposition* just as attaches to the opposition itself.

A certain person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is an effect of effort
[Here "effect" signifies "a thing produced"]

A certain other person, seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds, offers an opposition thus —

Sound is eternal,
because it is an effect of effort
[Here "effect" signifies "a thing revealed"]

The arguer replies that sound cannot be concluded to be eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean "a thing produced") The opponent rises again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean "a thing revealed") So the defect which is pointed out in the case of the opposition, may also be pointed out in the case of the opposition of the opposition

Here the opponent evidently took the word "effect" in the sense of "a thing revealed"

The third wing

The disputant, seeing that the reason "effect" is erratic, charges the opposition with a defect thus —

Sound is *not* eternal,
because it is an effect of effort

He means that sound cannot be inferred to be eternal from its being an effect, because "effect," which is the reason here, admits of two different meanings, viz (1) a thing [that did not previously exist but is now] produced, and (2) a thing [that already existed and is now] revealed The reason being erratic the conclusion is uncertain.

The fourth wing.

The opponent finding that the reason "effect," which is erratic, proves neither the eternality nor the non-eternality of sound, brings a counter-charge against the disputant thus:—

Sound is also *not* non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort

[illegible]

The fifth wing

The disputant finding that the counter- [illegible] eternal In other words the counter-charge has proved the charge, that is, it has indicated that the opponent admits the disputant's opinion.

The sixth wing

The opponent finding that the disputant instead of rescuing his argument from the counter-charge has taken shelter under his opponent's admission of the charge says —

The disputant by saying that "sound is also not eternal" has (by the force of the word "also") admitted that it is also not non-eternal In other words, if the counter-charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.

The first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent The sixth wing is a repeti- [illegible]

The points of defeat[1] also called clinchers, occasions for rebuk
or places of humiliation are the following :—

(1) Hurting the proposition (pratijñā-hāni), (2) shifting th
proposition (pratijñāntara), (3) opposing the proposition (pratijñā-vi
rodha), (4) renouncing the proposition (pratijñā-sannyāsa), (
shifting the reason (hetvantara), (6) shifting the topic (arthāntara
(7) the meaningless (nirarthaka), (8) the unintelligible (avijñātārtha
(9) the incoherent (apārthaka), (10) the inopportune (aprāpta-kāla
(11) saying too little (nyūna), (12) saying too much (adhika), (1
repetition (punarukta), (14) silence (ananubhāṣaṇa), (15) ignoran
(ajñāna), (16) non-ingenuity (apratibhā), (17) evasion (vikṣepa), (1
admission of an opinion (matānujñā), (19) overlooking the censur
able (paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa), (20) censuring the non-censurab
(niranuyojyānuyoga), (21) deviating from a tenet (apasiddhān
and (22) the semblance of a reason (hetvābhāsa).

"A point of defeat" which is the same as "a clincher," "a
occasion for rebuke," "a place of humiliation" or "a point of disgrace
arises generally from a misemployment of the proposition or any oth
part of an argument and may implicate any disputant whether he is
discutient, wrangler or caviller.

(1) Hurting the proposition occurs when one admits in one'
own example the character of a counter-example.

A disputant argues as follows :—

> Sound is non-eternal,
> because it is cognisable by sense,
> whatever is cognisable by sense is non-eternal as a pot,
> sound is so (cognisable by sense),
> therefore sound is non-eternal.

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[1] *Vide* Nyāya-sūtra, 5-1-43.

Jayanta observes :—

षट्पक्ष्यामुभयोरिति ।
वाच्यमुपरमतो निरवद्यं वादिप्रतिवादिनमपि प्रति मन्ये ।
वाद्युपोत्तरविरता न तु कार्या पक्षषट्क परिकल्पनमोहे ।
(Nyāya-mañjarī, chap. 12, p. 637, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

An opponent counter-argues thus :—

A genus (e.g. potness or pot-type), which is cognisable by sen is found to be eternal why cannot then the sound which is al cognisable by sense be eternal ?

The disputant being thus opposed says —

Whatever is cognisable by sense is eternal as a pot
sound is cognisable by sense,
therefore sound is eternal

By thus admitting in his example (the pot) the character (t eternality) of a counter-example (the genus or type), that is, admitting that a pot is eternal, he hurts his own proposition (v sound is non-eternal) A person who hurts his proposition in th way deserves nothing but rebuke

(2) Shifting the proposition arises when a proposition bei opposed one defends it, by importing a new character to, l example and counter-example.

A certain person argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus —

Sound is eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense,
like a genus (or type)

The first person in order to defend himself says that a genus type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one in all pervas and the other is no [illegible] the sound which is likened to a pot non-all- [illegible]

The [illegible] a change of proposition 1

is—,

-pervasive

his [illegible] r is to be rebul

example

on a

inct from colour, etc

at if substance is dist

colour, etc which c

tance is non-distinct fr

defined as, etc, etc. The defence made in this way furnishes an instance of defeat through non-relevancy The person who makes it deserves rebuke

(7) **The meaningless** is an argument which is based on a nonsensical combination of letters in a series.

A certain person, to prove the eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is eternal,
because k, c, t, t and p are j, v, g, d and d
like jh, bh, gh, dh and dh

As the letters k, c, t, etc., convey no meaning the person who employs them in his argument deserves rebuke

(8) **The unintelligible** is an argument, which although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.

[illegible]

his opponent nor by the audience although they are repeated three times This sort of defence is called "the unintelligible" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke

(9) **The incoherent** is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no other means of self-defences argues as follows —

Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl, goat's skin and a lump of sweets

This sort of argument, which consists of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent," which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke

(10) **The inopportune** is an argument, the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows —

The hill has fire (proposition),

[illegible]

fore rebuked.

In this argument the second reason and the second example are redundant

A person who having promised to argue in the proper way (according to the established usage) employs more than one reason or example is to be rebuked as "saying too much."

(13) Repetition is an argument in which (except in the case of reinculcation) the word or the meaning is said over again

Repetition of the word—Sound is non eternal
Sound is non-eternal

Repetition of the meaning—Sound is non-eternal echo is perishable what is heard is impermanent etc

There is a difference between "repetition" and "re inculcation" inasmuch as the latter serves some useful purpose

In re-inculcation a special meaning is deduced from the word reinculcated e g

In this argument the "conclusion" is a re-inculcation of the "proposition" serving a special purpose (viz in showing the fifth ember of the syllogism)

Repetition consists also in mentioning a thing by name although thing has been indicated through presumption, e g

"A thing which is not non eternal does not possess the character of a product"—this is a mere repetition of the following —

"A thing possessing the character of a product is non-eternal"

(14) **Silence** is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience

How can a disputant carry on his argument if his opponent maintains an attitude of stolid silence? The opponent who takes up such an attitude is to be rebuked

(15) **Ignorance** is the non-understanding of a proposition

Ignorance is betrayed by the opponent who does not understand a proposition although it has been repeated three times within the knowledge of the audience How can an opponent refute a proposition the meaning of which he cannot understand He is to be rebuked for his ignorance

(16) **Non-ingenuity** consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply

A certain person lays down a proposition If his opponent understands it and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he is to be scolded as wanting in ingenuity

(17) **Evasion** arises if one stops an argument in the pretext of going away to attend another business

A certain person having commenced a disputation in which he finds it impossible to establish his side, stops its further progress by saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business He who stops the disputation in this way courts defeat and humiliation through evasion

(18) **The admission of an opinion** consists in charging the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the same defect exists on one's own side

A certain person addressing another person says ' You are a thief"

This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of the "admission of an opinion" which brings disgrace on the person who makes it

(19) **Overlooking the censurable** consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.

It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues in a way which furnishes an occasion for censure. Seeing that the person himself does not confess his shortcoming, it is the duty of the audience

(11) Saying too little — If an argument lacks even one of its parts it is called "saying too little"

The following is an argument which contains all the five

1) The hill has fire (proposition)
(2) Because it has smoke (reason)
(3) All that has smoke has fire as a kitchen (example)
(4) The hill has smoke (application)
(5) Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion)

As all the five parts or members are essential a per-
even one of them should be rebuked as "saying too little"

(12) Saying too much is an argument which con
than one reason or example

A certain person to prove that the hill has fire, a
lows —

The hill has fire (proposition)
Because it has smoke (reason)
And because it has light (reason)
Like a kitchen (example)
And like a furnace (example)

In this argument the second reason and the second
redundant

A person who having promised to argue in th
(according to the established usage) employs more th
or example is to be rebuked as "saying too much"

(13) Repetition is an argument in which (e
of reinculcation) the word or the meaning is

Repetition of the word—Sound is
Sound is

Repetition of the meaning—S

There is a difference bet
inasmuch as the latter serves

In re-inculcation a
reinculcated e g

The hill has fire (
Because it has
All that has smoke
The hill has smoke (
Therefore the hill has

In this argument the "
"proposition" serving a spec
member of the syllogism)

Repetition consists also in n
the thing has been indicated th

of a sense with its object With reference to the perception of colour, for instance, it is asked whether the colour preceded perception or the perception preceded colour If one says that perception occurred anteriorly or preceded the colour, one must give up one's definition of perception viz that perception arises from the contact of a sense with its object If perception is supposed to occur posteriorly it cannot be maintained that objects of sense are established by perception Colour, for instance, is an object which is said to be established by visual perception But this conclusion will have to be abandoned if perception is supposed to occur posteriorly to the object If perception were simultaneous with its object there would not be any [illegible]

the colour and the smell can be perceived at the same time, that is, our perception of colour must be admitted to be simultaneous with our perception of smell This is absurd because two acts of perception, nay two cognitions cannot take place at the same time As there is an order of succession in our cognitions, perception cannot be simultaneous with its object Perception and other so-called means of right knowledge are therefore not only invalid but also impossible Moreover if an object of knowledge is to be established by a means of knowledge, this latter needs also to be established by another means of knowledge Just as a balance is an instrument when it weighs a thing, but is an object when it is itself weighed in [illegible]

In reply it is stated that if perception and other means of right [illegible]

[illegible]

Perception

It is said that the definition of perception as given above is defective as it does not mention the conjunction of soul and mind which are also causes of perception. [illegible] ledge always when it is [illegible] conjunction of soul with mind. A sense coming in contact with its object [illegible] produces knowledge only [illegible] in contact with the mind. Hence the conjunction of soul with mind should be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition of perception. Moreover the contact of a sense with its object is sometimes not found to be the cause of perception, e.g. a person listening to a song does not see colour though it comes in contact with his eye.

The definition of perception said to be defective.

In reply it is stated that if the conjunction of soul with mind is to be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition of perception, then direction (dik), space (deśa), time (kāla) and ether (ākāśa) should also be enumerated among the causes of perception. But such an enumeration is held on all hands to be undesirable. The soul, we point out, has not been excluded from our definition of perception inasmuch as knowledge is a mark of the soul. Perception has been described as knowledge and knowledge implies the soul which is its abode. Consequently in speaking of knowledge the soul has by implication been mentioned as a condition in the production of perception. The mind too has not been omitted from our definition inasmuch as we have spoken of the non-simultaneity of acts of knowledge. Perception has been defined as knowledge. An essential character of knowledge is that more than one act of knowing cannot take place at a time. This characteristic [illegible] the mind as

The definition of perception defended.

auditory perception also called ear-knowledge or sound knowledge, (3) the olfactory perception also called nose [illegible] (4) the gustatory [illegible] knowledge, and (5) [illegible] touch-knowledge [illegible] may not see colour [illegible] Yet the [illegible] that his [illegible] words, [illegible] because the [illegible]

inference

In [illegible]

Inference

Inference [illegible]

[illegible] is quite different from the manner in which they do so [illegible]

[illegible] gathering clouds is quite different from a man's imitation of it, for the latter is not natural If in such cases any wrong inference is drawn, the fault is in the person, not in the process

Comparison

Comparison, some [illegible]

Is comparison a means of right knowledge?

similarity or partial. On the ground of complete similarity we never say "a cow is like a cow"; on the ground of considerable similarity we cannot say "a buffalo is like a cow"; and on the ground of partial similarity we do not say "a mustard seed is like Mount Meru." Hence comparison is regarded by some as not a means of right knowledge, for it has no precise standard.

This objection does not, we maintain, carry any weight, for comparison is established through similarity in a high degree. The [illegible] a cow [illegible] size, [illegible]

Is comparison a case [illegible] perception?

[illegible] a strange animal one really performs an act of [illegible] perception. In reply it is urged that we cannot deny comparison as a separate means of knowledge, for how otherwise does the name *bos gavaeus* convey the general notion of the animal called *bos gavaeus*? That the name *bos gavaeus* signifies one and all members of the *bos gavaeus* class is not a result of perception but the [illegible]

[illegible] inference?

[illegible] at first sight through its special similarity to a cow which we have often perceived. This knowledge of a previously unperceived object derived through its similarity to a perceived object [illegible]

Verbal testimony

Is "word" or verbal testimony a mere inference?

Verbal testimony, some say, is inference because the object indicated by it is not perceived but inferred. Inference gives us the knowledge of an unperce[illegible]

to acquire the knowledg[illegible] word which is perceivec[illegible] testimony we pass to an unperceived object through an object which is perceived. Just as in inference there is a certain connection between a sign (e g smoke) and the thing signified by it (e g fire), so in verbal testimony there is connection between a word and the object signified by it Verbal testimony does not therefore differ from inference

In reply we say that there is a great difference between inference and verbal testimony The knowledge gained by verbal testimony is correct not simply because it comes through the medium of words but because it comes through words spoken by a reliable person There are, it is said, paradise nymphs, *uttarakurus*, seven islands ocean, human settlements, etc We accept them as realities not simply because they are known through words, but because they are spoken of by persons who are reliable Hence verbal testimony is [illegible]

"cow," we think of the animal signified by it, nevertheless the word and the animal are not connected with each other by nature or necessity In the case of inference however, the connection between a sign (e g. smoke), and the thing signified (e g fire), is natural and necessary The connection involved in inference is not therefore of the same kind as that involved in verbal testimony In the case of verbal testimony there is no perception of the connection The connection between a sign and the thing signified, which is the basis of inference, is obvious to perception For instance, the inference that "the hill [illegible]

Are there any other means of right know

knowledge as *rumour* ("aitihya") *presump-*

Other means

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] which we have first perceived. [illegible] perceived [illegible] unperceived [illegible] learned through [illegible] is said to be [illegible] inference.

In reply we maintain that it is not in a bos gavaeus [illegible] that we find the real matter of comparison. The matter of comparison is similarity e.g. between a cow and a bos gavaeus. The bos gavaeus in which we notice the similarity is first perceived; that in perceiving a bos gavaeus we notice its similarity to a cow. Hence comparison supplies us with knowledge of a perceived thing in its similarity to another thing also perceived. Th[illegible] [illegible] with [illegible] us with know[illegible] we say that it is not so "Not blue" is no doubt possible only in reference to "blue," but that blueness may exist elsewhere For instance, we can talk of this pot being not blue in contrast to that pot which is blue Moreover, we perceive non-existence as a mark antecedent to the production of a thing When we say that there will be a jar, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the jar in the halves (parts) which are destined to compose it

Non-existence or negation is not however a separate means of knowledge It is included in inference It infers one thing from the absence of another thing through the mutual connection of the two things, as follows If a particular thing existed it would have been seen, it is not seen therefore it does not exist

In the Nyāya sūtra, 2-2-12 non-existence or negation (*abhāva*) is divided into two kinds[1] viz (1) *prāgabhāva*, prior non-existence, that is, the non-existence of a thing before it is brought into existence, and (2) *pradhvamsābhāva* posterior non-existence or destruction, that is the disappearance of a thing after it has come into existence

(2) The Objects of Right Knowledge (*prameya*)

The Soul

The soul is different from the senses

A sense is not *soul* because we can apprehend an object through both *sight* and *touch* "*Previously I saw the* jar and now I touch it" such recognition will be impossible if "I" is not different from the eye which cannot touch and from the skin which cannot see In other words, the "I" or soul is distinct from the senses

Some say that the soul is not different from the senses [illegible]

[illegible]

of explaining the apprehension of colour In reply we say that the soul is certainly distinct from the senses There is no doubt, a fixed relation between a sense and its object, and [illegible]

[illegible]

apprehend only one object

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[1] [illegible]

Immortality of the soul

The soul is immortal inasmuch as we find in a child joy, fear and grief which arise from the memory of things previously experienced A new-born child [illegible]

[illegible] there is a soul continuing to his next life he will not suffer them at all This is a "loss of merited action" Again, we often find a man suffering the consequences of action which he never did in this life. This would be a "gain of unmerited action," unless we believe that his soul did the action in his previous life

Body

Our body is earthy because it possesses the special qualities of [illegible]

The senses are material.

The senses are material substances inasmuch as they invariably *receive obstruction* *Nothing can offer obstruction* to a non-material all-pervading substance The senses receive obstruction from wall, etc , and are therefore material substances

Senses.

[illegible] are dependent [illegible] ar, nose and [illegible] fications of touc[illegible] one sense viz touch (skin), all others being merely its forms [illegible]

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[1] Compare—All the senses are only modifications of touch —Democritus.

If the body were soul there should be release from sins as soon as the body was destroyed But in reality a per [illegible] the body [illegible]

[illegible] the mind inasmuch [illegible]

[illegible] cannot be the agent as it is atomic in nature An atomic agent cannot perform such diverse acts as seeing, hearing, knowing, feeling, etc

The soul is the seat of knowledge (cognitions)

Knowledge is not a natural quality of the body because it does not, in some cases, continue quite as long as the body does Knowledge belongs neither to a sense nor to its object because it continues even [illegible] of the sense, [illegible] knowledge [illegible] the sense [illegible] Simi-larly knowledge does not abide in an object of sense, and does not belong to the mind

[illegible] simultane [illegible]

Intellect.

be a quality of a conscious agent the soul Hence the intellect is not permanent

Mind

The mind is one.

The mind being one, there are no simultaneous cognitions If there had been more minds than one, they could have come in contact with many senses at a time so that many cognitions could have been produced simultaneously As many cognitions are never produced at once, the mind must be

Faults.

The faults their subdivision

The faults are divided into three groups viz affection, aversion and stupidity Affection includes lust, avarice, avidity and covetousness Aversion includes anger, envy, malignity, hatred and implacability Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, arrogance and carelessness Of the three, stupidity is the worst because it is only a stupid person who may be influenced by affection and aversion

Transmigration

Transmigration belongs to the soul and not to the body. The series [illegible]

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[1] It may be noted that in the Nyāya-sūtra there is only a casual mention of God

objects which are near (contiguous), but it cannot perceive obje which are far off. We can, however, perceive colour and sound f a great distance. This is certainly not the function of touch but some other sense which can reach distant objects.

In fact the senses are five. There are five objects, viz. col sound, smell (odour), taste (savour) and touch which are cognised res pectively by the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. There are therefo five senses corresponding to the five objects. The senses must be ad mitted to be five also on the following grounds:—(1) The characters knowledge—there are five senses corresponding to the five charac of knowledge viz. visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactua (2) The sites—the senses are five on account of the various sites the occupy. The visual sense rests on the eye-ball, the auditory sense the ear-hole, the olfactory sense on the nose, the gustatory sense the tongue, while the tactual sense occupies the whole body. (3) Th processes—there are five senses involving five different processes the visual sense apprehends a colour by approaching it through th ocular ray, while the tactual sense apprehends an object which is association with the body and so on. (4) The forms—the senses a of different forms, e.g. the eye partakes of the nature of a black ball, the ear is not different from ether, etc. (5) The materials—the sens are made up of different materials: the eye is fiery, the ear ethereal, the nose is earthy, the tongue is watery, and the skin (the is airy.

sleep, so there is no pressure of troubles and activities in one who [illegible]

[illegible] supreme felicity secured.

(3) Doubt (*saṁśaya*).

Doubt is said to be impossible

1 Some say that doubt cannot arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties, whether conjointly or separately It is said that doubt about an object is never produced, if *both* the common and uncommon properties of the object are recognized For instance, if we see in the twilight a tall object which moves, we do not doubt whether it is a man or a post We at once decide that it is a man, for though tallness is a property possessed in common by man and post, locomotion is a property which distinguishes a man from a post Likewise doubt about an object is said never to be produced if [illegible]

[illegible] replies: there is no soul The disputant and his opponent are quite sure that their respective statements are correct Hence there is no doubt, but on the contrary there is conviction, in the minds of both [illegible] by others who say that if God were the only source of fruits, man could attain them even without any acts Reconciling the two views we conclude that man performs acts which are endowed with fruits by God The acts do not produce any fruits by themselves they become fruitful only through the grace of God

The fruit is not pr [illegible]

Time of production of the fruits

time of death when the soul departs from our body Just as a tree, whose roots are now nourished with water, will produce fruits in future, so the sacred fire which is maintained now will enable the maintainer to attain heaven after death

[illegible] connection with [illegible]

thinking that pleasure is the *summum bonum*, are addicted to the world which causes them various distresses through birth, infirmity, disease, death, connection with the undesirable, separation from the desirable, etc It is therefore clear that one who pursues pleasure, does in reality pursue pain, or in other words pleasure is a synonym for pain

Emancipation

Attainment of emancipation.

Some say that there is no opportunity for us to attain emancipation because of the continual pressure of our debts,[1] troubles and activities As soon as we are born we incur, according to them, three [illegible] until the time of our decay [illegible] performed [illegible]

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[1] (1) Debt to sages ([illegible])—which can be cleared off [illegible] student life (2) Debt to gods ([illegible])—from [illegible] by performing sacrifices. (3) Debt to our progenitors [illegible] be cleared off except by begetting children.

36 Topics Incidentally Examined

(1) Parts and Whole (*avayava* and *avayavin*)

The parts alone are said to be real

Some say that *parts* alone are realities and that there is no *who* behind them A tree, for instance, is yello in some parts and green in other parts If th tree were one whole then the contradictor qualities of yellowness and greenness could not have belonged to simultaneously Hence the parts alone must, according to them b regarded as real

There is certainly a whole beyond its parts

In reply Aksapāda [illegible]

parts these latter [illegible] parts and so on, until we reac [illegible] Now the atoms which posses [illegible] ently the thing which is said t [illegible] erceptible We must therefor admit a whole beyond its parts Moreover, if there were no whole we could not have held or pulled an entire thing by holding or pullin a part of it We say 'one jar,' 'one man,' etc This use of 'one would vanish if there were no whole If any one were to say tha just as a single soldier or a single tree may not be seen from a di tance, but an army consisting of numerous soldiers or a forest con sisting of numerous trees is seen, so a single atom may not be per ceptible, but a jar consisting of numerous atoms will be perceptible and these atoms being called 'one jar,' the use of 'one' will no vanish The analogy, we reply, does not hold good because th soldiers and trees possess bulk and so are perceptible, whereas th atoms do not possess bulk and are individually not perceptible It i absurd to conclude that because soldiers and trees are perceptible in th mass, atoms too are perceptible in the mass, to avoid this conclusion we must admit the existence of a whole beyond the parts

(2) Atoms (*paramāṇu*)

In the Nyāya-sūtra 4-2-16, it is stated that there can neve come a time when there will be an utter annihilation of things Eve at the dissolution of the world (*pralaya*), things will continue to exis in the form of atoms. An atom is that which is not divisible int parts: it is a whole without parts The view that an atom canno be devoid of parts because it is pervaded by ether (ākāśa) in its inne and outer sides, is not tenable because the terms "innerside" an "outerside" are not applicable to an eternal atom which is altogethe different from an ordinary thing a constituent of which encloses, o is enclosed by, another constituent of it It is no doubt admitte that the [illegible]

Doubt is not impossible

1 In reply we say that doubt does arise from the recognitio of common and uncommon properties cor [illegible] properties commo [illegible]

[illegible] character whi [illegible]

opponent make conflicting statements, one is led to believe that bot statements are worth consideration, but is unable to penetrate into the precise characters of the statements Hence though the disputant and his opponent are both confident of their respective contentions, the umpire and the audience are thrown into doubt by their conflicting statements [illegible] from the [illegible]

does not lose its irregu ar character until the objects to which it [illegible] are removed 4 It has been urged that there is the possibility of an endless doubt inasmuch as its cause is continuous In reply we say that though materials of doubt, such as common properties, etc , continue to exist, we do not always recognize them Unless there is recognition of the common properties etc , there cannot be doubt

(4) Discussion (*vāda*)

With whom to hold discussion ?

One should hold discussions with unenvious[1] persons, such as disciples, preceptors, fellow-students and seekers of the *summum bonum* In case of a neces- [illegible]

Doubt is not impossible

1. In reply we say that doubt do
of common an
jointly The rec

object, but there is no precise (distinct
Precise knowledge (that is, knowledge o
distinguishes a man from a post) bein
Similar arguments will apply to doubt ar
uncommon properties alone 2 In the c
there is certainly a ground for doubt
statements on

umpire and the audience are thrown into
statements 3 It has been said that do
perception
the
ular
he o
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tinu
on p
Unl
it be

(4) *Discussion (vāda*

With whom to hold discussion?

One should hold discussions with unen
disciples, *preceptors*,
ers of the *summum bon*
sity for the search of
on side A person
by sim
establish

(5) Wrangling and Cavil (jalpa

Use of wrangling and cavil.

Wranglings and *cavils* may be employed t
truth just as *fences of*
to safeguard the grow
talkative people propou
are mutually opposed, while others violate all
of a bias for their own side Seeing that these
not freed from fa

The connection is conventional.

In reply we say that it is through convention that the meaning of a word is understood The connection between a word and its meaning is conventional and not natural The connection is fixed by man and is not inseparable Moreover there is no universal uniformity of connection between a word and its meaning The *ṛṣis*, *āryas* and *mlecchas* use the same word in different senses, e g the word "yava" is used by the āryas to denote a long-awned grain, but by the mlecchas to denote a panic-seed So the connection between a word and its meaning is not everywhere uniform

(5) The Veda.[1]

Is the Veda unreliable?

Some say that the Veda is unreliable, as it involves the faults of *untruth, contradiction and tautology* *For instance*, the Veda affirms that a son is produced when a sacrifice for the sake of a son (*putreṣṭi*) is performed It often [illegible]

[illegible]

thrice," "let the last hymn be recited thrice," etc

The Veda involves no faults.

In reply we say that the so-called untruth in the Veda comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice. Defect in the act consists [illegible]

[illegible]

these defects are avoided There is therefore no untruth in the Veda Neither is there any contradiction Let a person offer the oblation before sun rise or after sun-rise, if he has agreed upon doing it at either of the times Two alternative courses being open to him he can perform the sacrifice before sun rise or after sun-rise according [illegible]

[illegible]

the Veda, but there is no tautology in it Tautology means a useless [illegible]

[illegible]

embody a useful repetition

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[1] It is interesting to note how the Nyāya-śāstra defends the Veda from the attacks made against it perhaps by the followers of Ānvīkṣikī

the medical science Hence like the spells and medical science the Vedas must be accepted as authoritative.

(6) Sound (*śabda*)

The nature of sound.

There are conflicting opinions about the nature of sound Some say that sound is a quality of ether and that it is all-pervading eternal and capable of being manifested Others say that sound like smell, etc , is a quality of the substance in which it abides, and is capable of being manifested [illegible]

Sound is non-eternal.

[illegible] cussion of two hard substances, e g an axe and a tree, etc , (2) is cognised by one of our senses (the ear), and (3) is spoken of as possessing the properties of an artificial object, e g is [illegible]

[illegible] sion of two hard substances In reply it is [illegible]

Sound being cognised by our senses is non-eternal

[illegible] stance, we perceive a jar, we perceive also its genus (i e jar-ness) which is eternal In reply we say that not all things cognised by our senses are non-eternal, but only those that belong to a certain genus[1] A jar, for instance, is non-eternal because we perceive it as

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[1] The aphorism (Nyāya-sūtra 2-1-17) may also be interpreted as follows — Sound is non-eternal because it is inferred to advance in a series. We do not say that whatever is cognised by our sense is non-eternal our intention is to say that

The principle of classification of the Vedic speech

The two main divisions of the Vedá are (1) hymn (
(2) ritual (*Brāhmana*) The ritual
mits of three sub-divisions, viz the
(*vidhi*), descriptive (*arthavāda*), and
tive (*anuvāda*)

An injunction (*vidhi*), which may be either mandatory or
is that which exhorts us to adopt a certain course of ac
means of attaining good], e g "let him who desires parad
the fire-sacrifice" This is a mandatory injunction

[illegible]

that we are persuaded to perform it The deprecatory
speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of ac
quainting us with the undesirable consequences of neglect
' one who performs any other sacrifice neglecting the Jyot
into a pit and decays there" Here one is persuaded to
Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice the neglect of which brings about
quences The [illegible]

[illegible]

the foolish course of action adopted by the Caraka priests
as a warning to other priests who ought to avoid the co
narrative (*purākalpa*) is the mentioning of some thing as co
on account of its antiquity, e g. "By this the Brāhmanas
Sāma hymn, etc"

Re-inculcation (*anuvāda*) is the repetition of that whic
enjoined by an injunction Re inculcation may consist of
tion of an injunction or the repetition of that which has bee
The first is called verbal re-inculcation and the second ob
inculcation "Non-eternal not eternal" this is a verbal
"Non-eternal possessing the character of extinction"—
objective repetition

The reliability of the Veda established

The Vedas are reliable like the spells or mantras and t
science, because of the reliability
authors Spells counteract poison,
the medical science prescribes correct
is derived from the
The sages themse
intuitive perception of
and (3) they had
the truths The autho
also the authors of the

The author

d not by modification (*vikāra*), e g in *bho + ti* (*bhū + ti* =

genus, an in-
a form ?

animal), its form (limbs) and its genus or type
(cowhood or cow type) Now it is asked what
signification of a word—an individual a form or a genus
Some say that the word denotes an individual because it is
pect of individuals that we can make any statement e g
is going"—here "that" can be used only in reference to an
cow. Others say that the word denotes form by which an
recognised, e g we use such expressions as 'this is a cow,'
a horse,' only with reference to the forms of the cow and
Others hold that the word must denote genus (type), for
ot take genus into consideration the word cow might denote
al of any kind

we say that the word signifies all the three, though prom-
ven to one of them For the purpose of distinction the

is any substance which is cognised by the
ted abode of colour, taste, smell, touch, weight, solidity,
velocity or elasticity

(*ākṛti*) is that which is called the token of the genus The
genus, cowhood for instance, is recognized by a
certain collocation of the dewlap which is a

re a general
notion
cows

cows (i e derive knowledge of cowhood)
n all subsequent occasions to recognize

(*cakṣuḥ*)

that
really
n of the
is said
material
the eye,

two, the conceit of duality arises
le organ of vision being divided
the nose In reply we say that
estruction of one does not cause

material substance inasmuch
is limited by its contact. A
it has contact with the eye,
when the eye is not connected
ial substance, exercises its

belonging to the genus [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

It is said that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Artificial [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] we speak of the extension [illegible] as we speak of the extension of a blanket. In reply we say that when we speak of the extension of ether we really mean that [illegible] which has for its substratum the ether. Hence we [illegible] attribute to eternal things the properties of artificial objects. Sound is in fact not eternal because neither do we perceive it before utterance nor do we notice any cause which [illegible]. If it were eternal it would be perceived before utterance. [illegible] really existed before utterance but was [illegible] do not notice any such veil.

Traditionary teaching.

Some say that sound should be regarded as eternal because there is traditionary teaching. A teacher delivers in the form of a lecture certain words which are found to be repeated by his pupil after a long interval. [illegible] tege. immediate subsequency, separation, similar employment, position excess, receipt, intervention pleasure and pain, desire and

ning

Context—is the connection of subjects such as proof (*pramāna*), that which is to be proved (*prameya*), etc

Exercise—is the constant repetition which confirms an impression

Sign—may be (1) connected, (2) inseparable (intimate) (3) correlated, or (4) opposite e g smoke is a sign of fire with which

Possession—such as a property awakens the memory of the owner and *vice versa*

Protector and Protege—such as a king and his attendants

Immediate subsequency—as sprinkling the rice and pounding it in a wooden mortar

Separation—as of husband and wife

Similar employment—as of a fellow-disciple

Opposition—as between a snake and ichneumon

Excess—awakening the memory of that which exceeded

Receipt—reminding us of one from whom some thing has been or will be received.

Intervention—such as a sheath reminding us of the sword.

Pleasure and pain—reminding us of that which caused them

Desire and aversion—reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.

Fear—reminding us of that which caused it, e g death

Entreaty—reminding us of that which was wanted or prayed for.

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orgetful is made to recollect by being urged again and again "try and think of function only in virtue of its contact with things Others say tha the eye had been a material substance it could have apprehended o those things which coincided with itself in bulk But we find it can prehend things of greater and smaller bulk So it is contended t the eye is a non-material substance

In reply we say that
which are greater or smal
reach the things to their er
a material substance the
great and the small

(9) Intellect (*buddhi*)

Is knowledge a function of the permanent intellect?

Some philosophers[1] [the sāṁkhyas] maintain that the intellect permanent as it is capable of recognizing jects A thing which was known before known now as the identical thing. This of identifying knowledge is called recogniti which is possible only if the intellect which existed in the past contin also at the present time that is, if the intellect is permanent Kno

not different from the permanent intellect then various sorts knowledge could have as permanent entities existed simultaneous and there would have been no cessation of knowledge or recogniti Finding the absurdity of such contingencies we cannot admit the *intellect* to be a permanent entity and knowledge a function of it

(10) Memory (*smṛti*)[2]

Memory

Memory (*smṛti*) belongs to the soul which possesses knowled of the past, present and future Memory awakened by such causes as attention contex exercise, signs, marks, likeness possession, relation of protector a

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protege immediate subsequency, separation, similar employment, opposition excess, receipt, intervention pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, fear, entreaty action affection and merit and demerit

Attention—enables us to fix our mind on an object by restraining it from wandering away to any other object

Context—is the connection of subjects such as proof (*pramāna*), that which is to be proved (*prameya*), etc

Exercise—is the constant repetition which confirms an impression

Sign—may be (1) connected, (2) inseparable (intimate) (3) correlated or (4) opposite e.g. smoke is a sign of fire with which

Likeness—as the image of Devadatta drawn on a board reminds us of the real person

Possession—such as a property awakens the memory of the owner and *vice versa*

Protector and Protége—such as a king and his attendants

Immediate subsequency—as sprinkling the rice and pounding it in a wooden mortar

Separation—as of husband and wife

Similar employment—as of a fellow-disciple

Opposition—as between a snake and ichneumon

Excess—awakening the memory of that which exceeded

Receipt—reminding us of one from whom some thing has been or will be

reminding us of the sword

Plea

us of that which caused them.

us of one whom we liked or

that which caused it, e.g death

us of that which was wanted or prayed for

try and think of

has received in

and such a one—

our knowledge of

by their skill

as when a Bhikkhu

reference to a book, as

says: "Bring the book here."

as when, at the sight of goods

they were pledged)

because one has seen it, or a

smelt it, or a touch

perceived it."

7, pp. 122-123, translated

Action—such as a chariot reminding us of the charioteer
Affection—as recollecting a son or wife
Merit and *demerit*—through which there is recollection of the causes of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life

(11) The fixed signification of numbers[1] (*saṁkhyaikānta*)

Saṁkhyaikānta-vāda, the doctrine of the fixed signification of numbers

Some say that there is only *one* thing, viz Brahma Others say that things are *two*, viz the eternal and non-eternal Some find the things to be *three*, viz the knower, the knowable and knowledge; while others treat of *four* things, viz the agent of knowledge, means of knowledge, object of knowledge and act of knowledge In this way philosophers indulge themselves in a *fixed number* of things Akṣapāda opposes them by saying that the fixed number of number cannot be established In establishing the fixed number there must be a reason Now is the reason included in the number or excluded from it, or identical with it? If the reason is included in the number, it is as unfixed as the number itself. If the reason is excluded from the number, the fixity of number must be abandoned If the number and the reason are identical, there will remain no means to establish the fixity of number

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[1] This doctrine, which occurs in the Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-41, throws some light on the dialogue between Aṣṭāvakra and Vandin related in the Mahābhārata, Vana parva, chaps 132-134 (*vide ante*). It bears an analogy to the novice's questions (Kumāra-pañha) which runs as follows —

1 एकं नाम किं ? What is one ?	1 सब्बे सत्ता आहारट्ठितिका । Food is a thing on which all animals subsist
2 द्वे नाम किं ? What are two ?	2. नामञ्च रूपञ्च । Name and form
3 तीणि नाम किं ? What are three ?	3 तिस्सो वेदना । Three kinds of feeling
4. चत्तारि नाम किं ? What are four ?	4 चत्तारि अरियसच्चानि । The four noble truths.
5 पञ्च नाम किं ? What are five ?	5 पञ्चुपादानक्खन्धा । The five constituent aggregates, etc., etc.

(Khuddakapātha of the Pāli sutta Piṭaka).

CHAPTER III.

Commentaries on the Nyāya sūtra.

36a. NATURE OF THE COMMENTARIES

Commentaries are store-houses of information

In the previous chapter there has been given a summary of Nyāya-sūtra, the fundamental work on Nyāya Philosophy of the second century A D The Nyāya-sūtra was not followed, for several hundred years, by any other original treatises on Nyāya [illegible] of the sutra, the various theories of contemporaneous philosophies The commentaries are therefore store-houses of valuable information on Philosophy and Logic. It is not possible to give here a complete analysis of the commentaries, but a passing reference to some of their leading topics will be made in the following pages

37 VĀTSYĀYANA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-BHĀṢYA
(ABOUT 400 A.D).

Previous Commentaries.

The earliest commentary extant on the Nyāya-sūtra is the Nyāya bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana[1] or Pakṣila Svāmī.[2] In it there are references to previous logicians designated as *eke* (some), *kecit* (certain), or *anye* (others), who were perhaps authors of commentaries[3] which have not come down to us. The Nyāya-bhāṣya

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[1] The name Vātsyāyana occurs in the colophon of Uddyotakara's Nyāya-vārtika thus:—

यदक्षपादप्रतिभो भाष्यं वात्स्यायनो जगौ ।
अकारि महतस्तस्य भारद्वाजेन वार्त्तिकम् ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika, Book V, Chap II, last line)

[2] Vācaspati Miśra mentions the name Pakṣila Svāmin thus —

अथ भगवता अक्षपादेन निःश्रेयसहेतौ शास्त्रे प्रणीते व्युत्पादिते च भगवता-
स्वामिना किमपरमवशिष्यते यदर्थं वार्त्तिकारम्भ इति

(Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā, opening l

[3] Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya bhāṣya, 1-2-9, criticises, in definition of *kālātīta*, the opinion of a previous commentator

अवयवविपर्यासवचनं न सूत्रार्थः ।

Action—such as a chariot reminding us of the charioteer
Affection—as recollecting a son or wife
Merit and *demerit*—through which there is recollection of the causes of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life

(11) The fixed signification of numbers[1] (*samkhyaikānta*)

Saṁkhyaikānta-vāda, the doctrine of the fixed signification of numbers

Some say that there is only *one* thing, viz Brahma Others say that things are *two*, viz. the eternal and non-eternal Some find the things to be *three*, viz. the knower, the knowable and knowledge, … others treat of *four* things, viz. the agent
dge and act of
of knowledg … lves in a *fixed*
knowledge … that the fixity
number of th … fixed number,
of number c … in the number
there must … reason is included
or excluded from it, or identical with it? If the reason is included in the number, it is as unfixed as the number itself. If the reason is excluded from the number, the fixity of number must be abandoned. If the number and the reason are identical, there will remain no means to establish the fixity of number

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[1] This doctrine, which occurs in the Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-41, throws some light on the dialogue between Aṣṭāvakra and Vandin related in the Mahābhārata, Vana-parva, chaps. 132–134 (*vide* ante). It bears an analogy to the novice's question (Kumāra-pañha) which runs as follows —

1 एकं नाम किं ? What is one ?	1 सब्बे सत्ता आहारट्ठितिका । Food is a thing on which all animals subsist
2 द्वे नाम किं ? What are two ?	2 नामञ्च रूपञ्च । Name and form
3 तीणि नाम किं ? What are three ?	3 तिस्सो वेदना । Three kinds of feeling
4 चत्तारि नाम किं ? What are four ?	4 चत्तारि अरियसच्चानि । The four noble truths.
5 पञ्च नाम किं ? What are five ?	5 पञ्चुपादानक्खन्धा । The five constituent aggregates, etc. etc

(Khuddakapātha of the Pāli sutta Piṭaka).

CHAPTER III.

Commentaries on the Nyāya sūtra.

36*a*. NATURE OF THE COMMENTARIES

mmentaries are store-
es of information.

In the previous chapter there has been given a summary of Nyāya-sūtra, the fundamental work on Nyāya *Philosophy* of the *second century* A D The Nyāya-sūtra was not followed, for

[illegible]

37 VĀTSYĀYANA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-BHĀSYA (ABOUT 400 A D).

evious Commentaries

The earliest commentary extant on the Nyāya-sūtra is the Nyāya-bhāsya by Vātsyāyana[1] or Paksila Svāmī.[2] In it there are references to previous logicians designated as *eke* (some), at (certain), or *anye* (others), who were perhaps authors of commentaries[3] which have not come down to us. The Nyāya-bhāsya

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[1] The name Vātsyāyana occurs in the colophon of Uddyotakara's Nyāya-vārtika thus :—

वार्तिकम् ॥

V, Chap II, last line)

[illegible]

ng lines).

n connection with his saying—

n of

[illegible] the Nyāya-sūtra by at least two centuries, [illegible] explanations of certain terms which became al [illegible] at the time.[1]

[illegible] must have flourished before Dignāga (q.v.), the latter criticises him in connection w his explanation of the mind (*manas*) a sense-organ,[2] and possibly also before Vā [illegible] whose theory of syllogism, so antagonistic to that [illegible], has not been controverted, nay even referred to, [illegible] in his Nyāya bhāṣya.

The Nyāya-sūtra, as already observed, contains certain aph risms which refer to the doctrines expound in such well-known Buddhist works as t

327 B.C.), and in giving an example of "the incoherent" (*apārthaka*) extracts a sentence from the Mahābhāṣya[1] of Patañjali (150 B.C.).

Birthplace of Vātsyāyana

Vātsyāyana, also designated as Drāmila[2] (same as Drāvida), was in all probability a native of Drāvida (the Deccan), of which the capital was Kāñcīpura, modern Conjeeveram. The title "Svāmin"[3] appended to "Pakṣila" in the name "Pakṣila Svāmin" also points to the same country as his birthplace. We may add that Kāñcī was a famous centre not only of Brāhmanic learning, but also of Buddhistic culture, and it was here that [illegible]

[illegible]

lived about 400 A.D., when Candra Gupta II, called Vikramāditya, was king of Magadha should not be confounded with the sage or sages of that name, who compiled the Artha-śāstra and the Kāma-sūtra.

38. VĀTSYĀYANA CRITICISES NĀGĀRJUNA.

The Mādhyamika doctrine of inter-relation, *apekṣā* or *pratyaya* criticised

The sūtras 4-1-39 and 4-1-40 which seem to have been, as previously observed, interpolated into the Nyāya-sūtra[5] deal with the Buddhist doctrine of inter-relation (*apekṣā* or *pratyaya*) evidently taken from the Mādhyamika-sūtra[6] (Chapters I and XV) of Nāgārjuna who flourished about was separated from the Nyāya-sūtra by at least two centuries as we find in it explained [illegible] terms which became almost unintelligible at the time¹.

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[1] दशदाडिमानि षडपूपा
कुण्डमजाजिनं पललपिण्ड ।
(Nyāya-bhāṣya, 5-1-10, and Mahābhāṣya, 1-1-3)

[2] Jaina Hemacandra supposes Drāmila to be another name for Vātsyāyana —
वात्स्यायनो मल्लनाग कौटिल्यश्चणकात्मजो
द्रामिल पक्षिलस्वामी विष्णुगुप्तोऽङ्गुलश्च स ॥
(Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi)

Vātsyāyana would not have been called Drāmila, had he been a native of Vatsa, the capital of which was Kauśāmbī near Allahabad.

[3] Svāmin is a common surname in Madras. In Pāli books, however, we read of a sage named Vacchagotta or Vātsyāyana living in Ayodhyā.

[4] Nyāya-bhāṣya, 2-1-40, edited by Jaya Narayan Tarkapañcānana, Bibliotheca Indica series.

[5] The Nyāya-sūtra of Gotama, translated by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, S.B.H. Series, Allahabad.

[6] कपालादिव्यतिरेकेण यथा कुम्भो न विद्यते ।
वाय्वादिव्यतिरेकेण तथा रूपं न विद्यते ॥
(Mādhyamika-sūtra, Chapter I, verse 5, p. 19, B.T.S. edition, Calcutta)

Vātsyāyana preceded Dignāga and Vasubandhu.

Vātsyāyana must have flourished before Dignāga (500 A.D.) as the latter criticised [illegible] in connection with the explanation of the mind (manas) etc [illegible] and [illegible] Vasubandhu, whose theory of syllogism as distinguished from that of Akṣapāda has been controverted, may even referred to by Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya.

Vātsyāyana [illegible] Mādhyamika and the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra.

The Nyāya-sūtra as already observed contains certain aphorisms which refer to the doctrines expounded in such well-known Buddhist works as the Mādhyamika-sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, etc. These aphorisms do not constitute an essential part of the Nyāya-sūtra and were evidently interpolated into it before or during the time of Vātsyāyana² who wrote Bhāṣya commentary on it. Vātsyāyana must therefore have flourished after the composition of the Buddhist works, the doctrines of which were interpolated into the Nyāya-sūtra.

Age of Vātsyāyana.

Hence the earliest limit of his age is A.D. 300, when the Mādhyamika-sūtra and Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra are supposed to have been composed. As Dignāga lived about 500 A.D. and Vasubandhu about 480 A.D., Vātsyāyana who preceded them could not have lived after the latter date. Taking the mean between the earliest and the latest dates we may approximately fix the date of Vātsyāyana² at about 400 A.D.

Vātsyāyana in extolling the *Nyāya-śāstra* (called the *Ānvīkṣikī*), quotes a verse from the *Artha-śāstra*³ of Kauṭilya (about

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[1] Dr. H. Jacobi observes :—When commenting on Nyāya-sūtra, I-1-5, Vātsyāyana gives two different explanations of the terms *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, the names of the three subdivisions of inference, showing thereby that the meaning of these important terms had become doubtful at his time. (The dates [illegible] is [illegible] be [illegible] as, [illegible]

[2] Vide my "Vātsyāyana, author of the Nyāya-bhāṣya" in the Indian Antiquary for April 1915.

[3]

सेयमान्वीक्षिकी प्रमाणादिभिर्विभज्यमाना
"प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां विद्योद्देशे प्रकीर्तिता"

(Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-1, and Artha-śāstra, chap. II)

327 B.C.), and in giving an example of "the incoherent" (*apārthaka*) extracts a sentence from the Mahābhāṣya[1] of Patañjali (150 B.C.)

Birthplace of Vātsyāyana.

Vātsyāyana, also designated as Drāmila[2] (same as Drāvida), was in all probability a native of Drāvida (the Deccan), of which the capital was Kāñcīpura, modern Conjeeveram. The title "Svāmin"[3] appended to "Pakṣila" in the name "Pakṣila Svāmin" also points to the same country as his birthplace. We may add that Kāñcī was a famous centre not only of Brāhmanic learning, but also of Buddhistic culture, and it was here that [illegible]

lived about 400 A.D., when Candra Gupta II, called Vikramāditya, was king of Magadha should not be confounded with the sage or sages of that name, who compiled the Artha-śāstra and the Kāma-sūtra.

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[1] [illegible]

5-1-10, and Mahābhāṣya, 1-1-3).

a to be another name for Vātsyāyana —

कौटिल्यश्चणकात्मजो

ntāmaṇi).

een a native of Vatsa

ka, however we read of

vā.

Tarkapañcānana, Biblio-

Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana,

250-300 A D In the Bhāṣya on the sūtras, Vātsyāyana
marises the doctrine as follows —

Some say that things are not self existent as they exist
in relation to one another A thing is called short only in rela
to another thing which is long, and vice versa The long and sh
are inter related, but not self-existent

In the same Bhāṣya Vātsyāyana controverts the doctrine
the ground that it is self destructive If the long and short
not self existent it will be impossible to establish a relation bet
them, and in the absence of all relations the doctrine of inter rela
will fall to the ground

The Mādhyamika doctrine of Śūnyatā, voidness criticised

The sūtras 4-2-31, 4-2-32 and 4-2-33, of the Nyāya-sū
seem also to have been interpolations. In
the Bhāṣya on those sūtras, Vātsyāyana
criticises the doctrine, evidently taken from
the Mādhyamika-sūtra,[3] according to which
our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal as things ap
pearing in a dream or exhibited in jugglery or as the city of the
celestial choirs or as a mirage[1]

न सम्भवः स्वभावस्य युक्तः प्रत्ययहेतुभिः ।
स्वभावः कृतको नाम भविष्यति पुनः कथम् ॥
(Mādhyamika-sūtra, Chap XV, p 93, B T S edition, Calcutta).

न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् । (Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-39)

व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम्
(Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-40, S B H series, Allahabad).

[1] स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः ॥ 4-2-31
मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावद्वा ॥ 4-2-32
(Nyāya-sūtra translated into English by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, S B
Series, Allahabad)

[2] यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।
तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतम् ॥
(Mādhyamika sūtra, chapter VII)

यथैव गन्धर्वपुरं मरीचिका यथैव मायासुपिन यथैव ।
स्वभावशून्या तु निमित्तभावना तथोपमान् जानत सर्वधर्मान् ॥
(Quoted in the Mādhyamika vṛtti p 57, B T Society's edition, Calcutta)

[3] As explained in the Buddhist works (such as the Mādhyamika-sūtra, Laṅk
vatāra sūtra, Dvyardha śatikā, etc) The doctrine of inter-relation *pratyaya*
apekṣā) leads to that of voidness (*śūnyatā*) Compare—

यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः शून्यतां तां प्रचक्षते । . . .
यश्च स्वभावेनानुत्पादो भावानां सा शून्यता ।
यः प्रत्ययैर्जायति स ह्यजातो
न तस्य उत्पाद स्वभावतोऽस्ति ।

Nāgārjuna's logical theory of examples, *udāharana*, criticised

Nāgārjuna in his Upāyakauśalya-sūtra, chapter I, says that a thesis can be established through a reason and an example (*udāharana*), which may be either affirmative or negative A syllogism, according to him, consists of three members and not of five, the last two members, viz application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) being superfluous and not better than "analogous rejoinders" (*jātyuttara*)

Vātsyāyana[1] in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-39, answers these objections as follows.—

The application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) are essential parts of a syllogism inasmuch as they serve on the strength of the general principle involved in the example, to confirm the reason and reassert decisively the proposition which, when first advanced, was of a doubtful character After an invariable relation

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यः प्रत्ययाधीन स शून्य उक्तो
य शून्यतां जानाति सोऽप्रमत्त ॥ इति ॥

तथार्यलङ्कावतारे — स्वभावानुत्पत्तिं सन्धाय महामते सर्वधर्माः शून्या इति मया देशिता इति ॥ ह्यर्धशतिकायां शून्याः सर्वधर्माः निःस्वभावयोगेन । इति ॥

(Mādhyamika vrtti, Chap XXIV, pp 184–185, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition)

एव शून्यमुपादानमुपादाता च सर्वशः ।
प्रज्ञप्यते च शून्येन कथं शून्यस्तथागत ॥

(Mādhyamika vrtti, Chap XXII, p 160, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition)

The doctrine of voidness (*śūnya-vāda*) flourished between 200 A D. and 500 A D. Compare Dr L. Suali's Filosofia Indiana p 8.

[1] Vātsyāyana observes —

उपनयमन्तरेण साध्येऽनुपसंहृत साधको धर्मो नार्थं साधयेत् । निगमनाभावे चानभिव्यक्तसम्बन्धानां प्रतिज्ञादीनामेकार्थेन प्रवर्तनं तथेति प्रतिपादनं करोति ... न चैतस्यां हेतूदाहरणपरिशुद्धौ सत्यां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानस्य विकल्पात् जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वं प्रक्रमते, अव्यवस्थाप्य खलु धर्मयोः साध्यसाधनभावम् उदाहरणे जातिवादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठते व्यवस्थिते तु खलु धर्मयो साध्यसाधनभावे दृष्टान्ते गृह्यमाणे साधनभूतस्य धर्मस्य हेतुत्वेनोपादानं न साधर्म्यमात्रस्य न वैधर्म्यमात्रस्य वेति

(Nyāya bhāṣya 1-1-39, pp 34-35, published under the name of Nyāya-darśana, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta)

Uddyotakara too in his Nyāya vārtika, 1-1-39, cites the opinion of a certain sage who held that the application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) were not separate members of a syllogism, as they served no purpose different from that of the reason and the proposition :—

उपनयनिगमने वाक्यवाक्यान्तरे चार्थाविशेषात् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-39, p 140, edited by M M Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda, in the Bibliotheca Indica series)

The sage referred to was very probably Nāgārjuna. It is however to be noted that neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara mentions Nāgārjuna by name

[illegible]

2[illegible] A.D. In the [illegible]

[illegible]

In the same [illegible] the ground that it is self-contradictory. [illegible] not self-existent [illegible] them and in the absence of all relations the doctrine will fall to the ground.

The Nyāya on the doctrine of [illegible] criticised.

The sūtras 4-2-31, 4-2-32 and 4-2-33 of the [illegible] seem also to have been [illegible] the Bhāṣya on these sūtras [illegible] criticises the doctrine evidently [illegible] the Mādhyamika-sūtra [illegible] our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal [illegible] appearing in a dream or exhibited in jugglery or as the celestial choirs or as a mirage.[4]

न सम्भवः स्वभावस्य युक्तः प्रत्ययहेतुभिः ।
स्वभावः कृतको नाम भविष्यति पुनः कथम् ॥
(Mādhyamika-sūtra, Chap. XV, p. 91, B.T.S. edition [illegible]

न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् । (Nyāya-sūtra, 4
व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम्
(Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-40, S.B.H. series, All[illegible]

(स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः । 4-2-31
मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावद्वा । 4-2-32
(Nyāya-sūtra translated into English by Satis Chandra Vi[illegible] Series, Allahabad)

[4] यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।
तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग [illegible]

(Quoted in the Mādhyam[illegible]

[3] As explained in the [illegible] vatāra sūtra, Dvyardha-śatikā, etc.; [illegible] apekṣā) leads to that of voidness ([illegible]

thoughts alone, they say,
ll unreal
dhist doctrine by saying that
gs are capable of being sepa-
not be unreal and on the other
e incapable of being separated
of the doctrine commits accord-
ion by saying that things are un-
going on to separate them from our

e Theory of Impermanence

ich refers to the doctrine of momentari
ess (*kṣaṇikatva*) as explained in the Lan-
kāvatāra-sūtra, etc, was evidently inter-
polated by Vātsyāyana into the Nyāya-
sūtra[1] In his *Bhāṣya*—commentary—on
yana cites the opinion of *kṣaṇik-vādins* accord-
atities are momentary, as they exist for a moment
the momentariness of entities on seeing their
cay which imply production and destruction
ana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 3 2-12, 3 2 13, controverts
e of momentariness by saying that there is no abso-
nity for an entity to be replaced by another entity after
of a moment and that there is a connecting link between
gination of an entity and its cessation[3]

40 VĀTSYĀYANA'S EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN DOCTRINES

A Syllogism of Ten Members

Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-32, alludes to certain logicians according to whom a syllogism consisted of ten members as follows:—

1 Proposition (*pratijñā*)—This hill is fiery
Five ordinary members 2 Reason (*hetu*)—Because it is smoky
3 Example (*udāharaṇa*)—Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen

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[1] स्फटिकेऽपि अपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद् व्यक्तीनामहेतुः । 3-2 11
नियमहेत्वभावाद् यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा । 3-2 12.
नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः । 3-2 13
āya-sūtra, pp 86-87, edited and translated by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana.
Series, Allahabad)
ide the Lankāvatara sūtra, chap VI, called Kṣaṇika-parivarta p 99, Bengal
ty's MSS
All is in a state of flux—Heraclitus

between the reason (middle term) and the predicate (major ter has been proved in the example, there is no occasion for an arg ment to say that the application (upanaya) is a mere analog [illegible] because it is based not on a mere similarity or likeness as indicated by its particle [illegible] but on the general pr ciple established by the example.

37. VĀTSYĀYANA CRITICISES OTHER DOCTRINES OF THE BUDDHISTS

Vijñāna-vāda refuted.

The Vijñāna doctrine of existing knowledge criticised.

The sūtras 4-2-26 and 4-2-27 which seem to have been i polated into the Nyāya-sūtra[1] deal w the Buddhist doctrine of the reality knowledge (vijñāna) alone evidently ta from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra[2] chapters and X. In the Nyāya-bhāṣya, 4-2-26, Vātsyāyana[3] summa the Buddhist doctrine as follows:—

Some say that things do not possess a reality independe of our thoughts just as a web does not possess a reality indep

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Vātsyāyana seems here to have referred to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.

बुद्ध्या विवेचनात्तु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिस्तन्त्वपकर्षणे पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिव त्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥

Nyāya-bhāṣya, 4-2-26, translated by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, S.B. Series, Allahabad)

बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।
तस्मादनभिलाप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च देशिताः ॥

(Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, chap. II, p. 50, and chapter X, p. 115, of the Asi Society of Bengal)

བློ་ཡིས་རྣམ་པར་བརྟགས་ན་ཡང་།
ཀུན་རྫོབ་རང་བཞིན་མི་རྟོགས་ཏེ།
དེ་ཕྱིར་དེ་དག་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད།
ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མེད་པར་བསྟན།།

(Bkah-gyur, Mdo, ca, folio 150; also 253)

3 The Nyāya-sūtras, 4-2-26 and 4-2-27, may be interpreted in such a way tha they refer to the Mādhyamika philosophy rather than to the Yogācāra. In fac [illegible]

dent of its threads Hence it is our thoughts alone, they say, that are real, the external things are all unreal

Vātsyāyana controverts this Buddhist doctrine by saying that it is self-destructive because if things are capable of being separated *from our thoughts they cannot be unreal* and on the other hand if things are unreal they are incapable of being separated from our thoughts The holder of the doctrine commits according to Vātsyāyana, a contradiction by saying that things are unreal, and at the same time by going on to separate them from our thoughts

Kṣaṇika-vāda—the Theory of Impermanence

The doctrine of momentariness, *kṣaṇika vāda*, criticised

The sūtra 3-2-11, which refers to the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) as explained in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, etc, was evidently interpolated by Vātsyāyana into the Nyāya-sūtra[1] In his *Bhāṣya*—commentary—on the sūtra, Vātsyāyana cites the opinion of *kṣaṇik-vādins* according to whom all entities are momentary, as they exist for a moment only. We feel the momentariness of entities on seeing their growth and decay which imply production and destruction

Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 3 2-12, 3-2 13, controverts the doctrine of momentariness by saying that there is no absolute certainty for an entity to be replaced by another entity after the lapse of a moment and that there is a connecting link between the origination of an entity and its cessation[2]

40 VĀTSYĀYANA'S EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN DOCTRINES

A Syllogism of Ten Members

Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-32, alludes to certain logicians according to whom a syllogism consisted of ten members as follows —

Five ordinary members

1 Proposition (*pratijñā*) —This hill is fiery

2 Reason (*hetu*) —Because it is smoky

3 Example (*udāharaṇa*) —Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen

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[1] स्फटिकेऽपि अपरापरोत्पत्ते क्षणिकत्वाद् व्यक्तीनामहेतुः । 3-2 11
नियमहेत्वभावाद् यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा । 3-2 12
न पृत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः । 3-2 13
(Nyāya sūtra, pp 86–87, edited and translated by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. S.B H. Series, Allahabad)

[2] *Vide* the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, chap VI, called Kṣaṇika parivarta p 99, Bengal Asiatic Society's MSS
Cf All is in a state of flux—Heraclitus.

tion of eternal pleasure of the soul They based their view on the ground that human activity being always directed towards the attainment of pleasure, it was natural that the end of such activity was the enjoyment of eternal pleasure They also relied on the [illegible]

(*moksa*), which was a condition of immortality freed from fear and change, was attended with a total cessation of pain, but there was no cause for production in the emancipated soul of any pleasure which was eternal He further said that human activity was directed towards the removal of pain and not to the attainment of pleasure, which was invariably mixed up with pain and which could merely bring about bondage of an intricate form As regards the scripture-texts these, according to Vātsyāyana, spoke, no doubt, of the essence of soul as being pleasure, but pleasure signified nothing but perfect freedom from pain Hence emancipation or release was not, according to him, eternal pleasure but an absolute deliverance from pain

41 UDDYOTAKARA, AUTHOR OF THE Nyāya-vārtika (ABOUT 635 A D).

The latest date assigned to Uddyotakara.

Uddyotakara was the author of a sub-commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra called the Nyāya vārtika[1] The Vāsavadattā,[2] an immortal work of the poet Subandhu mentions Uddyotakara as a rescuer of the Nyāya, while the Vāsavadattā itself is mentioned in the Harsacarita[3] by Bāna as a classical work which humbled the pride of all previous poets The Harṣacarita[4] describes Bāna as a poet who lived at the court of King Śrī Harsa or Harṣavardhana, and the manner in which the poet introduces himself into the work leaves no room for doubt that he was very young while his patron the king was mature in age and

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[1] यदक्षपादप्रतिभो भाष्यं वात्स्यायनो जगौ ।
अकारि महतस्तस्य भारद्वाजेन वार्त्तिकम् ॥
(Nyāya-vārtika, closing lines)

[2] न्यायस्थितिमिवोद्योतकरस्वरूपां बौद्धसंगतिमिवालङ्कारभूषिताम् वासवदत्तां ददर्श
(Vāsavadattā, p 235, Hall's edition).

[3] कवीनामगलद् दर्पो नूनं वासवदत्तया ।
शक्त्येव पाण्डुपुत्राणां गतया कर्णगोचरम् ॥
(Harṣa-carita, ucchvāsa I)

[4] (Harṣa-carita, ucchvāsa II, p 58, Iśvara candra Vidyāsāgara's edition)

4 Application (*upanaya*).—So is this hill (smoky).
5 Conclusion (*nigamana*).—Therefore this hill is fiery.

Five additional members.

1 (a) Inquiry as to the proposition (*jijñāsā*).—Is this hill fiery in all its parts, or in a particular part?
2 (a) Questioning the reason (*saṁśaya*).—That which you call smoke may be nothing but vapour.
3 (a) Capacity of the example to warrant the conclusion (*śakya-prāpti*).—Is it true that smoke is always a concomitant of fire? In a kitchen there are of course both smoke and fire, but in a red-hot iron ball there is no smoke.
4 (a) Purpose for drawing the conclusion (*prayojana*).—Purpose consists in the determination of the true conditions of the hill in order to ascertain whether it is such that one can approach it, or such that one should avoid it, or such that one should maintain an attitude of indifference towards it.
5 (a) Dispelling all questions (*saṁśaya-vyudāsa*).—It is beyond all questions that the hill is smoky, and that smoke is an invariable concomitant of fire.

The five additional members serve no doubt to make our cognition clear, but they do not *prove any thing*. Hence they cannot, according to Vātsyāyana, be regarded as essential members or parts of a syllogism.[1]

God—Īśvara.

Akṣapāda in his Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-16 casually mentions Īśvara (God) whose nature is described by Vātsyāyana in the Nyāya-bhāṣya 4-1-21 as follows:

God is a soul specially endowed with qualities. He is freed from misapprehension, carelessness, etc., and is rich with merit, knowledge and concentration. He possesses eight supernatural powers which are the consequences of his merit and concentration. His merit, which conforms to his will, produces merit in each person and sets the earth and other elements in motion. God is, as it were, the father of all beings. Who can demonstrate the existence of Him who transcends the evidences of perception, inference and scripture?

[illegible]

In the Nyāya-bhāṣya 1-1-[illegible] there is mention of sects of philosophers who [illegible] that in [illegible] there was manifesta-the Nyāya-vārtika, resided at Thāneśvara which was connected with Srughna by a high road It is not unlikely that he received some time in his career patronage at the court of Thāneśvara

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[1] [illegible]

42. UDDYOTAKARA'S CONTROVERSY WITH THE BUDDHISTS

His aim was to refute the Buddhist doctrines.

The main object which prompted Uddyotakara to write his sub-commentary was to oppose Dignāga, Nāgārjuna, and other Buddhist logicians that preceded him This is evident from the opening lines of the Nyāya-vārtika in which he says "Akṣapāda the foremost of sages propounded a śāstra (body of doctrines) for the peace of the world, and I shall write an expository treatise on it to remove the veil of error cast by quibblers"[1]

Dignāga is throughout designated as *Bhadanta*[2] (a venerable Buddhist monk) whose definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*) is criticised in the Nyāya-vārtika (1-1-4), and whose denial of the evidences of comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) is reviewed in the same work (1-1-6, 7)

Do Buddhists deny the Soul?

The Buddhistic denial of the soul criticised.

In the Nyāya-vārtika, 3-1-1,[3] Uddyotakara points out a certain inconsistency among the doctrines maintained by Bhadanta Uddyotakara observes "If you (Buddhists) say that

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it stands on the high road leading from the Gangetic Doab, *via* Mirat, Saharanpur, and Ambala, to the Upper Panjab and commands the passage of the Jumna By this route Mahmud of Ghazni returned from his expedition to Kanoj, by this route Timur returned from his plundering campaign at Haridwar, and by this route Baber advanced to the conquest of Delhi."

(Ancient Geography of India, p. 347)

[1] यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनां
शमाय शास्त्रं जगतो जगाद ।
कुतार्किकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतु
करिष्यते तस्य मया निबन्धः ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika, opening lines)

[2] यतो प्रमाणाभिज्ञता भदन्तस्य यथा [illegible] प्रतिपत्तेः [illegible] प्रतिपद्यते इति सूत्रार्थे

(Nyāya vārtika, 1-1-4, p. 61, A S.B)

[3] न चात्मानमनभ्युपगच्छता [illegible] दर्शनम् [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] न चेदं वचनं नास्ति सर्वाभिसमयसूत्रेऽभिधानात् । तस्मान्नास्ति आत्मेति [illegible] सिद्धान्त बाधक इति ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 3-1-1, pp. 341-42)

experience King Harṣa reigned in Thāneśvara during the whole of the period (A D 629–644) that the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-thsang travelled through India This leads us to conclude that Bāṇa flourished about A D 635, which is the latest date that can be assigned to Uddyotakara

The date of Uddyotakara.

In the Nyāya-vārtika Uddyotakara mentions a Buddhist treatise on Logic called the Vādavidhi[1] which seems to be only another name for the Vādanyāya by Dharmakīrti. On the other hand Dharmakīrti in his Nyāya bindu[2] mentions a śāstra which evidently refers to the Nyāya vārtika, and a śāstra kāra who seems to be the same as Uddyotakara. Hence we conclude that Dharmakīrti[3] and Uddyotakara were contemporaries who flourished about A D 635

Various names of Uddyotakara

The name Bhāradvāja,[4] as applied to Uddyotakara, is derived from the family to which he belonged, while he is called Pāśupatācārya[5] on account of his having been a preceptor of the Pāśupata Śaiva sect

Residence of Uddyotakara.

Nothing is defin[illegible] Uddyota- [illegible]

Thānesvara[7] It seem [illegible]

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[1] यदपि वादविधौ साधनाभिधानं प्रतिज्ञेति प्रतिज्ञावचनमुक्तम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-33, pp 121, A S B).

[illegible]

(Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti in Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ce, fol 309).

It is reported that Vasubandhu too wrote a treatise called Vādavidhi, which is no longer extant.

[2] [illegible]

(Nyāya bindu, chap. III, pp. 110-11, Peterson's edition).

[3] For the date of Dharmakīrti see my "Uddyotakara, a contemporary of Dharmakīrti" in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, for July 1914

[4, 5] इति श्रीपरमर्षिभारद्वाजपाशुपताचार्यश्रीमदुद्द्योतकरकृतौ न्यायवार्तिके प्रथमोऽध्यायः ।

(Nyāya vārtika colophon)

[6] अयं पन्थाः स्रुघ्नं गच्छति

1-33, p 113, M M Vindhyesvarī Prasāda Dvivedin's edition)

[illegible] probably the route by which Hiuen-thsang reached Srughna in A D 635 (Vide Beal's Buddhist Records pp 186 [illegible]) Cunningham [illegible] The importance of the position [of Srughna] is shown by the fact that

43. UDDYOTAKARA CRITICISES VASUBANDHU AND NĀGĀRJUNA

The Buddhist theory of example, *dṛṣṭānta*, criticised.

In his Vārtika on the Nyāya-sūtra, I-1-37, Uddyotakara refers to a Buddhist philosopher (identified with Vasubandhu) who remarked that the three parts of a syllogism as defined by Akṣapāda were not so ingenious as they

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able fidelity by the celebrated author of the Bhāmatī, ad Brahma-sūtra ii, 2, 19 Fragments of the same sūtra are to be found in the Sarvadarśana

[illegible]

Are these last words authentic? . This seems very hard, but you know, dear Mr Rhys Davids, that I cannot help thinking that the *pudgalavāda* is more in harmony with the *duḥkha satya* and the law of *karman* than the *nairātmyavāda*, etc.

GHENT, LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN
January 7, 1901.

THE SŪTRA OF THE BURDEN BEARER.

WURZBURG,
April 23, 1901.

Dear Professor Rhys Davids,—It will probably not have escaped your notice that the "sūtra of the Burden and the Burden-bearer," which Professor de la Vallée Poussin, in his letter in your last issue (p 308), refers to as quoted by the Pudgalavādins as an authority on their side, is actually to be found in our Pali Piṭaka, at vol. iii, p. 25, of the Saṁyutta Nikāya.

The manner in which this ancient sutta was appealed to by the opponents of the Bauddhas as being against the Bauddhas' doctrine of the *non-ātman* is very instructive.

[illegible]

Uddyotakara, in his use of the sutta, is guilty of what we call, in logic, a *sub reptio*

Yours sincerely,
E. HARDY

[From the point of view of absolute truth the soul is unreal, but from the empirical standpoint it is real. The illusory relation between the fivefold aggregate and the soul as a burden and its bearer will continue until their absorption into Śūnyatā or nirvāṇa.]

there is no soul you make an assertion contrary to your own doctrine. Your doctrine is that "I" is identical neither with *rūpa* (form) nor with *vedanā* (feeling), *saṃjñā* (sensation), *saṃskāra* (impression) and *vijñāna* (knowledge). Your scripture declares: '*O monk, I am not rūpa, nor am I vedanā, I am not saṃjñā, saṃskāra is not myself, and neither am I vijñāna*.' The "I" which is not identical with the five *skandhas* (aggregates of being) is in fact the soul. One who does not admit the soul can make no sense out of the philosophy of Tathāgata. The text quoted above about the existence of the soul cannot be denied) as it actually occurs in the Sarvābhisamaya sūtra.' It is therefore clear that if Bhadanta says, 'there is no *ātman*,' he hurts his own system."

"A further text speaking of the soul is as follows:—'I shall teach you, O Bhikṣus, the burden and the burden-bearer: the five *skandhas* are the burden, and the *pudgala* is the burden-bearer.' He who says 'there is no *ātman*' is a heretic."[1]

43. Uddyotakara criticises Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna

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45. UDDYOTAKARA'S EXPLANATION OF PERCEPTION.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*), as defined by Akṣapāda, is knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of a sense with its object. The *intercourse* (*sannikarṣa*) which is of six kinds, is explained in the Nyāya-vārtika (1-1-4) of Uddyotakara as follows:—

(1) Conjunction (*saṁyoga*)—e g a jar is perceived through its conjunction with our eye

(2) Conjoined inherence (*saṁyukta-samavāya*)—e g in perceiv ing the colour of a jar there is conjunction of our eye with the jar in which colour inheres

(3) Conjoined inherent inherence (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*) —e g in perceiving the generic nature of the colour (colourness) there is conjunction of our eye with the jar in which inheres colour wherein again colourness is inherent

(4) Inherence (*samavāya*)—e g we perceive sound which inheres in our ear-cavity

(5) Inherent inherence (*samaveta-samavāya*)—e g we perceiv soundness (the generic nature of sound) which inheres i sound which in its turn is inherent in our ear-cavity

(6) Qualification or particularity (*viśeṣaṇatā*)—e g we perceiv the non-existence of a thing through the particularisatio of the spot which the thing could occupy on earth

46 UDDYOTAKARA'S DEFINITION OF INFERENCE

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-5, defines inferenc (*anumāna*) as that knowledge which is preceded by perception the reason (middle term) and remembrance of its invariable c comitance with the predicate (major term) For an instan I perceive that this hill has smoke which I remember to be variably concomitant with fire, and hence I infer that this has fire The form of inference is as follows —

(1) Whatever is smoky is fiery
(2) This hill is smoky
(3) Therefore this hill is fiery

Inference is divided by Uddyotakara as (1) exclusively—af ative (*anvayī*), (2) exclusively—negative (*vyatirekī*), and (3) af ative negative (*anvaya-vyatirekī*) Exclusively—affirmative i inference in which the middle term abides in the major term a as in things homogeneous with it, there being nothing which is h geneous from the major term, e g this is nameable, because

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1 स्मृत्यनुगृहीतो लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् । (Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-5, p 47, M M Vindhesvarī Prasada's edition)
Liṅga-parāmarśa (a syllogism from sign) as aided by remembrance

knowable. Exclusively-negative is the inference in which the middle term abides in the minor term alone, there being nothing else in which that term is known to be present, e g the earth is different from other elements, because it possesses smell Affirmative-negative is the inference in which the middle term, while abiding in things homogeneous with the major term, does not abide in any thing heterogeneous from the same, e g sound is non-eternal, because it is cognised by our senses

47. UDDYOTAKARA'S THEORY OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE

The signification of letters.

[illegible]

Uddyotakara.

[illegible]

ceding letters, viz c and o The letters c, o and w by a conventional association produce in us the cognition of the thing called cow. This is the way in which things are signified by letters or rather words composed of letters, in accordance with the Nyāya philosophy followed by Uddyotakara

Sphoṭa-vāda—the doctrine of phonetic explosion.

Uddyotakara in h [illegible]

A rival theory
Sphoṭa the outburst of a conglomerate sound

porters of *sphoṭa-vāda*, the theory of phonetic explosion. According to them, a thing is not signified by letters—no matter whether the letters are taken in their separate or collective form No single [illegible]

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(4) Inherence (*samavāya*)—*e g.* we perceive sound which inhe in our ear-cavity
(5) [illegible] —e g we perceiv inhere vity
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(2) This hill is smoky
(3) Therefore this hill is fiery

Inference is divided by Uddyotakara as (1) exc [illegible] eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin and mind), (8–13) the six objects of [illegible]

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[1] [illegible]
(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-5, p 47, M M Vindhesvari

Inference is liṅga-parāmarśa (a syllogism from sign)

49 VĀCASPATI MIŚRA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-VĀRTIKA-TĀTPARYA-ṬĪKĀ

(ABOUT 841 A.D.).

Vācaspati supports the Brāhmanic interpretations

Dharmakīrti and several other Buddhist logicians[1] having compiled treatises subversive of the interpretations of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, a Brāhmana logician of great erudition named Vācaspati Miśra wrote, in support of the Brāhmana commentators, an elaborate gloss on the Nyāya-vārtika called the Nyāya vārtika tātparya ṭīkā[2]

Vācaspati's place and time

Vācaspati, who is reputed to be a native of Mithilā (modern Darbhanga in North Behar), must have flourished in the ninth century A D, as he compiled his Nyāya sūci-nibandha[3] in the year 898, which evidently refers to the *samvat* era and corresponds to 841 A D He preceded the Buddhist logician Ratnakīrti[4] (about 1000 A.D.) who quotes him

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[1] यद्यपि भाष्यकृता कृतव्युत्पादनमेतत् तथापि दिङ्नागप्रभृतिभिरर्वाचीनैः कुहेतुसन्तमस-समुत्थापनेनाच्छादितं शास्त्रं न तत्त्वनिर्णयाय पर्य्याप्तम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā, opening lines, edited by M M Gangadhar Sastri in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

[2] In order to prevent interpolations into the Nyāya-sūtra, Vācaspati compiled an Index of the sūtras of the work called Nyāya-sūci-nibandha.

[3] न्यायसूचीनिबन्धोऽसावकारि सुधियां मुदे ।
श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्रेण वस्वङ्कवसुवत्सरे ।

(Nyāya-sūci-nibandha, colophon)

The year 898, if it refers to the samvat era, corresponds to 841 A.D, but if it refers to the śaka era, corresponds to 976 A D

[4] Apoha-siddhi, p 7; Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi, p 58 (included in Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, edited by H. P. Shastri).

We cannot also, they say, derive the cognition of a thing from a word on hearing its last letter as aided by the recollection of the preceding letters, because the recollection of letters can bring about only the [illegible] corresponding to [illegible] we [illegible] ust be [illegible] cogni [illegible] which [illegible] from [illegible] iterate [illegible] sound that [illegible] which literally [illegible] ter of [illegible] e and [illegible] tters [illegible] until at last we become cognisant of the thing signified by the word.

Apoha—negation of the opposite

Does a word denote *apoha*, exclusion?

In the Nyāya-vārtika, 2-2-65, Uddyotakara mentions the Buddhists who hold that what forms the denotation of a word is really *apoha*,[1] exclusion of the opposites A word bears, according to them, a denotation of exclusion; that is, it denotes exclusion of what is denoted by other words. Thus the denotation of a cow is the exclusion of the denotation of a non-cow, that is, a cow is that which is not a non-cow. This theory is controverted [illegible] conceive of a [illegible] idea of a cow from which the former idea is to be excluded, and if he has [illegible] of a cow there is no [illegible] h in [illegible] in of [illegible] t be [illegible] possible in the case of such a word as "all" which has nothing to exclude.

48. UDDYOTAKARA'S THEORY OF SUFFERINGS

Channels of sufferings.

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-1, says that pain or suffering (*duhkha*) is of twenty-one kinds, viz. (1) the body, (2-7) the six senses (the tattva-kaumudi occupy a most important place in the philosophical literature of India Being equally at home in all the systems of [illegible] Vācaspati [illegible] all systems [illegible] itions four schools of Buddhist philosophy,[1] viz the Mādhyamika, Vijñāna-vāda, Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika including the doctrine of the Vātsiputrīya sect; and repeatedly criticises Dignāga and Dharmakīrti[2]

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[1] [illegible]r a full criticism of the Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine of *apoha* consult the Nyāya- [illegible] chapter VI Cf also Nyāya-vārtika, 2-2-65, Bibliotheca Indica, Mim- [illegible] ka, and Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa

Reference to the four Buddhist schools

50 VĀCASPATI OPPOSES DIGNĀGA

The analogue (jāti) called "balancing the effect," kārya sama, criticised

Vācaspati Miśra, in his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā, criticises the definition of the analogue called "balancing the effect," *kārya sama*, as given by the Buddhist logician Dignāga, about 500 A D[3] "Balancing the effect"[4] is defined by Dignāga as an opposition which one offers by showing that the effect referring to the subject is different from the one referring to the example

For instance, a disputant argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is an effect of exertion
like a pot

His respondent opposes this argument by saying that no [illegible]

analogue called "balancing the effect"

Vācaspati[5] controverts Dignāga by saying, that the latter's

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[1] Nyāya vārtika tātparya tīkā, 1-1-23 1-2-4 3-1-1 4-1-33 4-2-35, etc

[2] Nyāya vārtika tātparya tīkā, 1-1-1 1-1-4 1-1-5 1-1-6 1-1-8 5-2-5, etc

[3] [illegible] Viziana gara [illegible]

[4] [illegible]

[illegible]

(Pramāṇa samuccaya, chap VI, quoted by Vācaspati)

[5] The Tibetan version runs as follows:—

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chap VI, Tshad-ma kun las btus pa chap VI, Pstan hgyur, Mdo, Co, folio 13)

Trilocana preceptor of Vācaspati

Vācaspati Miśra, whose patron was king Nṛga,[1] receive instruction in philosophy from a teache named *Trilocana*[2] Vācaspati plainly admits that his explanation of *pratyak* (perception), in so far as it refers to its division into *savikalpak* (the determinate), and *nirvikalpaka* (the indeterminate), is derive neither from the commentary of Vātsyāyana nor from the sub commentary of Uddyotakara, but reflects directly the teaching c his preceptor Trilocana This Trilocana, evidently a writer o Vaiśeṣika philosophy, must have flourished before 1000 A D whe his doctrines of generality[3] (*samavāya*) and causality[4] (*Kāry sahakārikāraṇa*), etc, were criticised by the Buddhist logicia Ratnakīrti the famous author of Apoha-siddhi and Kṣaṇabhaṅg siddhi Rājaśekhara (about 917 A D) mentions Trilocana[5] t whom is ascribed a poem called Pārtha-vijaya

Vācaspati's other works

Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāya kaṇikā,[6] a work on logic, is not no available He is said to have written com mentaries on the works of all the schoo of philosophy His commentary on the Vedānta-bhāṣya calle Bhāmatī-ṭīkā and that on the Sāmkhya-kārikā called Sāmkhy tattva-kaumudī occupy a most important place in the philosophical literature of India Being equally at home in all the ...

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[1] नरेश्वरा यच्चरितानुकारम् इच्छन्ति कर्तुं न च पारयन्ति ।
तस्मिन् महीपे महनीयकीर्तौ श्रीमन्नृगेऽकारि मया निबन्धः ॥
(Bhāmatī, last line)

[2] अत्रापि
त्रिलोचनगुरून्नीतमार्गानुगमनोन्मुखैः ।
यथामानं यथावस्तु व्याख्यातमिदमीदृशम् ॥
(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā 1-1-4, p 87, M M Gangādhar Sastri's edition)

[3] यत्तु त्रिलोचनः । [illegible]
(Ratnakīrti's Apoha-siddhi, p 13, included in the 'Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts' edited by M M Hara Prasad Shastri in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta)

[4] त्रिलोचनस्यापि परिहारः । [illegible]
(Ratnakīrti's Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi, p 58, included in the 'Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts')

[5] The following stanza, which is said to belong to the Sūktimuktāvalī, Rājaśekhara refers to Trilocana —
पार्थं त्रिलोचनादन्यः को वा वर्णयितुं क्षमः ।
[illegible]
[illegible] Pārtha-vijaya? [illegible]
[illegible]

[6] [illegible] Introduction, p 53, Calcutta University edition

[illegible] p 204, Vizianagram Sanskrit [illegible]

schools of Buddhist philosophy,[1] viz the Mādhyamika, Vijñāna-vāda, Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika including the doctrine of the Vātsīputrīya sect, and repeatedly criticises Dignāga and Dharmakīrti[2]

Reference to the four Buddhist schools

50. VĀCASPATI OPPOSES DIGNĀGA

Vācaspati Miśra, in his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā, criticises the definition of the analogue called "balancing the effect," *kārya sama*, as given by the Buddhist logician Dignāga, about 500 A D[3] "Balancing the effect"[4] is defined by Dignāga as an opposition which one offers by showing that the effect referring to the subject is different from the one referring to the example

The analogue (*jāti*) called "balancing the effect," *kārya sama* criticised

For instance, a disputant argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is an effect of exertion
like a pot

His respondent opposes this argument by saying that no conclusion can be drawn from it, because a sound is not an effect of exertion of the same ... the former being caused by ... a lump of clay. This sort ... Dignāga, signified by the ... by saying, that the latter's definition of "balancing the effect" is untenable, inasmuch [illegible] an effect of exertion, in so far as it signifies "coming into a st[illegible] of existence from that of non existence," is exactly the sa[illegible] the case of a sound as in that of a pot. Moreover, if Diṅ[illegible] definition were accepted, then the Buddhistic denial of a M[illegible] of the universe would be futile

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[1] Nyāya vārtika tātparya ṭīkā, 1-1-23 1-2-4 3-1-1 4-1-33 4-2-33, etc

[2] Nyāya vārtika tātparya ṭīkā, 1-1-1 1-1-4 1-1-5 1-1-6, 1-1-8 5-2-5, etc

[3] Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāya vārtika-tātparya ṭīkā 5-1-37, pp 489-480 Vizianagaram Sanskrit series, where Dignāga is called Bhadanta

[4] Dignāga defines *kārya-sama* (balancing the effect) as follows —

कार्यत्वान्यत्वलेशेन यत् साध्यासिद्धिदर्शनम् ।
तत् कार्यसमम् ।
(Pramāṇa samuccaya, chap VI, quoted by Vācaspati)

[5] The Tibetan version runs as follows —

བསྐྱེད་ཉིད་གཞན་ཉིད་ཙམ་ཡིན་ནི།
བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་སྟོན་པ་གང་།
དེ་ནི་བསྐྱེད་མཚུངས་འདོད་པར་རྟོགས།

(Pramāṇa samuccaya, chap VI, Tshad ma kun las btus pa, chap VI, Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 13)

Those who believe in God argue as follows —

The universe has a Maker
because it is a product
like a pot

If Diṅnāga were to oppose this argument by saying that [illegible] universe is not a product of the same kind as a pot, his [illegible] tion continues Vācaspati would constitute an analogous rejoinder called "balancing the effect." In fact Vācaspati prefers the de[illegible] nition of "balancing the effect" as given by Akṣapāda, [illegible] according to whom an effect of exertion, even when it refers to the subject alone, may be of diverse kinds

51 VĀCASPATI CRITICISES DHARMAKĪRTI

The point of defeat [illegible]

In the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā Vācaspati says that ac[illegible] ing to the Buddhist logician Kīrti (Dharma- kīrti about 635 A.D.) there are only tw[illegible] kinds[1] of the point of defeat [illegible] which occur respectively (1) when one adduces a reason w[illegible] to [illegible] (2) when one [illegible] defect in that where there is really no defect (adoṣodbhāvana). [illegible] is not correct, says Kīrti, to say that there are twenty-tw[illegible] varieties of the point of defeat inasmuch as all these are included in the two main kinds just mentioned

Vācaspati controverts the above criticism by saying that [illegible] that Akṣapāda has laid down two kinds of the point of defeat which [illegible] (1) when one misunderstands an argument [illegible] (2) when one does not understand it at all (apratipatti) [illegible] of the point of defeat into te[illegible] kinds, the view of Dharmakīrti does not differ from that of Akṣapāda, the two kinds as laid down by the latter are clearer

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[1] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

those laid down by Kīrti[1] A person defeated on the score of non-ingenuity may remain speechless or may talk irrelevantly This

certain. Vācaspati opposes him by saying that the uncertainty of reason being pointed out after the proposition has been renounced, the point of defeat must in this case be designated as "renouncing the proposition"[2]

Considering their special characters even Dharmakīrti[3] admits that there are twenty two varieties of the point of defeat

52. VĀCASPATI'S EXPLANATION OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE PERCEPTIONS, *Savikalpaka* AND *Nirvikalpaka*

Savikalpaká and *Nirvikalpaka* defined

Vācaspati[4] following his preceptor Trilocana[5] divides perception into two kinds, viz determinate or mediate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate or immediate (*nirvikalpaka*) The determinate is knowledge which admits of specification: it is the knowledge of an object as particularised by its genus, etc., e g. this is a man (an individual coming under the genus '*man*') The *indeterminate* perception on the contrary is that knowledge which admits of no specification it is the knowledge of an object derived through its first intercourse with one of our senses, e g this is *something*

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[1] Jayanta similarly observes —

अत्र कीर्तिरत्र द्विविधमिदं निग्रहस्थानानि विभजते .

(Nyāya mañjarī, āhnika 12, p 639, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

[2] Vācaspati says —

तस्मात् यदुक्तं कीर्तिना विनिश्चितार्थो हेत्वाभासानुपलब्धिभावेनोपपत्त्यपेक्षया तस्य प्रतिवादिनो हेत्वाभास एव स्वार्थं निग्रहस्थानमिति तदपास्तम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika tātparya ṭīkā, 5-2-3, p 499, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

[3] Jayanta says —

एतेषां सर्वेषां कीर्तेरपि च न विप्रतिपत्तिनिग्रहस्थानतायाम् ।

(Nyāya-mañjarī, p 659, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

[4] Vācaspati writes .—

व्यवसायात्मकपदं साक्षात् सविकल्पकस्य वाचकं, तथापि व्यवसायो द्विविधो विकल्प एवानर्थान्तरम् । स एव आत्मा रूपं यस्य तत् सविकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षम् । तदेतदतिगुरुत्वात् निर्विकल्पके एव इति व्याख्यातॄणां व्याख्यानम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya ṭīka, p 87).

[5] अस्माभिस्त्रिलोचनगुरून्नीतमार्गानुगमनोन्मुखैः ।

Niruktakāras criticised

Vācaspati further observes that the doctrine of determinate and indeterminate perceptions is very easy to comprehend and has not on that account been explained by Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya or Uddyotakara in his Vārtika The Niruktakāras[1] who flourished before Vācaspati used the term *nirvikalpaka*, but they explained it as the knowledge of an object in which its general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) features were combined Vācaspati controverts the view of the Niruktakāras by saying that if in the *nirvikalpaka* stage, an object were to combine in itself its general and particular attributes, how could, in the *savikalpaka* stage, the two, viz the general and the particular, be separated so that one might be predicated of the other in the form, 'this (particular) is man (general)'"

53 Vācaspati's Theory of Right Knowledge and Wrong Knowledge (*Pramā* and *Apramā*)

Right knowledge (*Pramā* or *tattva jñāna*) defined in the Nyāya vārtika, 1-1-2, is the knowledge of a thing as it is while wrong knowledge or error (*apramā*, *bhrama* or *mithyā jñāna*) is the knowledge of a thing as it is not

There are conflicting theories as to the exact nature of the wrong knowledge Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya vārtika tātparya ṭīkā, 1-1 2, mentions five different theories which may be summarised as follows —

(1) *Ātma khyāti* (manifestation of the self)—is a wrong knowledge in which our cognition which exists in our mind alone manifests itself as a thing existing outside of us The Yogācāra Buddhists who follow this theory say that our cognition (or knowledge) alone is real and its manifestation as external objects is a wrong knowledge

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[1] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
(Nyāya vārtika tātparya ṭīkā p 83 [illegible] Sanskrit series)

[illegible]

(2) *Asat-khyāti* (manifestation of the unreal)—is a wrong knowledge in which a thing, which is non-existent or unreal, manifests itself as existent or real, e g when a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver The piece of silver being non-existent or unreal, its manifestation is a wrong knowledge The Mādhyamika Buddhists, who hold this theory [illegible]

(3) [illegible]

as non-existent, e g when a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver our knowledge is neither that of a piece of silver (which is not present) nor that of a piece of non-silver (there being an apparent presence of a piece of silver) [illegible]
define [illegible]
say th [illegible]
be a w [illegible]
definab [illegible]
nor are they devoid of an empirical or apparent existence

(4) *A-khyāti* (non-manifestation)—is knowledge in which the difference of one thing (subject) from another thing (predicate) is not manifested on account of certain defects of our senses, etc, and owing to this non manifestation we say that the one (subject) is identical with the other (predicate), e g when a piece of shell is supposed by us to be a piece of silver, in the form "this is silver" there are *perception* of "this" (shell) and *recollection* of [illegible]

[illegible]

the Naiyāyi [illegible]

[illegible] a person mistakes one thing (e g. [illegible] piece of silver), there is an actual perception through imagination ([illegible]) of that very thing" because if he had not perceived it at all, he would not have exerted himself to pick it up. In fact when our mistake is discovered we remember that we actually perceived the thing. Hence the only rational theory according to Vācaspati Miśra is that anyathākhyāti which satisfactorily explains the origination of wrong knowledge

53a VĀCASPATI'S THEORY OF *Condition* (*upādhi*)

Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya vārtika tātparya ṭīkā, 1-1 says that an inference is based on the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of its middle term with the major term. Now, what is the nature of this invariable concomitance? The Buddhists say the middle term is in invariable concomitance with the major term if the former stand to the latter in causal relation (*kārana*) or the relation of identity (*svabhāva*)

Seeing that the Buddhistic definition is too narrow and wide, Vācaspati sets it aside by saying that the invariable concomitance is that relation of the middle term with the major term which is freed from all conditions (*upādhi*). A condition is illustrated in the following inference —

The hill is full of smoke
because it is full of fire

This is a wrong inference, because smoke always accompanies fire, but fire does not always accompany smoke

The inference will, however, be right if we attach a condition to its middle term in the following way —

The hill is full of smoke
because it is full of fire (fed by wet fuel)

Here 'wet fuel' is a condition (*upādhi*), which is attached to the middle term 'fire'. A fire by itself may not always accompany smoke, but when it is fed by wet fuel it is always attended by the same.

This kind of condition should not qualify the middle term ... must be perfectly free from all conditions. If an inference

53b THE THEORY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT (*kārya-kārana*)

In the Ny[illegible] in the Nyāya-vārtika tātparya-
ṭīkā, 3-2-17, [illegible]
hold that an [illegible]
yate) and, on [illegible]

effect pre-exists in its cause (*satah sajjāyate*) He expounds the doctrine of the Naiāyikas that an effect does not pre-exist in its cause, but that from a cause something originates which did not exist before such origination.

53c THE BUDDHIST AND JAINA SCRIPTURES CONDEMNED

Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya [illegible]
says that the
that of the Buc
deva While
and Rsabhadeva are not so How can we then place any confidence in the latter? While the Brāhmanic scripture legislates for men divided into four classes and passing [illegible]

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54 UDAYANĀCĀRYA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-VĀRTIKA-TĀTPARYA-TIKĀ-PARIŚUDDHI

(984 A D)

Udayana's works.

Vācaspati Miśra was criticised by a host of Buddhist logicians, and it was to vindicate him against their attacks that [illegible]

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[1] The Nyāya vārtika tātparya tīkā pariśuddhi embodies elaborate notes on the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya tīkā of Vācaspati Miśra whose words Udayana proposes to elucidate by the grace of the Goddess of Speech, thus:—

मातः सरस्वति पुनः पुनरेष नत्वा
बद्धाञ्जलिः किमपि विज्ञपयाम्यवेहि ।
वाक्चेतसोर्मम तथा भव सावधाना
वाचस्पतेर्वचसि न स्खलतो यथैते ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tīkā pariśuddhi, 1-1-1, edited by M M Vindhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin and M.M Lakshman Śāstri, in the Bibliotheca Indica series

[2] [illegible]
[illegible]
(Ātma-tattva-viveka, last lines).

Udayana's [illegible] Lakṣaṇāvalī [illegible] in the Śaka year 906 corresponding to A.D. 984. [illegible] on the east bank of the river Kamalā.

[illegible]

55. UDAYANA [illegible] THE BUDDHISTS.

[illegible]

It is said of Udayana that he frequently defeated the Buddhists[1] in religious discussions but the latter did not admit his victory over them. One day there was a very hot controversy between him and the Buddhists on the question of the existence of God. Not being able to make them believe in God by arguments Udayana ascended the top of a hill taking a Brāhmaṇa and a Śramaṇa (Buddhist) with him. He hurled both of them down from the top of the hill. When falling down on the ground the Brāhmaṇa cried aloud 'there is God' while the Śramaṇa exclaimed 'there is no God.' It so happened that the Śramaṇa died of the fall while the Brāhmaṇa came to the ground unhurt. This fact was considered as a convincing proof of the existence of God.

Udayana gained victory but was blamed as a murderer. Becoming penitent, he proceeded to the temple of Jagannātha at Puri. After he had lived there for three days and three nights, he was told in a dream that Jagannātha would not appear before him until he was cleansed of his sin by performing the penitentiary rites of *tuṣānala* at Benares. Accordingly he went to that city, where he put an end to his life by *tuṣānala*, i.e. by burning himself in a slow fire. It is said that Udayana was not pleased with the decision of Jagannātha as that deity did not show any mercy towards him in consideration of the services he had rendered to maintain his glorious existence. Udayana, while dying, thus addressed Jagannātha :—

"Proud of thy prowess thou despisest me—upon whom thy existence depended when the Buddhists reigned supreme!"[3]

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[1] तर्काम्बराङ्कप्रमितेष्वतीतेषु शकान्ततः ।
वर्षेषूदयनश्चक्रे सुबोधां लक्षणावलीम् ॥
(Lakṣaṇāvalī, colophon)

[2] Vide my article on "Buddhism in India" in the Journal, Buddhist Text Society, part I, 1898.

[3] ऐश्वर्यमदमत्तोऽसि मामवज्ञाय वर्तसे ।
पुनर्बौद्धे समायाते मदधीना तव स्थितिः ॥

56. UDAYANA OPPOSES KALYĀNA RAKṢITA AND DHARMOTTARA

The doctrine of *apoha*.

Kalyāna Rakṣita (about 829 A D) and Dharmottarācārya (about 847 A D), two Buddhist logicians [illegible]

añjali. In the Ātma-tattva-viveka Udayana criticised the theories of *apoha* (the knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites), *Kṣana-bhanga* (the momentary existence), *srutyaprāmānya* (denial of the authority of the Veda), etc, propounded by Kalyāna Rakṣita in his Anyāpoha-vicārakārikā, śruti-parīkṣā, etc, and by Dharmottara in his Apoha-nāma-prakarana and Kṣana-bhanga-siddhi

57 UDAYANA'S KUSUMĀÑJALI.

God—*Īśvara*.

The Kusumāñjali (literally "a handful of flowers"), which is divided into five chapters called clusters, treats of the supreme soul (*Paramātmā*) or God (*Īśvara*) whose worship enables us, according to Udayana, to attain paradise and emancipation "Although all men worship Him alike under various names, there is," says he, "no harm in carrying on a logical investigation about Him which may also be called His worship"

Proof of the existence of God, *Īśvara*.

In the course of the investigation, Udayana says that there is an unseen cause called desert (*adṛṣṭa*)[1] which determines our happiness and misery When we perform a good or bad action, the merit or demerit that ensues therefrom resides in our soul under the name of *adṛṣṭa* or desert Associated with a suitable time, place and object, it produces in us pleasure or pain

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[1] That there is an unseen cause called *adṛṣṭa* (desert) is proved on the following grounds —

(a) An effect proceeds from a cause If there had been no interdependence [illegible] called the Veda. [illegible] the Veda is [illegible]. The Veda is [illegible] eternal [illegible]. Non-eternal as it is, it cannot be a source of right knowledge unless we suppose its author to be a reliable person. That person is God. Those who deny God virtually overthrow the authority of the Veda.

If you say that there is no God as we do not perceive Him, Udayana silences them by stating that the non-perception of an object can prove its non-existence only if the object is one which is ordinarily perceptible. God is not ordinarily perceptible and hence our non-perception of Him does not prove His non-existence.

It has been contended that God is no authority to us inasmuch as He does not possess *right knowledge*. A right knowledge, nay, knowledge of any kind concerns itself with an object unknown before. God's knowledge which is not limited by time and space cannot come under this description because it never refers to an object previously unknown. Udayana meets the contention by *saying that the description of right knowledge cited above is incorrect*. A right knowledge should, in his opinion, be defined as an independent apprehension which corresponds to its object in the external world. God is the source of such knowledge and is therefore the supreme authority to us.

There are many proofs to establish the existence of God. The earth being a product like a pot must have a maker. The maker must be an intelligent being possessing a will to bring atoms together and to support them. That intelligent being is God. It is He who introduced the traditional arts such as carpentry, weaving, etc., which have come down to us from time immemorial.

(c) The effects which are diverse in character imply a diversity of causes. As our happiness and misery are diverse in character, we cannot say that God or nature alone is their cause. They must be due to the diversity of our deserts.

(d) It is a universal practice to perform good actions and avoid bad actions as the means of gaining happiness and avoiding misery. The actions themselves dis[illegible]

सापेक्षत्वादनादित्वाद् वैचित्र्याद् विश्ववृत्तितः ।
प्रत्यात्मनियमाद् भुक्तेरस्ति हेतुरलौकिकः ॥

(Kusumāñjali, stavaka I)

God having made this world causes it to collapse, and having destroyed it remakes it as a magic show. His will manifests itself unhindered in all actions

[illegible]

Kusumāñjali, as follows —

"Iron-souled are they in whose hearts Thou canst find no place, though repeatedly washed by the inundations of ethics and sacred texts; still in time, O Merciful One, Thou in Thy goodness wilt save those people too, because even in going to controvert Thy existence they have earnestly meditated on Thee"[1] "As for us, O Thou Essential Beauty, though our minds have been long plunged in Thee, the ocean of joy, yet are they verily restless still and unsatisfied therefore, Oh Lord, haste to display thy mercy, that, our minds being fixed only on Thee, we may no more be subject to the afflictions of death[2]"

58. UDAYANA'S ĀTMA-TATTVA-VIVEKA.

An analysis of the Ātma-tattva viveka

The Ātma-tattva-viveka (lit a discussion about the true nature of the soul) is otherwise called Bauddhādhikāra (a discourse concerned with the Buddhists) or Bauddha dhikkāra (Fie to the Buddhists). It[3] proposes to refute four Buddhistic theories in order to establish a permanent soul The four theories are (1) *kṣaṇa-bhanga*—that every thing is momentary, (2) *vāhyārtha-bhanga*—that things possess no external reality, (3) *guṇa-guṇi-bheda-bhanga*—that a substance is not distinct from its qualities;

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[1] इत्येव श्रुतिनीतिसम्प्लवजलैर्भूयोभिराक्षालिते
येषां नास्पदमादधासि हृदये ते शैलसाराशयाः ।
किन्तु प्रस्तुतविप्रतीपविधयोऽप्युच्चैर्भवच्चिन्तकाः
काले कारुणिक त्वयैव कृपया ते तारणीया नराः ॥

(Kusumāñjali, stavaka 5, edited and translated by E B Cowell and M C Nyāyaratna, Calcutta)

[2] अस्माकन्तु निसर्गसुन्दर चिराच्चेतो निमग्नं त्वयि
अद्धानन्दनिधौ तथापि तरलं नाद्यापि सन्तृप्यते ।
तन्नाथ त्वरितं विधेहि करुणां येन त्वदेकाग्रतां
याते चेतसि नाप्नुयाम शतशो याम्याः पुनर्यातनाः ॥

(The Kusumāñjali, stavaka 5, edited and translated by E B Cowell and M C Nyāyaratna, Calcutta)

[3] The Ātma-tattva-viveka, edited by Jaya Nārāyana Tarkapañcānana, pp. 1, 9, 10, 24, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, 39, 45, 46, 47, 53, 69, 89, 92, 93, etc

known as *Vṛttikāra*, was the son of Paṇḍita Candra[1] If we suppose him to be identical with his namesake the great-grandson of Śakti Svāmin,[2] minister of King Muktāpīḍa, he must have flourished in Kāśmīra in the 10th century A D

Date of Jayanta

He could not have lived earlier than the 9th and later than the 11th century A.D as he quotes Vācaspati Miśra[3] (841 A D) and Māgha[4] (about 905 A D) in the Nyāya-mañjarī, and is himself quoted in the Ratnā-vatārikā[5] by Ratnaprabha (1181 A D), and in the Syādvāda-ratnākara[6] by Deva Sūri (1086–1169 A D)

60 JAYANTA'S EXPLANATION OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE

Words and their meanings

Abhihitānvaya-vāda and Anvitābhidhāna-vāda

In explaining verbal knowledge Jayanta reviews two theories[1] called respectively the *Connection of the Expressed* (*abhihitānvaya vāda*) and the *Expression of the Connected* (*anvitābhidhāna-vāda*) The Bhatta Mīmāṁsakas, who uphold the first theory, main-

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[1] [illegible] इति च [illegible]
[illegible] इति यं [illegible] पुनः ।
[illegible]
[illegible] ॥

(Nyāya mañjarī chapter XII, colophon p 659, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

[2] The lineage of Jayanta is described in the opening verses of the Kādambarī kathāsāra which was composed by his son Abhinanda.

[3] यदपि [illegible] — [illegible] — इति यदपि [illegible]
[illegible] इति [illegible] ॥

(Nyāya mañjarī, p 312, edited by M M Gangādhar Śāstri, in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series)

[4] Nyāya mañjarī, p 84 Māgha is said to be a cousin of Siddharṣi author of Upamiti bhava prapañcā Kathā

[5] तथा च जयन्तः
[illegible] । न हि [illegible] .. . .
(Ratnāvatārikā chap I).

[6] [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥
(Syādvāda ratnākara chap II)

In 1348 A D Rājaśekhara Sūri quotes Jayanta as follows —
[illegible] ।

(Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri's Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya, verse 103, chapter on Śaiva darśana).

[1] Nyāya mañjarī, chapter VI, pp 432-433 Vizianagaram Sanskrit series.

ection which
and by words
tence after con-

veying their respective meanings disappear, and then the meanings themselves produce in us a knowledge of their mutual connection which is called verbal knowledge The Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas who uphold the second theory, say that it is only in a sentence that words can express to us any meanings, and produce in us the knowledge of a mutual connection among those meanings called verbal knowledge

The Nyāya doctrine of *tātparya* intention

Jayanta dismisses the second theory on the ground that it presupposes a word to bear various meanings *in connection with* various words in a sentence It is indeed absurd to suppose that a word bears no definite meaning He also does not completely accept the first theory inasmuch as words alone do not produce verbal knowledge, as is evident from the fact that a sentence composed of disorderly and ungrammatical words does not express a systematic meaning As an amendment of the first theory we must assume that a sentence, if it is to convey a consistent meaning, must have, underlying it, a power called intention (*tātparya*) over and above its component words

Jayanta opposes sphota-vāda

Sphoṭa vāda—the theory of phonetic explosion

Jayanta examines *sphota*,[1] the theory of phonetic explosion, which he pronounces to be untenable The grammarians (*Vaiyākarana*), who propound the theory, define *sphota* (explosion) as the essence of sound revealed by a letter, word or sentence The sound-essence, which is revealed by a letter, is called *varna-sphota*, a letter-explosion, that revealed by a word is called *pada-sphota*, a word-explosion, and that revealed by a sentence is called *vākya sphota*, a sentence explosion As there is a constant relation between a sound and the thing signified by it, the sound-essence of a letter, word or sentence, as soon as we hear it, reminds us of a thing corresponding to the same.

Suppose a person utters the word *cow* composed of the letters c, o and w. As soon as we hear c, there is revealed to us the essence *cow* in an indistinct form and then as we go on

n-

is

l-

the sound

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[1] *Nyāya mañjarī*, āhnika 6 Cf *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya*, kānda I, Vaiyākarana-bhūṣana sāra and Śabda-kaustubha, and Max Muller's Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 402

essence of the entire word in a distinct form is called *sphoṭa* or phonetic explosion,

A single letter, unless it is a complete word, cannot signify any thing. While some, the advocates of *pada-sphoṭa*, say that a [illegible] the words are mere parts of a sentence and the letters are parts of words.

Now, what is the nature of a sound-essence (*sphoṭa*)? A sound-essence is eternal and self-existent, bearing a permanent relation to the thing signified by it It is *revealed* by a letter, [illegible] is eternal, persists to signify the thing called *cow*

Jayanta's criticism of *sphoṭa-vāda*

Jayanta, as a Naiyāyika, opposes the above theory by saying that it is a most cumbrous one In the case of the word "cow," *c* and *o*, after being heard, no doubt pass away, but they leave on our soul (which is eternal) impressions which coupled with our [illegible] not perceive it in all times and everywhere? If, on the other hand [illegible]

61 JAYANTA CRITICISES THE DOCTRINES OF KALYĀṆA RAKṢITA (ABOUT 829 A.D.) AND DHARMOTTARA (847 A.D.).

Apoha, Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga, Īśvara bhaṅga, etc.

Jayanta in his Nyāya-mañjarī (chapters V, VII, IV and III) severely criticises the doctrines of *apoha* (the knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites), *kṣaṇa-bhaṅga* (the momentary existence), *śrutyaprāmānya* (denial of the authority of the Veda),

Iśvara-bhaṅga (the non existence of God), etc , propounded by Kalyāṇa Rakṣita, ([illegible] kārikā Iśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā, and [illegible]
his Apoha-nāma-pra [illegible]

62 JAYANTA'S REVIEW OF SEVERAL OTHER BUDDISTIC DOCTRINES

The Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika, etc

In the Nyāya-mañjarī, chapters I–III, Jayanta criticises definition of *pratyakṣa* (perception) as g by Dharmakīrti who is designated a *Bhikṣu*, *Saugata*, *Bauddha* or *Śākya* tries also to refute the Buddhist theories t there are only two means of right knowledge (perception and in [illegible]

[illegible] mentioned and criticised in chapters [illegible]

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are

ferred to as saying that the so-called external objects are m forms of our cognition which alone is real The Mādhyamikas said to hold that the world is void as our cognition is transpare and formless

In chapter XII Jayanta observes that even Dharmakī maintained that Points of Defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) were of 22 kind In the same chapter as an instance of the incoherent (*apārthaka* Jayanta cities the metaphysical views of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrā tika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika.

Jayanta carried on such a vehement crusade against th Buddhists that in the *Nyāya-mañjarī* he actually reproached the as follows :—

guides What a strange character the Bauddhas possess, they are verily a monument of conceit."[1]

63 ŚRIKAṆṬHA
(BEFORE 1409 A D).

About 1409 A D Gunaratna, a Jaina philosopher, in his Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti mentions a Brāhmaṇa logician named Śrīkantha[2] who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra called Nyāyālaṅkāra.

64 ABHAYATILAKOPĀDHYĀYA
(BEFORE 1409 A D)

In the Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti the Jaina philosopher Gunaratna mentions a Brāhmana logician named Abhayatilakopādhyāya[3] who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra called Nyāya-vṛtti

65 OTHER COMMENTATORS ON THE NYĀYA-SUTRA.

These are the principal Brāhmana commentators on the Nyāya-sūtra Subsequently there arose a number of commentators such as Vardhamana, author of the Nyāya-nibandha prakāśa, Vācaspati Misra the junior, author of Nyāya-tattvāloka, Visvanātha, author of Nyāya-vṛtti, etc , whose names are not mentioned here as they belong to the modern school of Nyāya in respect of their style and method of interpretation

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[1] नास्त्यात्मा फलभोगमात्रमथ च स्वर्गाय चैत्यार्चनं
संस्काराः क्षणिका युगस्थितिभृतश्चैते विहाराः कृताः ।
सर्वं शून्यमिदं वसूनि गुरवे देहीति चादिश्यते
बौद्धानां चरितं किमन्यदियती दम्भस्य भूमिः परा ॥

(Nyāya mañjarī, 7th Āhnika, p 467, Gangādhara Śāstri's edition)

[2], [3] Gunaratna observes —

एते तर्कग्रन्थाः न्यायसूत्र - भाष्य - वार्त्तिक-तात्पर्यटीका-तात्पर्यपरिशुद्धि न्यायालङ्कार-वृत्तयः । क्रमेण अक्षपाद वात्स्यायन उद्योतकर वाचस्पतिमिश्र-श्रीउदयन-श्री कण्ठ अभयतिलकोपाध्याय विरचिताः ४४०० ।

(Ṣaddarśana samuccaya vṛtti called Nyāya (Tarka)-rahasya-dipikā, chap II, p 94, edited by Dr L Suali, in the Bibliotheca Indica)

CHAPTER IV.

The Nyāya recognized as a Branch of Orthodox Learning

66 A COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE OF THE ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ AND THE NYĀYA

The means for gaining recognition

The Indian Logic at its first stage called *Ānvīkṣikī* was ofte looked *upon with positive* disfavour and subjected to adverse criticisms, as its deduc*tions were held apparently to be* sophistical and heterodox But at the second stage when it was named *Nyāya*, it gradually got a steady foothold and an increasing number of followers, *nay it succeeded, as we read in the* writings of Yājña-valkya [1] and others, in gaining recognition as a branch of orthodox learning *On account of its intrinsic worth it became* the most prominent of the six systems of philosphy called *Ṣaḍdarśana* Ab [illegible] the *Veda and adapting* itself [illegible] nto the orthodox comm [illegible] ical approbation

67 THE NYĀYA INCLUDED IN *Ṣaḍdarśana.*

The Jaina writers include *Nyāya* in *Ṣaḍdarśana*

After the term darśana (philosophy) had come into use at *the beginning of the Christian era,* widely divergent systems of thought were desig-nated by *this common appellation* W learn that at a later period six systems [illegible] called *Ṣaḍdarśana* Opinions differ as t [illegible] but it i [illegible] Accord [illegible] Ṣaḍdar-śana-samuccaya [illegible] Bud-*dhist, the Nyāya,* the Sāmkhya [illegible] a, th Vaiśeṣika and the Jaiminīya (comprising the Mīmāmsā and th Vedānta). Jinadatta Sūri [2] (about 1220 A D) reviews the same si systems in his Viveka-vilāsa under the head of *Ṣaḍdarśana vicāra.* Another Jaina writer named Maladhāri Śrī Rājaśekhara Sūri[1] (1348 A.D.) enumerates the same six systems in a different order, viz. the [illegible]

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[1] The Yājñavalkya-samhitā, 1-3

बौद्धं नैयायिकं सांख्यं जैनं वैशेषिकं तथा ।
जैमिनीयं च नामानि दर्शनानाममून्यहो ॥
(Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, verse 3, Dr [illegible] edition)

[2] About the date of Jinadatta Sūri, Sir R G Bhandarkar in his Report o Sanskrit Manuscripts for 1883 84, p 156, observes: "Jinadatta therefore live in the first half of the 13th century of the Christian era." Klatt in his Onomasticon, no 44, maintains on the authority of [illegible] and Prabandha

The Brāmanic writers recognize Nyāya as a constituent of Ṣaḍdarśana.

[illegible] Prakāśa on the Naiṣadhacarita, speaks of *Ṣaḍdarsana* in which he evidently includes the *Nyāya*. In the Hayaśirṣa-pañcarātra,[3] a Brāhmanic work supposed to have been introduced into Bengal by Rājā Vallāla Sena (about 1158–1170 A.D.) as well as in the Gurugītā of the Viśvasāra-tantra, the six systems comprising *Ṣaḍdarsana* are specified as the philosophies of Gotama (*Nyāya*), Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika), Kapila (Sāmkhya), Patañjali (Yoga), Vyāsa (Vedānta) and Jaimini (Mīmāmsā). By the term *ṣaḍdarśana* the Brāhmanic writers understand at present these six systems to the exclusion of the Jaina and the Buddhist which are considered by them as lying outside the pale of it.

68 THE NYĀYA SUPPORTS THE VEDA.

Authority of the Veda established.

In the Nyāya-mañjarī[4] Jayanta observes that the authority of the Veda was to a large extent established through the aid of the science of reasoning called the Nyāya. The reasoning

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cintāmani that Jinadatta Sūri was present at the pilgrimage of Vastupāla in samvat 1277 or 1220 A.D.

[1]
जैनं सांख्यं जैमिनीयं यौगं वैशेषिकं तथा ।
सौगतं दर्शनान्येवं नास्तिकं तु न दर्शनम् ॥

(Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri's Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, p. 1, Yaśovijaya-granthamālā, Benares)

[2]
साङ्गं प्रपञ्चयति न पञ्चमुखे न तां
सर्वाभ्युपैति न प्रपञ्चमपि भावे ।
यस्यां द्वये नियतवाङ् विमतौ मतानाम्
षड्दर्शनस्य इव सत्यतरेऽपि लोकः ॥ (Naiṣadhacarita, 13–36)

In the commentary on this verse Nārāyaṇa says —

तमामां सांख्यादि षड् दर्शनानां मध्ये . . .परमार्थतो विद्यमानेऽपि षड्दर्शने तथे ....
बुद्धाद्यविचार दृष्टो जनो यथा यदा न जाने।

[3]
गौतमस्य कणादस्य कपिलस्य पतञ्जलेः ।
व्यासस्य जैमिनेश्चापि दर्शनानि षडेव हि ॥

(Hayaśirṣa pañcarātra, a work which is quoted by Raghunandana in his Deva pratiṣṭhā tattva.) This verse is quoted in the Gurugītā of the Viśva sāra-tantra.

[4] The Nyāya mañjarī, pp. 4–5, edited by Gangādhara Śāstri, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series.

required for the establishment of such authority has been dealt with in the Nyāya more fully than in any other system of philosophy. The Mīmāṁsā treats of the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions, but it does not examine their worth through the employment of reasoning. The Nyāya[1] alone demonstrates that the Veda is authoritative, because it was delivered by sages who were trustworthy persons. It is true that the Buddhists and Jainas too wrote treatises on reasoning, but these being opposed to the Veda cannot properly be included in the Nyāya, one of the fourteen branches of orthodox learning. In fact it is the work of Akṣapāda that should really be called Nyāya the supporter of Veda. The Nyāya sūtra actually defends the Veda from the attacks of those who find in it untruth, contradiction and tautology, and declares the sacred text to be infallible like a spell or the medical science.

69. THE NYĀYA ADAPTS ITSELF TO ŚAIVISM

(1188 A.D.)
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Nyāya-śāstra was promulgated by the gracious Siva himself

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[1] The Nyāya sūtras 2-1-58 and 2-1-69, translated by Satischandra Vidyabhusana, S B H series, Allahabad.

[2] The Naiyāyikas were also called Yaugas.

अथादौ नैयायिकानां यौगापराभिधानानां लिङ्गादिस्वरूपमुच्यते । सदा शिवभक्तत्वात् शैवा इत्युच्यन्ते। वैशेषिकास्तु पाशुपता इति। तेन नैयायिकमतं शैवमाख्यायते। वैशेषिकदर्शनं च पाशुपतमिति। ....

अक्षपादमते देवः सृष्टिसंहारकृच्छिवः ।
विभुर्नित्यैकसर्वज्ञो नित्यबुद्धिसमाश्रयः ॥

(Ṣaddarśana samuccaya of Haribhadra Sūri, edited by Dr Suali pp 49-52)

[3] Saddarśana samuccaya of Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri, pp 8-11, published in the Yaśovijaya granthamālā series, Benares.

[4] [illegible] कथामनुप्राप्य [illegible] ।
तेन [illegible] विद्यां [illegible] ॥
[illegible] ।
[illegible] विद्यां [illegible] ॥

... mathana rāla, chapter XVI, 3199 in the col

Characteristics of the Naiyāyikas

The Naiyāyikas are called Śaivas because they look upon, as their tutelary deity, Śiva who is the creator and destroyer of the universe. As described by Maladhārī Rājaśekhara Sūri the Naiyāyikas, identified with Śaivas, walked nude, wore matted hair, besmeared their bodies with ash and subsisted on roots and fruits. They always meditated upon Śiva and worshipped his eighteen figures, muttering the formula *om namah Śivāya*, "hail! obeisance to Śiva."

Naiyāyikas salute Śiva

Akṣapāda, author of the Nyāya-sūtra, was a son of Soma-Śarmā[1] who was Śiva incarnate. Vātsyāyana begins his Nyāya-bhāṣya with obeisance to the *Pramāṇas* (Means of Knowledge), but in the body of the book he describes God[2] (*Iśvara*) in a style applicable only to Maheśvara (Śiva).

Whatever might have been the faiths of Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana, there is no doubt that all the Brāhmanic Naiyāyikas from Uddyotakara downwards were Śaivas. Uddyotakara, as is evident from the colophon of his Nyāya-vārtika, was a leader of the Pāśupata Śaiva sect. The Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra opens with salutation to Pinākin (Śiva) while the Nyāya works of Udayana[3] contain abundant proofs that their author was a Śaiva by faith. Bhāsarvajña, author of the Nyāya-sāra,[4] and Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, author of the Tattvacintāmaṇi, begin their works with salutation to Śambhu or Śiva "the Supreme Lord and the Seer of all truths."

70 THE POPULARITY OF NYĀYA ESTABLISHED

Three causes make Nyāya popular

From the above it is clear that three distinct causes contributed to the popularity and predominance of Nyāya as a school of philosophy. The first was the intrinsic worth of the system which was acknowledged as most useful in carrying on processes of reasoning and which obtained for the system the foremost rank among the schools of philosophy called *Ṣaddarsana* In the second place we notice that having supported the authority of the Veda the Nyāya was readily recognized as an approved branch of learning, and the charge of heterodoxy levelled against it at its early stage was proved to be baseless Thirdly, the fact that Nyāya adopted the Śaiva cult gave it a positive stamp of orthodoxy and gained for it an unquestionable recognition

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[1] Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa published under the name of Vāyupurāṇa by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, adhyāya 23, verses 200 seq.

[2] Nyāya-bhāṣya, 4-1-19, 21.

[3] Kusumāñjali, chapter I, opening line; chapter II, last verse; chapter IV, last verse, etc.

[4]
प्रणम्य शम्भुं जगतः पतिम्परं
समस्ततत्त्वार्थविदं स्वभावतः ।
शिशुप्रबोधाय मयाभिधास्यते
प्रमाणतद्भेदतदन्यलक्षणम् ॥

(Nyāya-sāra, p. 1, edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta.)

PART II.

THE MEDIÆVAL SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC

CALLED

PRAMĀṆA-ŚĀSTRA—THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE.

(400 A D —1200 A D)

SECTION I.

The Jaina Logic (400 A.D.—1700 A.D.).

CHAPTER I.

Topics of Logic mentioned in the Jaina Canons

1. THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF MEDIÆVAL LOGIC (FROM CIRCA 509 B C. ONWARDS)

Termination of the Ancient School.

In Part I a short account has been given of the Ancient School of Indian Logic which deals as we have seen, with the doctrine of the soul and its salvation, as well as with the rules of debate and true reasoning The Ancient School, which reached the height of its development at the hands of Akṣapāda about 150 A.D., extended over a period of one thousand years, beginning with Gautama about 550 B C and ending with Vātsyāyana about 400 A D It must not however be supposed that the Ancient School became extinct at 400 A D A host of commentators such as Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya, who flourished subsequently, kept the stream of that Logic flowing But the thousand years from 550 B C to 400 A D. represent what may be termed the period of organic growth of the Ancient School.

Formation of the Mediæval School.

Part II will represent a system of logic called the Mediæval School, the foremost exponents of which were the Jainas and the Buddhists—two powerful sects that were founded by Mahāvīra and Buddha about 600 B C At the time of the founders, and in subsequent times, the Jaina and Buddhist writers occasionally handled the principles of pure logic in expounding the dogmas of their own religion and metaphysics Some of the writers even [illegible] other frag-

Mediæval School of Indian Logic This school covered a period of nearly eight hundred years from 400 A D to 1200 A D In matter and method the Mediæval School conducted by the Jainas and Buddhists differs markedly from the Ancient School which was essentially Brāhmanic The Ancient Logic dealt with sixteen [illegible] categories [illegible]

only in so far as these are necessary for its proper elaboration The doctrine of *pramāna* is treated in such a way that it may be equally applied to the religious systems of the Brāhmanas, Jainas and Buddhists Inference, a kind of *pramāna*, which was briefly noticed in the Ancient Logic, receives a full treatment in the Mediæval School Numerous technical terms are coined and great subtleties are introduced into the definition of terms, the theory of syllogism, etc *Prameya*, the object of knowledge, is [illegible] works on logic to treat [illegible] comprised under this [illegible] called in Sanskrit

The works [illegible] tute the Jaina Lo[illegible] tute the Buddhi[illegible] Jainism, precede[illegible] treat of the Jaina Logic

2. MAHĀVIRA—THE FOUNDER OF JAINISM
(599–527 B C)

The Jainas maintain that their religion is coeval with time According to their traditions there appeared at various periods in the world's history sages whom they call *Jinas*, conquerors of [illegible] and [illegible] sages are [illegible]

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[1] Period of evolution or [illegible]

Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhadeva, the 24th was Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna,

[illegible]

except Pārśvanātha the 23rd Tīrthankara was a subsequent invention

3 THE JAINA SECTS—ŚVETĀMBARA AND DIGAMBARA (FIRST CENTURY A D)

The Jainas are divided into two sects, the *Śvetāmbaras*, those who are clothed in white, and the *Digambaras*, those who are sky-clad or naked The *Śvetāmbaras* claim to be more ancient than the *Digambaras*, whose existence as a separate sect is said to date from A D. 82,[1] i e 609 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* by Mahāvīra

4. INDRABHUTI GAUTAMA—A DISCIPLE OF MAHĀVĪRA (607 B C—515 B C)

The teachings of Mahāvīra as represented in the scriptures are said to have been collected[2] by a disciple of his, called Indrabhūti This disciple is often known as Gautama or Gotama He subsequent times, the Jaina and Buddhist writers occasionally handled the principles of pure logic in expounding the dogmas of *their own religion and metaphysics.* Some of the writers even

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[1] पणछस्सयवस्सं पणमासजुदं गमिय वीरणिव्वुइदो सगराजो। (Trilokasāra of the Digambara sect) "Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa* 605 years 5 months before the Śaka King (78 A D) came to the throne," that is, in 527 B C As he lived 72 years he must have been born in 599 B C

According to Vicārasreṇi of Merutunga, Tīrthakalpa of Jinaprabha Sūri, Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa, Tapāgaccha paṭṭāvalī, etc , of the Śvetāmbara sect—Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa* 470 years before Vikrama Saṁvat or in B C 527

Dr Jacobi of Bonn, in his letter dated the 21st October 1907, kindly writes to me as follows:—

"There is however another tradition which makes this event (viz the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra) come off 60 years later, in 467 B C (see Pariśiṣṭa Parvan, Introduction, p 4 f also Kalpasūtra Introduction, p 8) The latter date cannot be far wrong because Mahāvīra died some years before the Buddha whose death is now placed between 470-480 B C "

[2] The Śvetāmbaras say —छव्वास सयाइं नवुत्तराइं तइया सिद्धिंगयस्स वीरस्स तो बोडियाण दिट्ठी रहवीरपुरे समुप्पन्ना। "The Digambara doctrine was preached in Rathavīrapura 609 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* by Mahāvīra (Āvaśyaka niryukti—52) But the Digambaras deny this and say that the Śvetāmbaras rose in Vikrama 136 or 79 A D Cf Bhadrabāhucarita IV 55

मृते विक्रमभूपाले षट्त्रिंशदधिके शते ।
[illegible] मतं श्वेताम्बराभिधम् ॥
[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Jaina Harivaṁśa Purāṇa)

and metaphysics, laid the true foundation of what is termed the Mediæval School of Indian Logic This school covered a period of nearly eight hundred years from 400 A D to 1200 A D In matter and method the Mediæval School conducted by the Jainas and Buddhists differs markedly from the Ancient School which was essentially Brāhmanic The Ancient Logic dealt with sixteen categories such as *pramāna*, *prameya*, etc comprising such heterogeneous elements as doctrine of salvation and nature of the soul, etc The Mediæval Logic, on the contrary, concerns itself with one category viz *pramāna*, which touches upon other categories only in so far as these are necessary for its proper elaboration. The doctrine of *pramāṇa* is treated in such a way that it may be equally applied to the religious systems of the Brāhmanas, Jainas and Buddhists Inference, a kind of *pramāna*, which was briefly noticed in the Ancient Logic, receives a full treatment in the Mediæval School Numerous technical terms are coined and great subtleties are introduced into the definition of terms, the theory of syllogism, etc *Prameya*, the object of knowledge, is

tute the Buddhist Logic Seeing that Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, preceded Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, I shall first treat of the Jaina Logic

2 MAHĀVĪRA—THE FOUNDER OF JAINISM
(599–527 B C)

The Jainas maintain that their religion is coeval with time According to their traditions there appeared at various periods in the world's history sages whom they call *Jinas*, conquerors of their passions, or *Tīrthaṅkaras*, builders of a landing place in the sea of existence. These sages preached the religion of the Jainas The Jainas hold that in every cycle of time (*utsarpinī or avasarpinī kāla*[1]) 24 sages are born The first sage of the last series was

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[1] Period of evolution or involution

In the Sthānāṅga sūtra[1] an example, called in Prākṛta *nāa* (in Sanskrit *jñāta*), is divided into four kinds, viz (1) *āharaṇa*, a complete example which bears similarity to the thing exemplified in all respects, (2) *āharaṇa-taddesa*, a limited example which bears similarity to the thing exemplified only in respect of a part, (3) *āharaṇa-taddosa*, a defective example, and (4) *upanyāsopanaya*, an anecdote used as an example.

Various kinds of example

In the Sthānaṅga sūtra[2] the following are enumerated as expedients in a hostile debate or debate *a l'outrance* (1) *Asakkaittā* taking some time in making oneself ready, (2) *ussakkaittā*, [illegible]

Expedients in a debate (*vivāda*)

defects (*doṣa*) of a debate :—

(1) *Tajjāta-doṣa*, the defect arising from a disputant being agitated in mind (2) *matibhaṅga-doṣa*, the defect arising from the failure of his memory, (3) *praśāstṛ-doṣa*, the defect arising from the authorities, e g the president or the members, showing partiality, (4) *pariharaṇa-doṣa*, avoidance of the charges brought by a disputant, (5) *lakṣaṇa-doṣa*, the defect of definition [which may be too wide, too narrow or altogether incomprehensible], (6) *kāraṇa-doṣa*, the defect of arguing, (7) *hetu-doṣa*, committing fallacies, (8) *saṁkramaṇa-doṣa*, diversion to other subjects, (9) *nigraha-doṣa*, the defect of understanding, and (10) *vastu-doṣa*, the defect of the subject (of debate)

The defects of a debate

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[1] चउव्विहे णाए पन्नत्ते, तं जहा, आहरणे, आहरणतद्देसे, आहरणतद्दोसे, उवन्नासोवणए।

(Sthānāṅga-sūtra, p 300, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta)

[2] छव्विहे विवादे पन्नत्ते, तं जहा, ओसक्कइत्ता, उस्सक्कइत्ता, अणुलोमइत्ता, पडिलोमइत्ता, भइत्ता, भेलइत्ता।

(Sthānāṅga-sūtra, p. 421, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta).

[3] दसविहे दोसे पन्नत्ते, तं जहा, तज्जायदोसे मइभंगदोसे, पसत्थारदोसे परिहरणदोसे, सलक्खण-कारण हेउदोसे संकामण निग्गहवत्थुदोसे।

(Sthānāṅga sūtra, p. 500, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta).

Hetu

The word "Hetu" is found in the Prākṛtra scriptures, b its use in these works makes it clear th it had not at this period acquired a v definite significance In the Sthānānga-sūtra[1] it is used not o in the sense of reason, but also as a synonym for valid knowle (*Pramāna*) and inference (*Anumāna*) *Hetu* as identical with v knowledge (*Pramāna*) is stated to be of four kinds, viz —

(1) [illegible] from perception (*Pratyaksa*);
(2) [illegible] *nāna*);
(3) [illegible] (*Upamāna*),
(4) [illegible] or reliable au rity (*Āgama*)

When *Hetu* is used in the sense of inference (*Anumāna*), classified according to the following types —

(1) This *is*, because that *is* There is a fire, because th smoke
(2) This *is not* because that *is* It is not cold, because th a fire
( ) This *is*, because that *is not* It is cold here, because is no fire
(4) This *is not* because that *is not* There is no *śimśap* here, because there are no trees at all

Several terms of debate

In the Sūtrakṛtānga[2] there is mention of *vitarka* (in Prā *viyakka*) in the sense of speculation, (in Prākrta *takka*) in the sense of r ing or debate, *paksa* (in Prākrta *pakkha*) in the sense of a and *chala* in the sense of quibble

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[1] अहवा हेऊ चउव्विहे पन्नत्ते तं जहा
पच्चक्खे अणुमाणे उवमे आगमे ।
अहवा हेऊ चउव्विहे पन्नत्ते तं जहा
अत्थि तं अत्थि सो हेऊ अत्थि तं ।
णत्थि सो हेऊ णत्थि तं अत्थि सो
हेऊ णत्थि तं णत्थि सो हेऊ ॥

(Bhagavatī-sūtra, p 336 and Sthānānga-sūtra, pp 309-310, publis Dhanapat Singh and printed in Calcutta)

[2] [illegible] न [illegible] ।
एवं तुपक्खं [illegible] आरंभ [illegible] ॥ १८ ॥
एवमेव वियक्काहिं नो अन्नं पज्जुवासिया
अप्पणो य वियक्काहिं, अयमञ्जू हि दुम्मई ॥ १९ ॥
एवं तक्काहि साहिता, धम्माधम्मे अकोविया ।
दुक्खं ते नाइतुट्टंति सउणी पंजरं जहा ॥ २० ॥

(Sūtrakṛtānga, p 62, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta)

[illegible]

[illegible] was the author of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti, but [illegible] hold the view that the second was the author of several of [illegible] existing Jaina works. [illegible]

[illegible] be concluded that Bhadrabāhu lived in the reign of Candra [illegible]

7. BHADRABĀHU'S SYLLOGISM.

[illegible] ith [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] १७० ।
[illegible]
[illegible] ॥ १८ ॥

rvāvali by Munisundara-sūri published in the Jaina Yaśovijaya-granthamālā res, p 4)

'ide the Sarasvatī gaccha-paṭṭāvalī in the Indian Antiquary, October 1891 rch 1892

'ide Dr R G Bhandarkar's Reports on Sanskrit MSS during 1883-84

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Kalpa-sūtra-subodhikāvṛtti printed in Bombay).

CHAPTER II

Early Jaina writers on Logic

BHADRABĀHU THE SENIOR (CIRCA 433-357 B.C.)

BHADRABĀHU THE JUNIOR (CIRCA 375 A.D. OR 453 [illegible] A.D.)

Though we come across some technical terms of Ancient Logic in the canonical scriptures of the Jainas, yet we have no proof that the Jainas undertook at that stage to write any regular work on logic. The early Jaina writers who discussed definite problems of logic, were Bhadrabāhu and Umāsvāti. An elaborate discussion of certain principles of logic is found in a Prākṛta commentary on the Daśavaikālika-sūtra, called Daśavaikālika-niryukti. This commentary was the work of one Bhadrabāhu of the Prācīna Gotra. For 45 years this sage lived the ordinary life of the world, 17 years he passed in the performance of religious vows (*Vratas*), and for 14 years he was acknowledged by the Jainas to be the foremost man of his age (*Yuga-pradhāna*).[1] He was a *Śrutakevalin*,[2] that is, one versed in the 14 *Pūrvas* of the *Dṛṣṭivāda*.

The above-mentioned incidents are generally accepted as facts in the life of the author of the commentary. There is, however, some doubt as to the time in which he lived.[3] According to the records[4] of the *Śvetāmbaras* he was born in 433 B.C. and died in 357 B.C. The *Digambaras* maintain there were two Bhadrabāhus, that the first (Bhadrabāhu the *senior*) lived to 162 years from the

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[1] For particulars vide Dr. J. Klatt's Kharataragaccha-paṭṭāvalī in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247; Weber II, p. 999; Peterson's 4th *Report* [illegible]

[illegible]

[4] In Weber II, p. 999, in which the Gurvāvalī-sūtra of Mahopādhyāya Dharmasāgaragaṇi is noticed, we read of Sambhūtivijaya and *Bhadrabāhu* "Ubhau pṛ[illegible] pasthapaṭṭadharau."

चतुर्दशः पूर्वभृतां द्वितीयः
श्रीभद्रबाहुश्च (७) गुरुः शिवाय ।
पञ्चाद्विवरलब यो
बहु भत्याधिनीतिं ॥ ११ ॥

nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra, that is, up to 365 B.C., and that the second[1] (Bhadrabāhu the junior) to 515 years from the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra that is, up to 12 B C They do not state definitely which of these Bhadrabāhus was the author of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti, but they hold the view that the second was the author of several of the existing Jaina works. The *Śvetāmabara* records do not contain any mention of the second Bhadrabāhu, but in the Ṛṣimaṇḍala-prakaraṇa-vṛtti[2] and Kalpa-sūtra-subodhikā-vṛtti,[3] two commentaries of the *Śvetāmbaras*, and in the Caturviṁśati prabandha, it is stated that Bhadrabāhu lived in the south in Pratiṣṭhāna and was a brother of Varāhamihira. Now Varāhamihira is popularly believed to have lived in the first century B C It is possible therefore, even according to the *Śvetāmbaras*, that the Daśavaikālika-niryukti was the work of a commentator who, if we rely on popular belief, lived about the time of the opening of the Christian era As a fact Bhadrabāhu could not have lived much earlier than 500 A D if he was a brother of Varāhamihira

From the confusing traditions preserved by the Jainas, it may be concluded that Bhadrabāhu lived in the reign of Candra Gupta II, called Vikramāditya, about 375 A.D

Whatever was his date, the author of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti wrote commentaries (niryuktis) on the following Jaina scriptures.—Āvaśyaka-sūtra, Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Ācārāṅga-sūtra, Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra, Daśāśruta-skandha-sūtra, Kalpa-sūtra, Vyavahāra-sūtra, Sūrya-prajñapti-sūtra, and Ṛṣibhāṣita-sūtra.

7. BHADRABĀHU'S SYLLOGISM

Bhadrabāhu did not set himself to analyse knowledge with the object of evolving a system of logic His object was to illus-

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त्रिदुंक त्रिरामयपयोविराय
सार्द्धं च वीरात् कनकेन्दुवर्षे १७० ।
तयोर्विनेय स्थविरभद्र-
श्रीस्थूलभद्रस्य ददातु हर्षं ॥ ११ ॥

(Gurvāvali by Munisundara-sūri published in the Jaina Yaśovijaya-granthamālā of Benares, p 4)

[1] *Vide* the Sarasvatī gaccha-paṭṭāvalī in the Indian Antiquary, October 1891, and March 1892.

[2] *Vide* Dr R G Bhandarkar's Reports on Sanskrit MSS during 1883-84, p. 138, Bhadrabāhu must have lived as late as the 6th century A D, if he was really a brother of that Varāhamihira who was one of the nine Gems at the court of Vikramāditya. Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya maintain that Bhadrabāhu's brother was not the same Varāhamihira that adorned the court of Vikramāditya

[3] प्रतिष्ठानपुरे वराहमिहिर भद्रबाहु द्विजौ भ्रातरौ । भद्रबाहोराचार्य्ये पदप्राप्ते रुष्टः सन् वराहो द्विजवेषमाश्रित्य वाराहीं संहितां कृत्वा निमित्तैर्जीवति ।

(Kalpa-sūtra-subodhikāvṛtti printed in Bombay).

CHAPTER II.

Early Jaina writers on Logic.

BHADRABÃHU THE SENIOR (CIRCA 433-357 B.C)

BHADRABÃHU THE JUNIOR (CIRCA 376 A.D. OR 450-520 A.D.

Though we come across some technical terms of Ancient log in the canonical scriptures of the Jainas, yet we have no pro that the Jainas undertook at that stage to write any regular wo on logic The early Jaina writers who discussed definite pro lems of logic, were Bhadrabāhu and Umāsvāti An elabo discussion of certain principles of logic is found in a Prākrta com mentary on the Daśa-vaikālika sūtra, called Daśavaikālika ni yukti This commentary was the work of one Bhadrabāhu[1] the Prācina Gotra For 45 years this sage lived the ordinary li of the world; 17 years he passed in the performance of religio vows (Vratas), and for 14 years he was acknowledged by th Jainas to be the foremost man of his age (Yuga pradhāna)[1] was a Śrutakevalin,[2] that is, one versed in the 14 Pūrvas of th Drstivāda

The above-mentioned incidents are generally accepted as la in the life of the author of the commentary. There is, howe some doubt as to the time in which he lived[4] According to th records[5] of the Śvetāmbaras he was born in 433 B.C. and died 357 B.C. The Digambaras maintain there were two Bhadrabāhu that the first (Bhadrabāhu the senior) lived to 162 years from th he gods It is as likely that fire will be cold as that they will be oved by the gods, as to do them honour will be regarded by men

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[1] ... gaccha-pattāvali in the In ... 4th Rep

...ed by Peterson ... included among

...ar's Report, ...

[4] In Weber II, p 999, in which the Gurvāvali masāgaragani is noticed, we read of Sambhūtivij sasthapattadharau "

[5]

स्वस्ति' पूर्वभृता द्वितीय.
श्रीभद्रबाहु (७) ...
...

nte truth"

(7) An instance or example (*Dṛṣṭānta*),—"the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* do not even cook food, lest in so doing they should take life. They depend on householders for their meals"

(8) Questioning the validity of the instance or example (*Āśankā*),—"the food which the householders cook is as much for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* as for themselves If, therefore, any insects are destroyed in the fire, the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* must share in the householders' sin Thus the instance cited is not convincing."

(9) The meeting of the question (*Āśankā-pratiṣedha*),—"the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* go to householders for their food without giving notice and not at fixed hours How, therefore, can it be said that the householders cooked food for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*? Thus the sin, if any, is not shared by the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*"

(10) Conclusion (*Nigamana*),—"to refrain from taking life is therefore the best of virtues, for those who so refrain are loved by the gods, and to do them honour is an act of merit for men."

8 BHADRABĀHU'S EXPLANATION OF *Syādvāda*

Syādvāda

Bhadrabāhu in his Sūtra kṛtānga niryukti[1] mentions another principle of the Jaina Logic called *Syādvāda* (*Syat* "may be" and *Vāda* "assertion," or the assertion of possibilities) or *Saptabhangī-naya* (the sevenfold paralogism)

The *Syādvāda*[2] is set forth as follows —(1) May be, it is, (2) may be, it is not, (3) may be, it is and it is not, (4) may be, it trate the truth of certain principles of the Jaina religion. I this he in his Dasavaikālika niryukti,[1] elaborated a syl consisting of ten parts (*Dasāvayava vākya*), and then demon how the religious principles of Jainism satisfied the condi this syllogism

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[1] असियसय किरियाणं
अकिरियाण च होइ चुलसीति ।
अन्नाणिय सत्तट्ठी
वेणइयाणं च बत्तीसा ॥ ११ ॥

(Sūtra kṛtānga niryukti, skandha 1, adhyāya 12, p 448, edited by Bhim Singh Manak and printed in the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay).

Cf Sthānānga-sūtra, p 318, published by Dhanapat Singh, Benares edition.

[2] Cf Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, translated by Cowell and Gough, p 53 For full particulars about Syādvāda or Saptabhangī naya vide Saptabhangī tarangiṇī by Vimala Dāsa printed in Bombay

The following is an example —

The Syllogism of ten parts

(1) The proposition (*Pratijñā*),—"to refrain from taking is the greatest of virtues."

(2) The limitation of the proposition (*Pratijñā vibhakti*)—"t refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues, according to th Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras"

(3) The reason (*Hetu*),—"to refrain from taking life is th greatest of virtues, because those who so refrain are loved by t gods and to do them honour is an act of merit for men"

(4) The limitation of the reason (*Hetu-vibhakti*),—"none b those who refrain from taking life are allowed to reside in t highest place of virtue"

(5) The counter-proposition (*Vipakṣa*),—"but those who de pise the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras and take life are said to be loved by the gods, and men regard doing them honour as an act of merit Again, those who take life in sacrifices are said to be residing in the highest place of virtue. Men, for instance, salute their fathers-in-law as an act of virtue, even though the latter despise the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras and habitually take life Moreover, those who perform animal sacrifices are said to be beloved of the gods"

(6) The opposition to the counter-proposition (*Vipakṣa-prati tiṣedha*),—"those who take life as forbidden by the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras do not deserve honour, and they are certainly not loved b

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[1] ते उ पइन्न विभत्ती हेउ विभत्ती विवक्खपडिसेहो।
दिट्ठंतो आसंका तप्पडिसेहो निगमणं च ॥ १३७ ॥

(Daśavaikālika-niryukti, p 74 published under the patronage of Dhana Singh by the Nirṇava Sāgara Press, Bombay, and Dr E Leumann's edition Daśavaikālika-niryukti, p 649)

The Jainas characterise a syllogism of ten parts as the best (*uttama*) a syl gism of five parts as the mediocre (*madhyama*), and a syllogism of two parts the worst (*jaghanya*) Candra Prabha Sūri (1102 A D) observes —

अवयवापेक्षया जघन्य मध्यमोत्कृष्टास्तिस्र कथा भवन्ति इति। तत्र हेतुप्रतिपादक जघन्या। द्व्याद्यवयवनिवेदन मध्यमा, सम्पूर्ण दशावयवकथनमुत्कृष्टा।

(Nyayāvatāra-vivṛti on verse 20 of Nyāyāvatāra p 8, edited by Satis Chan Vidyabhusana, Calcutta) Similarly Ratnaprabha Sūri (1181 A D) says —

पक्षादिद्व्यवयव पञ्चधाख्या। तत अमुमर्थं दशावयव परार्थानुमानम् इत्युक्तं अर्थ मध्यमं तु पक्षावयवादारभ्य यावत् पञ्चावयवम्। जघन्यं पुन साधनमात्रोपन्यास प्रतिपाद्यानां मन्दबुद्ध्यादिमत्त्वात्।

(Syād vāda-ratnā karā vatārikā, p 20 Chap. III and Bechar Das in the Yaśovijaya Series Benares) tanaya. He was also known as Vātsi-suta, because his mother was Umā of the Vatsagotra In the Tirthakalpa of Jinaprabhasūri, it is stated that Umāsvāti was the author of 500 Sanskrit prakaranas (treatises) He is said to have belonged to the *Śvetāmbara* sect, though it is probable that the distinction between that sect and the *Digambaras* had not in his time come into existence

10 UMĀSVĀTI S DOCTRINE OF *Pramāna* (RIGHT KNOWLEDGE)

In the [illegible]

Paroksa, indi
ledge, and
direct knowled

ledge, which is acquired by the soul through external agencies such as the organs of sense, and (2) *Pratyaksa*, direct knowledge, which is acquired by the soul without the intervention of external agencies. *Paroksa*, indirect knowledge, includes *mati* [1] and *sruta*, for these are acquired by the soul through the medium of the senses and the mind Knowledge which is attained by *Yoga* (concentration) in its three stages of *avadhi* *manahparyāya* and *kevala* —is a species of *Pratyaksa*, direct knowledge, because it is acquired by the soul not through the medium of the senses

Umāsvāti contends [2] that inference (*Anumāna*), comparison

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same as Umāsvāti) is included as the sixth Digambara Sūri of the Sarasvatī gaccha,

[illegible]

इति दिगम्बराचार्येषु [illegible] इति ॥

(Jambudvipa-samāsa, p 39, published as Appendix C to the Tattvārthādhigama sūtra in the Bibliotheca Indica series)

The Tattvārthādhigama sūtra has been translated into English by Mr J L Jaini of Indore

[1] *Mati* is knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind

Sruta is knowledge of things (past, present and future) acquired through

[illegible]

अनुमानोपमानागमार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानपि च प्रमाणानीति केचिन्मन्यन्ते तत्कथमेतदिति
अत्रोच्यते । सर्वाण्येतानि मतिश्रुतयोरन्तर्भूतानि इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात् ॥

(Tattvārthādhigama sūtra, p 15)

is indescribable, (5) may be, it is and yet is indescribable, (6) ma be, it is not and it is also indescribable, (7) may be, it is and it not and it is also indescribable

9 UMĀSVĀTI

(1–85 A. D.)

The Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra

Jaina philosophy recognises seven categories, viz (1) the s (Jīva), (2) the soulless (Ajīva), (3) (Āsrava), (4) bondage (Bandha), (5) re-straint (Saṃvara), (6) destruction of the consequences of action (Nirjarā), and (7) release or salvation (Mokṣa) According to the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra[1] which with a Bhāṣya or commentary was composed by one Umāsvāti, these categories can be comprehended only by Pramāṇa, the means of valid knowledge and by Naya, the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints

Umāsvāti is better known as Vācaka-śramaṇa he was this title being

Umāsvāti's life

genealogy) The Hin

Umāsvāti-vācakācārya

days and ascended heaven in Saṃvat 142, i e in the following account

kh, but he

Kusumapura

gotra Hi

called Svāti

---

by Pūjyapā

ālankār

न्यग्रोधिकाप्रसूतेन विहरता पुरवरे कुसुमनाम्नि ।
कौभीषणिना स्वातितनयेन वात्सीसुतेनार्घ्यम् ॥ ३ ॥
अर्हद्वचनं सम्यग्गुरुक्रमेणागतं समुपधार्य ।
दुःखार्तं च दुरागमविहतमतिं लोकमवलोक्य ॥ ४ ॥
इदमुच्चैर्नागरवाचकेन सत्त्वानुकम्पया दृब्धम् ।
तत्त्वार्थाधिगमाख्यं स्पष्टमुमास्वातिना शास्त्रम् ॥ ५ ॥

(Tattvārthādhigama sūtra chap X p 233, edited by Mody Keshavlal Pre chand in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta)

A similar account is found in the commentary on the Tattvārthādhigama sūt by Siddhasenagaṇi This account is mentioned by Peterson in his 4th Report Sanskrit Manuscripts, p xvi

For further particulars about Umāsvāti see Peterson's 4th Report on Sansk Manuscripts, p xvi, where he observes that in the Digambara Paṭṭāvali publish by Dr Hoernle in the Indian Antiquary, XX, p 341, Umāsvāmin (probably t

Samgraha

Samgraha, the collective, is the method which takes into consideration generic properties only, ignoring particular properties

Vayavahāra.

Vyavahāra, the practical, is the method which takes into consideration the particular only The general without the particular is a nonentity If you ask a person to bring you a plant, he must bring you a particular plant, he can not bring plant in general

Ṛju sūtra

Ṛjū-sutra, the straight or immediate, is the method which considers a thing as it exists at the moment, without any reference to its past or its future It is vain to ponder over a thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future All practical purposes are served by considering the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man who in a previous birth was my son is now born as a prince, but he is of no practical use to me now. The method of *Ṛju-sūtra* recognises the entity itself (*bhāva*), but does not consider its name (*nāma*) or image (*sthāpanā*), or the causes which constituted it (*dravya*) The fact that a cowherd is called *Indra* does not make him lord of the heavens An image of a [illegible]

Śabda

is of three kinds, viz *Sāmprata*, the suitable, *Samabhirūdha*, the subtle, and *Evambhūta*, the such-like. In Sanskrit a jar is called *ghata*, *kumbha* or *kalasa*, and these are synonymous terms *Sāmprata* consists in using a word in its conventional sense, even if that sense is not justified by its derivation For example the word "*Śatru*," according to its derivation, means "destroyer," but its conventional meaning is "enemy." *Samabhirūdha* consists in making nice distinctions between synonyms, selecting in each case the word which on etymological grounds is the most appropriate *Evambhūta* consists in applying to things such names only as their actual condition [illegible]ies Thus a man should not be called *Śakra* (strong), [illegible]ually possesses the *Śakti* (strength) which the name [illegible]

शब्द [illegible] अर्थे प्रत्यय साम्प्रत. ऋजु अर्थेषु

gama sūtra, p 32).

(*Upamāna*), verbal testimony or reliable authority (*Āpta*), presumption (*Arthāpatti*), probability (*Sambhava*), and non-existence (*Abhāva*), are not separate sources of valid knowledge; he includes them under *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). According to his theory the majority of them are the result of the contact of the senses with the objects which they apprehend, and some of them are not sources of valid knowledge at all.

It is interesting to note that according to Umāsvāti and the earlier Jaina philosophers all sense-perceptions (visual perception, auditory perception, etc.) are indirect apprehensions, inasmuch as the soul acquires them not of itself but through the medium of the senses. The words *Parokṣa* and *Pratyakṣa* are thus used by these authors in senses quite opposite to those which they bear in Brāhmanic logic and in the later Jaina Logic.[1]

11. UMĀSVĀTI'S EXPLANATION OF *Naya* (THE MOOD OF STATEMENTS)

Naya, the method of descriptions or mood of [illegible]

In the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, *Naya*[2] is described as the method by which things are comprehended from particular standpoints. *It is of five* [illegible] the non-distinguished [illegible] the col[illegible] [illegible]traight or [illegible] [illegible]h an ob[illegible] [illegible]h general and specific properties, no distinction being made between them. For instance, when you use the word "bamboo," you are indicating a number of properties some of which are peculiar to the bamboo, while others are possessed by it in common with other trees. You do not distinguish between these two classes of properties.

Naigama.

In his *bhāṣya* on 1—6 of the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, Umāsvāti observes — चतुर्विधमित्येके । (Tattvārthādhigama sūtra, p 9)

In his *bhāṣya* on 1—35 he mentions the four Pramāṇas thus — यथा वा प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानाप्तवचनैः प्रमाणैरेकोऽर्थः प्रमीयते स्वविषयनियमात् न च ता विप्रतिपत्तयो भवन्ति तद्वन्नयवादा इति ॥ (Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, p 35)

[illegible] the Nyāya Sūtra of the [illegible]

[illegible]

[1] Here *Parokṣa* stands [illegible] Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra [illegible] [illegible]mārthika *pratyakṣa* (*vide* Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka[illegible]

[2] नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारर्जुसूत्रशब्दा नयाः ॥ १-३४ ॥ (Tattvārthādhigama sūtra, p 32)

Saṁgraha, the collective, is the method which takes into consideration generic properties only, ignoring particular properties

Saṁgraha

Vyavahāra, the practical, is the method which takes into consideration the particular only. The general without the particular is a nonentity If you ask a person to bring you a plant, he must bring you a [illegible]

Vyavahāra

[illegible] d which [illegible] the mo- [illegible] past or its future It is vain to ponder over a thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future All practical purposes are served by considering the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man who in a previous birth was my son is now born as a prince, but he is of no practical use to me now. The method of *Rju-sūtra* recognises the entity itself (*bhāva*), but does not consider its name (*nāma*) or image (*sthāpanā*), or the causes which constituted it (*dravya*) The fact that a cowherd is called *Indra* does not make him lord of the heavens An image of a king can not perform the functions of the king The causes, which exist in me now and will necessitate my being born hereafter with [illegible]

[illegible]

kalasa, and these are synonymous terms *Sāmprata* consists in [illegible]

[illegible]

Śakra (strong), unless he actually possesses the *Śakti* (strength) which the name implies

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[1] Umāsvāti in his *bhāṣya* on 1–35 observes —

यथार्थाभिधानं शब्द. नामादिषु प्रसिद्धपूर्वाच्छब्दादर्थे प्रत्यय साम्प्रत सत्सु अर्थेषु असंक्रम. समभिरूढ । व्यञ्जनार्थयोरेवंभूत इति ॥

(Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, p 32).

(Upamāna) verbal testimony of reliable and [illegible]
sumption (Arthāpatti), probability (Sambhava), and a [illegible]
(Abhāva) are not separate sources of valid knowledge [illegible]
them under Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) According [illegible]
theory the majority of them are the result of the cont[illegible]
senses with the objects which they apprehend; and some [illegible]
are not sources of valid knowledge at all.

It is interesting to note that according to Umāsvāti a[illegible] earlier Jaina philosophers all sense perceptions (visual perc[illegible] auditory perception, etc) are indirect apprehensions, inasm[illegible] the soul acquires them not of itself but through the medi[illegible] the senses The words Parokṣa and Pratyakṣa are thus use[illegible] these authors in senses quite opposite to those which they b[illegible] in Brāhmanic logic and in the later Jaina Logic.[1]

11 UMĀSVĀTI'S EXPLANATION OF *Naya* (THE MOOD OF STATEMENTS)

Naya, the method of descriptions or mood of statements

In the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, *Naya*[2] is described as method by which things are comprehe[nded] from particular standpoints It is of kinds —(1) *Naigama*, the non-distingu[ished] or non-analytical, (2) *Saṃgraha*, the [col]lective, (3) *Vyavahāra*, the practical, (4) *Ṛju-sūtra*, the straig[ht] immediate, (5) *Śabda*, the verbal or nominal

Naigama.

Naigama, the non-analytical, is the method by which a [ob]ject is regarded as possessing both ge[neric] and specific properties, no distinction made between them For instance, when you use the "bamboo," you are indicating a number of properties so[me] which are peculiar to the bamboo, while others are possess[ed by] it in common with other trees. You do not distinguish be[tween] these two classes of properties

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In his *bhāṣya* on 1—35 he mentions the four Pramāṇas thus:—
यथा वा प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानाप्तवचनैः प्रमाणैरेकोऽर्थः [illegible]
विप्रतिपन्नयो भवन्ति शब्दनयवादा इति ॥ (Tattvārthādhigama-sū[tra])
[illegible] seem to refer to those in the
[illegible] kinds are
[illegible] of the Jainas.
[illegible] *pratyakṣa* wh[illegible]

[1] Here *Parokṣa* [illegible] Pramāṇa naya tattvalokālankāra,
[illegible] *pratyakṣa* (vide [illegible]

14 SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA *alias* KSAPAṆAKA
(ABOUT 480—550 A D)

The first Jaina writer on systematic logic was Siddhasena Divākara It was he who for the first time laid the foundation of a science called Logic among the Jainas by compiling a treatise called Nyāyāvatāra[1] in thirty-two short stanzas

Siddhasena Divākara is also famous as the author of the Sammatitarka-sūtra which is a work in Prākṛta on general philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic This author, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, has been mentioned by Pradyumna Sūri (*q v*) in his Vicāra-sāra-prakarana[2] and by Jina Sena Sūri in the Ādipurāna dated 783 A D

Siddhasena's date

Siddhasena, who was a pupil of Vṛddha-vādisūri, received the name of Kumuda-candra[3] at the time of ordination He is said to have split, by [illegible] to Jainism 470 years after the *nirvāna* of Mahāvīra, that is, in 57 B C[4]

But Vikramāditya of Ujjainī does not seem to be so old, as he has been identified by scholars with Yaśodharma Deva, king [illegible]

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[1] [illegible]

[2] पचेव य वरिससए सिद्धसेणदिवायरो य जयपयडो ।
[illegible] ॥ ९९ ॥
(Vicāra sāra prakarana, noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 272)

[3] Cf Prabhāvakacaritra VIII, V 57

[4] [illegible]

and 587 A D [1] It is therefore very probable that V
and his contemporary Siddhasena Divākara lived at c
530 A D I am inclined to believe that Siddhasena w
than *Kṣapanaka*[2] (a Jaina sage) who is traditionally k
Hindus to have been one of the nine Gems that ad
of Vikramāditya

Siddhasena Divākara seems to have been a co
porary of Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa (484-58
criticises Dvātriṁśat-dvātriṁśikā of which the Nyāyā
part

15 SIDDHASENA'S NYĀYĀVATĀRA

The Nyāyāvatāra written in Sanskrit verse give
tion of the doctrine of *Pramāṇa* (sources of valid know
Naya (the method of comprehending things from parti
points)

Pramāṇa—Right Knowledge

Pramāṇa is right knowledge which illumines itself
other things without any obstr
is of two kinds (1) direct valid
or perception (*Pratyakṣa*) and (2) indirect valid know
rokṣa) Direct valid knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) is twofold (1
tical (*Vyāvahārika*) which is the knowledge acquired b

Perception

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[1] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[2] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

through the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (*Manas*), and (2) transcendental (*Pāramārthika*) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of the soul: it is called *Kevala* or absolute knowledge

Verbal Testimony

Indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*) is also of two kinds (1) inference (*Anumāna*) and (2) verbal testimony (*Śabda*) Verbal testimony is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons including knowledge from scripture Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable the word of the old man is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or *Laukika Śābda* Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference for instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or

Inference

Inference (*Anumāna*) is the correct knowledge of the major term (*Sādhya*) derived through the middle term (*Hetu*, reason or *Liṅga*, sign) which is inseparably connected with it It is of two kinds (1) inference for one's own self (*Svārthānumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*Parārthānumāna*).

The first kind is the inference deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations A man by repeated [illegible]

If the inference is communicated to others through words, it

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[1] आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लंघ्यमदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् ।
तत्त्वोपदेशकृत् सार्वं शास्त्रं कापथघट्टनम् ॥
(Verse 9, Nyāyāvatāra).

and 587 A D[1] It is therefore
and his contemporary Siddhasena
550 A D I am inclined to believ
than *Kṣapanaka*[2] (a Jaina sage) w
Hindus to have been one of the n
of Vikramāditya

Siddhasena Divākara seen
porary of Jinabhadra Gani Kṣ
criticises Dvātriṁśat-dvātriṁś
part

15 SIDDHASEN

The **Nyāyāvatāra** written
tion of the doctrine of *Pramāṇ*
Naya (the method of comprehen
points)

Pramāṇa—R

Pramāṇa is right knowledg
Perception other th
is of two
or perception (Pratyakṣa) and
māna) Direct valid knowledge
tical (*Vyāvahārika*) which is th

---

[1] Varāhamihira ch Śaka 427 or A
cal calculation showing thereby that he

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Pañcasiddhāntikā, chap 1.

Vide also Dr Thibaut's I

[2] The nine gems are —

In the Pañc
[illegible]
named as K

is called an inference for the sake of others A type of that kind of inference is as follows

(1) The hill (minor term or Pakṣa) is full of fire (major term or Sādhya)

(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term or Hetu)

(3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire as e g a kitchen (example or Dṛṣṭānta)

(4) so is this hill full of smoke (application or Upanaya)

(5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or Nigamana)

Terms of a syllogism

In a proposition the subject is the minor term (Pakṣa) and the predicate the major term (Sādhya) The minor term is that with which the connection of the major term is to be shown In the proposition "the hill is full of fire" the hill is the minor term and fire major term The middle term (Hetu) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term Thus in the proposition "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke," smoke is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term The example (Dṛṣṭānta) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term It is of two kinds (1) homogeneous or affirmative (Sādharmya), such as "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke as a kitchen," and (2) heterogeneous or negative (Vaidharmya) which assures the connection between the middle term and major term by contrariety that is, by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term, such as "where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake"

In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (Pakṣa) must be explicitly set forth otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, e g This hill has fire because it has smoke.

This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form —

Having fire, | Because having smoke

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance
[illegible] fire and smoke exist in union, and might mistake a lake
[illegible]stance In such a case the whole reasoning will be
d

of which the major term or predicate is affirmed, is
evidence, public opinion, one's own statement, etc,
at which is known as the fallacy of the minor term
a) of which there are many varieties

Fallacies of the minor term.

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (*Pakṣābhās* arises when one attributes to it as a prove fact that which is yet to be proved, c which is incapable of being proved, or whe it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent wit public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus —

[illegible]

this is opposed to perception

(4) "There is no omniscient being"—this is, according to th Jainas, opposed to inference

(5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"—this is inconsistent wit public opinion

(6) "All things are non-existent"—this is incongruous with one' own statement

Inseparable connection

Inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (*Vyāpti*) the constant accompaniment of the middl term by the major term. In the inference "this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke," the connec tion between fire and smoke, that is, the constant presence of fir with smoke, is called *Vyāpti* or Inseparable Connection It is c two kinds (1) Intrinsic, and (2) Extrinsic

Antar-vyāpti.

Intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antar-vyāpti*) occurs whe the minor term (*pakṣa*), itself as the commo abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the majo term (*sādhya*), shows the inseparable connection between them thus —

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term)
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term)

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke shown by the hill (minor term) in which both of them abide

Bahir-vyāpti

Extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahir-vyāpti*) occurs whe an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) from the outside introduced as the common abode of th middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) to assure the in separable connection between them, thus:—

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term),
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term);
(3) as a *kitchen* (example)

Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of th inference, but is introduced from without as a common instanc of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them

Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*), can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antar-vyāpti*) only hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahir-vyāpti*) is superfluous

Fallacies of the middle term

The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (*Hetvābhāsa*) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it (the middle term) It is of three kinds —

(1) The unproved (*Asiddha*) This is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus

Here the reason (middle term), viz the sky-lotus, is unreal

(2) The contradictory (*Viruddha*) "This is fiery, because it is a body of water"

Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) The uncertain (*Anaikāntika*) "Sound is eternal, because it is always audible"

Here the reason or middle term is uncertain, because audibleness may or may not be a proof of eternity.

Fallacies of homogeneous of example

The fallacy of example (*Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form, from a defect in the middle term (*hetu*) or major term (*sādhya*) or both, or from doubt about them

Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) are as follows —

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term), like *perception* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of* [illegible] like a *dream* (homogeneous example) [illegible] (*hetu*), [illegible] he[illegible]ous [illegible]

(3) The omniscient being is [illegible] (middle term), like a *jar* [illegible] is not *apprehended by the senses* (middle term), like a *jar* [illegible] example)

Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *hetu*), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses

(4) This person is *devoid of passions* (major term), because he is *mortal* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example)

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions

(5) This person is *mortal* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions

(6) This person is *non omniscient* (major term) because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example)

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non-omniscient.

It is stated in the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz —

(1) Unconnected (*Ananvaya*), such as. This person is *full of passions* (major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term), like a *certain man in Magadha* (example)

Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions"

(2) Of connection unshown (*Apradarśitānvaya*), such as —

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term), as a jar (example)

Here though there is an inseparable connection between "produced" and "non-eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form as —

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a jar"

(3) Of inverted connection (*Viparītānvaya*), such as —

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term)

Here if the inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) is shown thus—

"Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar," instead of—

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar," the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection

Fallacies of heterogeneous example

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example (*Vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) are of six kinds, thus —

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term). whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a *dream* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid

(2) Perception is *non-reflective* or *nirvikalpaka* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term): whatever is reflective or *savikalpaka*, is not a source of knowledge, as *inference* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them

Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*), can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antar-vyāpti*) only hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahir vyāpti*) is superfluous

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Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya-dṛṣṭā bhāsa*) are as follows:—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is *ledge* (middle term), like *perception* (homogeneous example)

Here the example involves a defect in for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is *invalid* (major term), because *valid knowledge* (middle term), like a *dream* (hom

Here the example involves a defect in the for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge

(3) The omniscient being is not *existent* is not *apprehended by the senses* (middle term), like example)

Here the example involves a defect in middle terms (*sādhya* and *hetu*), for the jar apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is *devoid of passions* *mortal* (middle term), like the *man in*

Refutation.

Refutation (*Dūṣana*) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above The semblance of a refutation (*Dūṣaṇābhāsa*) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all

Consequence of *pramāna*

The immediate effect of *Pramāna* (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance The consequence of the transcendental perception (*Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa Pramāna*) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (*Mokṣa* or final emancipation), while that of the other kinds of *Pramāna* (direct and indirect knowledge) is the facility which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things

Naya—the method of descriptions

Naya or the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints

Naya is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers The *Naya* is of seven kinds *naigama*, *saṁgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*

Syādvāda.

Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided *nayas*, is called *Syādvāda-śruta*. It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc , according as we take it from one or other standpoint

The soul (*Jīva*) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self [illegible]

[illegible]

not be traced to its beginning or followed to its end.

16 JINABHADRA GAṆI KṢAMĀŚRAMAṆA
(484—588 A D).

[illegible]

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[1] Peterson's Fourth Report, p xxxix

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Naya—the method of descriptions

Naya or the method of comprehending things from [illegible]

Naya is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes [illegible]

evaṁbhūta

Syādvāda.

Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object [illegible] *vāda-śruta*. It is the p [illegible] possible standpoints. [illegible] may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint

The soul (*Jīva*) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self, doer and enjoyer. It undergoes changes of condition and is self-conscious, being different from the earth, water, etc.

This system of *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*, with which all of us are familiar and which serves to perform all practical functions, cannot be traced to its beginning or followed to its end

16. JINABHADRA GAṆI KṢAMĀŚRAMAṆA
(484—588 A.D.)

Jinabhadra Gaṇi, author of a commentary on the Āvaśyaka-niryukti called **Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya**, was born in Samvat 541 or 484 A D He was well known as Ksamāśramaṇa, and continued to be pontiff from 528 A D to 588 A D.[1]

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[1] Peterson's Fourth Report, p xxxix

17 SIDDHASENA GANI
(600 A D)

Siddhasena Gaṇi, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, was the author of a commentary on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra called Tattvārthaṭīkā[1] in which the logical principles of *Pramāṇa* (the sources of knowledge), and *Naya* (the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints), have been fully discussed He was a pupil of Bhāsvāmin[2] who was a spiritual successor of Simhasūri, himself a disciple of Dinna Gaṇi Siddhasena Gaṇi[3] is generally believed to have been a contemporary of Devardhigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, who flourished 980 years after Mahāvīra, or about 453 A D But as he has in his Tattvārthaṭīkā quoted Siddhasena Divākara and was posterior to Simhagiri or Simhasūri, a contemporary of Vikramāditya, I am inclined to suppose that he lived after 533 A D or about 600 A D

18 SAMANTABHADRA
(600 A D)

Samantabhadra, who belonged to the Digambara sect of Southern India, was famous as the author of a well-known commentary on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra called Gandhahasti mahābhāṣya. The introductory part of this commentary is called Devāgamastotra[4] or Āptamīmāṃsā, and is replete with discussions of logical principles besides a review of the contemporary schools of philosophy including the Advaita Vāda[5] The Āptamīmāmsā has been cited by the Hindu philosopher Vācaspati Miśra[1] in explaining Śaṅkarācārya's criticism of the Syādvāda doctrine in the Vedānta-sūtra

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[1] A palm-leaf manuscript of the Tattvārthaṭīkā in the temple of Śāntinātha, Cambay, has been noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp 83-85.

[2] [illegible] ।
तत्त्वार्थटीकामिमां व्यधात् सिद्धसेनगणिः ॥ ७
(Tattvārthaṭīkā, noticed in Peterson's 3rd Report, p 83)

[3] Simhasūri is identified by Peterson with Simhagiri who was a contemporary of cramāditya (Peterson's 4th Report, pp cxxxi and cxxviii)

Muni Dharmavijaya and his pupil Indra-vijaya tell me that Siddhasena Gaṇi [illegible]

[illegible] mastotra —

समन्तभद्रो भद्रार्थो भातु भारतभूषणः
देवागमेन येनात्र व्यक्तो देवागमः कृत ॥
(Pāṇḍavapurāṇa, noticed in Peterson's 4th Report, p 157)

[5] अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि दृष्टो भेदो विरुध्यते ।
कारकाणां क्रियायाश्च नैकं स्वस्मात् प्रजायते ॥ २४ ॥
(Āptamīmāṃsā, verse 24)

His age

Samantabhadra, who was styled a Kavi and whose works were commented on by Vidyānanda[2] and Prabhācandra, was also the author of the Yuktyanuśāsana, the Ratnakarandaka (also called Upāsakādhyayana), the Svayambhū-stotra, and the Caturvimśati-jina-stuti He is mentioned by Jina Sena in the Ādipurāna composed about 838 A D, and is referred to by the Hindu philosopher Kumārila.[3] Kumārila, a contemporary of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, is generally held to have lived in the 7th century A D Samantabhadra is supposed to have flourished about 600 A D

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[1] Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmatī-ṭīkā on Śaṅkara's exposition of the Vedānta Sūtra, 2-2-33, quotes the following verse:—

स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधः ।
सप्तभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकृत् ॥

(Bhāmatī, Bibliotheca Indica, p 459)

The same verse occurs in the Āptamīmāmsā as follows:—

स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधिः ।
सप्तभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकः ॥ १०४ ॥

(MSS of the Āptamīmāmsā, verse 104, borrowed from Mr Jain Vaidya of Jaipur)

[2] Vidyānanda at the closing part of his commentary on the Āptamīmāmsā (called Āpta mīmāmsālankṛti ṭīkā aṣṭasāhasrī) refers to Samantabhadra thus —

येनाशेषकुनीतिवृत्तिसरितः प्रेक्षावतां शोषिताः
यद्वाचोऽप्यकलङ्कनीतिरुचिरास्तत्त्वार्थसार्थद्युतः ।
स श्रीस्वामिसमन्तभद्रयतिभृद् भूयाद् विभुर्भानुमान्
विद्यानन्दघनप्रदोऽनघधियां स्याद्वादमार्गाग्रणीः ॥

(Folio 218, Āptamīmāmsālankṛti ṭīkā, Govt Collection, in the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No 1525)

Prabhācandra in his commentary on the Ratnakarandaka (or Upāsakādhyayana) observes —

येनाज्ञानतमो विनाश्य निखिलं भव्यात्मचेतोगतं
सम्यग्ज्ञानमहांशुभिः प्रकटितः सागारमार्गोऽखिलः ।
स श्रीरत्नकरण्डकामलरविः संसृत्सरिच्छोषको
जीयादेष समन्तभद्रमुनिपः श्रीमत्प्रभेन्दुर्जिनः ॥

(Upāsakādhyayana with the commentary of Prabhācandra noticed in Peterson's 4th Report, pp 137–38)

[3] *Vide* Dr R. G. Bhandarkar's *Report on Sanskrit MSS during* 1883–84, p. 118, and J.B B R.A.S, for 1895, p 227.

19. SAMANTABHADRA'S ĀPTAMĪMĀMSĀ

Syād vāda

The Āptamīmāmsā consists of 115 stanzas in Sanskrit, divided into ten chapters called *Paricchedas*, in the course of which a full exposition of the seven parts of the *Syād-vāda* or *Sapta bhangī-naya* has been given. The first and second parts of the doctrine, viz *Syād-asti* ("may be, it is"), and *Syād-nāsti* ("may be, it is not"), have led to a most interesting discussion of the relation between *asti*, that is, *bhāva* or existence, and *nāsti*, that is, *abhāva* or non-existence.

Non-existence

Non-existence (*Abhāva*) is divided into four kinds (1) antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), e g. a lump of clay becomes non-existent as soon as a jar is made out of it, so the jar is an antecedent non existence with reference to the lump of clay, (2) subsequent non-existence [illegible] a subsequent non- [illegible] itual non-existence [illegible] post are mutually [illegible] l (4) absolute non- [illegible] the inanimate is not a living object.

It is observed[1] that, on the supposition of mere existence to the entire exclusion of non-existence, things become all-pervading, beginningless, endless indistinguishable and inconceivable. For instance, if the antecedent non-existence is denied, action and substance become beginningless, while on the denial of the subsequent non-existence, they become endless, and in the absence of mutual non-existence, they become one and all-pervading, while on absolute non-existence being denied, they are to be supposed as existing always and everywhere

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[1] भावैकान्ते पदार्थानामभावानामपह्नवात् ।
सर्वात्मकमनाद्यन्तमस्वरूपमतावकम् ॥ ९ ॥
कार्यद्रव्यमनादि स्यात् प्रागभावस्य निह्नवे ।
प्रध्वंसस्य च धर्मस्य प्रच्यवेऽनन्ततां व्रजेत् ॥ १० ॥
सर्वात्मकं तदेकं स्यादन्यापोहव्यतिक्रमे ।
अन्यत्र समवायेन व्यपदिश्येत सर्वथा ॥ ११ ॥
अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भावापह्नववादिनाम् ।
बोधवाक्यं प्रमाणं न केन साधनदूषणम् ॥ १२ ॥
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।
अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥ १३ ॥
कथं चित्ते सदेवेष्टं कथंचिदसदेव तत् ।
तथोभयमवाच्यं च नययोगान्न सर्वथा ॥ १४ ॥

(*Āptamīmāmsā*, MS., verses 9-14, lent to me by Mr Jain Vaidya of Jaipur)

In the same way on the supposition of mere non-existence to the entire exclusion of existence, it becomes impossible to establish or reject anything (since it is non-existent) If on the other hand existence and non-existence, which are incompatible with each other, are simultaneously ascribed to a thing, it becomes indescribable Therefore the truth is as follows —

(1) A thing *is* existent—from a certain point of view
Sevenfold paralogism (2) It *is non*-existent—from another point of view
(3) It is *both* existent and non-existent *in turn*—from a third point of view
(4) It is *indescribable* (that is both existent and non-existent simultaneously)—from a fourth point of view
(5) It *is* existent and *indescribable*—from a fifth point of view
(6) It *is non*-existent and *indescribable*—from a sixth point of view
(7) It *is both* existent and *non*-existent and *indescribable*—from a seventh point of view

20 AKALANKADEVA
(ABOUT 750 A D)

Akalanka, otherwise known as Akalankadeva or Akalankacan-

Āptamīmāmsā called Asta śatī[1] which is a most precious work on the Jaina philosophy, *dealing mainly with logic* Mānikyanandi's Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra (q v) was based on another work on logic, called **Nyāya-viniścaya**, written by Akalanka, to whom the following works are also attributed **Tattvārtha vārtika-vyākhyānālankāra**, Laghīyastraya, Akalaṅka-stotra, Svarūpa-sambodhana and Prāyaścitta Laghusamantabhadra[3] in his Aṣta-sāhasrī-viṣama-pada-tātparya-tīkā calls Akalaṅka as *Sakala-tārkika-cakra-cūḍāmaṇi* or "the crest gem of the circle of all logicians"

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[1] For an explanation of the term "Kavi" *vide* R G Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS during 1883-84, page 122

[2] A manuscript of the Aṣta śatī was kindly supplied to me by Mr Jain Vaidya of Jaipur early in 1907.

[3] *Vide* Aṣtasāhasrī viṣamapada tātparya tīkā by Laghusamanta bhadra, noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p 217

[illegible]

have put an end to that prompting or inspiration by kicking the jar over with his foot

His age

Akalaṅka, though mentioned along with Dharmakīrti[1] as a logician, flourished at a considerably later time He is held to have been a contemporary of Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Śubhatunga[2] or Kṛṣṇarāja I As Kṛṣṇarāja's son, Govind II, lived in Śaka 705[3] or 783 A D, Kṛṣna-rāja I, and consequently his contemporary Akalanka, must have flourished about 750 A D

21 VIDYĀNANDA
(ABOUT 800 A D).

His works

Vidyānanda, mentioned by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya,[5] was a Digambara logician of Pātaliputra He was the author of the Āpta mīmāmsālaṅkṛti, otherwise called Aṣṭasāhasrī, an exhaustive subcommentary on the Āptamīmāmsā, containing an elaborate exposition of various logical principles Vidyānanda, in the opening and the closing lines of his Aṣṭasāhasrī,[6] makes an indirect reference to Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka respectively [illegible]

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[1] [illegible]
[illegible]
(Pāṇḍavapurāṇa, noticed by Peterson in his 4th Report, p 167)

[2] [illegible]
(Pramāṇa mīmāmsā, by Hemacandra, noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p 11?)

[3] Vide K B Pathak's article on "Bhartṛhari and Kumārila" in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Vol XVIII, 1892.

It is reported that Akalaṅka and Niṣkalaṅka were two sons of Śubhatunga whose capital was Mānyakheṭa. Śubhatunga is another name of Kṛṣṇarāja the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king who reigned in the Deccan between 753-775 A D Akalaṅka for-[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]

The closing lines of the Aṣṭasāhasrī are :—
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

author of [illegible]

He [illegible]

His [illegible]

dha philo[illegible]
Dharmakī[illegible]
Sureśvara [illegible]
Pātra Kesari or Pātra Kesari Svāmi, who has been praised by Jina

---

The lines in Chapter X referred to run thus —

श्रीमदकलङ्कविवृतां समन्तभद्रोक्तिमत्र संक्षेपात् ।
परमागमार्थविषयामष्टसहस्रीं प्रकाशयति ॥
(Aṣṭasāhasrī, MSS., Asiatic Society of Bengal)

[1] यदुक्तं धर्मकीर्तिना :—

अनदूष परादान मनुनाप प्रवेदनात् ।
ग्राह्यविषयमोर्त्त भिन्नभेदावलिहितौ ।
(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap I)

अर्थविषयोऽपि पुनः स्यात् शब्दानुयोजनम्
अथवौऽर्थरूपेण सोऽर्थो सविकल्पो भवेत् ।
(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap I)

[2] प्रज्ञाकरस्येदं वच :—

अगमनीयेवं स्यात् प्रथमकारणता मतिः ;
तत्तादर्थ्यात् पुनः पश्चात् यत. कर्ता प्रतीयते ॥
(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap I)

This extract may be an interpolation, or else this Prajñākara must be different from the Buddhist logician Prajñākara Gupta to be mentioned hereafter

[3] न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
[illegible]वाभाति सर्वं शब्दे प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥

(T[illegible] by Bhartṛhari is quoted in the Aṣṭasāhasrī, vide

चूर्णितम् ।
I ....

[illegible]asāhasrī)
[illegible]ed by Manohar Lal, Bombay.

Sena in the Ādi Purāṇa[1] composed about Śaka 760[2] or A D. 838 He is believed to have lived early in the 9th century A D[3] at Pāṭaliputra[4]

22 MĀṆIKYA NANDI
(ABOUT 800 A D)

His age

Māṇikya Nandi was a Digambara author whose Parīkṣā-mukha-śāstra[5] or Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra is a standard work on Jaina logic As his work is based on that of Akalanka,[6] he must have lived after 750 A D The earliest commentary on the Parīkṣāmukha-śāstra is the Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa of Prabhācandra Vidyānanda, Māṇikya Nandi and Prabhācandra have been pronounced to be contemporaries[7] So Māṇikya Nandi seems to have lived about 800 A D

23 MĀṆIKYA NANDI'S PARĪKṢĀMUKHA-SŪTRA

Subjects

The Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra is divided into six chapters thus (1) the characteristic of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa svarūpa*) (2) direct apprehension or perception (*Pratyakṣa*), (3) indirect apprehension (*Parokṣa*), (4) the object of valid knowledge (*Viṣaya*), (5) the result of valid knowledge (*Phala*) and (6) the semblances or fallacies (*Ābhāsa*)

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[1] [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Ādipurāṇa quoted by Mr K. B. Pathak J B B R A S for 1892 p 222)

Mr Pathak has quoted Samyaktvaprakāśa to show that Vidyānanda and Pātrakesari were identical —

[illegible]
[illegible] । (J B B R A S for 1892 pp 222 227)

[2] [3] Vide K B Pathak's article on Bhartṛhari and Kumārila in J B B R A S for 1892 pp [illegible]

[4] Vide Prabhācandra's [illegible] of Pātrakesari alias Vidyānanda

[5] A manuscript of the Parīkṣā-mukha-śāstra was kindly lent to me by Mr Jain Vaidya of Jaypur (Rajputana) and subsequently another manuscript of the work was procured from the Sanskrit College, Benares. I have [illegible]

[6] Peterson in his [illegible] Report p 133 [illegible] The [illegible] in the Prameya-ratna-mālā [illegible] of Anantavīrya which runs thus —

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

[7] Vide K. B. Pathak's article on [illegible] in J B B R A S [illegible] Mr Pathak [illegible] Māṇikya Nandi [illegible]

Valid knowledge—*Pramāna*

Pramāna, valid knowledge, is defined by Mānikya Nandi as
Right knowledge
knowledge which ascertains the nature
what was uncertain to one's self. It gen
ally arises in the form "I know the jar by myself," which c
[illegible]

and the scripture (*Āgama*) Recollection is a knowledge of the f
Kinds of right knowledge
"that" which arises through the awak
of impressions, thus "that Devadatt
Recognition is a knowledge which ar
from perception through recollection in the forms, "this is th
"this is like that," "this is different from that," "this is
counterpart of that," etc., thus: "this is that Devadatta," "
bos gavaeus is like the cow," "the buffalo is different f
the cow," "this is far from that," "this is a tree," etc A
mentation is a knowledge of the connection between the mi
term and the major term based on the presence or absence of
latter, in the form, "if this is, that is, if this is not, that is n
thus smoke arises only if there is fire, but it cannot arise if t
is no fire Inference[1] is the knowledge of the major term ar
through the middle term. there is fire here, because there is am

middle term is called *sādhana* or that by which it is to be proved Sometimes the major term is also called *dharma* or predicate, and the middle term *linga*, mark or sign

The minor term is called *Pakṣa*, the place or locus in which the major term abides, or *Dharmin*, the subject, thus: "this place is fiery"; "sound is mutable" here "this place" and "sound" are the minor terms No philosophers, who divide the middle term (reason) into three phases, should dispense with the minor term in an inference

The middle term (*Hetu*) is defined as that which is inseparably connected with the major term, or in other words, which cannot come into existence unless the major term exists For instance, smoke could not come into existence unless the fire existed.

Reason—*hetu*

Different phases of the middle term

The middle term or reason (*Hetu*) is divided as (1) perceptible (*upalabdhi*), and (2) imperceptible (*anupalabdhi*). Each of these again may occur in the form of an affirmation (*vidhi*) or negation (*pratiṣedha*).

The *perceptible* reason in the *affirmative* form admits of six subdivisions according as it is —

- (i) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—sound is mutable, because it is factitious,
- [illegible] because there
- [illegible] there is an
- (iv) prior (*pūrva*)—the Rohiṇī stars will rise, for the Kṛttikās have risen,
- (v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharaṇī stars certainly rose for the Kṛttikās have risen,
- (vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—the man had a mother, for he had a father, or this mango has a particular colour because it has a particular flavour

The *perceptible* reason in the *negative* form admits of six subdivisions as follows.—

- (i) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—there is no cold sensation, because of heat
- (ii) an effect (*kārya*)—there is no cold sensation because of smoke,
- [illegible] because
- [illegible] the

(v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharanī did not rise a moment ago, for the Pusyā has risen

(vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—there is no doubt of the existence of the other side of this wall, for this side of it is perceived

The *imperceptible* reason in the *negative* form admits of seven subdivisions as follows —

(i) identity (*svabhāva*)—there is no jar here, because it is imperceptible,

(ii) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—there is no Śimsapā here, because there is no tree at all,

(iii) an effect (*kārya*)—there is no smouldering fire here, because there is no smoke,

(iv) a cause (*kārana*)—there is no smoke here, because there is no fire,

(v) prior (*pūrva*)—Rohinī stars will not rise in a moment, for the Krttikās are not perceptible,

(vi) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharanī did not rise a moment ago, for the Krttikās are not perceptible,

(vii) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—in this even balance there is no bending upwards, because it is not perceptible

The *imperceptible* reason in the affirmative form may appear in the following ways:—

(i) as an effect (*kārya*)—in this man there is some disease, because there is no healthy movement in him;

(ii) as a cause (*kāraṇa*)—this man is sorrowful, because he has no union with his beloved ones;

(iii) as an identity (*svabhāva*)—there is uncertainty here, because certainty is not discernible

Example—*dṛṣṭānta*

Example is superfluous

The middle term and the major term are the parts of an inference, but the example (*udāharana*) is not Nevertheless for the sake of explaining matters to men of small intellect, the example (*udāharana* or *dṛṣṭānta*), nay, even the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*), are admitted as parts of an inference The example is of two kinds: (1) the affirmative or homogeneous (*anvayi* or *sādharmya*) which shows the middle term as covered by the major term, such as: wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a *kitchen*; and (2) the negative or heterogeneous (*vyatireki* or *vaidharmya*) by which the absence of the middle term is indicated by the absence of the major term, e g wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a *lake*.

est commentary on the Parīkṣā-mukha sūtra of Mānikya Nand He was also the author of the Nyāya-kumuda-candroday (or briefly Candrodaya), a commentary on the Laghīyastray Akalanka He has in his Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa mentioned Bhagavān Upavarṣa, Śabarasvāmī, Bhartṛhari, Bāṇa,[1] Kumāril Prabhākara, Dignāga, Uddyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Vidyānanda and others He himself has been mentioned by Jina Sena in the Ā purāṇa[3] composed about Saka 760 or A D. 838. Prabhā Candra, as a contemporary of Mānikya Nandi and Vidyānanda, is believed to have lived in the first half of the 9th century A D

25 RABHASA NANDI

(CIRCA 850 A.D.)

Rabhasa Nandi, probably a Digambara, wrote a work calle
, Sam
, wor
live

and before 1444 A D , which is the date of the copy of the wor acquired for the Bombay Government[4]

26 MALLAVĀDIN

(ABOUT 827 A D.)

He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the famo author of a commentary on the Buddhist logical treatise Nyāy binduṭikā called Dharmottara-ṭippanaka. According to a Jaina legend,[1] Malla was the son of King Śilāditya's sister He was called *vādin* or logician, because, having vanquished the Buddhists in a dispute, he re-established the Jaina faith and brought to its former glory the great figure of Ādinātha on Mount Satruñjaya (in Kathiwar)

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[1] Prabhā Candra has quoted the following verse from Bāṇa's Kādambarī —

रजोजुषे जन्मनि सत्त्ववृत्तये
स्थितौ प्रजानां प्रलये तमःस्पृशे ।
अजाय सर्गस्थिति-नाश हेतवे
त्रयीमयाय त्रिगुणात्मने नमः ॥

(Prameya kamala-mārtaṇḍa, Deccan College, MSS , p 21a, quoted by K B Pathak in J B B R A S , for 1892, p 221)

[2] Prabhā Candra refers to Kumārila, otherwise called Bhaṭṭa, thus —

यथा चार्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्तरं तथाच अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतो वा ऽर्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यते इत्यदृष्टार्थकल्पना कुमारिलोऽपि चैतदेव भाषमाणस्तथा आह ।

(Prameya kamala-mārtaṇḍa, quoted by Mr K B Pathak in the J B B R A S for 1892, p 227).

[3] In the Ādipurāṇa Prabhā Candra is thus mentioned —

चन्द्रांशुशुभ्रयशसं प्रभाचन्द्रं कविं स्तुवे ।
कृत्वा चन्द्रोदयं येन शश्वदाह्लादितं जगत् ॥ ४७ ॥

(Quoted by Mr K B Pathak in J B B R A S , for 1892, p. 222).

On p 227 of the same journal, the date of the Ādipurāṇa is fixed at Saka 70 or 838 A D

[4] Peterson's Third Report p 407

A palm-leaf manuscript[2] of the Dharmottara-tippanaka is preserved at Anhilwad Patan and is said to be dated Samvat 1321 or 1174 A.D According to the Prabhāvakacaritra[3], Mallavādin was also the author of a work called the Padmacaritra and lived in Vīra Samvat 884 or 357 A.D. But this is impossible, as Dharmottara (q v), on whose Nyāyabinduṭikā Mallavādin wrote Tippanaka, lived about 837 A D On the other hand Mallavādin is mentioned[4] by Hem Candra Sūri, who lived during 1088—1172 A.D. It seems therefore probable that the year 884 in which Mallavādin lived does not refer to Vīra Saṁvat, but to Vikrama or Saka Samvat. On this supposition Mallavādin lived in 827 A D or 962 A.D

27. AMṚTA CANDRA SŪRI
(905 A D)

Amṛta Candra Sūri[5] who belonged to the Digambara sect, was the author of Tattvārtha-sāra, Ātmakhyāti,[6] etc, and lived in Samvat 962 or 905 A.D

28 DEVASENA BHAṬṬĀRAKA
(899—950 A D)

Devasena,[7] a pupil of Rāmasena, was the author of Nayacakra, etc. He was born in Samvat 951 or 894 A D., and wrote his Daṁsaṇa sāra (Darśana-sāra) in Samvat 990 or 933 A D

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[1] Peterson 4, pp 3-4, in which is mentioned the legend from the Prabandha cintāmaṇi (Rāmacandra's edition, Bombay, p 273)

[2] इति धर्मोत्तरटिप्पनके श्रीमल्लवाद्याचार्यकृते तृतीय परिच्छेदः समाप्तः मङ्गलं महाश्रीः ॥ संवत् १३२१ वर्षे भाद्रपद शुदि ११ रवौ (Peterson's Report V, p 3)

संवत् १३२१ वर्षे भाद्रपद शुदि ११ रवौ अद्येह श्रीपत्तनविशाम माथुर ठं दामोदरसुतप- पावकेन महाजा धर्मोत्तर-टिप्पनकं लिखापितम् ॥ (Noticed in Peterson 5, App p. 3)

[3] *Vide* Klatt, Vienna Oriental Journal, Vol IV, p 67

[4]
अनु मल्लवादिनं तार्किकाः ।
मल्लवाद्यन्ये हीना इत्यर्थः ॥
(Siddha Hema Śabdānuśāsana-bṛhat-ṭīkā, 2-2-39)

[5] Peterson's fourth Report, p ix

[6] Ātmakhyāti, which is a commentary on the Samaya-prābhṛta of Kundakundācārya, has been edited by Paṇḍita Gajādhar Lal Nyāyaśāstri

[7] Peterson's Fourth Report,

29 PRADYUMNA SŪRI
(ABOUT 980 A D)

He[1] belonged to the Rājagaccha of the Śvetāmbara se In Mānikyacandra's Pārśvanātha caritra,[2] his prowess in logi discussions is referred to in the following terms —

"There was born the preceptor Pradyumna Sūri—the fi [illegible] removed all corru [illegible] tati [illegible] ssior [illegible] made his irrelevant opponents to sweat and thereby to [illegible] cur *of the fever of pride*"

In the same work reference is made to his victory over t Digambaras of Venkapaṭṭa in the presence of the king of th province He delighted the kings of various countries by no few than eighty-four triumphs in discussion He was eleventh ascent from Mānikyacandra Sūri, who wrote his Pārśvanāth caritra in Samvat 1276 or 1219 A D Pradyumna must ha flourished about 980 A D, for he was the preceptor of Abhayade Sūri (q v.) who lived a little before 1039 A D

30 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI
(ABOUT 1000 A D)

Abhayadeva Sūri belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect[3], and wa the pupil and successor of Prdyumna Sūri of the Rājagaccha He was an eminent logician and author of Vādamahārṇava, a treat ise on logic called the Ocean of Discussions, and of a commentary on the Sammati-tarka-sūtra called Tattvārtha-bodha-vidhāyinī.[1] "He is described as a lion that roamed at ease in the wild forest of books on logic. That the [illegible] might not sweep away the pa[illegible] his Vāda-mahārṇava." He [illegible]

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[1] For further particulars about Pradyumna Sūri, see Peterson's 4th Report, p lxxix.

[2] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
(P[illegible] caritra as noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report pp [illegible])

[3] [illegible]

31. Laghusamantabhadra
(about 1000 A.D.)

He[3] wrote a commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrī of Vidyānanda called the Aṣṭasāhasrī-viṣamapada-tātparya ṭīkā[4] and seems to have belonged to the Digambara sect and lived about 1000 A.D.

चद्राख्यतिलकाख्या मधुकरौ श्रीवर्धमानाह्वयौ
चिरा विहरमाणः चिरतनौ माद्यौ यदौपासनम् ॥ ६ ॥
तत्शिष्यः समयभेरमेषा
भूर्ण करिष्यन्ति जइः धर्मेता ।
रत्नैव रोधाय चकार ताभ्यां
छन्द नवं व्याकरणार्थे च ॥ ७ ॥
विद्वत्पदसमौलिमपलमपि प्रेक्षणयोरस्पंचि-
निर्पंक्तोऽपि जिनेश्वरः समजनि श्रीमान् चन्द्र ।
य मल्लसूरितप्रजमश्रीजिनमौः पुर प्रविश्य ।
वादे वादिवरान् विजित्य विजयश्रीसमर्प च स्थान् ॥ ८ ॥

(Pārśvanātha-caritra by Māṇikyacandra, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, pp 158–59)

[1] See R. Mitra's Catalogue, X, pp 39–40

[2] For particulars about Abhayadeva Sūri, see Peterson's Fourth Report, p iii

[3] Weber's Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse, etc., p. 851, vv 1, 2, and p 121, vv 4–5. Jineśvara Sūri was probably a spiritual brother of Dhaneśvara Sūri

[4] यस्याः शुरुवराने गुणनिधिः श्रीसर्वदेवाभय
सूरीर्मोऽभयदेव सूरिरविलयाततसाथोऽपि च ।
सद्योवं समुदयपादविद्यल (?) दक्षाद्यविद्यागुरु (?)
सस्यास्माय चिरं भुवि प्रचरतु श्रीमाणिक्यसूरिः कृति ॥

[illegible]

विद्योऽष्टसाहस्रीविषमपदं लघुसमन्तभद्रोऽदम् ॥

32 KALYĀṆA CANDRA
(ABOUT 1000 A D)

Kalyânacandra was the author of **Pramāna-vārtika tīkā** whi is a commentary on the Pramāna-vārtika (probably of Dharm kīrti who lived about 635 A D). It must have existed before 13 A D when Jñānacandra mentioned it in his Ratnākarāvatārik tippana [1]

33. ANANTA-VĪRYA
(ABOUT 1039 A.D)

Ananta-vīrya was the Digambara author of a commentary the Parīksāmukha of Mānikya Nandi called **Parīksā-mukha-pañjikā** or **Prameya-ratnamālā**, as also a commentary on Akalanka's Nyāya-viniścaya called the **Nyāya-viniścaya vṛtti** He wrote the former for Śānti-sena at the request of Hirapa, son of Vijaya and Nānambā [2] Now Sānti-sena, supposed to be identical with Śānti Sūri, died in Samvat 1096 or A D 1039 His contemporary Ananta-vīrya must, therefore, have flourished about that time Ananta-virya must have lived before the 14th century, for he is mentioned by Mādhavācārya in the chapter on Jaina darśana in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha

34 DEVA SŪRI (1086—1169 A D)

HIS LIFE

Deva Sūri, called Vādipravara or the foremost of disputants, belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was a pupil of Municandra [illegible] f women [at the court of Jaya-simha-deva at Anahilla-na in N. Guzerat] and thereby practically stopped the [illegible]

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[1] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Ratnākarāvatārikā-tippana p 7 Yaśovijaya granthamālā series Benares)

[2] [illegible]

[illegible]

(Parīkṣā-mukha-pañjikā noticed in Peterson's Fourth Report, p 153)

[3] Vide the Indian Antiquary Vol XI p 253, and Dr R G Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS during 1883-84 p [illegible]

[4] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

rd Śrī Deva Sūri, who was the crest-gem of the pupils of emed Municandra Sūri and succeeded him in his patta chair), conquered the Digambaras in the council-room of ya-simha Deva and raised a pillar of victory by maintain- nirvāna or salvation of women [that is, holding that even were capable of attaining nirvāṇa] "

चन्द्राश्विशिववर्षेऽत्र वैशाखे पूर्णिमादिने ।
आहूतौ वादिशालायां तौ वादिप्रतिवादिनौ ॥

hāvakacar., XXI, v 95, quoted by Dr Klatt in his article on "Histori-ds of the Jains" in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p 254)

tnaprabha Sūri observes:—

सिद्धाः श्रीमुनिचन्द्रसूरिवरभिर्यैर्नाथंबुद्धामधिः
पट्टे ते विनिवेशितस्तदनु च श्रीदेवसूरिप्रभुः ।
आस्थाने जयसिंहदेवनृपतेर्येनास्तदिग्वाससा
स्त्रीनिर्वाणसमर्थनेन विजयस्तम्भः समुत्तम्भित ॥
तत्पट्टप्रभवो भवन्त्य गुणधामाभिरामोदया
श्रीभद्रेश्वरसूरय शुचिधियस्तस्यासनप्रीतये ।
श्रीरत्नप्रभसूरिभिः शुभकृते श्रीदेवसूरिप्रभो
शिष्यैः सेयमकारि सम्मदकृते वृत्तिर्विशेषार्थिनाम् ॥

(Upadeśamālāṭīkā, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, p 167)

isundara Sūri, in his Gurvāvalī composed in Saṁvat 1466, gives a similar :—

क्षमार्दितगुरस्मीति दुर्वादिकोटीर-
कक्षीकपक्षपरमामदकेलिमाली ।
वादाहवे कुमुदचन्द्रदिगम्बरेन्द्रः
श्रीसिद्धभूमिपतिसंसदि पत्तनेऽस्मिन् ॥ ७४ ॥
स्याद्वादरत्नाकरतर्कवेधा
सूरेः स येषां भवि देवसूरिः ।
चतुश्चतुर्विंशतिसूरिमार्यं
बभूव ॥ ७५ ॥

भवन् विदिताः ॥ ८६ ॥

Jaina Yaśovijaya-granthamāla of Benares, pp.

In Samvat 1204 or 1147 A D Deva Sūri founded a caitya, raised a *bimba* at Phalavardhigrāma, and established an image of Neminātha at Ārāsana [1] He was born in Samvat 1143 or 1086 A D, attained the rank of Sūri in 1174 Samvat or 1117 A D, and ascended to heaven in Samvat 1226 or 1169 A D [2]

35 DEVA SŪRI's Pramāṇa naya tattvālokālaṅkāra

Pramāṇa—right knowledge

The **Pramāṇa naya tattvālokālaṅkāra**[3] consists of eight chapters (*paricchedas*), viz —

Subjects of the Pramāṇa naya tattvālokālaṅkāra

(1) Determination of the nature of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (2) determination of the nature of perception (*pratyakṣa svarūpa-nirṇaya*), (3) determin-

verbal testimony of scripture (*āgamākhya-pramāṇa-svarūpa-nir naya*), (5) determination of the nature of objects of knowledge (*viṣaya-svarūpa-nirṇaya*), (6) determination of the consequences and fallacies of knowledge (*phala pramāṇa-svarūpādyābhāsa-nirṇaya*); (7) determination of the nature of one-sided knowledge (*nayātma-* … and (8) determination of th … of

's

is

n-

7-

Nature of right or valid knowledge

ledge which ascertains the nature of itself as well as other things The intercourse between the sense-organs and the objects of sense is not *pramāna* (valid knowledge), for though it can ascertain the nature of objects outside itself, it cannot ascertain its own nature, since it has no consciousness *Pramāna* must certainly be *knowledge*, for it is capable of choosing what is desirable and rejecting what is undesirable It must also be definite in character, for it is opposed to superimposition (*samāropa*) Superimposition is of three kinds (1) inversion (*viparyaya*)—such as looking upon a pearl oyster as a piece of silver, (2) doubt (*samsaya*)—such as is this a post or a man? and (3) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*) consisting in a mere cogitation in the mind as to what the thing might be

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[1] *Vide* Peterson's Fourth Report, p lv also Klatt, Ind Ant XI p 254

[2]
शिखिवेदशिवे जन्म दीक्षा युग्मशरेश्वरे ।
वेदाश्वशङ्करे वर्षे सूरित्वमभवत् प्रभोः ।
रसयुग्मरवौ वर्षे श्रावणे मासि सङ्गते ।
कृष्णपक्षस्य सप्तम्यामपराह्णे गुरोर्दिने ॥
मर्त्यलोकस्थितं लोकं प्रतिबोध्य पुरन्दर-
बोधका इव ते जग्मुर्दिवं श्रीदेवसूरयः ॥

(Prabhāvakacar, XXI vv 287 seq quoted by Dr Klatt in his article on "Historical Records of the Jains" in the Indian Antiquary, Sept 1982, Vol XI, p 254) According to some authorities Deva Sūri was born in Samvat 1134 or 1077 A.D

The Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra has been printed and published in Benares in the Jaina Yaśovijaya series.

Direct knowledge Perception

Pramāna (valid knowledge) is of two kinds (1) direct (*pratyaksa*, perception) and (2) indirect (*paroksa*, outside the senses) The direct knowledge or perception is of two kinds practical (*sām-* [illegible]

including *avadhi-jñāna* (limited knowledge), i e knowledge of special objects which, near or remote, are not differentiated, and *manah-paryāya*, i e definite knowledge of another's thoughts and the laying bare of the secrets of the heart, and (2) *sakala*, i e. perfect, which is the unobstructed intuition of the entire aspects of a thing One who possesses that perfect transcendental knowledge is called an [illegible]

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[1] The explanation of *avagraha*, etc., as given here is taken from Col Jarrett's translation of the Ain i Akbari, published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol III, p 190, as the portion related to *pramāna* in the Jaina chapter of Ain-i-Akbari very closely resembles that in the *Pramāna-naya-tattvālokālankāra*. Dr R. G Bhandarkar's explanation of these terms given on p 93, footnote, of his Report on Sanskrit MSS., for 1883-84, is, however, different

Inference is of two kinds (1) *svārtha*, for one's own self, and (2) *parārtha*, for the sake of others. *Hetu* (reason or the middle term) is defined as that which cannot happen except in connection with the major term The definition that the *hetu* (middle term) is that which possesses three characteristics, is to be rejected as involving fallacies [1] Those who maintain the threefold characteristic or division of the *hetu* (reason or middle term), cannot but admit the necessity of using the minor term (*pakṣa*) in an inference.[2]

Inference

According to some, as the connection or absence of connection between the middle and the major terms can be shown by internal inseparable connection (*antar vyāpti*), the example forming the external inseparable connection (*bahirvyāpti*) is useless [3] For instance —

The hill (minor term) is fiery (major term), because it is smoky (middle term), as a kitchen (example)

Here the hill is an integral part of the inference, and in it may be found the necessary connection between fire and smoke. Why then should we burden our inference with an example from without? The kitchen certainly shows the same connection; fire and smoke are found together there but it is not an essential [illegible] unessential is brought across its track

Uselessness of the example

The application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) as the syllogism are also useless, but these together with the are to be employed to convince men of small intellect.[1]

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[1] निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुः न तु त्रिलक्षणकादिः ।
तस्य हेत्वाभासस्यापि सम्भवात् ॥ ११ ॥
(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālankāra, Chap III)

This is an attack on Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist logicians who define the three characteristics of *hetu* as follows:—

त्रैरूप्यं पुनर्लिङ्गस्य अनुमेये सत्त्वमेव ।
सपक्ष एव सत्त्वम् । असपक्षे चासत्त्वमेव निश्चितम्
(Nyāyabindu, Chapter II)

[2] त्रिविधं साधनमभिधायैव तत्समर्थनं विदधानः कः खलु न पक्षप्रयोगमङ्गीकुरुते ॥ २१ ॥
(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra, Chap III)

[3] अन्तर्व्याप्त्या हेतोः साध्यप्रत्यायने शक्तावशक्तौ च बहिर्व्याप्तेरुद्भावनं व्यर्थम् ॥ ३५ ॥
tattvālokālankāra, Chap III)

d a syllogism.

Avayava or parts of an inference or syllogism are therefore stated to be the g —

Paksa-prayoga (use of the minor term, otherwise called propo- [illegible]

[illegible]

n-existence (*abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*) is subdivided as (1) [illegible] (2) subsequent [illegible] mutual (*itaretarā-* [illegible] is kinds of *ābhāsa* [illegible] verbal testimony (i.e. as also under the method of one-sided interpretation there is given an elaborate exposition of the *Saptabhangī-* evenfold paralogism). The mediate and immediate results knowledge (*pramāṇa*) have been clearly laid down. e results of knowledge and the practical use made of them ed to be not illusory (*saṁvṛti*), but real (*pāramārthika*)

Fallacies of *Naya.*

der *naya* (the method of comprehending a thing from lar points of [illegible]
l thus [illegible]

(5) *Śabdābhāsa* (the verbal fallacy)—occurs when we recognize th distinction of times into past, present and future, but g on attaching one and the same meaning to a word in al the three cases, e g if we now use the word "krata' (sacrifice) in the sense of "strength" which it signified thousand years ago

(6) *Samabhirūdhābhāsa* (the fallacy of the subtle)—occurs whe we interpret synonymous words such as Indra, Śakra Purandara, etc , signifying altogether different things

(7) *Evambhūtābhāsa* (the fallacy of the such-like)—occurs when thing is discarded simply because it does not, at the moment, possess the properties implied by the name, e g Rāma is not a man (a thinking animal), because he is not at present thinking

The Soul—*ātmā*

The soul (*ātmā*) which is the doer and enjoyer, and an embodiment of consciousness, is of the same size as its body In every person there is a separate soul which, having got rid of the bondage of its *karma* (act-fruits), attains emancipation.

The Method of Debate.

The last chapter expounds the method of debate. Discussion (*Vāda*) consists in assertion and counter-assertion for the establishment of a certain proposition by rejecting its opposite The disputant or the person who opens the discussion may be eager either to gain a victory or to ascertain a truth The truth may be sought either for one's own self as a disciple seeks it, or for others as a teacher seeks it The same remarks apply to the opponent or respondent There are four constituents of a council of discussion, viz (1) the disputant (*vādī*), (2) the opponent [illegible] the members (*sabhya*) and

[illegible]

members must be acceptable to both the parties in respect of the skill in grasping their dogmas, they must have a good memory, be very learned, and possess genius, patience and impartiality. Their duties consist in stating the assertions and replies of the disputant and his opponent with reference to the particular sub- [illegible] of their

[illegible]

must be [illegible] partiality. His duty consists in judging the speeches of the parties and the members, as also in preventing quarrels, etc, among them In the event of the parties being desirous of victory alone, they may continue the discussion with vigour as long as the members wish, but if they are eager to ascertain the truth alone, they may continue the discussion so long as the truth is not ascertained and so long as they retain their vigour

36 Hemacandra Sūri.

(1088—1172 A D)

Hemacandra Sūri[1] (surnamed *Kalikāla-sarvajña*), born at Dhandhuka in Ahmedabad, was a pupil of Devacandra of the Vajraśākhā He was a contemporary of King Jaya Simha and is said to have been the preceptor of Māhārāja Kumāra Pāla of Guzerat about Samvat 1199-1229 He was the author of a large number of works such as
śāsanavṛtti, Abhi
graha, Dvāśraya
part of which is (
Pariśiṣṭaparva), Yogaśāstra, Nighaṇṭuśeṣa, etc

He was also the author of a most important work on logic called **Pramāṇa mīmāmsā**,[2] on which he himself wrote a commentary. This work, which is divided into five chapters, is written in the *Sūtra* or aphoristic style, and not in the form of a *prakaraṇa* (expository treatise)

He was a spiritual brother of Pradyumna Sūri,[3] was born in Samvat 1145 or 1088 A D., took the vow (*vrata*) in 1150 Samvat or 1093 A D, attained the rank of Sūri in 1166 Samvat word of the Arhats like a mother by his 1,400 works He is said to have used the word *viraha* (separation or sorrow) as his mark in the last verse of each of his works He was by birth a Brāhmaṇa and was chaplain to king Jitāri whose capital was Chittore near the Citrakūṭa hill[1] He was instructed in the Jaina doctrine by Jinabhaṭa. Two of his pupils, named Haṁsa and Paramahaṁsa, are said to have left him as missionaries of the Jaina faith, and to have been slain in the Bhota country (Tibet) by the fanatical Buddhists whom they sought to convert The sorrow caused by the death of these two pupils is said to have been symbolised in the word *viraha*.

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[1] For details about Hemacandra, see Buhler's "Ueber das Lebens des Jaina Monches Hemacandra", Peterson's Fourth Report, p cxli, and p 82, and also Peterson's lecture on the story of Hema Candra published in the *Bombay Gazette*, August 29, 1895

[2] A manuscript of the Pramāna-mīmāmsā with a commentary by the author himself has been noticed by Peterson in his Fifth Report on Sanskrit MSS, pp 147-148 In explaining why the Pramāna mīmāmsā was written in the form of aphorisms, Hemacandra in the first chapter of the commentary says —

वाचकमुख्यविरचितानि सकलशास्त्रचूडामणिभूतानि तत्त्वार्थसूत्राणीति यद्येवमकलङ्क-
धर्मकीर्त्यादिवत् प्रकरणमेव किं नारभ्यते किमनया सूत्रकारत्वाहोपुरुषिकया मैवं वोच । भिन्न-
रुचिर्ह्ययं जनस्ततो नास्य स्वेच्छाप्रतिबन्धे लौकिकराजकीयं वा शासनमस्तीति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् अत्र
वर्णसमूहात्मकैः पञ्चभिरध्यायैः शास्त्रमिदमरचयदाचार्यः । तस्य च प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यर्थमभिधातुमिद-
मादिसूत्रम् । अथ प्रमाणमीमांसा अथ इत्यस्य अधिकारार्थत्वात् ।

(Quoted in Peterson's Fifth Report, p 148)

[3] श्रीचान्द्रकुलेऽभवद्गुणनिधिः प्रद्युम्नसूरिप्रभु-
वैभुर्देवश्च सिद्धहेमविषये श्रीहेमसूरिर्विभिः ।

(Candrasena's commentary on Utpādasiddhiprakarana, a manuscript of which is noticed in Peterson's Third Report, p 209)

It is generally supposed that Haribhadra Sūri, whose pupils were killed in Tibet, was the first author of that name. But there will be no inconsistency if we suppose him to be the second Haribhadra Sūri, for the religious intercourse between India and Tibet was more frequent in the 12th century A D than in the 5th century, when Tibet had scarcely emerged into the ken of history

41 PĀRŚVADEVA GAṆI
(1133 A D).

Pārśvadeva was the author of a commentary on Nyāyapraveśa, called Nyāyapraveśapañjikā.[2] He assisted Āmradeva Sūri in Saṁvat 1190 or 1133 A D in writing his commentary on the Ākhyāna-maṇi-koṣa of Nemicandra[3]

42 ŚRICANDRA
(ABOUT 1137—1165 A D)

Candra or rather Śrī Candra,[4] a disciple of Hema Candra Sūri of the Harṣapurīya gaccha wrote about 1137 A D a work [illegible] commentary [illegible]

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[1] *Vide* Introduction to Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya published in the Chowkhamba series, Benares, and Peterson's Third Report p 35

[2] [illegible] ।
[illegible] ।
(Quoted in Peterson's First Report, p 81)

[3] Peterson's Fourth Part, p lxxvii

[4] *Vide* "Jainistic Notices" by Professor N. D. Mironow published as a Bulletin of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, St. Petersbourg, 1911.

[5] *Vide* Peterson's Fourth Report, pp xxvii–xxviii

43. DEVABHADRA
(ABOUT 1150 A D).

Devabhadra,[1] a disciple of both Hemacandra Sūri and Śrī Candra,[2] was the author of a logical treatise entitled the **Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippana**, a super-commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti. In this work there are quotations from Vindhyavāsin, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Jñānaśrī Mitra[3] and others He lived about 1150 A D.

44 CANDRASENA SŪRI
(ABOUT 1150 A D)

Candrasena, who seems to have been a pupil of Pradyumna Sūri, wrote, with the assistance of Nemicandra, a work called **Utpāda-siddhi-prakaraṇa** with a commentary on the same in Sanskrit in Samvat 1207 or 1150 A D[4]

45. RATNAPRABHA SŪRI
(1181 A D)

Ratnaprabha Sūri, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, was a logician of repute, being the author of a light commentary (*laghu-ṭīkā*) on the Pramāṇa-naya tattvālokālankāra called **Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā**,[5] in which are quoted the views of the Buddhist logicians Arcata (q v) and Dharmottara (q v.).

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[1] *Vide* "Devabhadra and his Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippana" in the Jainistic Notices by Professor N D Mironow published as a Bulletin of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, St Petersbourg 1911

Vide also Peterson's Fourth Report, p lv

[2]
श्रीमद्देवप्रभसूरीणां सर्वं रति सर्वेव वाच्यता ।
सद्य शिष्य सवेनेदं चक्रे किमपि टिप्पनम् ॥

(Praśasti of Pāṇḍava-caritra)

[3] Devabhadra, in his Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippana, quotes Jñāna-śrī Mitra thus —

ननु चार्थक्रियासामर्थ्यमेव सत्त्वं नान्यत् । तथा हि ज्ञानश्री —— यदि नाम प्रतिक्षणं क्षणभेदसत्त्वापौर्वापर्यक्रियासामर्थ्यमेव सत्त्वमभिप्रेतमिति ।

[4]
द्वादशवर्षशतेषु श्रीविक्रमतो गतेषु मुनिभि. ।
चैत्रे समर्थितमिद साहाय्य चात्र मे नेमि ॥

(Colophon of Saṭīka Utpāda-siddhiprakaraṇa quoted in Peterson's Third Report, p 209).

[5]
प्रमाणे च प्रमेये च बालानां बुद्धिसिद्धये ।
किञ्चिद् वचनचातुर्यचापल्यायेदमादधे ॥
प्रमेयरत्नकोटीभि पूर्णो रत्नाकरो महान् ।
तत्रावतारमात्रेण बालानां हि कृतार्थता ॥

(Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā, Muni Dharmavijaya's MSS , p 99). A part of the Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Yaśovijaya series.

While in Broach at the Aśvāvabodhatīrtha in Samvat 1238 or 1181 A D, he wrote another work called Upadeśamālāvṛtti[1] *to please Bhadreśvara Sūri and in payment* of the debt he owed to Vijayasena Sūri, the brother of Bhadreśvara. There he gives his spiritual descent in the Vṛhadgaccha as follows: (1) Municandra Sūri, (2) Deva Sūri, (3) Bhadreśvara Sūri, and (4) Ratnaprabha Sūri[2]

46 TILAKĀCĀRYA
(ABOUT 1180—1240 A.D).

Tilaka Ācārya, who belonged to the Candragaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, was a spiritual descendant of Candraprabha Sūri through Dharmaghoṣa, Cakreśvara and Śivaprabha. He was author of several works such as the Āvaśyaka-laghu-vṛtti written in 1239 A D, and, the Pratyeka-buddha-caritra in 1204 A.D[3]

47 MALLISENA SURI
(1292 A D)

Malliṣena belonged to the Nagendra Gaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, and was the author of the **Syādvādamañjarī**, a commentary on Hemacandra's Vitarāga-stuti or Dvātriṃśikā The Syādvāda-mañjarī contains an exposition of the *Pramāṇa*, *Saptabhaṅgī-naya*, etc, and criticises Akṣapāda's theories of *Pramāṇa*, *Chala*, *Jāti*, *Nigrahasthāna*, etc The doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, Aulūkya, Jaiminīya, Bhaṭṭapāda Vedānta, Yogācāra Mādhyamika, Cārvāka, etc, have also been his favourite subjects of attack At the close of his work Malliṣena describes himself as a pupil of Udayaprabha Sūri and as having composed the work in Śaka 1214 or A D 1292[4]

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[1] [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥
[illegible]
[illegible] ॥

([illegible] vide Peterson 5 p 120).

[2] For other particulars of Ratnaprabha Sūri vide Peterson 4 p [illegible] Compare also Weber II p [illegible]

[3] Vide Peterson's Fourth Report p [illegible] and Fifth Report [illegible]

[4] [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Vide Syādvāda-mañjarī p 229 printed in the [illegible] Sanskrit Series and edited by [illegible])

48 RĀJAŚEKHARA SŪRI
(1348 A D)

Rājaśekhara Sūri, or Maladhāri Śrī Rājaśekhara Sūri, be- ed to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the author of the Ratnā- rikā-pañjikā,[1] a sub-commentary on the Pramāna-naya-tattvā- lankāra, as also of two other works called Syādvāda-kalikā Caturvimśatiprabandha[2] He is also the author of a Pañjikā imentary) on the Nyāya-kandalī of the Hindu philosopher lhara. He studied the Nyāya-kandalī under the guidance of prabha,[3] and completed his Caturvimśatiprabandha in Samvat i or 1348 A D[4]

49. JÑĀNA CANDRA
(1350 A.D)

He belonged to the Śvet[illegible]

. Jñāna Candra's date may approximately be fixed at about) A D

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[1] A part of the Ratnākarāvatārikā-pañjikā has been printed and published in Benares Jaina Yaśovijaya series.

[2] This work has been published by Hira Lal Hamsarāja at Jāmanagara in diawar

श्रीमत्तिलकप्रभविबोधितस्य न्यायकन्दलीं किंचित् ।
तस्यां विवृतिमथ करवै स्वपरोपकाराय ॥

Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara with the Pañjikā of Rājaśekhara noticed in Peter- l, p 273, cf also Peterson 3, pp 28–29)

[4] *Vide* Weber II, p 1207

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(Colophon of Caturvimśatiprabandha)

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥
[illegible]
[illegible] ... [illegible] ॥

Jñāna[illegible] ippana, chap I, p 7, published in Yaśo-

[illegible] ।

[illegible] ॥

[illegible] tippanaka, lent to me by Muni [illegible] ited and published in the Benares

60. GUṆARATNA
(1409 A D.)

Guṇaratna belonged to the Tapāgaccha of the Ś sect, and was the distinguished author of a commenta Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya[1] called Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya vṛtt rahasya dīpikā in which the Nyāya (logic) along with oth has been lucidly explained He also wrote the Kriyā rat caya

He is mentioned by Ratna śekhara Sūri in the pratikramaṇa-sūtra-vṛtti composed in Samvat 1496 or A In that work Guṇaratna is mentioned as a pupil of Dev who attained the exalted position of Sūri at Anahillap Samvat 1420 or A D. 1363[3] Guṇaratna must, theref lived between A D 1363 and A D. 1439 Devasundara teacher of Guṇaratna, was a contemporary of Muni-sundara the famous author of the Gurvāvali[4] composed in Samvat or A.D 1409 Guṇaratna himself says that his Kriyā samuccaya[5] was composed in Samvat 1466 or A.D 1409

Guṇaratna, in his elaborate commentary (*Vṛtti*) on the darśana-samuccaya, has mentioned Śauddhodani, Dharmo cārya, Arcata, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Kamalaśīla, Dignāga, and other Buddhist authors, as well as Tarkabhāsā, Hetubindu, Arcata-tarkatīkā, Pramāna-vārtika, Tattvasamgraha, Nyāya-bindu, Nyāyapraveśaka, and other Buddhist works on logic, etc, *in the chapter on the Bauddha system* *Mention has also been* made, in the chapter on the Nyāya, of such Hindu logicians as [illegible]

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[1] Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya with Vṛtti, edited by Dr Suali and published Asiatic Society of Bengal There is another commentary on Ṣaḍdarśana caya called Laghuvṛtti by Maṇibhadra. It has been published in the Chowk series

[2] The Śrāddha-prati kramaṇa sūtra vṛtti, by Ratnaśekhara Sūri, has noticed in Peterson 3, pp 226–227 whence the following lines are quoted —

विख्याततपेत्याख्या जगति जगच्चन्द्रसूरयोऽभूवन् ।
श्रीदेवसुन्दरगुरूत्तमाश्च तदनुक्रमाद्विदिता ॥ १ ॥
पञ्च च तेषां शिष्यास्तेष्वाद्या ज्ञानसागरा गुरवः ।
कुलमण्डना द्वितीया श्रीगुणरत्नास्तृतीयाश्च ॥ २ ॥
षड्दर्शनवृत्तिक्रियारत्नसमुच्चयविचारनिचयसृजः ।
एषां श्रीसुगुरूणां प्रसादतोऽस्य षडावश्यकमिते ।
श्रीरत्नशेखरसूरिर्विनिर्ममामात्मन स्मृतिहेतोः ॥ ३ ॥

[3] *Vide* Dr Klatt on the Paṭṭāvali of the Kharataragaccha in the Ind *Vol.* XI, September 1882 pp 255–256, cf also Weber II, p 884 and Dr Bhandarkar's Report, *1883–84*, p 157

[4] रसरसमनुमितवर्षे १४६६ मुनिसुन्दरसूरिणा कृता पूर्वम् ।
अथ श्रीदेवपाठ्यां गुर्वावलीय जयतादेषा ॥ ८९ ॥
(Gurvāvalī, Jaina Yaśovijaya granthamālā series, p 109)

[5] काले षड्रसपूर्वे १४६६ वत्सरमिते श्रीविक्रमाद्गते
गुर्वादेशमवाप्य च सदा स्वान्योपकार परम् ।
ग्रन्थं श्रीगुणरत्नसूरिरतनोत् प्रज्ञाविहीनोऽप्यमुं
निर्हेतूपकृतिप्रधानजनने शोध्यस्त्वयं धीधनैः ॥ ११ ॥
(Kriyāratna samuccaya, Jaina Yaśovijaya granthamālā series, p 3

[illegible]

have also been mentioned

51. Śrutasāgara Gaṇi
(About 1493 A D)

Śrutasāgara Gaṇi, author of Tattvārthadīpikā, was a pupil of Vidyānandin of the Sarasvatī Gaccha of the Digambaras Nemidatta, who wrote in Samvat 1585 or 1528 A D, describes himself as devoted to the service of Śrutasāgara whose literary activity must be referred to about Samvat 1550 or 1493 A D.[1]

52. Dharma-bhūṣaṇa
(About 1600 A D)

Dharmabhūṣana, a disciple of Vardhamāna Bhaṭṭāraka, was a Digambara who wrote the Nyāya-dīpikā about 300 years ago *He has been mentioned in the Tarkabhāṣā by Yaśovijaya Gaṇi.*

The Nyāya-dīpikā begins with a salutation to Arhat Vardhamāna It is divided into three chapters (*Prakāśa*), viz (1) general [illegible]

Tattvārtha-sūtra, Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika, Āptamīmāṃsā vivaraṇa, Nyāyaviniścaya, Pramāṇa-nirṇaya, Pramāṇa-parīkṣā, Parīkṣāmukha, Nyāyabindu, etc.

52a VINAYAVIJAYA
(1613 A D —1681 A D)

Vinayavijaya was born in a Vaiśya family in Guzerat in Samvat 1670 or A D 1613 His spiritual teacher Kīrtivijaya[1] [illegible] sūri of Akbara's time [illegible] is under [illegible] d philo- [illegible] ascetic, [illegible] rney to [illegible] se [illegible] d [illegible] d [illegible] on his pilgrimage to the Girnar hills in 1651 A D He visited [illegible] it, Marwad, etc, and died at Rander in Guzerat in 1681 A D Of the numerous works written by him the undermentioned treatise on Jaina Nyāya deserves a special notice —

Naya karṇikā—"an ear-ring of *Naya*, the method of descriptions," which was composed at Dīva near Junāgadh in Kathiawad in 1651 A D for the satisfaction of *Guru* Vijayasimha Sūri[2] *Naya* aims at describing things from all possible standpoints There are altogether seven standpoints, viz *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evaṁbhūta*, explanations of which have already been given. The first four of [illegible] though the standpoints are mutually conflicting, they serve collectively to establish the dogmas of the Jaina scripture [1]

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[1] *Vide* the concluding verses of the chapters of Vinayavijaya's Lokaprakāśa.

इत्थं नयार्थवचन कुसुमैर्जिनेन्दु-
र्वीरोऽर्चितः सविनयं विनयाभिधेन।
[illegible]
[illegible] ॥ २२ ॥

(Naya karṇikā)

[2] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] ॥ २२ ॥

(Naya karṇikā)

53 YAŚOVIJAYA GAṆI
(1608—1688 A D)

Yaśovijaya's life

Yaśovijaya Gaṇi, a member of the Śvetāmbara sect, was a distinguished logician who flourished at Dabhoi in the Baroda State (Guzerat), approximately between 1608 A D and 1688 A D. He was a spiritual descendant of Hīravijaya Sūri, the well-known Jaina High-priest of the time of the Moghul Emperor Akbar [2] In about 1626 A.D. he came to Benares,[3] where he studied Nyāya-śāstra in the disguise of a Brāhmaṇa ascetic By about 1638 A D. he confessed that he was a Jaina and was asked at once to leave the Sanskrit academies of the Brāhmaṇas On account of his vast erudition in Logic and Metaphysics he obtained the titles of Upādhyāya, Nyāya-viśārada and Nyāyācārya He died at Dabhoi in 1688 A.D [4]

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[1] Vide Introduction to Naya-karṇikā edited by Mohan Lal Desai, pp 3-4 — The doctrine of [illegible]

[2]



Hīravijaya (1526-1595 A D)
Vijayasena Sūri
Vijayadeva Sūri
Vijayasiṃha Sūri
Kalyāṇavijaya
Lābhavijaya
Nayavijaya
Yaśovijaya (Tapāgacchapaṭṭāvalī)
Kīrtivijaya
Vinayavijaya

[3] रविया काशीमठे जेषयी मे भणी।
न्यायदर्शन विपुलभाव पाया॥ (Mandharastuti)

[4] पूर्वं न्यायविशारदत्वबिरुदं काश्यां प्रदत्तं बुधै
न्यायाचार्यपदं तत कृतशतग्रन्थस्य यस्यार्पितम्।
शिष्यप्रार्थनया नयादिविजयप्राज्ञोत्तमानां शिशु
तत्त्वं किञ्चिदिदं यशोविजय इत्याख्याभृदाख्यातवान्॥
(Tarkabhāṣā)

His review of other writers.

Yaśovijaya wrote more than one hundred works (in Sanskrit and Guzerati) in which he has preserved a detailed criticism on the Logic of Mithilā and Nadia as taught in the Benares academies of the 17th century A.D. He must have been a man of extraordinary talent, or else he would not have ventured to [illegible]

[illegible]

"The ocean of Logic is hard to approach owing to the uproar of waves of the Dīdhiti—Commentary (of Siromani); yet, is not the water of that ocean capable of being drunk by our cloud-like genius?"[1]

54. YAŚOVIJAYA'S WORKS

Yaśovijaya was the author of several rare works on Logic such as **Nyāya-pradīpa**, **Tarkabhāṣā**, **Nyāya-rahasya**, **Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī** and **Nyāya khaṇḍa-khādya**. He also wrote a commentary on the Digambara work Aṣṭasāhasrī called **Aṣṭasāhasrī-vṛtti**.[3]

The **Tarkabhāṣā**, which begins with a salutation to Jina,[4] consists of three chapters, viz. (1) Valid knowledge, *pramāṇa*; (2) Knowledge from particular standpoints, *naya*, and (3) Imposition, *nikṣepa* [illegible] so an occasional discussion on *vyāpti-graha*, induct[illegible]ess of ascertaining a universal connection betw[illegible]rm and the major term.

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[1] [illegible] काव्य कियदिति ।
MSS. in possession of Vijayadharma or Dharma-

[illegible]
[illegible] किं नाम चित्रम् [illegible] ।
MSS. of Vijaya-dharma Sūri and Indravijaya.

[illegible] as follows —
[illegible] whose water is saline and which is unap-
[illegible] uproars of commentators. Is not then the
[illegible] drunk? Why not, intelligent people like
[illegible] drink its water pure and sweet!'

[illegible]vijaya, see Peterson 6, p. xiv. For his works
[illegible]ibay.
[illegible]ovijaya there has been established at
[illegible] under the auspices of which
[illegible] published in a series called Jaina Yaśovi-

[4] [illegible] नमार्हद्भ्यः [illegible] ।
[illegible] समर्थ्येदम् ॥
(Tarkabhāṣā Chapter I)

term and major term (*vyāpya-vyāpaka*), knowledge and external world (*vijñānavāda-vāhyārthavāda*), etc The undermentioned philosophers, philosophical treatises and systems are referred to —

Sāṁkhya, Kaṇabhakṣa, Akṣapāda, Naiyāyika, Bauddha, Mādhyamika, Prabhākara, Mīmāṁsaka, Bhāṣya, Vārtika, Ṭīkā, Samantabhadra, Gandhahasti, Sammati, Miśra, Bhaṭṭa, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Nārāyaṇa,[1] Nārāyaṇācārya, Śiromaṇi[2] Dīdhiti-kāra, Vardhamāna, and Guṇānanda[3]

The **Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivaraṇa**,[4] which is a gloss on the Aṣṭasāhasrī of Vidyānanda, opens with an obeisance to Indrabhūti Gautama The work makes reference to the undermentioned philosophers, philosophical treatises and systems —Vācaspati, Naiyāyika, Maṇḍana Miśra, Prajñākara, Bhaṭṭa, Prābhākara, Hemacandra, Vācakacakravartī (Umāsvāti), Vaidānti-paśu, Kusumāñjali, Gurumata, Murāribhaṭṭa, Murāri Miśra, Gautamīya, Udayanācārya, Bhaṭṭācārya Jarannaiyāyika, Raghudeva Bhaṭṭācārya,[5] Bhūṣaṇasāra,[6] etc

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[1] एतेनैव अवभङ्गो वस्तुत इत्ययमभिप्राय इति नारायणाचार्यं ।

(Nyāyakhaṇḍa-khādya, leaf 3 Bombay)

[2] जातेर्यदि इतिनियतो यदि न स्वभावात्
जाति विना न च ततो व्यवहारसिद्धि ।
तत्प्रेक्षितं ननु शिरोमणि आयतस्ते
तद्वाक्य नीषदपि तस्य न किञ्चिदेव ॥

(Nyāyakhaṇḍa khādya, leaf 42, Bombay)

[3] एतेन इति तद्वृत्ते भावधूमत्वस्फुरणकालानतिरिक्तकालवृत्ति प्रागभावस्य कालतया व्यवच्छेदकत्वाय यथेत्यपि प्रयोजनवदिति गुणानन्देनोक्तं तदसत् ॥

(Nyāyakhaṇḍa khādya leaf 2 Bombay)

[4] ऐन्द्रमहं प्रणिधाय न्यायविशारदयतिर्यशोविजय ।
विवृणमदष्टसहस्रीमष्टसहस्र्याः विवेचयति ॥

(Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivaraṇa, MSS belonging to Vijayadharma Sūri and Indravijaya Sūri)

[5] Raghudeva is referred to in leaves 4, 22 of Aṣṭasāhasrī

[6] The Bhūṣaṇasāra (Vyākaraṇa) is referred to in leaves 34, 35, etc

CHAPTER IV.

Continuity of Jaina Logic.[1]

55 THE CONCILIATORY CHARACTER OF JAINA LOGIC

No conflict with the Brāhmanas

In the previous pages there has been given an indication of the services rendered by the Jainas and the Buddhists in the formation of the Mediæval School of Indian Logic Since the Brāhmanas did not in respect of their social practices differ so markedly from the Jainas as they did from the Buddhists, their attack on the Jaina Logic was not so violent as that on the Buddhist Logic In fact the logical theories of the Jainas are in many instances akin to those of the Brāhmanas. The terms *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison), *āgama* (verbal testimony), *āharaṇa* or *udāharana* [illegible] thānānga-sūtra and the [illegible] meanings similar to, if [illegible] sponding terms of the [illegible] the Brāhmanas There was in the Logic of the Brāhmanas a casual review of the syllogism of ten members as propounded in certain works of the Jainas, but there was no protracted quarrel on that account between the two parties The Jaina logicians quoted Brāhmanic authors[2] generally in an academic spirit The special Jaina doctrines of *Naya* (method) and *sapta-bhangī* (sevenfold paralogism), though occasionally criticised, did not receive any rude blows from the Brāhmanas.

The Jainas, so far as they wrote regular treatises on Logic, did not differ much from the Buddhists in respect of their subject and style. The Nyāyāvatāra, by the Śvetāmbara Jaina (500 A.D), traverses almost the [illegible] yāya praveśa of the Buddhist logician [illegible]. Rabhasa Nandi, a Digambara Jaina [illegible] called Sambandhoddyota on the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (635

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[1] [illegible] usana's "Me[illegible] ool of Indian Logic," his [illegible] the [illegible] aka of Java-subba Sūri, [illegible] Epigraphia Indica Vol. II; [illegible] ahar [illegible]

[2] [illegible] ra in his Sammatitarka, and [illegible] a and Anekānta-jayapatākā, [illegible] a Sūri of Rājagaccha.

A.D) The Pramāna-vārtika-ṭīkā of Jaina Kalyāna-candra is likewise a commentary on the Pramāna-vārtika of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti (635 A D) Dharmottara-tippanaka is the title of a Jaina commentary by Mallavādin (about 962 A D) on the Buddhist work Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā of Dharmottara (847 A D.) If the Buddhist author Śānta Rakṣita (749 A D) instituted in his Tattvasamgraha an inquiry into the Jaina doctrine of soul, the Jaina author Haribhadra Sūri (1129 A D) gave in his Saddarśana-samuccaya a complete summary of the Buddhist philosophy In fact there was no bitter rivalry between the Jainas and the Buddhists

56 ROYAL PATRONAGE AND PERSECUTION

Patronage

From time to time Jainism enjoyed patronage as well as suffered persecution at the hands of the rulers King Candra Gupta,[1] who carried on controversies in the spirit of scholars, was a great supporter of the Jaina religion which spread widely in Northern India and was introduced into Mysore by Bhadrabāhu Samprati, a grandson of Emperor Aśoka, accepted the Jaina faith which was welcomed throughout the Deccan about 215 B C The Svetāmbara Jaina [illegible] patronised at the [illegible] The Chinese [illegible] and Pāndya [illegible] religion [illegible] it was popu- [illegible] Marātha [illegible] The Digambara Jaina [illegible] Akalanka Deva enjoyed [illegible] about 1142-1172 A D

Persecution

In the latter half of the seventh century A D there occurred, however, a terrible persecution of Jainism in Southern India King Kūna, Sundara or Nedumāran Pāndya, who had been brought up as a Jaina, became a pupil of Saint Tirujñāna Sambandar and accepted the Śaiva faith Displaying the zeal of a convert he persecuted with savage cruelty his late co-religionists of whom no fewer than eight thousand were put to death. Mahendra Varman of the Pallava dynasty, whose rule extended to Trichinopoly, was originally a Jaina Through the influence of a Tamil saint he accepted Śaivism, and destroyed the large Jaina monastery of Pāṭaliputtriam in South Arcot at about 610 A D In the Cālukya Kingdom of Vātāpi, where Jainism flourished to a certain extent during 550–750 A D, Buddhism was supplanted by Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism King Amoghavarṣa of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa line, whose capital was at Mānyakheta (in the Nizam's Dominions) devoted the last part of his life to ascetic practices and patronised the Digambara Jaina faith during 815–877 A D Jainism made a rapid progress in his kingdom up to the 10th century A D Ajaya Deva, a Śaiva King of Guzerat (about 1174–76 A.D) mercilessly persecuted the Jainas and put their leader to death

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[1] If we suppose this Candra Gupta to be identical with Candra Gupta Maurya, the date of introduction of Jainism into Mysore must be about [illegible] B C On the contrary if he is the same as Candra Gupta II, Mysore could not have welcomed [illegible] A D The date of Bhadrabāhu will have to be determined

No hostility from the Mahomedans.

In spite of such persecutions the Jaina religion went on flourishing in the Hindu period up till 1200 A D During the Mahomedan rule which followed, Jainism remained unperturbed [illegible] certain days

57. SUPPORT OF THE JAINA COMMUNITY.

Rights and privileges of the laity

Though in all periods the Jainas enjoyed a fair share of royal patronage, the main source of their stay and strength lay in the community of Jaina laymen The founder of Jainism left the church not entirely at the mercy of the monks (*sādhu*) and nuns (*sādhvī*), but placed it also in the hands of the laymen (*śrāvaka*) and laywomen (*śrāvikā*) called respectively the male and female devotees In all religious and social ceremonies the lay people exercise control in the full measure. It is at their choice and with their permission that the head of the church called *Ācārya* can be appointed The management of temples and places of pilgrimage is entrusted entirely to the lay people, who select the residence of monks and nuns

Aid to literary men

It is on account of the mutual help of the monks and lay people that the Jaina church has continued undisturbed The lay people, who belong mainly to the Vaiśya (merchant) community command the wealth of India. They have uniformly supported Jaina authors, and so long as they continue, the Jaina logicians will never have to recede from literary pursuits for want of funds.

88. Jaina Logic will not be extinct.

We have seen that the Jainas, who were very well organised against the Brāhmaṇas and Buddhists. They always tried as far as practicable, in averting the displeasure of their rulers, and framed their ecclesiastical rules in liberal spirit to ensure the sympathy of the laity. Under such circumstances it is not at all strange that Jainism has not died and there is no fear that the Jaina logic will ever be extinct.

SECTION II.

The Buddhist Logic.
(CIRCA 570 B C —1200 A.D.).

CHAPTER I

Topics of Logic mentioned in the old Buddhist Literature

59. BUDDHA GAUTAMA
(570 B.C —490 B.C)

[illegible] four Buddhas are said to have already appeared, *viz* Krakucchanda, Kanaka Muni, Kāśyapa and Gautama, while the fifth, *viz* Maitreya, is yet to be born [4]

Of the past Buddhas the last, *viz*. Buddha Gautama, otherwise called Śākya Muni, was born at Kapilavastu (modern Nigliva in the Nepal Terai) about 570 B C , and attained *nirvāṇa* at Kuśinagara (modern Kuśinārā or Kasia near Gorakhpur) about 490 B C.[5] He passed almost his whole life in Magadha (modern Behar) He is regarded by modern scholars as the real founder of Buddhism, while his predecessors are considered as purely mythical

60. ORIGIN OF THE PĀLI BUDDHIST LITERATURE
(490 B C —76 B C)

Buddha Gautama is said to have delivered his teachings in the Māgadhī or Pāli language On his death these teachings were rehearsed by the Buddhist monks in three councils[5] held at Rāja-

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[illegible]

61 Logical topics in the Pāli Literature

In the *Tipiṭaka*—nay in the whole Pāli literature[1]—there is [illegible]

[illegible]

tion has not been carried far enough to lay the foundation of a Logic that deserves the name of science

In the Tipitaka there are, however, occasional references to logical topics and to a class of men who were called *Takki* (in Sanskrit. *Tarkin*) or *Takkika* (in Sanskrit *Tārkika*)—that is, those [illegible]

[illegible]

in quibble and casuistry.

62. Suttapitaka · Digha-nikāya: Brahmajāla sutta (490 B C)

Casuists and sophists

In the Brahma-jāla-sutta,[*] which forms a part of the Digha Nikāya of the Sutta Pitaka and was rehearsed in the First Buddhist Council about 490 B C, there is mention of certain Śramanas and Brâhmanas who were *takki* (argumentationists) and *vimamsi* (casuists) and indulged in *takka* (argumentations) and *vimamsā* (casuistry) These Śramaṇas and Brāhmanas from the standpoints of their philo-

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[illegible]

sophical views were divided into various classes such as the eternalists (*sassata vādā*), eternalist-non-eternalists (*ekacca-sassatikā ekacca asassatikā*), and the annihilationists (*uccheda-vādā*)

With regard to the eternalists who were perhaps the followers of (the Sāṁkhya philosophy of) Kapila, Buddha says —

Eternalists

There are, brethren, some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are eternalists, and who, on four grounds, proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal. . . . They are addicted to logic and reasoning [argumentation and casuistry], and give utterance to the following conclusion of their own, beaten out by their argumentations and based on their sophistry "eternal is the soul, and the world, giving

ak, as a pillar

transmigrate

spring up in

With regard to the eternalist non-eternalists who were perhaps the followers (of the Ānvīkṣikī) of Medhātithi-Gautama, Buddha says —

There are, brethren, some recluses and Brāhmanas who are

With regard to the annihilationists who were perhaps the followers of the Lokāyata philosophy, Buddha observes —

Annihilationists

There are, brethren, recluses and Brāhmanas who are annihilationists, who in seven ways maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihi-

In the first, place, brethren,

ng view "Since,

ments and is the

royed on the dis-

solution of the body, and does not death; and then,

sir, the soul is *completely annihilated.*"

There are other classes of Śramanas and Brāhmanas such as a class of fortuitous-originists (*adhicca-samuppannika*) of whom Buddha speaks as follows :—

"[illegible]

63. Suttapiṭaka, Majjhimanikāya, Anumāna sutta
(490 B C).

"Anumāna sutta," which presupposes the use of the word *anumāna* in the sense of "inference" or rather "guess," is the title of a chapter of the Majjhima Nikāya, while the word *vāda* in the sense of discussion occurs in the Upālivāda-sutta of the same Nikāya of the Suttapiṭaka[1]

64. Suttapiṭaka · Khuddaka Nikāya : Udāna
(490 B C)

In the Udāna, which is included in the Khuddaka Nikāya of the Sutta Piṭaka and is supposed to have been rehearsed in the three Buddhist Councils during 490 B C.—255 B C , we read —

"As long as the perfect Buddhas do not appear, the *Takkikas* [sophists] are not corrected nor are the Sāvakas · owing to their evil views they are not released from misery."[2]

This passage leaves no doubt that the *Takkikas* were sophists

65 Vinaya-piṭaka. Parivāra
(490 B C).

The logical procedure of a Judicial Council of Monks

Four kinds of cases for settlement (*adhikarana*)

In the Parivāra,[3] a work of the Vinaya-piṭaka, there is mention of four kinds of *adhikarana*, cases for settlement, *viz.*, (1) *vivādādhikarana*, a case pertaining to differences of opinion, (2) *anuvādādhikarana*, a case in which one party accuses another party of the violation of a rule of good conduct; (3) *āpattādhikaraṇa*, a case in

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[1] *Vide* Majjhima Nikāya, vol. I, 15th sutta, and vol. II, 5th sutta.

[2] The original of this passage runs as follows :—

Yāva sammā sambuddhā loke n uppajjanti, na *takkikā* sujjhanti na c'āpi sāvakā, duddiṭṭhī na dukkhā pamuccare ti

—Udānam, vi, 10, edited by Paul Steinthal in the Pāli Text Society series, London.

[3] The Parivāra, chapters IX—XIII, included in the Vinaya-piṭaka, vol. V

A complaint (*codanā*)

A complaint, complainant and respondent

A *complaint* (*codanā*) is intended for humiliating a person by reminding him of the nature of his criminal action. The complaint may be well founded or unfounded It may arise from any [illegible]

The *respondent*, *accused* or *defendant* (*cuditaka*) must speak the truth and must not show temper

A judicial council of monks (*sangha*).

A *council of monks* (*saṅgha*) engaged in trying a case, must receive the arguments of the complainant and the respondent who are the parties of the case Deliberation (*matikamma*) must be shared in by each member of the council

Members of a council (*samgāmāvacara bhikkhu*).

The monks who constitute the members of a judicial council (called in Pāli *saṁgāmāvacara bhikkhu*) must approach the council with meekness of spirit They must know how to take their respective seats They must refrain from irrelevant and useless talk They may speak on good law, or they may solicit their brother monks to speak on it, or they may remain absolutely silent

The members must ascertain the nature of the case under trial, the nature of the breach of morality, the section of the moral code applicable to the case and the nature of the personnel of the council and the parties They must not be biassed They should, when necessary, employ persuasion and exhortation towards the respondent and should at times express their satisfaction at his conduct

They must not, on account of their own superiority in knowledge or seniority in age, hold anybody in contempt

The judge or umpire (*anuvijjaka*)

The judge (*anuvijjaka*), elected by the council to act as such, must not talk rashly or in haste. He must refrain from talking of a subject which is in itself unprofitable, and which may rouse dispute or ill-feeling He must hear attentively what the parties have to say Having the welfare of all at heart, he must not hastily accept the version of one party as true The complainant will say that the respondent "is guilty," *āpanno*, while the respondent himself will plead "not guily," *anāpanno* Instead of discarding the statement of either of the parties, the judge must see that each party is consistent with his first statement

The judge must satisfy himself that the complainant understands the nature of the complaint he makes As regards the respondent the judge must not put to him questions which may refer to his preceptor, teacher, brother-priest, resident pupil, caste, name, family, tradition, clan or native place The reason is that thereby the judge may be biassed towards or prejudiced against the respondent, and his judgment may be influenced by affection, hatred, fear or delusion

[illegible] and not [illegible] the case in season and not out of season, as it is and not as it is not, gently and not rudely, with good will and with his limbs and sense-organs duly restrained

He must control the complainant and the respondent, must take note of what they say, and must not add any thing that they do not say. He must make the languid cheerful, the timid hopeful, and the angry cool He must not act from affection, hatred, fear or delusion. A judge who behaves himself in this way is a true follower of Buddha and is justly loved by all people

66. Vinaya pitaka ; Pātimokkha
(490 B C)

An ecclesiastical act

As an instance of the method in which monks combined in a council (*sangha*) used to perform an ecclesiastical act (*kiccādhikarana*), I explain the several stages and requisites of the Buddhist sabbath called *uposatha*[1] in accordance with the Pātimokkhupadesa[1] of the Vinaya-pitaka

Uposatha (*Sabbath*)

1. *Pubba-karana*, preparation, which refers to the following requisites —
    - (a) *Sammajjanī*, brooming or cleansing the ground, on which monks are to assemble
    - (b) *Padīpa*, lighting a lamp, if the uposatha is celebrated in the night

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[1] *Vide* the Pāli Pātimokkha of the Vinaya-pitaka, and also the translation of the Vinaya texts by T W Rhys Davids and H Oldenberg Compare also the Tibetan version of the Pātimokkha called *So-sor-thar-pa* edited with the Tibetan text and an English translation by Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in J A S B, nos. 3 and 4, 1915. *Pubba-karana* and *pubba-kicca* are explained fully in the Kankhā-vitaranī and Samantapāsādikā of Buddhaghosa

(c) *Udaka*, water, for drinking or washing one's face and leg
(d) *Āsana*, seat, on which monks are to sit

2. *Pubba-kicca*, the preliminary acts, which refer to the following.—

(a) *Chanda*, vote by proxy. If a monk cannot, owing to any unavoidable cause, attend a council, he may authorize a brother-monk to exercise his vote The formula of authorization runs thus –

chandam dammi, I give authority,
chandam me hara, do ye receive my authority,
chandam me ārocehi, do ye convey my authority to the council

(b) *Pārisuddhi*, purity A monk who cannot attend a council of sabbath, must inform it of his purity through a brother-monk

(c) *Utukkhāna*, naming the season In a year there are three seasons, viz the winter, summer and rain, in each of which *there are celebrated eight uposathas (sabbaths)* The third and seventh *uposathas* of every season are held on the 14th day of the moon while the remaining six are held on the 15th day of the moon *Uposathas* are of three kinds, viz those [illegible]

(d) [illegible] or more monks

(e) *Ovāda*, arrangement for the instruction to be imparted to a council of nuns by a monk deputed for the purpose

3. *Pattakallam*, in season When the *pubba-karaṇa* and *pubba kicca* are over, the council should see whether it was the right time when every thing was in order and there was nothing objectionable

4. *Pātimokkhuddesa*, recitation of the code of monastic laws The introductory part of the Pātimokkha, called *nidāna*, is cited below —

[illegible]

[illegible] are perfect [illegible] I ask [illegible] [illegible] The treatises are perfect [illegible] [illegible]

The [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] regarding [illegible] matters [illegible] be [illegible] must be [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]

8. After the [illegible] has been [illegible] I have the [illegible] with a feeling of [illegible] here.

6. Abhidhamma-piṭaka Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa

(about 255 B.C.)

The Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa, a work of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, composed by Moggaliputta Tissa at the Third Buddhist Council during the reign of Asoka about 255 B.C.,[1] mentions [illegible] Dhamma (illustration) [illegible] (in Sanskrit [illegible]) [illegible] (in Sanskrit [illegible]) [illegible] (in Sanskrit [illegible]) [illegible], etc.,[2] which are the technical terms of Logic. Though Moggaliputta Tissa has not made any reference to a special work on Logic, his mention of some of its technical terms warrants us to suppose that that science in some shape existed in India at the time about 255 B.C.

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[1] Asoka ascended the throne [illegible] B.C. [illegible] Vincent A. Smith's Asoka, p. [illegible]. In the [illegible] year of his reign the Third Buddhist Council took place. [illegible], p. [illegible].

[2] [illegible] is the name of a chapter in the first chapter of the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa. [illegible] is the name of another section of that work. A passage, in which the terms [illegible] and [illegible] occur, is quoted below —

[illegible] (Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa [illegible]) [illegible] Dhammapada [illegible]

In the commentary on the above passage [illegible] [illegible] which [illegible] technical term of Logic, has been [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

68. METHODS OF DISPUTATION AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE KATHĀVATTHU

As a specimen of the method of reasoning carried on during the time of Aśoka, the following controversy (*kathā*) between a Theravādin (a Buddhist disputant who did not admit the existence of the soul, *puggala*, as a genuine reality) and a Puggalavādin (a heretic respondent who asserted that there was a genuine reality called soul, *puggala*) is quoted from the Kathāvatthu[1] —

A case presented by a disputant in a regular form (*anuloma*)

Theravādin Is the soul (*puggala*) known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin Yes

Theravādin Is the soul known in the same way as a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin No, that cannot be said

Theravādin Acknowledge your defeat

(i) If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also say that the soul is known in the same way as any other genuinely real thing is known

(ii) That which you say here is wrong, viz (a) the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not (b) known in [illegible]

(iii) [illegible]

(iv) [illegible] (b), you are wrong

A rejoinder by the respondent (*paṭikamma*)

Puggalavādin Is the soul not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Theravādin: No, it is not known

Puggalavādin: Is it unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known?

Theravādin: No, that cannot be said

Puggalavādin Acknowledge the rejoinder

(Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā, published by the Pali Text Society of London, p 13)

[1] Kathāvatthu, vol. I, pp 1–69, edited by A C. Taylor and published by the Pāli Text Society, London.

Compare the English translation called "Points of Controversy," by Mr Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, published by the Pāli Text Society, London, pp. 1–70

(i) If the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also say that the soul is unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.

(ii) That which you say here is wrong, for (a) the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.

Conclusion (*niggamana*).

Puggalavādin. As for ourselves we do not deserve any defeat

The following assumptions which you made are wrong:—

(i) If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, it must also be known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.

(ii) It is wrong to couple the statement (*a*), *viz*. the soul is [illegible]

(iii) [illegible] also be denied

(iv) If the statement (*a*) is admitted, then the statement (*b*) must also be admitted

The defeat you propose to inflict on us is unfair But our rejoinder is fair and demonstration well done

[illegible] respectively as follows: "Is the soul known *everywhere*, *always* or *in everything* in the sense of a genuinely real thing?" "In the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Defeats *not known* is substituted for *known* in the question.

A case presented through a simple comparison (*suddhika samsandana*)

Theravādin Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, and is matter also known in the same sense?

Puggalavādin Yes

Theravādin: Is matter one thing and the soul another?

Puggalavādin No, that cannot be said

Theravādin. Acknowledge defeat.

[illegible] mer be admitted To say that the soul and matter are both known in the sense of genuinely real things but that they are not mutually distinct things, is wrong

[illegible]

Definition of terms (*lakkhanayutti-kathā*)

Theravādin Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin Yes

Theravādin Is the soul related or absolute compounded or uncompounded eternal or temporal is possessed of form or without form?

Puggalavādin No these cannot be said

Theravādin Acknowledge defeat

Clearing the meaning of terms (*vacana-sodhana*)

The extension of the subject in relation to its predicate is clearly set forth in the following controversy –

Theravādin Is the soul (subject) known and is that which is known (predicate) the soul?

Puggalavādin The soul is known but of that which is known a portion is soul and the remaining portion is not soul

Theravādin Do you say this with respect to the subject also of the soul a portion is known and the remaining portion is not known

Puggalavādin No that cannot be said etc

A case presented through an analogy (*upamā-saṁsandana*)

Theravādin Matter (rupa) as you have admitted, known as a genuinely real thing Feeling (vedana) also is known as such Now is matter one thing and feeling another?

Puggalavādin Yes

Theravādin Is the soul known also in the sense of a genuinely real thing as matter is known?

Puggalavādin Yes

Theravādin Then is matter one thing and the soul another thing?

Puggalavādin No that cannot be admitted

Theravādin Acknowledge defeat

[illegible]

A case presented through the four fold method (*catuk ka-naya-saṁsandana*)

Theravādin Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing ?

Puggalavādin Yes

Theravādin : (i) Is matter the soul ? or (ii) Is the soul in matter ? or (iii) Is the soul apart from matter ? or (iv) Is matter in the soul ?

Puggalavādin No, that cannot be said

Theravādin Acknowledge defeat

The doctrine of impermanence (*khaṇika-kathā*)

The doctrine of momentariness (*khaṇika-kathā*)[1] in its crude form is discussed in the following dialogue —

Theravādin Do all things exist in our consciousness for a moment *only* ?

Pubbaseliyas Yes

Theravādin : Do you mean that it is in our consciousness that there exist the earth, ocean, Sumeru water, fire, wind grass, twigs and trees ?

Pubbaseliyas No

Theravādin Do you mean that our sense-organs have grown along with our sense-cognitions ?

Pubbaseliyas No

Theravādin : Do you mean that the sense organs are coincident in time with our sense-cognitions ?

Pubbaseliyas Yes

Theravādin · Do you accept the authority of the scripture which [illegible]

Pubbaseliyas Yes.

Theravādin Therefore you can not say that the sense-organs are coincident in time with our sense-cognitions

Pubbaseliyas : Should we say that things do not exist in our mind for a moment only ?

Theravādin : Yes

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[1] Kathāvatthu, Khaṇika-kathā XXII—8, pp 620—621, edited by A. C Taylor in the Pali Text Society Compare also the translation called "Points of Controversy" by S Z Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids Also Majjhima Nikāya, i, 190

Definition of terms (lakkhaṇayutti-katha)

Theravādin: Is the soul known in the sense of a [illegible] thing?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the soul related or absolute, compounded or uncompounded, eternal or temporal, is possessed of a form or without form?

Puggalavādin: No, these cannot be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge defeat.

Clearing the meaning of terms (vacana-sodhana)

The extension of the subject in relation to its [illegible] clearly set forth in the following controversy:—

Theravādin: Is the soul (subject) known, and is that which is known (predicate) the soul?

Puggalavādin: The soul is known, but of that which is known a portion is soul and the remaining portion is not soul.

Theravādin: Do you say this with respect to the subject also, that of the soul a portion is known and the remaining portion is not known?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot be said, etc.

A case presented through an analogy (opamma-saṃsandana)

Theravādin: Matter (rūpa) is [illegible] known as a real thing. Feeling (vedanā) is [illegible] something and feeling [illegible] another [illegible]

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the soul known also in the sense of a [illegible] is the soul [illegible] known?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: [illegible] the soul [illegible]

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge defeat.

[illegible]

'When scholars talk a matter over with one another, then is there a winding up, an unravelling, one or other is convicted of error, and he then acknowledges his mistake, distinctions are drawn, and contradistinctions, and yet thereby they are not angered Thus do scholars, O King, discuss'

'And how do kings discuss?'

'When a king, Your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any one differ from him on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying "Inflict such and such a punishment upon that fellow!" Thus, Your Majesty, do kings discuss'

'Very well It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss Let Your Reverence talk unrestrainedly as you would with a brother, or a novice, or a lay disciple, or even with a servant Be not afraid!'

70 ORIGIN OF THE MAHĀYĀNA

(ABOUT 78 A D)

At the opening of the Christian era the north-western part of India was invaded by the Kuśānas, Turuṣkas or Scythians Kaniska,[1] who was one of their chiefs, conquered Kāśmīra, Palhava and *Delhi, and is said to have founded the era called Śakābda in 78* A.D He accepted the Buddhist faith and established a new system of Buddhism called *Mahāyāna*,[2] the Great Vehicle The [illegible] li Tipiṭaka was [illegible] e The *Mahā-* [illegible] China, Japan, [illegible] lon and thence spread to Burmah, Siam, etc In India both the systems prevailed

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[illegible]

in oneness,[1] (2) the Vaiśeṣikas who believe in difference, (3) the Nirgrantha putras who believe in both, and (4) the Jñātiputras who believe in neither.[2]

Reference to Logic and Logicians.

The Laṅkāvatāra speaks in a prophetic style of the *Naiyāyikas* (logicians) and *Tārkikas* (dialecticians). Thus in Chapter II of the work Mahāmati asks Buddha :—

> "Say how in time to come *Naiyāyikas* will flourish?"[3]
> "How is *tarka* (reasoning) corrected and how is it carried on?"[4]
> "What is the nature of the doctrine that draws conclusion from a reason and an example?"[5]

In Chapter X of the work we read :—

> "Whatever is produced is destructible: this is the conclusion of the *Tārkikas*."[6]

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[1] Here the word Sāmkhya stands for the Upaniṣad or Vedānta. The Sāmkhya as mentioned in the Mahābhārata really teaches the doctrine of oneness. Even Vijñāna Bhikṣu, the author of Sāmkhya-bhāṣya, admits that the Sāmkhya philosophy is not opposed to the doctrine of oneness. Cf.

एकमेवाद्वितीय ब्रह्म इति श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रवादश्च सर्वत्रात्मनो द्वये विभागेन
अविभक्तमिदमभेदेनैत्यविरोध । (Sāmkhya bhāṣya, Chap. I, Sūtra 61)

[2] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio, no. 1259. Cf. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, A.S.B. MSS., leaf 135 :—

साङ्ख्या वैशेषिका नग्ना विप्रा पाशुपतास्तथा ।
असत्सद्दृष्टिपतिता विविक्तार्थविवर्जिता ॥

[3] The Sanskrit original runs as *follows* :—

नैयायिका कथ ब्रूहि भविष्यन्ति अनागता ।

(Laṅkavatāra sūtra, Asiatic Society of Bengal's MSS. Chap. II, leaf 11).
The Tibetan version runs thus :—

རྟོག་པ་ཉམས་ཀྱང་ཇི་ལྟ་བུར །
མ་འོངས་དུས་ན་འབྱུང་བ་གསུངས ॥

(Bkaḥ-hgyur, Mdo, vol. V, Asiatic Society of Bengal's xylograph)

[4] कथं हि शुध्यते तर्कं कथ तर्कं प्रवर्तते ।
(Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Chap. II, leaf 11, A.S.B. MSS.)

ཇི་ལྟར་རྟོག་གེ་ཇི་ཡི་སྦྱང་དུ་འགྱུར །
(Bkaḥ-hgyur, Mdo, vol. V)

[5] दृष्टान्तहेतुभिर्युक्त सिद्धान्तो देशना कथम् ?
Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, p. 30, Buddhist Text Society's edition)

[6] कृतकस्य विनाश स्यात् तार्किकाणामयं नय ॥
(Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Chap. X, leaf 143, A.S.B., MSS.).

བྱས་ན་ཉམས་པར་འཇིག་པར་འགྱུར །
འདི་ནི་རྟོག་གེ་ཅན་གྱི་ཚུལ ॥ (Bkaḥ-hgyur, Mdo, vol. V).

Idealism (*vijñāna-vāda*)

In Chapter II, the doctrine of idealism[1] (*vijñāna-vāda*) is explained. According to this doctrine our knowledge alone is real and the so-called external objects are mere manifestations of it. Knowledge (*vijñāna*) is stated to be of two [illegible] the objectified knowledge (*vastu-prativikalpa vijñāna*) or knowledge which is manifested as external objects through the act-force (*karma*) inherent in our aforesaid potentialities, reminiscences, tendencies or impressions.

These two kinds of knowledge combined [illegible]

compared to an ocean, the former is compared to high winds which agitate it.

This basic knowledge, *ālaya-vijñāna*, is otherwise called an ego (*aha n*). As we pass on our *pravṛtti-vijñāna* changes but our ego persists. By means of concentration (*yoga*) we can understand the true nature of the ego. It alone is perfect (*pariniṣpanna*). Non-ego or the external world is false (*parikalpita*) and conditional (*paratantra*). When emancipated, our *pravṛtti-vijñāna* totally disappears, but the ego or *ālaya vijñāna* continues[2]. The

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[1] Vijñāna-vāda is called in Tibetan ṛnam-par śes-pahi lta-wa, རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་ལྟ་བ It is designated in Sanskrit as *yogācāra-darśana* corresponding to Tibetan ṛnal-ḥbyor-pahi-lta-wa, རྣལ་འབྱོར་པའི་ལྟ་བ། *Pravṛtti-vijñāna* is called in Tibetan len-pahi-ṛnam-par śes, ལེན་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས, signifying knowledge as received. *Ālayavijñāna* is called in Tibetan kun-gshi ṛnam par-śes pa, ཀུན་གཞི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ, signifying knowledge which constitutes the basis or foundation of all. *Pariniṣpanna* is called in Tibetan yons grub, ཡོངས་གྲུབ, complete in itself, *paratantra* gshan-dwaṅ, གཞན་དབང་, [illegible] on others, and *parikalpita* kun-brtags, ཀུན་བརྟགས, fanciful or

[2] [illegible] not quite accurate to say that when emancipated the ego or [illegible] becomes identical with the void or *śūnyatā* of the [illegible] while the former look upon *ālaya* as perfect (*parinis*-[illegible] consider *Śūnyatā* to be so [illegible] the vi[illegible] to *ahaṁkāra* (and *puruṣa*) of the [illegible]sophy [illegible] on *ahaṁkāra*, according to the Sāṁkhyas, [illegible] *ālaya* [illegible] [vi]jñāna-vādins persists. The sāṁkhyas do [illegible] called *puruṣa* (soul) which continues to [illegible] noted in the following passage

[illegible] स्यात् । [illegible]

[illegible] edited by Sarat Chandra Das and Satis ego, unruffled by the external world and freed from all potentia ties, reminiscences, tendencies or impressions, attains its pristi purity. This is its emancipation or final rest

In chapter VI of the Lankāvatāra-sūtra entitled *kṣanik parivarta* (a chapter on momentariness), there is a clear explan tion of the theory that everything is momentary In a passage the sūtra the author observes as follows[1] —

"A momentary thing is that

The doctrine of momentariness

after being produced"

75 EIGHTEEN SECTS OF THE BUDDHISTS

We have previously found that

I. Ārya Sarvāstivāda
  (1) Mūla Sarvāstivāda
  (2) Kāśyapīya
  (3) Mahīśāsaka
  (4) Dharma-guptīya
  (5) Bahuśrutīya
  (6) Tāmraśātīya
  (7) Vibhajyavādin
II Ārya Sammitīya
  (8) Kurukullaka
  (9) Āvantika
  (10) Vātsīputrīya

Belonging to the *Vaibhāsika* School of Philosophy

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[1] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

(Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Chap. VI, p. 99, Bengal Asiatic Society's MS)

[2] Vide the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol I, part III, 15, Takakusu's I tsing, pp. xxiii, xxiv and xxv, Rhys Davids' article in the urnal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1891, p 411, 1892 pp. 1—37; Rockhill's Buddha, p 181 ff; Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 270—274, and Wijesinha's Mahāvamsa, part I, apter V, p 15.

III Ārya Mahāsāmghika
(11) Pūrva-śaila
(12) Apara-śaila
(13) Haimavata
(14) Lokottaravādin
(15) Prajñaptivādin
IV Ārya Sthavira
(16) Mahāvihāra
(17) Jetavanīya and
(18) Abhayagirivāsin

} Belonging to the *Sautrāntika* School of Philosophy

All the sects mentioned above belonged to the *Hīnayāna*, though later on they joined the *Mahāyāna* too

76 FOUR SCHOOLS OF THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

The philosophical views of the sects mentioned above were gradually formulated into two schools, *viz* the (1) *Vaibhāsika* and (2) *Sautrāntika* The Mahāyāna sect of the Buddhists founded by Kaniṣka established two other schools of philosophy, *viz* the (3) *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra* So there were altogether four schools of philosophy, two of the *Hīnayāna* and two of the *Mahāyāna*[1]

Vaibhāṣika

Vaibhāsika was a later appellation of the philosophy of the Sarvāstivāda (Pali· Sabbatthivāda) sect[2] who, as their name implies, admitted the reality of the world—internal and external. In fact the Vaibhāṣika said that our cognition and its corresponding external object were both real. The fundamental philosophical work of this sect is Kātyāyanī-putra's Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra,[3] or simply Jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra, composed 300 years after the *nirvāna* of Buddha The next work of this sect is the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra,[4] or simply Vibhāṣā, compiled at the council of Kaniska about 78 A D It was from this *Vibhāṣā* that the name *Vaibhāsika*[5] was derived *Vibhāṣā* means "commentary," and the

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[illegible]

Vaibhāsika philosophy seems to have been so called becaus
based on the commentaries rather than on the original t
the teachings of Buddha Sanghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra-
otherwise called Koṣa-kāraka śāstra, composed about 489
is a most learned work of the *Vaibhāsika* philosophy

Sautrāntikas admit cognition and therefrom infer the

Sautrāntika

ence of the external objects The
Sautrāntika[3] was derived from *Sūtr*
called in Pāli *Suttanta*, meaning "original text" The *Sautrā*
philosophy seems to have been so called, because it was base
the original text of the teachings of Buddha rather than on
commentaries thereon The *text*, on which the *Sautrāntika* ph
sophy was based, belonged to the sect of Ārya Sthaviras, cal
in Pāli Theras, who held the First Council in 490 B C, and possi
also to the sect of the Mahāsāmghikas[4] who were the first dissente
in 390 B C The philosophical principles of this school are said
have been formulated in Kāśmīra[5] during the reign of Kaniska abo
78 A D by a sage named Dharmottara or Uttara-dharma[6] But th
Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang who visited India early in the 7th
century A D, states that the renowned teacher Kumāralabdha[7]
of Taksaśilā (Taxila in the Punjab) was the founder of the *Sau-
trāntika* school and wrote several very valuable treatises on it He
is supposed to have lived about 300 A D, as he was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna (q v), Ārya Deva (q v), and Aśvaghoṣa There
was another very famous teacher named Srīlabdha[8] who wrote
Vibhāṣā-śāstra (or commentary on a work) of the *Sautrāntika*
school Hwen thsang saw in Ayodhyā the ruins of a Sanghārāma
where Śrīlabdha resided

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[1] This work exists in Chinese and Tibetan, *vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalog
of the Chinese Tripitaka no 1265

[2] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka Appendix II,
95 For Sanghabhadra *vide* also Hwen thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhi
Records of the Western World, vol I, pp 193—194

[3] Compare the explanation of the term *Sautrāntika* given by the Hind
philosopher Mādhavācārya in the Sarvadarśana-samgraha, chapter on Baudha
darśana translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition p. 24 *Vide* also Satis
Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Mādhyamika School" in the Journal of the Buddhist
Text Society of Calcutta for 1895, part II, p 4
Vide Rhys Davids' Buddhist India, p 168, and Beal's Fahian and Sungyun,
p. 143

[4] *Vide* Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol II, p 161

[5] *Vide* the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta vol I part III,
pp 18 19, and Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner p 53

[6] *For the* Dharmottarīya or Dharmottara sect vide Wassiljew's Buddhism
p 233, and Mahāvamsa, part I chapter V, p 13 Wijesinha's foot note

[7] *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World vol II p 302, and
Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p 78 where Kumāralabdha
stands for Kumāralabdha

[8] *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World
[illegible] Geschichte des Buddhismus [illegible]

Yogācāras maintained that the external objects were unreal but the reality of our cognition could not be denied. The word[1] *yogācāra* (called in Tibetan rnal-hbyor-wahi ltа-wa) is compounded of *yoga* meaning 'meditation' and *ācārā* meaning 'practice.' The *yogācāra* or the contemplative system was so called, because it emphasised the practice of meditation as the means of attaining *bhūmis*[2] or the seventeen stages of Buddhistic Perfection. The chief dogma established in it is *ālaya-vijñāna*,[3] the basis of conscious states, which is the same as our 'ego' or 'soul.' It is not known who was the founder of the *yogācāra* school, but in the Tibetan and Chinese books[4] the Lankāvatāra sūtra, Mahāsamaya sūtra,[5] Bodhisattvacaryā-nirdeśa and Saptadaśa-bhūmi śāstra-yogācārya have been named as the prominent old works of the system. Maitreyanātha and Ārya Asaṅga were the early teachers of it. The *yogācāra* school seems to have originated about 300 A.D. when the Lankāvatāra sūtra etc were composed.

Yogācāra

Mādhyamikas held that our cognition and its corresponding external object were neither absolutely real nor totally unreal. The name *Mādhyamika*[6] (called in Tibetan Dwu-ma) was derived from *madhyama*, the

Mādhyamika

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[1] The yogācāra philosophy is generally known in China, Tibet and Nepal as *yogācārya*. For an account of this system, *vide* Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol I, p 356, Dr Schlagintweit's Buddhism, chap V. Compare explanation of the word *yogācāra* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, chapter on Buddha-darśana, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p 24. *Vide* also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "the Mādhyamika School" in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta [illegible]

[illegible]

यतो भावाभावान्तद्वयरहितत्वात् सर्वस्वभावानुत्पत्तिलक्षणा शून्यता मध्यमा प्रतिपन्मध्यमो मार्ग इत्युच्यते ॥

(Mādhyamikā vṛtti, chap. XXIV, p 195, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition)

Compare the explanation of the term *Mādhyamika* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya, in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, chapter on Bauddha-darśana, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 21; and also Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's History of the Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, 1897, part IV, pp 7—20

Vide Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Descriptive list of works on the Mādhyamika Philosophy, no. I" in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, no 7, 1908 middle. The *Mādhyamika* philosophy was so called because it avoided two extremes, i e advocated neither the theory of absolute [illegible]

CHAPTER II

Early Buddhist Writers on Logic

77. RISE OF THE BUDDHIST LOGIC

With the growth of the four philosophical schools just mentioned, the study of Logic spread far and wide in the Buddhist community The adherents of each of the schools considered it [illegible]

Akṣapāda, and to produce a band of logicians among the Buddhists.

78 ĀRYA NĀGĀRJUNA

(ABOUT 250—320 A D)

Nāgārjuna or rather Ārya Nāgārjuna, the founder of the [illegible]

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[1] *Vide* Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol II, Book VIII, p. 97, and Book X, p 210, Watters' 'On Yuan Chwang,' vol II, pp. 201—202 and Wassiljew quoted by Schiefner in the Geschichte de Buddhismus, p 301

[2] Sadvāha is the same as Sātavāhana, which is a general name of the kings of the Andhra dynasty —*Vide* Dr R G Bhandarkar's Early History of the Dekkan, second edition, pp. 25—37

Nāgārjuna wrote an instructive letter to Sātavāhana, whose private name in Chinese was Sh'-yen-tŏh-cia. This letter is called Ārya Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva [illegible]

[illegible] to have lived four hundre
But he d
was one of
nda,[2] which
come into existence in the 1st century B C, and
even in 399 A D, when the Chinese pilgrim
visit India Nāgarjuna called in Tibetan "Klu-
by Lama Tāranātha to have been a contemporar
Candra, who is supposed to have reigned about
latest date that can be assigned to Nāgārjuna is
his biography was translated into Chinese by Ku

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[1] It is prophesied in the Mañju-śrī-mūla-tantra (called in
rtsa-rgyud) that —

དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་འདས་ནས། །
ལོ་ནི་བརྒྱ་ཕྲག་བཞི་ལོན་པ། །
དགེ་སློང་ཀླུ་ཞེས་དེ་འབྱོད་འབྱུང་། །
བསྟན་པ་ལ་ནི་དད་ཅིང་ཕན། །

(Quoted in the Introduction to Śis rab sdon bu publish

"Four hundred years after Buddha's departure from
appear a Bhikṣu named Nāgārjuna, who will do good to t
doctrine"

[illegible] noted that according to some books of Tibe

[illegible]

Jaya Candra
Nemi Candra
} Ruled in Aparāntaka

Phani Candra
Bhamsa Candra
Śāla Candra
Candra Gupta
} Ruled in Magadha.

The six kings, beginning with Akṣa Candra to Śāla Candra,
pear weak and insignificant while Candra Gupta, the seventh
as having been very powerful This Candra Gupta, who died
[illegible] the Gupta era in 19

79 NĀGĀRJUNA'S Mādhyamika-kārikā (ABOUT 300 A D)

The middle path doctrine—Madhyama-mārga

The Mādhyamika-kārikā [1] is the first regular work on the Mādhyamika philosophy

The doctrine which permeates this work, is that of the middle path [2] which is to be comprehended from four aspects, viz (1) in contradistinction to onesidedness, (2) as the abnegation of onesidedness, (3) as unity in plurality, and (4) in the sense of absolute truth

As we cannot conceive of being (existence) independently of non-being (non-existence), it will be taking an onesided view if we are to say that the world *exists* or that it *does not exist* The middle path furnishes a contrast to this onesidedness by avoiding the two extremes of being and non-being This is the first aspect of the middle path

Denying the two extremes the middle path reveals itself through a complete harmony between them

The middle path, which unifies all particulars, does not lie beyond them The particulars attain their characters of particularity only through our conception of the unity among them

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printed in Hanoi, 1903, and for his hymns such as धर्मधातुस्तव, निरुपमस्तव etc, *vide* Bstan hgyur, Bstod pa, vol *Ka*.

For an account of other works, *vide* the article "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet, No 3," by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, new series, vol III, No 7, 1907 For the philosophical works of Nāgārjuna, see Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, no 3

The Nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra or Hetu-vidyā nyāya dvāra śāstra, as noticed in Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Nos 1223, 1224, is not a work of Nāgārjuna but of Dignāga

[1] The Mādhyamika-kārika with the Vṛtti of Candra Kīrti has been published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta It has also appeared in the St. Petersburg Buddhist Text Series under the editorship of Professor Louis de La Vallee Poussin Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's translation of the Kārikās with notes appeared in several numbers of the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, 1895-1900

[2] अतो भावाभावान्तद्वयरहितत्वात् सर्वस्वभावानुत्पत्तिलक्षणा
शून्यता मध्यमा प्रतिपत् मध्यमो मार्ग इत्युच्यते ।

(Mādhyamikā vṛtti, chap XXIV, p 185, Buddhist Text Society's edition, Calcutta)

For an Indian account of the Mādhyamika philosophy or the middle path doctrine, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's articles on the subject published in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, 1895-1900 For the Chinese account, see Dr T Suzuki's article named "the Mādhyamika School in China" published in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, part IV, 1898

Had there been no unifying principle, the particulars would have ceased to be such This is the third aspect of the middle path

By "middle path" it is not to be understood that there is something between the two extremes of being and non-being In fact, we must avoid not only the two extremes, but also the middle[1] The middle path, which discards all limitations, expresses the human conception of the absolute truth This is the fourth aspect of the middle path

The absolute (*śūnyatā* or *void*)[2] is demonstrated through the consumption of two truths—the conditional (*sanvṛti*) and the transcendental truth no [illegible] Judged by the transcendental truth no [illegible] being It is from the [illegible] n speak of the [illegible] o object has a [illegible] e in virtue of [illegible] existence or non exist[illegible] objects come [illegible] nature or self-existence objects come [illegible] Taking a substance and its qualities we find that the latter exist in relation to the former, and the former exists in relation to the latter So a whole exists in relation to its parts, and the latter exist in relation to the former Proceeding in this way we find that the world is an aggregate of relations or conditions in virtue of which it revolves like a water-wheel These conditions being causes of confusion, the whole world is no better than an illusion

The conditional and the transcendental truth

Origination and cessation, persistence and discontinuance, unity and plurality, coming and going—these are the eight fundamental conceptions of relation or condition[4] These conceptions, which are in essence unreal, give rise to our prejudices and wrong judgments There nestles in them the principle of unrest and misery, and as people cling to them, their life is an everlasting prey to the pendulous feeling of exultation and mortification

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[1] आर्यो समाधिराजे चोक्तं भगवता. —
अस्तीति नास्तीति उभेऽपि अन्ता ।
शुद्धीति अशुद्धीति इमेऽपि अन्ता ॥
तस्मादुभेऽन्त विवर्ज्जयित्वा ।
मध्येऽपि स्थानं न करोति पण्डितः ॥
(Quoted in Mādhyamikā Vṛtti, Chap V, p. 41, Buddhist Text Society's edition Calcutta)

[2] Śūnya-vāda is called in Tibetan: stoṅ-pa-ñid, སྟོང་པ་ཉིད། Saṁvṛti satya is called in Tibetan Kun-rdsob-bden-pa, ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ། Paramārtha satya is called don-dam pahi-bden-pa, དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ།

[3] Vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's article on the "absolute" in Dr Ha tings' Dictionary of Religion, J and T Clark, Edinburgh

[4] द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्म्मदेशना ।
लोकसंवृतिसत्यञ्च सत्यञ्च परमार्थतः ॥
(Mādhyamikāvṛtti, chap XXIV, p. 180, Buddhist Text Society's editio Calcutta).

अनिरोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतम्
अनेकार्थमनानार्थम —

Where there is conditionality, there is no truth. Truth and conditionality are incompatible Therefore, to attain truth, conditionality must be completely cast aside When our mind is [illegible]

The absolute Śūnyatā and Nirvāṇa.

It may be asked as to whether there is actually a thing called 'suchness," "transcendental truth," or "the absolute" The answer will be that the thing which lies beyond conditionality, cannot be expressed in terms of "is" and "is not" or "being" and "non-being" It avoids the two extremes of "being" and "non-being," nay, it unifies both by underlying each of them This so-called thing (*śūnyatā*) is called *Nirvāṇa*,[1] which is an unconditional condition in which all contradictions are reconciled Attempts have been made to express this condition by the term "Infinite," "Eternal," "Profound," "Unconditioned," "Absolute" or "Blissful," but in reality no language can give adequate expression to it[2]

80 NĀGĀRJUNA'S REFERENCES TO THE LOGICAL DOCTRINES OF AKṢAPĀDA

Technicalities of Logic

In the Mādhyamika-kārikā Nāgārjuna has occasionally referred to certain technical terms of Ancient Logic, such as *punarukta* (repetition) in

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यः प्रतीत्य समुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवं
देशयामास सम्बुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतां वरम् ॥
(Mādhyamika-sūtra, chap. 1).

[1] न चाभावोऽपि निर्वाणं
कुत एवास्य भावता ।
भावाभाव परामर्श-
क्षयो निर्वाण मुच्यते ॥
(Ratnāvalī quoted in Mādhyamikā vṛtti, p. 194)

[2] अनक्षरस्य धर्मस्य श्रुतिः का देशना च का ।
श्रूयते देश्यते चापि समारोपादनक्षरः ॥
(Mādhyamikāvṛtti, chap. V).

Criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of *Pramāṇa*

There is also a criticism of Akṣapāda's doctrine of *Pramāṇa* (evidence). Akṣapāda says that just as a lamp illumines itself and other objects, so does a *pramāṇa* establish itself as well as other objects. Nāgārjuna opposes him by saying that a lamp cannot illumine itself as there is no darkness in it. If a lamp could remove darkness even without coming in contact with it, why could it not, standing here, remove the darkness of the entire universe?[2]

81. NĀGĀRJUNA'S VIGRAHA-VYĀVARTANĪKĀRIKĀ (ABOUT 300 A.D.)

The Tibetan and Chinese versions.

Vigraha-vyāvartanīkārikā is a work on the Mādhyami philosophy which eventually criticises th Nyāya-theory of *pramāṇa*, the eviden or means of knowledge, as laid down b Akṣapāda. The work, the Sanskrit original of which is los is called in Tibetan Rtsod-pa bzlog pahi tshig-lehur byas-pa, sign fying memorial verses on quelling disputes. It consists of folio 26—29 of the Bstan-hgyur Mdo, tsa. The original Sanskrit tex which had been composed by Ārya Nāgārjuna, was translate into Tibetan by the Indian sage Jñāna-garbha and the Tibeta interpreter Ka-wa dpal brtsegs. Subsequently the translatio was recast by the Kāśmirian Paṇḍita Jayānanta and the inter preter Khu mdo-sde dpal.

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[1] The following verse refers to the fallacy of siddhasādhana :—

[illegible]
[illegible]

(Mādhyamika kārikā, chapter IV.)

[2] Akṣapāda says :—

न प्रदीपप्रकाशवत् तत्सिद्धेः

(Nyāya-sūtra 2-1-19).

Nāgārjuna says :—

प्रदीपे नान्धकारोऽस्ति यत्र चासौ प्रतिष्ठितः ।
किं प्रकाशयति दीपः प्रकाशो हि तमोवधः ॥
अप्राप्यैव प्रदीपेन यदि वा निहतं तमः ।
इहस्थः सर्वलोकस्थं स तमो निहनिष्यति ॥

(Mādhyamika kārikā, chap. VII, p. [illegible], [illegible] Buddhist Text Society's ed.)

[3] Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, no. 1251.
[illegible]
Cf. Prof. H. Ui's Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. [illegible]

The Chinese version of the Vigraha-vyāvartanī kārikā is noticed by Bunyiu Nanjio under the name of Vivāda-śamana-śāstra. It was translated into Chinese by the sage Vimokṣa-prajña and others in 541 A D

In the Vigraha-vyāvartanī kārikā (as reproduced in Tibetan) Nāgārjuna criticises the validity of *pramāṇa*, the evidence or means of knowledge, as follows —

If you establish objects through a *pramāṇa*, the *pramāṇa* itself must be established through another *pramāṇa* and that again by a fresh *pramāṇa*, until you commit the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum* If, on the other hand, you attempt to establish objects without a *pramāṇa*, your tenet (viz that objects are established through *pramāṇa*) falls to the ground.

The validity of Akṣapāda's *pramāṇa* criticised

A *Pramāṇa* is not self-established Had it been so, there would have been a complete cessation of gloom or ignorance The view that a *pramāṇa* establishes itself as well as other objects, is untenable A fire, which is cited as an illustration, can illumine other objects by removing darkness which besets them, but it cannot illumine itself inasmuch as a fire never co-abides with darkness.

A *pramāṇa* cannot be so called, if it is totally independent of *prameya* (objects) If, on the other hand a *pramāṇa* is dependent on *prameya* (objects), how can it, having no self-existence, establish the latter ? etc , etc

82. NĀGĀRJUNA'S Pramāṇa-vihetana OR Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana

(ABOUT 300 A.D)

To Nāgārjuna is attributed the composition of a logical treatise called Pramāṇa-vihetana or Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana, which literally signifies "the quelling of *pramāṇa*," and which was in fact a review of the definition of the sixteen categories as given by Akṣapāda The Sanskrit original of this work is not available There is however extant the Tibetan version of a commentary on the work called Prāmāṇa-vihetana-teppitaka-vṛtti or Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana-sambhāsita-vṛtti dated probably about 650 A.D It extends over folios 415—418 of the Ḇstan-ḥgyur, Ṃdo, ha. In Tibetan the commentary is called Tshad-ma-ṛnam par-ḥjoms-pa ṃdor-ḅśad-paḥi-ḥgrel, which literally signifies "a magic-stick commentary on Pramāṇa-vihetana, or Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana "[1]

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[1] Called by P Cordier in his Tibetan Catalogue as Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana-teppitaka-vṛtti.

This work does not perhaps represent the views of Nāgārjuna but refers to those of the commentator

The commentator, whose name is not mentioned, pays obeissance to Mañju-śrī-kumāra-bhūta and introduces his work as follows.—

To please the learned people, I give an exposition of the vihetana or vidhvamsana (i e Pramāṇa-vihetana or Pramāṇa-vidhvamsana)[1]

Then he observes that the instructions on Nyāya delivere by Nāgārjuna are put together to constitute the present work

A legend about Nāgārjuna

He further observes that Nāgārjuna, who bore special mark of greatness, proceeded once for the di semination of culture to the region of th Nāgas. They exhibited their magic powers which could not overcome him. Beholding his supe human greatness Upendra, king of the Nāgas, offered him h daughter, while the other Nāgas worshipped him in a befittin manner They took orders and coming to the region of me practised the austerities of monks

The commentator reproduced Nāgārjuna's definition of th categories which are stated in Tibetan as follows·—

Categories defined in the work.

(1) Tshad-ma (*pramāna*), (2) gshal-bya (*prameya*), (3) the-tshon (*samśaya*), (4) dgos-pa (*prayojana*), (5) dp (*drstānta*), (6) grub-pahi-mthah (*siddhānta*) (7) cha-śas (*avayava*), (8) rtog-ge (*tarka*), (1 (9) [illegible]

[illegible] an example It may

[illegible] appear in one of the

[illegible] ras-bu, *kārya*), (2) an identity (rnam-bshin, *svabhāva*), and (3) non-perception (mi-dmigs, *anupalabdhi*)

An example[2] (dpe, drstānta) is defined as the place in which is decisively shown the connection between the reason (middle term) and its universal companion the predicate (major term)

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[1] མཁས་པ་དགའ་བ་བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །
རྣམ་པར་འཇོམས་པའི་དོན་བཤད་དུ། །།

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, ha, folio 415)

[2] ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་དང་ གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་ དཔེ་དང་ བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་དང་ ཉེར་གྱིས་ཟུན་པ་དང་ ། རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་དང་ ། ལྡོག་པ་ཅེས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་རྣམ་པའོ །།

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, ha, folio 417)

[3] It is doubtful whether this was the original doctrine of Nāgārjuna It might [illegible]

83. Upāya kauśalya hṛdaya-śāstra
(ABOUT 300 A D)

The Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra,[1] the Essence of Skill in the Accomplishment of Action, is stated to be a work on the art of debate by Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. In Chinese this work is called Fān-pien-sin-lun It was translated into Chinese by Ci-cia-ye and Thān-yāo in A.D 472

Seeing that the Vaiśesika and other systems were obscure in their terminology, Nāgārjuna, it is reported, undertook to write this book to give a clear exposition of the art of debate The book is divided into four chapters styled respectively as (I) an elucidation of debate [vāda-visadikarana], (II) an explanation of [illegible] an explanation of the [illegible] nalogue or far-fetched

(I) The first chapter consists of eight sections which treat respectively of (1) an example (*udāharana*), (2) a tenet, truth or conclusion (*siddhānta*), (3) the excellence of speech (*vākya praśamsā*), (4) the defect of speech (*vākya dosa*), (5) the knowledge of inference (*anumāna* or *hetu-jñāna*), (6) the appropriate or opportune speech (*samayocita vākya*), (7) the fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*), and (8) the adoption of a fallacious reason (*dusta vākyānusarana*)

(1) The [illegible]

(2) Th [illegible]

The means, by which the tenets, truths or conculsions are established, are called *pramānas* (the sources of valid knowledge) which are of four kinds, viz perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and scripture (*āgama*)

This definition is criticised by Uddyotakara in his Vārtika on Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-37

[1] Some suspect that the work was not composed by Nāgārjuna whose name, though mentioned by some Chinese editors, does not appear in the Chinese version. In the absence of *any introduction to the Chinese version we cannot deny* altogether the authorship of Nāgārjuna. *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, no 1257.

(3) A *speech is said to be excellent* if its words are neither inadequate nor redundant, and its reason and example well expressed.

(4) A *speech is said to be defective* if its words are inadequate, or redundant, or if it employs the same word to convey different meanings or different words to convey the same meaning

(5) Th[illegible] *(pūrvavat)*, (2) [illegible]

[illegible] east and sets in the west, must have moved

(6) The *appropriate or opportune speech* consists in its being pertinent to the subject and occasion, *e g* in the discussion as to whether there will be rain to-morrow, one may appropriately speak of the condition of the sky of the previous day

(7) The *fallacies* signify reasons which are derived from an imperfect perception, inference, or comparison, or which deviate from the scripture. There are various kinds of fallacies designated respectively as follows —

(a) The *quibble in respect of a term (vāk-chala), e g* a man pretends to use the term *nava-kambala* in the sense of nine blankets while he really means a new blanket

[illegible]

(d) [illegible]

(e) [illegible] body is eternal or not? [illegible]

non-eternal If you say so it will follow that a tortoise possesses hair and salt possesses smell, because they are apprehended by the mind · this is absurd

(h) The *contradictory (viruddha)*—either in respect of the example or in respect of the conclusion

(8) The *adoption of a fallacious reason*—If in the course of one's argument one commits fallacies, one will be thrown into difficulties and disgrace

(II) "The points of defeat" are the following —

(1) [illegible] *bhā*), [illegible] *ūna*), [illegible] *utrar-* [illegible] *erent* [illegible]

(III) "An explanation of the truths" deals mainly with the admission of an opinion (*matānujñā*)

(IV) The "analogue" or far-fetched analogy is of various kinds as follows :—

(1) Ba[illegible] *samā*)

84 ĀRYA DEVA
(ABOUT 320 A D).

Deva,[1] or rather Ārya Deva, was the next writer on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. He is otherwise known as Karnaripa, Kāna Deva, Nīla-netra and Pingala-netra. He was born in Southern India and was an eminent disciple of Nāgārjuna. According to Hwen-thsang,[2] he visited the countries of Mahākośala, Srughna, Prayāga, Cola and Vaiśālī, in all of which he won great renown by defeating the Tīrthikas and preaching [illegible] assigned to Deva is 401 A D,[4] when his biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva He wrote numerous works on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy, such as the Śataka śāstra, Brahma-pramathana-yukti-hetu-siddhi,[1] etc., all of which bear evidences of his knowledge of Logic.

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[1] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No 4; and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p 321, vol. II, pp 225—226.

[2] *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, Book IV, pp 186—190, Book V, p 231, vol. II, Book X, pp. 210, 227, Book XII, p. 302, Book VIII, pp 98—102

[3] *Vide* Lama Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 83—85 and 93.

[4] *Vide* Nāgārjuna. Cf. Dr Jacobi's "Dates of philosophical sūtras," J A O S, for 1911, p. 2.

[5] *Vide* Bunyio Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 4.

85. MAITREYA
(ABOUT 400 A.D.).

His life and age.

Maitreya,[2] or rather Maitreya-nātha, who was an emi teacher of the Yogācāra School, was call in Chinese 'Mirok' and in Tibetan 'Bya pahi-mgon-pa'. He was the author of several works such as t Bodhisattva-caryā-nirdeśa which was translated into Chinese dur 414—421 A.D., the Saptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya which translated into Chinese in 646—647 A.D., and the Abhisama laṅkāra-kārikā which was translated into Tibetan during 103 1109 A.D. Maitreya, who lived 900 years after the Buddha, that is, about 400 A.D.,[3] is reported by Hwen Ths to have communicated the materials of three Buddhist treat to Ārya Asaṅga while the latter was residing in a monaster Ayodhyā.[4]

86. MAITREYA'S Abhisamayālaṅkāra kārikā[5]

Doctrines of Momentariness and Voidness.

Maitreya strongly supported the doctrines of momentar (kṣaṇika vāda) and voidness (śūnya vā This is evident from the Abhisam laṅkāra kārikā in which he says that w we attain perfect wisdom our thought neither precedes nor fol it, just as a lamp which removes darkness neither precedes follows the same. Profound indeed are the eight character objects.[6] Profound is the origination of an object, and so at tion and suchness. The knowable, knowledge, action, means expedients are all profound Inasmuch as the objects partake e character of a dream, there is no reality underlying our ence and its emancipation

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[1] Vide Satis Chandra [illegible] 'Indian Logic as preserved in [illegible]' in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, new series, [illegible] 1907.

[2] Vide [illegible] Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Append [illegible]

[3] Vide [illegible]

[4] Vide [illegible]

[5] [illegible]

Taking one's stand on the dreamy character of objects, one e practising charity, etc, realizes that these are void One eives in a moment that a dream and a seer of the dream are connected but are non-dual in their essence.[1]

The knowledge of objects and their connection and separa- is momentary.[3]

87. MAITREYA'S TREATISE ON the Art of Debate

In the 15th volume of Maitreya's Saptadaśa-bhūmi śāstra-kārya[4] there is a treatise on the art of debate It consists even chapters styled respectively as follows —

1. *The subject of debate*

In beginning a debate on a subject, we must first see that the bjects of the treatise subject is a useful one A useless subject should be abandoned

2 *The place of debate*

Debate should not be entered upon in any and every place It uld be carried on in the presence of scholars, in the palace of a king he office of a minister or in a council (*parisad*)

स्वप्नान्ते च पश्यन् सत्त्वोपाय कौशले ।
स्वप्नोपमत्वाद् धर्माणां भवशमयोरकल्पना ॥

(Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā, Chap IV, p 22, MSS of the Asiatic Society of gal)

[2]

स्वप्नोपमेषु धर्मेषु स्थित्वा दानादिचर्यया ।
अलक्षणं धर्माणां क्षणेनैकेन बुध्यति ॥
स्वप्नं तद्दर्शिनं चैव द्वययोगेन नेक्षते ।
धर्माणामद्वयं तत्त्वं क्षणेनैकेन पश्यति ॥

(Abhisamayālankāra-kārikā, Chap VII, p. 28, MSS of the Asiatic Society of gal)

[3]

धर्माणामन्वयज्ञान व्यतिरेकज्ञान क्षणात्मकः ।

(Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā, Chap III, p. 14, MSS. of the Asiatic Society of gal).

[4] It is perhaps this work which is called *yoga* by Dr Sugiura, *vide* its Chinese sion Yuka Ron, Book XV.

3 The means of debate

[illegible]

(1) [illegible]

4 The qualifications of a debater

(a) The debaters must be versed in each other's scriptures
(b) They must not under any circumstances use
respectful language. In addressing each other they
employ words of dignity
(c) They must remain fearless
(d) They must speak continuously without any break, and
be intelligible to the entire audience
(e) They must speak in harmony—sometimes slowly and so
times aloud—to please the audience

5 Points of defeat (nigrahasthāna)

(a) If a debater at first opposes an assertion and afterw
speaks in agreement with it he is defeated
(b) If a debater being unable to defend the subject which he
been discussing introduces another subject, he is defeate
(c) If a debater talks irrelevantly (atīta-vākya), he is defeated

6 Attending a place of debate

(a) A person, in proceeding to a place of debate, should cons
whether the debate will be of any benefit to him
(b) He should, before proceeding there consider whether the deb
will exercise any good influence on the debater, the op
nent, the umpire, and the audience
(c) He should consider whether the debater and his oppon
are persons worthy of carrying on debate through
process of a proposition (siddhānta), a reason (hetu),
example (udāharana), etc

7. Confidence of a Debater.

The debater should appear to the audience in such a way that is, as it were, sure to gain victory. He should be understood by th to be one who knows the scripture of both the parties, who is se possessed and full of enthusiasm, and who can speak without a breal

It is evident from the titles of the chapters just mentioned that Maitreya mainly discussed the practical questions of Logic But occasionally there was mixed with the discussions some Pure Logic also A thesis [*pratijñā*], according to Maitreya, is to be supported by a reason [*hetu*] and two examples [*dṛṣṭānta*]. Validity of the reason and of the examples requires that they be based either (1) on fact or perception [*pratyakṣa*], (2) on inference [*anumāna*], or (3) on holy saying [*āgama*] Analogy or Comparison [*upamāna*] is omitted The form of his reasoning is illustrated as follows:—

(1) Sound is non-eternal,

[illegible]

88. ĀRYA ASANGA
(ABOUT 405—470 A.D)

His life

Asanga,[2] called in Chinese Mucak and in Tibetan Thogs-med, was born in Gāndhāra (modern Peshwar). He was at first an adherent of the Mahīśāsaka[3] sect and followed the *Vaibhāṣika* philosophy of the *Hīnayāna*. Later on he became a disciple of Maitreya and adopted the *Yogācāra* philosophy of the *Mahāyāna* He is said to have lived for some years as a paṇḍita in Nālandā[4] He lived about 450 A D.[5] The latest date that can be assigned to him is 531 A.D ,[6] when one of his works, called the Mahāyāna-sampangraha-śāstra, was translated into Chinese Hwen-thsang in the 7th century A D. saw the ruins of *Saṅghārāmas* in Kauśāmbī and Ayodhyā, where Asaṅga resided for some years.[7] He wrote 12 works, most of which still exist in Chinese and Tibetan versions.[8]

His logical views.

A short summary of the Logic of Asaṅga is found in the 11th volume of Prakaraṇārya vācā śāstra[9] and 7th and 16th volumes of Mahāyānābhidharma saṃyukta saṅgīti-śāstra. The first work called in Chinese

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[1] *Vide* "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," p 30

[2] *Vide* Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol I, pp 98, 227 and 236.

[3] *Vide* Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol I, p. 357

[4] *Vide* Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p 122.

[5] Asanga is approximately placed at 450 A.D as he was the eldest brother of Vasubandhu (q v) who lived about 480 A D.

[6] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix I, No 5.

[7] *See* Beal's Buddhist Records, Vol I, pp 98, 227, 236.

[8] *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix I, No 5.

[9] Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Nos. 1177, 1178.

Hhien-yān shan cito lun (signifying 'a śāstra on expounding holy teaching') was composed by Bodhisattva Asaṅga It [illegible] translated into Chinese by Hwen thsang (Yuan chwang) of Thān dynasty in A D 645—646 The second work called Chinese Tā-shan o-phi-tā-mo tsā-tsi-lun was compiled by Bo[illegible] sattva Sthitamati It was translated into Chinese by Hwen-ths[illegible] of the Thān dynasty in A D 646

In logical views Asaṅga follows Maitreya except in respec[illegible] [illegible] pro[illegible] hara[illegible] (4) an application (*upanaya*), (5) a conclusion (*nigamana*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), (7) comparison (*upamāna*), and (8) sc[illegible]ture (*āgama*)

The first five subdivisions constitute what is called an[illegible]ference (*anumāna*)

Asaṅga's form of reasoning, which is somewhat different f[illegible] Maitreya's, is given below —

(1) Sound is non-eternal,
(2) Because [illegible]
(3) [illegible]
(4) [illegible] nal, so is sou[illegible]
(5) [illegible]

89 VASUBANDHU
(ABOUT 410—490 A D)

[illegible]

by [illegible]
was [illegible]
the [illegible]
brother Asanga to the *Yogacāra* school of the *Mahāyāna* [illegible]

[illegible]

of Buddha, that is before 500 A D He was a contemporary [illegible] another *Vaibhāsika* teacher, named Saṅghabhadra, who live[illegible] about 489 A D[2]

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[1] *Vide* Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World [illegible] I, pp 98, 105, 172, 193, 225, 236, and Watters "On Yuan Chwang," Vol [illegible]

210 [illegible] translated Vibhāṣā vinaya into Chinese in 489

[2] Sangab[illegible] talo[illegible] Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix II, No

Vâmana,[1] who lived at the end of the 8th and beginning of the 9th century A.D., quotes a verse alluding to Vasubandhu as a counsellor (possibly of Kumâra Gupta during 413—455 A D). A biography[2] of Vasubandhu was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese during 557—569 A D Paramârtha,[3] the translator of the biography (499—569 A D), tells us that Vasubandhu, who was patronised by Vikramâditya (possibly Skanda Gupta), died at the age of eighty years during the reign of Bâlâditya Narasimha Gupta (485—490 A D) He was therefore a contemporary of Kumâra Gupta, Skanda Gupta, Pura Gupta and Bâlâditya (from about 410 A D to about 490 A D).

His works.

Vasubandhu was the author of a large number of very valuable works,[4] some of which are available in Sanskrit and the rest in Chinese and Tibetan translations

In the 7th century A.D while Hwen-thsang was travelling in India, he saw three works on the art of debate attributed to Vasubandhu[5] The Sanskrit originals of these works as well as their Chinese versions are now lost The works were styled in Chinese as (1) Ronki (*Vâda vidhi*—the method of debate), (2) Ronshiki (*Vâda-mârga*—the course of debate), and (3) Ronshin (*Vâda-kauśala*—the expedients of debate)

90 Vasubandhu's Tarka Śâstra

Besides these three works, there was a treatise on Logic called

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[1] [illegible]

साभिप्रायत्वं यथा,—

सोऽयं सम्प्रति चन्द्रगुप्ततनयश्चन्द्रप्रकाशो युवा।

जातो भूपतिराश्रयः कृतधियां दिष्ट्या कृतार्थश्रम॥

आश्रय कृतधियामित्यस्य च सुबन्धुसाचिव्योपक्षेपपरत्वात् साभिप्रायत्वम्।

(Kâvyālankāra-sūtra-vṛtti, 3-2 2, p 86, Benares Sanskrit series)

[illegible]

An analysis of the Tarka-śāstra

Tarka-śāstra[1] composed by Vasubandhu There exists a Chinese version of this work called Zu shih lu The Chinese version was prepared by Paramārtha of the Chan dynasty in A.D. 550. The Tarka-śāstra consists of three chapters dealing respectively with (1) the five parts of a syllogism (pañcāvayava), (2) the analogous rejoinder (jāti), and (3) the points of defeat (nigraha-sthāna)

In chapter I, Vasubandhu treats of a proposition (pratijñā), a reason (hetu), an example (udāharaṇa), an application (upanaya), and a conclusion (nigamana), which constitute the five parts of a syllogism

Though according to the Tarka-śāstra a syllogism consisted of five parts, in the Ronki quoted by Kwei-ke, Vasubandhu maintained that a thesis could be proved by two parts only, viz [illegible] therefore, the necessary terms [illegible], the minor term [illegible] term (hetu)[2] [illegible] alogous Rejoinder (jāti) which is subdivided under three heads as follows :—

A. A rejoinder on the basis of reversion (viparyaya-khandana) which consists of (1) balancing the homogeneity (sādharmya-samā), (2) balancing the heterogeneity (vaidharmya-samā), (3) balancing the thesis (sādhya samā), (4) balancing the unquestionable (avarnya-samā), (5) balancing the mutual absence (aprāpti-samā), (6) balancing the non-reason (ahetu-samā), (7) balancing the demonstration (upapatti-samā), (8) balancing the doubt (saṃśaya-samā), (9) balancing the non-difference (aviśeṣa-samā), [illegible] aninglessness (nirartha- [illegible] g the point in dispute (prakarana-samā), (12) balancing the counter-example (pratidṛṣṭānta-samā), and (13) balancing the infinite regression (prasanga-samā)

C. A contrary rejoinder (viparīta-khandana), which consists of (14) balancing the non-produced (anutpatti-samā), (15) balancing the eternal (*nitya-samā*), and (16) balancing the presumption (*arthāpatti-samā*)

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[1] Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No 1252

[2] The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara probably refers to Vasubandhu when he says that according to some logicians antarvyāpti (internal inseparable connection) consisting of pakṣa or minor term, sādhya or major term and hetu or middle term, is quite enough in establishing a thesis, and that dṛṣṭānta or example is altogether useless. Siddhasena Divākara writes :—

अन्तर्व्याप्त्यैव साध्यस्य सिद्धेर्बहिरुदाहृतिः ।
व्यर्था स्यात्तदसद्भावेऽप्येवं न्यायविदो विदुः ॥ २० ॥

(Siddhasena Divākara, edited by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidya
bhu
d by the Indian Research Society of Calcutta)

Chapter III deals with twenty-two kinds of points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*) enumerated below —

(1) Hurting the [illegible] proposition [illegible] *virodha*), (4 [illegible] (5) shifting [illegible] *tara*), (7) t [illegible] the semblance of a reason or fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*)

It is to be regretted that neither the Ronki nor its Sanskrit original is available Vasubandhu seems, however, to have used two forms of syllogism, *viz* a syllogism of five parts at the time of a debate and a syllogism of two parts on an ordinary occasion. The two forms are exhibited below —

A syllogism of five parts.

(1) Sound is non-eternal
(2) Because it is a product
(3) Products are non-eternal like a pot, which is a *product and is non-eternal*,
(4) Sound is an instance of a product
(5) Therefore sound is non-eternal

A syllogism of two parts.

(1) Sound is non-eternal.
(2) Because it is a product.

CHAPTER III

Systematic Buddhist Writers on Logic

91 THE COMMENCEMENT OF MEDIÆVAL LOGIC
(450—1200 A D)

In the previous chapter we have seen that from the origin of Buddhism in the 6th century B C to its expansion into four philosophical schools in the 4th century A D, there were no systematic Buddhist works on Logic, but only a few stray references to that science in the works on philosophy and religion Nāgārjuna, about [illegible] more review of the [illegible] Dinn [illegible] of Logic [illegible] mixed up with the problems of the *Yogācāra* and *Vaibhāṣika* schools of philosophy Vasubandhu's three works[1] on Pure Logic mentioned by Hwen thsang are now lost and consequently their merits cannot be judged With 450 A D begin a period when Logic was completely differentiated from general philosophy, and a large number of Buddhist writers gave their undivided attention to that branch of learning The works brought out by these writers, along with those brought out by the Jainas, constitute the Mediæval School of Indian Logic *Dignāga is the earliest known writer of this school*

92 ĀCĀRYA DIGNĀGA FATHER OF MEDIÆVAL LOGIC
(CIRCA 450—520 A D)

A portrait of Dignāga

century A D., must have copied the likeness from some earlier specimen, which was taken to Tibet during her intercourse with India between 600 A.D and 1200 A D

A peculiarity of this likeness is its cap In the early Buddhist Church monks were not allowed to wear any head-dress (*vide* the Pātimokkha rules of the Vinaya Pitaka) With the introduction of Mahāyāna in the first century A D by Kaniska, a great change was effected in the dress of monks, and caps of various shapes were invented The hat worn here is called Panchen-shwa-dmar[1] or "Pandita's red cap," with a pointed peak and long lappets. The lappets of the cap were lengthened in proportion to the rank of the wearer

It is not known when the "Pandita's cap" was first introduced It is said to have been taken to Tibet in 749 A D by Śānta Rakṣita "Pandita" was a degree which was conferred by the Vikramaśilā University on its successful candidates It is not known what title the University of Nālandā conferred on its distinguished



བསྟན་འགྱུར་མདོ་ཙ་གཅིག།

སློབ་དཔོན་ཕྱོགས་གླང་ལ་ནམོ །།

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[1] *Vide* Waddell's Lamaism, pp. 194—196.

[illegible]

II. [illegible]

The [illegible] is one of the [illegible] works of [illegible]. It is said to have been [illegible] while he was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] writing the opening lines [illegible] were filled with light and a [illegible] was [illegible]. A [illegible] named [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

The same verse has been quoted [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

([illegible] chapter on [illegible].)

[illegible]

[illegible]

The Acārya returning from his rounds for a meal met the Brāhmana they began a controversy, either staking his own doctrine When he had vanquished the Tīrtha (Brāhmana) several times and challenged him to accept the Buddhist doctrine, the Tīrtha scattered ashes, pronouncing incantations over them, and burnt all the goods of the Acārya that happened to lie before him, and while the Ācārya was kept back by fire, the Tīrtha ran away There upon Dignāga reflected that, since he could not work the salvation of this single individual, he would not be able to work that of others [illegible] ose [illegible] rya [illegible] ing with mean persons Please know that when you have demonstrated it, this Śāstra cannot be injured by the host of Tīrthas. I undertake to be your spiritual tutor till you have attained the stage of perfection In later times this śāstra will become the sole eye of all the śāstras "[1]

So saying Mañjuśrī disappeared, and Dignāga resumed his work and completed Pramāna-samuccaya

The Tibetan version of Pramāna-samuccaya

The Pramāna-samuccaya[2] is a Sanskrit work written in *anuṣṭubh* metre The Sanskrit original of it is lost, but a Tibetan translation still exists The translator [illegible] section Mdo, volume Ce[1] In Tibetan it is called Tshad-ma-ḥ kun-las-btus pa (=Pramāna sūtra-samuccaya) or briefly Tsh ma-kun las-btus-pa (=Pramāna-samuccaya) signifying a compi tion of aphorisms on Pramāna, valid knowledge It begins thus "Bowing down before Sugata—the teacher and protector—who Pramāna incarnate, and benefactor of the world, I, for the sake o expounding Pramāna (valid knowledge), put together here various scattered matters, compiled from my own works"[2] In the clos ing lines it is stated that "Dignāga, the subduer of controversial ists in all regions and the possessor of elephantine strength, com piled this from his own works"[3]

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[1] བུ་མ་བྱེད་མ་བྱེད་སྐྱེ་བོ་དམན་དང་འགྲོད་ལས་བློ་གྲོས་ངན་སྐྱེ་སྟེ།
ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བརྟན་ནས་འཛམ་འདི་ལ་མུ་སྟེགས་ཚོགས་ཀྱིས་གནོད་མི་ནུས་པར་ཤེས།
ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ས་མ་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་བར་དུ་དགེ་བའི་བཤེས་སུ་ང་འགྱུར་གྱི།
ཕྱི་མའི་དུས་སུ་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀུན་གྱི་མིག་གཅིག་པུ་ནི་འདི་འགྱུར་རོ།།

Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C I E, p. 101

[2] Probably the same as "The Śāstra on the grouped inferences," vide Takakusu's I-tsing, p 187

It is divided into six chapters which are named respectively (1) Perception (Sanskrit Pratyakṣa, Tibetan Mṅon-sum); Inference for one's own self (Sanskrit Svārthānumāna, Tibe Raṅ-don gyi-rje-dpag), (3) Inference for the sake of others (S krit Parārthānumāna, Tibetan Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rje-dpa (4) Reason and example (Sanskrit Hetu-dṛṣṭānta, Tibetan Gta tshigs-daṅ-dpe), (5) Negation of the opposite (Sanskrit Apoh Tibetan Gshan-sel-wa); and (6) Analogue (Sanskrit Jāti, Tibetan Ltag-gcod

Chapter I—Perception

Pramāna

In opposition to Akṣapāda who propounded four pramānas (means of valid knowledge), Dignāga[4] states in Chapter I of the Pramāna-samuccaya that *pramāṇas* are only two, viz perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) All objects being known through them, there is no other *pramāṇa*

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[1] The volume Ce of the Bstan hgyur, section Mdo, was put at my disposal by the India Office, London through Mr Thomas

[2]
ཚད་མར་གྱུར་པ་འགྲོ་ལ་ཕན་པར་བཞེད། ।
སྟོན་པ་བདེ་གཤེགས་སྐྱོབ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ནས། ।
ཚད་མ་སྒྲུབ་ཕྱིར་རང་གི་གཞུང་ཀུན་ལས། ।
བཏུས་ཏེ་སྣ་ཚོགས་འཐོར་རྣམས་འདིར་གཅིག་བྱ། ॥

(Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 1)

[3]
ཕྱོགས་རྣམས་ཀུན་གྱི་ལས་ནི་རྒོལ་བ་རྣམས། ।
འཇོམས་པར་བྱེད་ལ་གླང་པོའི་སྟོབས་ལྡན་པ། ॥
ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་གླང་པོའི་གཞུང་ཀུན་ལས་བཏུས་པ། ॥

(Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 13)

[4]
མངོན་སུམ་དང་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག
ཚད་མ་དག་ནི་མཚན་ཉིད་གཉིས། ।
གཞལ་བྱ་དེ་ལ་རབ་སྦྱོར་ཕྱིར
ཚད་མ་གཞན་ནི་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། ॥

(Tshad-ma kun-las btus pa, Chapter I)

Dignāga's description of Perception.

Dignāga does not give any formal definition of Perception, which is well known as the knowledge of objects derived through the channel of the senses. But he describes Perception as that which, being freed from preconception, is unconnected with name, genus, etc[1] Suppose a man in twilight mistakes a rope for a snake his knowledge of the snake is a preconception and is not, according to Dignāga, an act of Perception Dignāga contends that Perception is not connected with the name, as we can perceive a thing without knowing its name It is also unconnected with genus, so that the perception of a thing consists of the knowledge of its individual characteristics alone. Suppose I see a cow This cow, which I see, is a peculiar one Its infinite peculiarities can only be realised by me who have seen it. If I proceed to indicate this cow to other persons by saying that I saw a cow which is named Dittha or which is red, etc, I can only convey to those persons the idea of a cow

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Chapter I)

whole theory

in his Nyāya-

Perceptions as defined in other schools

Dignāga reviews the doctrines of perception of the Yog (or Yogācāras called in Tibetan Rnal-hbyor pa) and the Sāmkhyas (called in Tibetan Grangs-can pa) or Kāpilas[1] (called in Tibetan Ser-skya-wa)

Dignāga criticises the definition of perception as given by Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana

Akṣapāda, whom Dignāga designates as Naiyāyika (in Tibetan rigs-pa-can), defines perception[2] as know ledge which arises from the intercourse of sense organs with their objects, being deter minate, unnameable and non-erratic. Vāt syāyana in his Bhāṣya, commentary,[3] admits that this definit enumerates only the special factors of perception. The (ātman), etc. which co-operate in producing not only percepti but also inference, etc., are general factors and as such not men tioned in the definition. As to the objection that the definit fails to enumerate even the special factor of perception, viz the m (manas) which through its intercourse with the soul, pleasure, et brings about their perception, Vātsyāyana observes that the min is included in the sense-organs, it has been designated a sense-org in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and the designation has been tac accepted in the Nyāya philosophy according to the scientfic axiom, viz "if I do not oppose a theory of my opponent, it is to be understood that I accept it"

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[1] [illegible]
[illegible]
(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I)

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

perception with generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*) on which, as pointed out by Dignāga, the Vaiśeṣika's intercourse is dependent Oh! what a strange consistency

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[1] Dignāga quotes the Vaiśeṣika definition as follows —

བྱེ་བྲག་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་མདོ་ལས ——
བདག་དང་དབང་པོ་དང་ཡིད་དང །
དོན་དུ་ཕྲད་པ་ལས་གང་བྱུང་བ་དེ་གཞན་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I)

The Sanskrit original should stand thus:—

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षाद् यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यत् ।

But it is actually found in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra as follows —

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद् यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यत् ।

(Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 3-1-18, p. 121, Sacred Books of the Hindus, Allahabad).

In another place of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra in connection with the perception of pleasure, etc., the definition of perception, which includes the mind, is stated as follows:—

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षात् सुखदुःखे ।

(Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 5-2-15, p 181, Sacred Books of the Hindus, Allahabad)

In the Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda, the mind (मनस्) is explicitly mentioned as a sense-organ:—

सर्वाणि इन्द्रियाणि घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्रमनांसि षट् ।

(Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, p. 186, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series)

Dignāga quotes the explanatory portion of the Vaiśeṣika definition as follows:—

སྤྱི་དང་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་བལྟོས་པ་དང །
རྫས་དང་ཡོན་ཏན་དང་ལས་ལ་བལྟོས་པ་དེ
མངོན་སུམ་ལས་ཞེས་སྒྲོར་བར་མི་བྱེད ॥

(Pramāṇa samuccaya, Chapter I)

The Sanskrit original of this portion should stand thus:—

सामान्यविशेषापेक्षं द्रव्यगुणकर्मापेक्षं हि प्रत्यक्षमिति न योजितम् ।

Compare Praśasta-pāda who gives a definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*) which is similar to the one criticised by Dignāga —

सामान्यविशेषद्रव्यगुणकर्मविशेषणापेक्षाद् आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यते ।

(Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, p 186, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series).

As to the mind it is not, says Dignāga, a sense-organ, and pleasure (*sukha*) etc. are not objects of knowledge. The view that the Naiyāyika, not having opposed the mind as a sense-organ, tacitly accepts it as such, is untenable. If non-opposition was a proof of assent, it was useless for the Naiyāyika to have mentioned the other sense-organs.[1]

Chapter II—Inference for one's self.

Inference (called in Sanskrit *anumāna* and in Tibetan rjes-dpag) is of two kinds *viz.* inference for one's self and inference for the sake of others.

Definition.

An inference for one's self[1] (*svārthānumāna*, raṅ-don-gyi rjes-dpag) is defined as the knowledge of a thing derived through its mark or sign of three characters.

Three characters of the middle term.

The mark or sign (reason or middle term) should possess one of the following three characters:—

(1) *Effect* (*kārya*, hbras bu)—the mark may be an effect of the thing to be inferred (predicate or major term), *e.g.* smoke of fire.

(2) *Identity* (*svabhāva*, raṅ bshin)—the mark may be in essence identical with the thing to be inferred, *e.g.* a *śiṃśapā* identical with a tree.

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[1] Dignāga observes:—

འདི་ཐོགས་གཞན་གྱི་མིན་པས
དབང་པོ་གཞན་ཡོད་ཡིད་དབང་པོ །
བཀག་པ་མེད་ཕྱིར་ཚོལ་ཅེ་ན
དབང་པོ་གཞན་གྱི་སྨྲ་དོན་མེད །།

(Pramāṇa samuccaya, Chapter I.)

The original Sanskrit text of the verse is quoted by Vācaspati Miśra thus:—

न सुखादि प्रमेयं वा मनो वास्तीन्द्रियान्तरम् ।
[illegible]

(3) *Non-perception* (*anupalabdhi*, mi-dmigs-pa)—non-perception of the mark may be due to the non-existence of the thing to be inferred, e g non-preception of a pot is a mark of non-existence thereof

Inference

Dignāga mentions the views of some logicians who from smoke, which is the middle term, infer *fire*, the major term, which is inseparably connected with it, and also of others, who from smoke infer the *connection* between fire (the major term) and the hill (the minor term) He argues against the first mentioned logicians saying that if they infer *fire* from smoke they gain no new knowledge from the

things, whereas here only one thing, *viz* the hill, is visible, but the other, *viz* fire, is not visible What then do we really infer from smoke? Dignāga says it is not fire nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the *fiery* hill that is inferred.[1]

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[1] Dignāga writes —

རྟགས་ནི་འཁྲུལ་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
ཁ་ཅིག་ཆོས་གཞན་དཔག་བྱ་ཟེར།
ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་ཅན་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།
ཁ་ཅིག་འབྲེལ་བ་འདོད་པ་ཡིན།
ཆོས་ལ་རྟགས་ནི་གྲུབ་ཅེ་ན།
གཞན་དེས་ཅི་ཞིག་དཔག་པར་བྱེད།
ཅི་སྟེ་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་དེ་ཉིད།
ཅི་ཕྱིར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་མི་བྱེད།
འབྲེལ་པ་ལ་ཡང་གཉིས་པོ་མེད།
དེ་ལྡན་ལ་ནི་དྲུག་པ་རྣམས།
བརྗོད་མིན་དོན་གྱིས་གཟུང་བར་འགྱུར།
འདི་ལ་རྟགས་དང་འབྲེལ་མ་ཡིན།
རྟགས་ཀྱི་མི་འཁྲུལ་པ་ཡང་ན།
ཆོས་དང་གཞན་དུ་བརྟེན་པར་བྱ།
དེ་ལ་གྲུབ་ན་ཆོས་ཅན་ནི།
དེ་དང་ལྡན་པར་རྟོགས་པར་འགྱུར།།

(Pramāna-samuccaya, chapter II)

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are as follows —

केचिद् धर्मान्तरं मेयं लिङ्गस्याव्यभिचारतः ।
संबन्धं केचिदिच्छन्ति सिद्धत्वाद्धर्मधर्मिणोः ॥
लिङ्गं धर्मे प्रसिद्धं चेत् किमन्यत् तेन मीयते ।
अथ धर्मिणि तस्यैव किमर्थं नानुमेयता ॥

Chapter III. Inference for the sake of others

Definition

An inference for the sake of others[1] (called in Sanskrit parārthānumāna and in Tibetan gshan-gyi-don-rjes-dpag) takes place when a person demonstrates to others the conclusion drawn by him through an inference for one's self.

Predicate

The predicate[2] or major term (called in Sanskrit anumeya or sādhya and in Tibetan dpag-bya or bsgrub-bya) is the object which is desired by one's self to be predicable of (attributed to) the subject (or minor term) and which is not opposed to perception, inference or verbal testimony, e.g. the hill is *fiery*.

संबन्धोऽपि द्वयं नास्ति षष्ठी श्रूयते तद्वति ।
अवाच्यं नुगृहीतत्वात् भावो निरर्थकम् ।
लिङ्गस्याव्यभिचारस्तु धर्मेणान्यत्र दृश्यते ।
तत्र प्रसिद्धं तद्युक्तं धर्मिणं गमयिष्यति ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

The Hindu logician Vācaspati Miśra has quoted and criticised these lines in the *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya ṭīkā*, 1-1 5.

[1] Dignāga observes :—

གཞན གྱི དོན གྱི རྗེས དཔག ནི །
རང གིས མཐོང དོན གསལ བྱེད ཡིན ॥

(Pramāṇa samuccaya, chapter III).

The Sanskrit original of this verse runs thus :—

परार्थानुमानन्तु स्वदृष्टार्थप्रकाशनम् ।

(Quoted in Ślokavārtika-ṭīkā, p 232)

Praśastapāda defines parārthānumāna thus :—

पञ्चावयवेन वाक्येन स्वनिश्चितार्थप्रतिपादनं परार्थानुमानम् ।

(Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, p 231, edited by M M Vindhyeśvari Prasad Dvivedin, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series)

[2] Dignāga observes :—

རང ཉིད ངོ བོ ཁོ ན བསྟན
བདག འདོད རང གི ཆོས ཅན ལ །
མངོན སུམ དོན དང རྗེས དཔག དང
ཡིད ཆེས གྲགས པས མ བསལ བའོ ॥

(Pramāṇa samuccaya, chapter III)

The Sanskrit original should run thus :—

स्वरूपेणैव निर्देश्यः
स्वयमिष्टः स्वधर्मिणि ।
प्रत्यक्षार्थानुमानेन
आप्तवाक्याऽनिराकृतः ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III)

The law of extension—The law of extension of the middle term (called in Sanskrit *pakṣa-dharma*[1] and in Tibetan phyogs-chos), which refers to the local area of a reason or middle term in relation to its minor and major terms, is stated as follows —

(1) The reason or middle term must cover the subject or minor term (*pakṣa*)
(2) The reason or middle term must be present in the homologue (*sapakṣa*) of the predicate or major term
(3) The reason or middle term must be absent from the heterologue (*vipakṣa*) of the predicate or major term.

Nine Reasons—It is possible to conceive of nine reasons or middle terms[2] [illegible]

A table of nine reasons, in reference to their homologues and heterologues, is given below —

---

[1] ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡོད་མེད་དང་
ཆས་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་ །
ཆོས་གསུམ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལའང་
ཡོད་མེད་ཆས་པ་གཉིས་ཕྱིར་རོ །།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III)

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are quoted by Vācaspati Miśra as follows —

सपक्षे सदसत् द्वेधा
पक्षधर्मः पुनस्त्रिधा ।
प्रत्येकमसपक्षे च
सदसद् द्विविधत्वतः ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III, quoted in Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā on Nyāya-sūtra, 1 1 35, p 198, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

[2] In the commentaries on Nyāya sūtra, 1 1-35, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra both severely criticise Dignāga's theory of Nine Reasons Dignāga too reviews the definitions of a proposition (pratijñā) as given by Akṣapāda and the Mīmāṁsaka

[3] དེར་གང་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་དང་
ཉམ་གཉིས་དེ་མེད་ལ་མེད་པ །
དེ་རྟགས་དེ་ལས་བཟློག་པ་ནི
འགལ་བ་གཞན་ནི་མ་ངེས་ཉིད །།

(Pramāṇa

The Sanskrit originals quoted by Vācaspati

तत्र यः सन् सजातीये
द्वेधा चासन् तदत्यये ।

Chapter III. Inference for the sake of others.

[illegible] An inference for the sake of others (called in Sanskrit parārthānumāna and in Tibetan gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rjes-dpag) takes place when a person demonstrates to others the conclusion drawn by him through an inference for one's self.

[illegible] The predicate[1] or major term (called in Sanskrit anumeya or sādhya and in Tibetan dpag-bya or bsgrub-bya) is the object which is desired by one's self to be predicable of (attributed to) the subject (or minor term) and which is not opposed to perception, inference or verbal testimony, e.g. the hill is fiery.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III.)

The Hindu logician Vācaspati Miśra has quoted and criticised these lines in the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā 1-1-5.

[1] Dignāga observes:

[illegible]
[illegible]

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III.)

The Sanskrit original of this verse runs thus:

[illegible]

(Quoted in [illegible], p. [illegible])

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Prasad Trivedin
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III.)

The Sanskrit original should run thus:

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III.)

The law of extension.—The law of extension of the middle term (called in Sanskrit *pakṣa-dharma*[1] and in Tibetan phyogs-chos), which refers to the local area of a reason or middle term in relation to its minor and major terms, is stated as follows:—

(1) The reason or middle term must cover the subject or minor term (*pakṣa*).
(2) The reason or middle term must be present in the homologue (*sapakṣa*) of the predicate or major term.
(3) The reason or middle term must be absent from the heterologue (*vipakṣa*) of the predicate or major term.

Nine Reasons.—It is possible to conceive of nine reasons or middle terms[2] [illegible]

dictory and the others are uncertain.[3]

A table of nine reasons, in reference to their homologues and heterologues, is given below:—

---

[1] ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡོད་མེད་དང༌
རྣམ་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་ །
རྣམ་གསུམ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལའང༌
ཡོད་མེད་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཕྱིར་རོ ༎

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III)

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are quoted by Vācaspati Miśra as follows:—

सपक्षे सन्नसन् द्वेधा
पक्षधर्मः पुनस्त्रिधा ।
प्रत्येकमसपक्षे च
सदसद् द्विविधत्वतः ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III, quoted in Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā on Nyāya-sūtra, 1 1 35, p 198, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

[2] In the commentaries on Nyāya-sūtra, 1 1 35, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra both severely criticise Dignāga's theory of Nine Reasons. Dignāga too reviews the definitions of a proposition (*pratijñā*) as given by Akṣapāda and the Mīmāṃsaka.

[3] དེར་ཡང་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་དང༌
རྣམ་གཉིས་དེ་མེད་ལ་མེད་པ །
དེ་རྟགས་དེ་ལས་བཟློག་པ་ནི
འགལ་བ་གཞན་ནི་མ་ངེས་ཉིད ༎

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III)

The Sanskrit originals quoted by Vācaspati run thus:—

तत्र यः सन् सजातीये
द्वेधा चासंस्तदत्यये ।

Nine reasons

No.	*Homologue of the major term (sapakṣa)*	*Heterologue of the major term (vipakṣa)*	*Nature of the reason*
1	The reason is wholly present (*sat*) in the homologue	The reason is wholly present (*sat*) in the heterologue	The reason is uncertain.
2	The reason is wholly present (*sat*) in the homologue	The reason is wholly absent (*asat*) from the heterologue	The reason is valid.
3	The reason is wholly present (*sat*) in the homologue.	The reason is partly present (*sadasat*) in the heterologue	The reason is uncertain.
4	The reason is wholly absent (*asat*) from the homologue	The reason is wholly present (*sat*) in the heterologue.	The reason is contradictory
5	The reason is wholly absent (*asat*) from the homologue	The reason is wholly absent (*asat*) from the heterologue	The reason is uncertain.
6	The reason is wholly absent (*asat*) from the homologue	The reason is partly present (*sadasat*) in the heterologue	The reason is contradictory
7	The reason is partly present (*sadasat*) in the homologue	The reason is wholly present (*sat*) in the heterologue	The reason is uncertain.
8	The reason is partly present (*sadasat*) in the homologue	The reason is wholly absent (*asat*) from the heterologue	The reason is valid.
9	The reason is partly present (*sadasat*) in the homologue	The reason is partly present (*sadasat*) in the heterologue	The reason is uncertain

Illustration of the nine reasons.—The nine reasons[1] are illustrated by Dignāga in his Hetucakra (Wheel of Reasons) in which he assumes the following as reasons (or middle terms) and major terms respectively:—

Reasons or middle terms (*hetu*[2])—(1) knowable (*prameya*), (2) a product (*kṛtaka*), (3) non-eternal (*anitya*), (4) produced

---

स हेतुर्विपरीतोऽस्माद्
विरुद्धोऽन्यस्त्वनिश्चितः ॥

[1] Pramāṇa samuccaya, chapter III, quoted in Nyāyavārtika tātparya-ṭīkā on [illegible]

[2] [illegible] Miśra from Pramāṇa-samu-

(*kṛta*), (5) audible (*śrāvana*), (6) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), (7) non-eternal (*anitya*), (8) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), and (9) tangible (*sparśaja*)

Predicates or major terms (*sādhya*[1])—(1) eternal (*nitya*), (2) non-eternal (*anitya*), (3) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), (4) eternal (*nitya*), (5) non-eternal (*anitya*), (6) eternal (*nitya*), (7) a non-product of effort (*ayatnaja*), (8) non-eternal (*anitya*), and (9) eternal (*nitya*)

Application of the Law of Extension.—Applying the Law of Extension to the Table of Nine Reasons or the Wheel of Reasons we find that the second and the eighth reasons are valid, and the remaining seven are invalid inasmuch as these are either contradictory or uncertain Take the case illustrating the first reason in the Wheel of Law It stands thus —

Sound is eternal,
Because it is knowable,
Like ether and like a pot

Here "knowability," the reason, is wholly present in "sound" which is the subject and in "ether" which is a homologue of "eternal" the predicate But being wholly present also in "a pot" which is a heterologue of the "eternal," knowability becomes an uncertain reason Take the case illustrating the eighth reason which stands thus —

This sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product of effort,
Like a pot, unlike lightning and ether

Here "a product of effort" abides in "this sound" which is the subject, and in "a pot" which is a homologue of "non-eternal" the predicate, but does not abide in "lightning" which is also a

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प्रमेय कृतकानित्यकृत श्रावण यत्नजाः ।
अनित्य यत्नजास्पर्शा नित्यादिषु वै नव ॥

(Nyāyavārtika tātparya ṭīkā on 1 1-35, p. 198, Vizianagram Sanskrit series).

The Tibetan version runs thus:—

གཞལ་བྱ་བྱས་མི་རྟག་དང་
བྱས་དང་མཉན་དང་རྩོལ་བ་ལས་བྱུང་ །
མི་རྟག་རྩོལ་བྱུང་རེག་བྱ་མིན་
རྟག་སོགས་ཅན་ལ་ནི་དེ་དགུའོ ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chap III).

The Sanskrit originals are quoted by Vācaspati Miśra from Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III, thus —

[1] नित्यानित्यप्रयत्नोत्थ[illegible] नित्य साधनाः ।
नित्यानित्याश्च प्रमेयादिषु साधनाः ॥

(Nyāyavārtika tātparya-ṭīkā on 1-1-35).

homologue and in "ether" which is a heterologue of the predicate. Here the reason is partly present in the homologue and wholly absent from the heterologue and as such is valid.

Chapter IV. Reason and Example

Affirmative and negative reasons.

From a certain point of view, the reason or middle term (called in Sanskrit *hetu* and in Tibetan *gtan-tshigs*) is of two kinds, viz. affirmative (*anvayi*) and negative (*vyatireki*). The affirmative reason signifies that the thing signified by it is invariably accompanied by the thing signified by the predicate or major term, e.g. the hill is fiery because it is smoky (where smoke is an affirmative reason). The function of the negative reason is stated thus: wherever there is absence of the thing signified by the major term there is also absence of the thing signified by the reason or middle term, e.g. the hill is not smoky because it is not fiery.

A person who desires to produce in others as in his own self a definite conviction [illegible] should state in words the subject, the predicate and the reason as also their mutual connection in reference to the Law of Extension.

[illegible]

In regard to the connection of the reason with the major term he should state [illegible]

Sanskrit [illegible]

sādharmya) and negative or heterogeneous (*vyatireki* or *vaidharmya*). An illustration of the examples is given below —

> The hill is fiery,
> Because it is smoky,
> That which is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen (affirmative example),
> But that which is not fiery is not smoky, as a lake (negative example)

The two examples are in fact identical as they both point out the connection of the reason with the predicate or major term

Chapter V—Apoha—negation of the opposite

According to [illegible]

Apoha

which is not a not [illegible]
the mutual relatic [illegible]
yon-tan), action (*karma*, las), particularity (*visesa*, bye-brag, or, khyad), generality (*sāmānya*, spyi), and inherence (*samavāya*, hdu-wa)

Comparison, upamāna

According to Dignāga, Comparison[2] (*upamāna*, ñer-hjal) is useless as it is not a separate source of knowledge He says that when we recognise a thing through perception of a similar thing, we really perform an act of Perception Hence Comparison or Recognition of Similarity is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception

Credible word, śabda

Credible Word[3] or Verbal Testimony (*śabda*, yid-ches-tshig, sgra-las-byun-wa, or, nag-don) is also rejected as not being a separate source of

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[1] ཅེས་སོགས་བརྗོད་དུ་རང་དོན་ལ། །
གཞན་སེལ་བས་ནི་རྗོད་པར་བྱེད། །
(Pramāna-samuccaya, chapter V)

[2] ཉེར་འཇལ་བཞིན་དུ་དོན་མེད་ཡིན། །
(Pramāna-samuccaya, chapter IV)

Vide a very interesting discussion on it in the Nyāyavārtika, 1-1-6, where the Brāhmana Logician Uddyotakara defends the Nyāya-sūtra and the Nyāya-bhāṣya from the attacks of Dignāga.

[3] སྒྲ་ལས་བྱུང་བ་རྗེས་དཔག་ལས། །
ཚད་མ་གཞན་མིན་དེ་ལྟར་དེ། །
(Pramāna-samuccaya, chapter V)

Compare—

न प्रमाणान्तरं शाब्दमनुमानात्तथा हि तत् ।
(Ślokavārtika, śabda pariccheda, verse 15)

knowledge Dignāga asks "What is the significance of a Credible Word? Does it mean that the person who spoke the word is credible, or that the fact he averred is credible?" "If the person," continues he, "is credible, it is a mere inference On the other hand if the fact is credible, it is a case of Perception" Hence Dignāga concludes that Credible Word or Verbal Testimony is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception and Inference[1]

Law governing the middle term

The mark (middle term)[2] is present where the thing to be inferred (major term) or its homologue is present, but absent where the thing or its homologue is non-existent, e g smoke is present only where there is fire or any thing homogeneous with it, but absent where there is no fire nor any thing homogeneous with the same

Chapter VI—Analogues or Far-fetched analogy

In this chapter there is an explanation of the Analogue[3] or Far-fetched Analogy (called in Sanskrit *jāti* and in Tibetan ltag-gcod) which is of various kinds[4], such as (1) *prāptisamā* (phrad-mtshuns), (2) *aprāptisamā* (ma-phrad-mtshuns), (3) *varnyasamā*

शब्दानुमानयोरैक्यं धूमाद्यग्न्यनुमानवत् । ९७ ॥
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेकं प्रत्यक्ष दर्शनात् ।
सम्बन्धपूर्वकत्वाच्च प्रतिपत्तिरियं यत ॥ ९८ ॥
प्रत्यक्षाद्यप्रमाणत्वात्तद्वदर्थावबोधनात् ।
सामान्यविषयत्वाच्च त्रैकाल्यविषयाश्रयात् ॥ ९९ ॥
(Ślokavārtika, śabda pariccheda)

[1] ཡིད་ཆེས་ཚིག་ནི་མི་བསླུ་བ།
སྤྱི་ལས་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པར་ཉེད།།
(Pramāna samuccaya, chapter II)

The Sanskrit original is quoted by Vācaspati Miśra thus —

आप्तवादाविसंवादसामान्यादनुमानता ॥
(Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā on Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1 7)

Vide Uddyotakara's rejoinder in the Nyāyavārtika, 1 1 7

[2] རྗེས་དཔག་བྱ་དང་དེ་མཚུངས་ལ།
ཡོད་དང་མེད་ལ་མེད་པར།།
(Pramāna samuccaya, chapter II)

The Sanskrit originals of these lines which have been quoted and criticised by Uddyotakara, run as follows —

अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये सद्भावो नास्तितासति ॥
(Nyāyavārtika, 1 1-5 p 59 Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta)

[3] For an explanation of these terms vide the Nyāya-s

(brjod-mtshuns), (4) *avarnya-samā* (ma brjod mtshuns), (5) *anutpatti samā* (ma-skyes-mtshuns), (6) *kārya samā* (hbras-mtshuns), (7) *sādharmya-samā* (chos-mthun-mtshuns), (8) *vaidharmya-samā* (chos-mi mthun mtshuns), (9) *vikalpa-samā* (rnam-rtog-mtshuns), (10) *upalabdhi samā* (dmigs pa-mtshuns), (11) *samśaya-samā* (the-tshom-mtshuns), (12) *arthāpatti samā* (don-rtogs-mtshuns), (13) *sādhyasamā* (bsgrub-bya mtshuns) and (14) *prasanga-samā* (thal-wa-mtshuns) Some other kinds of *analogue* are said to be enumerated in the Tirthika works

95. DIGNĀGA'S Nyāya-praveśa.

The Nyāya-praveśa [1], or rather "Nyāya-praveśo-nāma pramāna-prakarana," is another excellent work on Logic by Dignāga The Sanskrit original is lost There exists a Tibetan translation of it which extends over folios 183—188 of the Bstan-hgyur, section Mdo, volume Ce The translation was prepared by the great Kaśmīrian Pandita Sarvajña-śrī Raksita and the Śākya monk Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan-dpal-bzan, in the great Śa-skya monastery of Western Tibet The work in Tibetan is called Tshad-ma-rigs-par hjug pahi-sgo signifying the "Door of Entrance to Logic" It opens thus — [illegible]

A Syllogism—Nyâyâvayava.

Parts of a Syllogism [3]

Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noticed below —

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[1] I consulted the Nyāya-praveśa in the volume Ce of the Tibetan Bstan hgyur which was placed at my disposal by the India Office, London I have also [illegible]

སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་ནི་སུན་འབྱིན་ཉིད། །
ལྟར་སྣང་བཅས་པ་གཞན་རྟོགས་ཕྱིར། །
མངོན་སུམ་དང་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག །
ལྟར་སྣང་བཅས་པ་བདག་རིག་ཕྱིར། །
ཅེས་པ་བསྡུན་པའོན་བསྡུས་པའོ། །

(Nyāya-praveśa).

[3] In Tibetan: Rigs pahi yan-lag (རིགས་པའི་ཡན་ལག) and in Sanskrit: Nyāyāvayava (न्यायावयव).

Reasoning according to the Nyāya-praveśa is carried on by means of a minor term, a major term, a middle term and examples. The minor term is also called the subject, in Sanskrit pakṣa or dharmin, and in Tibetan phyogs or chos-can. The major term is also called the predicate, in Sanskrit sādhya or dharma, in Tibetan bsgrub-par-bya-ba or chos. The middle term is also called the reason or mark, in Sanskrit hetu or liṅga, in Tibetan gtan-tshigs or rtags. The example, called in Sanskrit dṛṣṭānta, in Tibetan dpe, is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous (in Sanskrit sādharmya, in Tibetan chos-mthun-pa) and (2) heterogeneous (in Sanskrit vaidharmya, in Tibetan chos-mi-mthun-pa). The form of reasoning is as follows:—

Terms of a Syllogism.

(1) This hill is fiery
(2) because it has smoke
(3) All that has smoke is fiery like a kitchen, and whatever is
not fiery has no smoke like a lake

Here 'hill' is the minor term, 'fiery' the major term, 'smoke' the middle term, 'kitchen' a homogeneous example, and 'lake' a heterogeneous example.

The Minor Term.

Thesis

A minor term and a major term taken together constitute a proposition, e.g.

The *hill* (minor term) is *fiery* (major term)

A proposition which is offered for proof is a Thesis. There are certain types of thesis which cannot stand the te of proof and are therefore fallacious.

The Fallacies of Thesis.[1]

The following theses are fallacious:—

(1) A thesis incompatible with perception, such as: "soun is inaudible."

(2) A thesis incompatible with inference, such as: "A p is eternal."

(Really "A pot is non-eternal, because it is a product.")

[illegible] incompatible with the public opinion, such a [illegible]

say [illegible]
80).

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[1] In Tibetan: phyogs-ltar-snan ([illegible]); and in Sanskrit: pak bhāsa (पक्षाभास).

(4) A thesis incompatible with one's own belief or doctrine, such as· A Vaiśesika philosopher saying "sound is eternal"

(5) A thesis incompatible with one's own statement, such as "My mother is barren."

(6) A thesis with an unfamiliar minor term, such as The Buddhist speaking to the Sāmkhya, "Sound is perishable." (Sound is a subject well known to the Mīmāmsaka, but not to the Sāmkhya)

(7) A thesis with an unfamiliar major term, such as The Sāmkhya speaking to the Buddhist, "The soul is animate"

(8) A thesis with both the terms unfamiliar, such as The Vaiśesika speaking to the Buddhist, "The soul has feelings as pleasurable, etc"

(The Buddhist deals neither with the soul nor with its feelings)

(9) A thesis universally accepted, such as "Fire is warm" (This thesis cannot be offered for proof, as it is accepted by all)

The Middle Term and the Major Term.

Three Characteristics of the Middle Term[1]

The Middle Term (*hetu*) must possess three characteristics, *viz* —

(1) The whole of the minor term (*pakṣa*) must be connected with the middle term, *e g*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot, but unlike ether

In this reasoning, "product" which is the middle term includes the whole of "sound" which is the minor term

(2) All things denoted by the middle term must be homogeneous with things denoted by the major term, *e g*

All things produced are non-eternal, as a pot

(3) None of the things heterogeneous from the major term must be a thing denoted by the middle term, *e g.*

No non non-eternal (that is, no eternal) thing is a product, as ether.

If we express the minor term as such not to be 'S' the middle [illegible]

[illegible]

(1) All S is R.
(2) All R is P
(3) No R is non-P.

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[1] Called in Tibetan. gtan tshigs-ni-tshul-gsum (གཏན་ཚིགས་ནི་ཚུལ་གསུམ) and in Sanskrit Lingasya trairūpyam (लिङ्गस्य त्रैरूप्यम्) ।

Now, the negative aspect of the middle term, *viz* no R is -P, only confirms the truth conveyed by one of the positive ects, *viz* all R is P. Hence we may put aside the negative ect, and exhibit the positive aspects as follows :—

(1) All S is R
(2) All R is P

Again, in the above instance 'R' and 'P' may be taken in r whole extent or partially. So the two positive aspects tioned above may be fully exhibited as follows :—

(1) (*a*) All S is all R
    (*b*) All S is some R
(2) (*a*) All R is all P
    (*b*) All R is some P

Combining aspect (1) and aspect (2) together, we find that a gism may be of any one of the following forms —

(1) All S is all P (conclusion)
    Because All S is all R,
        All R is all P
(2) All S is some P (conclusion)
    Because All S is all R,
        All R is some P
(3) All S is some P (conclusion)
    Because All S is some R
        All R is all P
(4) All S is some P (conclusion)
    Because All S is some R,
        All R is some P

Hence we find that Dignāga admits only two conclusions, *viz.*

All S is all P, and
All S is some P

tive extension of dle Term and the Term

The second and third of the characteristics mentioned above indicate the relative extension of the middle term and major term. They show that the middle term is universally, invariably, or inseparably connected with the major

This universal, invariable, or inseparable connection between them is called in Sanskrit *Vyāpti* and in Tibetan *Khyab* was, as far as I find, first discovered by Dignāga.

Supposing that the middle term or reason is R, and the term or predicate is P, the connection between the two may be symbolically set forth as follows —

(1) All R is all P, and
(2) All R is some P.

Fourteen Fallacies

Fallacies of the Middle Term[1]

Owing to the violation of one or more of the three characteristics, there occur Fallacies of the Middle Term which may be of fourteen kinds as follows —

A. The *unproved* (Sanskrit *Asiddha*, Tibetan Ma-grub) which occurs.

(1) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognized by both the parties, *e g*

Sound is non eternal,
Because it is *visible*

(Neither of the parties admits that sound is visible)

(2) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognized by one party only, *e g.*

Sound is evolved.
Because it is a *product*

(The Mīmāmsakas do not admit that sound is a product)

(3) When the truth of the middle term is questioned, *e g.*

The hill is fiery,
Because there is *vapour*

(Vapour may or may not be an effect of fire, and may or may not be connected with it otherwise)

(4) When it is questioned whether the middle term is predicable of the minor term, *e g*

Ether is a substance,
Because it has qualities

(It is questioned whether ether has qualities)

B The *uncertain* (Sanskrit *Aniścita*, Tibetan: Ma-nes-pa) which occurs·

(5) When the middle term is too general, abiding equally in the major term as well as in the opposite of it, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is *knowable*

(The 'knowable' is too general, because it abides in the eternal as well as the non-eternal This is a fallacy of being too general, called in Sanskrit: *Sādhārana*, and in Tibetan: Thun-mon)

(6) When the middle term is not general enough, abiding neither in the major term nor in its opposite, *e g*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is audible.

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[1] In Tibetan: Gtan tshigs ltar snan (གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྣང་) and in Sanskrit: Hetvābhāsa (हेत्वाभास)।

(This is a fallacy of being not general enough, called in Sanskrit · *Asādhārana*, and in Tibetan Thun-moń-ma yin).

(7) When the middle term abides in some of the things homogeneous with, and in all things heterogeneous from, the major term, *e g*

Sound is not a product of effort
Because it is *non-eternal*

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are products of effort, such as lightning, and abides in all thi which are not non-products of effort)

(8) When the middle term abides in some of the thi heterogeneous from, and in all things homogeneous with, t major term, *e g.*

Sound is a product of effort,
Because it is non-eternal

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are r products of effort, as lightning, and abides in all things which a products of effort)

(9) When the middle term abides in some of the thin homogeneous with, and in some heterogeneous from, the maj term, *e g*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal

(Some incorporeal things are eternal as ether, but others a not as intelligence)

(10) When there is a non-erroneous contradiction, that i when a thesis and its contradictory are both supported by wha appear to be valid reasons, *e g.*

The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Mīmāmsaka

"Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product"

The Mīmāmsaka speaking to the Vaiśesika.

"Sound is eternal,
Because it is always audible"

(Both of the reasonings are correct, but as they lead to contradictory conclusions they are classed as *uncertain*)

C The *contradictory* (Sanskrit · *Viruddha*, Tibetan Ḥgal-wa) which occurs ·

(11) When the middle term is contradictory to the major term, *e g*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product.

(12) When the middle term is contradictory to the implied major term, *e.g.*

> The eyes, etc , are serviceable to some being,
> Because they are made of particles,
> Like a bed, seat, etc [1]

(Here the major term "serviceable to some being" is ambiguous, for, the apparent meaning of 'some being' is 'the body,' but the implied meaning of it is 'the soul' Though things 'made of particles' are serviceable to the body, they are not, according to the Sāmkhya, serviceable to the soul which is attributeless. Hence there is contradiction between the middle term and the implied major term)

(13) When the middle term is inconsistent with the minor term, *e g*

Sāmānya (generality) is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action;

Because it depends upon one substance and possesses quality and action.

Like generality-particularity—(*Sāmānya* or generality does not depend upon one substance, etc)

(14) When the middle term is inconsistent with the implied *e g*

> Objects are stimuli of action;
> Because apprehended by the senses

Obj , meaning (1) things and (2) pur- inconsistent with the minor term in

The Example.

An example before the time of Dignāga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to lerstanding of the

a universal proposition, universal, invariable or

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that the author of Nyāya-praveśa the oldest of the works on Sāṁkhya

proposition expressive of the universal ajor term serves as the major premise Aristotle. It was long unknown in proposition marks a new era in the inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, which stand to each other in the causal relation or in the relation of inherence, *e g*

The hill is fiery
Because it has smoke
All that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen (homogeneous example)

The above example is homogeneous A heterogeneous example is thus given —

Whatever is not fiery has no smoke as a lake

Fallacies of the homogeneous example.[1]

Examples have already been stated to be of two kinds *viz* (1) Homogeneous and (2) Heterogeneous Each of these kinds becomes fallacious under certain circumstances Fallacies of the homogeneous example are the following —

(1) An example not homogeneous with the middle term, *e g*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal
That which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms

(The atoms cannot serve as an example, because they are not incorporeal This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle Term)

(2) An example not homogeneous with the major term, *e g*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
That which is incorporeal is eternal as intelligence

(Intelligence cannot serve as an example, because it is not eternal This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Major Term)

(3) An example homogeneous with neither the middle term nor the major term, *e g*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
That which is incorporeal is eternal, as a pot

(The pot cannot serve as an example, because it is neither incorporeal nor eternal This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle and Major Terms)

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history of Indian Logic, and shows a great development of the principle of induction

[1] Called in Tibetan. Chos-mthun-dpe-ltar-snaṅ wa (ཆོས་མཐུན་དཔེ་ལྟར་སྣང་བ) and in Sanskrit Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभास)

> Whoever is a speaker is passionate as a certain man in Magadha

(Though a certain man in Magadha may be both a speaker and passionate, there is nevertheless no universal connection between being a speaker and being passionate. This is a fallacy of Absence of Connection, called in Sanskrit *Ananvaya*, in Tibetan Ṛjes-su-ḥgro-wa-meḍ.)

(5) A homogeneous example showing an inverse connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

> Sound is non-eternal,
> Because it is a product of effort,
> Whatever is non-eternal is a product of effort, as a pot.

(The pot cannot serve as an example, because though it is both non-eternal and a product of effort, the connection between the major term and the middle term has been inverted, *i.e.* all products of effort are non-eternal but all non-eternals are not products of effort. This is a fallacy of Inverse Connection called in Sanskrit *Viparītânvaya*, in Tibetan: Ṛjes-su-ḥgro-wa-phyin-ci-log-pa.)

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example[1]

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example are the following:—

(6) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the middle term, *e.g.*

> Sound is eternal,
> Because it is incorporeal,
> Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as intelligence.

(Intelligence is non-eternal, yet incorporeal. This is a fallacy of Included Middle Term in a heterogeneous example.)

(7) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the major term, *e.g.*

> Sound is eternal,
> Because it is incorporeal
> Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as atoms.

(The atoms are not incorporeal, yet they are eternal. This is a fallacy of included Major Term in a heterogeneous example.)

(8) An example heterogeneous from neither the opposite of the middle term nor the opposite of the major term, *e.g.*

> Sound is eternal,
> Because it is incorporeal,
> Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot.

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[1] Called in Tibetan: Choṣ-mi-ṃthun-dpe-ltar snaṅ-wa (ཆོས་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ལྟར་སྣང་བ) and in Sanskrit: Vaidharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभास)।

(A pot is neither eternal nor incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of Included Middle and Major Terms in a heterogeneous example.)

(9) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of disconnection between the middle term and the major term, e.g.

This person is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Whoever is non-passionate is not a speaker, as a piece of
stone.

(This is called a fallacy of Absence of Disconnection of a heterogeneous example.)

(10) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of inverse disconnection between the middle term and the major term, e.g.

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Whatever is non-product is not non-eternal, as ether.

The example should be inverted as:

Whatever is non-non-eternal, i.e., eternal, is not a product, as ether. This is called a fallacy of Inverted Negation of a heterogeneous example.

All the three kinds of fallacies—of the Thesis, Middle Term and Example—are fallacies of reasoning. Refutation (called in Sanskrit Dūṣaṇa and in Tibetan Sun-hbyin) consists in finding out in the reasoning of the opponent any one of the fallacies aforementioned. Fallacies of Refutation (called in Sanskrit Dūṣaṇābhāsa, and in Tibetan Sun-hbyin-ltar-snaṅ-wa) consists

96 DIGNĀGA'S Hetu-cakra-hamaru

(*Logic of Nine Reasons*).

The Hetu cakra-hamaru[1] is another small treatise on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost, but a Tibetan translation [illegible] 94. The [illegible] of Za-h[illegible] is called [illegible]

teristics of the Reason (or Middle Term)"[3]

In this work Dignāga has analysed all nine possible relations between the middle and the major terms and has found that there are among them two relations which conform to the three characteristics of the middle term already laid down, and the remaining seven relations are at variance with those characteristics. Accordingly he has concluded that only two relations are valid as will be evident from the annexed diagram.

97 Pramāṇa samuccaya-vṛtti

The Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti is a commentary on the Pramāṇa-samuccaya by Dignāga himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation which extends over folios 13—96 of the [illegible] the end of the work it is stated that "Held on by the compassionate Mañjunātha (the god of learning), Dignāga the great dialectician of sharp intellect wrote this śāstra which is as deep as the ocean."

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[1] I brought a copy of the Tibetan version of the Hetu-cakra-hamaru from the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim which I visited in June 1907. This work is probably the same as the Hetu-dvāra-śāstra vide Takakusu's I-tsing, p. 187.

[2] The *Hetu-cakra* is also called in Sanskrit *Pakṣadharma-cakra* and in Tibetan Phyogs-chos-dguḥi-ḥkhor-lo.

[3] འཁྲུལ་བའི་དྲ་བ་འཇོམས་མཛད་པའི །
ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ནས །
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཕྱོ་ཆོ་ཡི །
གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་བཤད་པར་བྱ ॥

(Hetu-chakra-hamaru).

There is another translation of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya in Tibetan extending over folios 94–183 of the Bstan-ḥgyur section Mdo volume Ce. It was prepared by the Indian sage Hema or Kanaka Varma (called in Tibetan Gser-gyi-go-cha) and the Tibetan interpreter Dad-pa śes-rab in the monastery of Se-wahi-dge gnas.

98. Pramāṇa-śāstra Nyāya-praveśa

Pramāṇa-śāstra Nyāya-praveśa[1] is another work by Dignāga. It was translated into Chinese by the Chinese interpreter Tha sam-tsan. The Chinese version[2] was translated into Tibetan by the Chinese scholar Dge-ses-sin gyan and the Tibetan monk Ston-gshon in the sa-skya monastery of Western Tibet. The very venerable Chinese monk Dharmaratna (called in Tibetan Chos-kyi rin-chen) who edited the Tibetan version compared it thoroughly with the Chinese version. The Sanskrit original of the work appears to be lost but the Tibetan version still exists. It consists of folios 188—193 of the Bstan-ḥgyur, section Mdo, volume Ce. In Tibetan the work is called Tshad-maḥi-bstan-bcos-rig-pa-la-ḥjug-pa signifying "An Entrance to the Science of Logic." The Chinese title of the work is Gyen-min gshiḥi-cin-liḥi-lun.

99. Ālambana-parīkṣā

The Ālambana-parīkṣā[3] is another work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation which consists of one folio only (folio 180)

[illegible]

[illegible] The work in Tibetan [illegible] n Examination of the [illegible] invocation to Buddha

100 Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti

The Ālambana-parīkṣā vṛtti[1] is a commentary on the Ālambana-parīkṣā by Dignāga himself The Sanskrit original of this [illegible]

[illegible]

101. Trikāla-parīkṣā.

The Trikāla-parīkṣā[2] is a work by Dignāga The Sanskrit [illegible]

Examination of Three Times"

102. PARAMĀRTHA (498 A D—569 A D)

Paramārtha,[3] *born in 498 A D, was a Buddhist ascetic* [illegible]

China in 569 A D

In 550 A D he translated Vasubandhu's Tarka śāstra into Chinese He is said to have translated the Nyāya sūtra too It is further reported that he wrote a work called Nyāya-bhāṣya[1] or an explanation of the Nyāya-sūtra in five volumes.

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[1] I have consulted the xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office London

[2] I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work as contained in the [illegible]

103. ŚANKARA SVĀMIN (ABOUT 550 A.D.)

Śankara Svāmin,[2] as it appears from Chinese records, was a pupil of Dignāga He seems to have been a native of Southern India Logic is said to have been handed down by Dignāga through Śankara Svāmin and ten other masters to Śilabhadra, who was the head of the Nālandā University, and the favourite teacher of the Chinese pilgrim, Hwen-thsang, in 635 A D According to the Chinese Tripitaka Śankara Svāmin was the author of a work called Hetuvidyā Nyāya-praveśa śāstra, or Nyāya praveśa Tarka śāstra,[3] which was translated into Chinese by Hwen-thsang in 647 A D This work seems to be different[4] from the "Nyāya-praveśa" or more fully the "Nyāya praveśo-nāma-pramāṇa prakarana" which, as we have seen, is ascribed by the Tibetans to Dignāga

104 DHARMAPĀLA

(ABOUT 600—635 A D).

Dharmapala,[5] a logician, was a native of Kāñcīpura in Drāvida (modern Conjeeveram in Madras) He was the eldest son of a great minister of the country From his childhood he exhibited much cleverness, and as he was a young man the king and queen of the country condescended to entertain him at a feast In the evening of that day his heart was oppressed with sorrow and, assuming the robes of a Buddhist recluse, he left home and applied himself with unflagging earnestness to learning He was admitted into the University at Nālandā in which he acquired great distinction Subsequently he became the head

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[illegible] H Ui observes — [illegible]

37.

[3] Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No 1216, and Appendix I, No 13

[4] The Tibetans do not know Śankara Svāmin at all The Chinese pilgrim I-tsing, who visited India during 671—695, speaks of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but does not mention Śankara Svāmin Even Hwen-thsang in his Travels does not mention him. Śankara Svāmin's Nyāya-praveśa Tarka-śāstra seems to correspond to No 1216 of Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue. Is the original Sanskrit text of 1216 different from that of 1224?

[5] Vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, p 237; vol II, pp. 110—223, 229 and 230 Vide also Takakusu's I-tsing, p lvii, and Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No 16

of the University He must have retired from Nālandā before 635 A D , when Hwen-thsang visited it, and found that Śīlabhadra had succeeded him in the headship of the University. Dharmapāla conjointly with Bhartṛhari composed a Bedā-vṛtti on Pāṇini's grammar

He was a follower of the Yogācāra philosophy, and was the author of several works such as (1) Ālambana-pratyaya-dhyāna-śāstra-vyākhyā, (2) Vidyāmātra siddhi-śāstra-vyākhyā, and (3) Śata śāstra-vaipulya-vyākhyā which was translated into Chinese in 650 A D Hwen-thsang, who visited India in 629 A D, found in Kauśāmbī the ruins of a monastery where Dharmapāla had refuted the arguments of the heretics

105. ĀCĀRYA ŚĪLABHADRA

(635 A.D.).

Śīlabhadra[1] belonged to the family of the king of Samataṭa (Bengal), and was of the Brāhmaṇa caste He was a pupil of Dharmapāla at the Nālandā University of which subsequently he became the head The Chinese pilgrim, Hwen-thsang, was his pupil[2] in 635 A.D Śīlabhadra was a great logician and master of śāstras

106. ĀCĀRYA DHARMAKĪRTI

(ABOUT 635—650 A D.).

Darmakirti's life

The excellent Dharmakīrti,[3] called in Tibetan Chos-grags, according to the accounts of all earlier sages, was born in the south in the kingdom of Cūḍāmaṇi.[4] Since, however, there is now no country of that name, and since on the other hand all the orthodox and heterodox alike name Trimalaya as the birth-place of Dharmakīrti, it is to be accepted that in olden times Trimalaya was called the kingdom of Cūdāmani. His father was a Tīrtha of the Brah-[illegible]

[illegible] years old, he was already deeply versed in

[illegible] Western World, vol. II, p. 110; and

[illegible] Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 175—

[illegible] Coḍa or Chola country in the Eastern [illegible] the Deccan. Vide Pramāṇa-vārtika-

Dharma (doctrine) up as the prize they began the debate, and finally Dharmakīrti was victorious Kumārila and his 500 followers became followers of Buddha [1]

Dharmakīrti's triumph

Dharmakīrti further withstood the Nirgranthas (Jainas), Rāhuvratin and others, who lived within the range of the Vindhya mountains [2] Returning to Dravali (Drāvida) he challenged by criers those who were ready for debate The majority of the Tīrthas fled; and some [illegible]

Dharmakīrti towards the end of his life erected a vihāra in the land of Kalinga, and after having converted many people to the Law (*Dharma*) passed away Those of his pupils, who by their lives had become like Brahma, carried him to the cemetery for cremation Then there fell a heavy rain of flowers, and for seven days the whole country was filled with fragrance and music.

This Ācārya (Dharmakīrti) and the Tibetan king Sroṅ-tsan-gam-po are said to have been contemporaries, which statement might be accepted as authoritative

Dharmakīrti's age

From this account it is evident that Dharmakīrti was a pupil of Dharmapāla As the latter lived in 635 A.D, Dharmakīrti must also have lived about that time. This date agrees well with the statement that Dharmakīrti was a contemporary of the Tibetan king Sroṅ-tsan-gam-po who lived during 627—698 A.D[1] It seems that in 635 A.D, Dharmakīrti was very young as Hwen-thsang does not mention him On the other hand I-tsing, who travelled over India during 671—695 A D, declares eloquently how "Dharmakīrti made further improvement in Logic"[2] after Dignāga The Brāhmanic logician Uddyotakara[3] is attacked by Dharmakīrti. The Mīmāmsaka Sureśvarācarya,[4] author of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika, and the Digambara Jaina Vidyānanda, author of the Aṣṭa sāhasrikā,[5] have on the contrary criticised the definition of perception (*Pratyakṣa*) as given by Dharmakīrti, who is sometimes designated by the shorter name Kīrti. Vācaspati Miśra[6] too quotes Dharmakīrti to criticise him.

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[1] This tradition, which is recorded in the Chos byuṅ of Tāranātha, is repeated in the Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ, as follows —

དེའི་ཚེ་གཞོན་ནུ་རོལ་པས་ཁྲོས་ནས་ཁྲིམ་ཏེ་འཁོར་ལྔ་བརྒྱ་བཅས་ཀོང་ནས་བརྩོལ་ཙ་ཕྲ་བའི་ཐུན་མོང་

མིན་པའི་དམ་བཅས་ལྔ་བརྒྱ་པོ་ཐུན་ཐུང་ཏེ་ནང་པར་གཞུགས།

(Dpag-bsam-ljon bzaṅ, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, p 106).

The extract may be translated thus —Upon this Kumārila was enraged and appeared with 500 attendants for debate Being defeated he and his attendants became, in pursuance of his extraordinary pledge, followers of Buddha.

[2] While sojourning in the Vindhya mountains Dharmakīrti was invited by a neighbouring king who, as a token of honour, had the following inscription recorded on his gate:—

གལ་ཏེ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པ་ཡི།
སྨྲ་བའི་ཉི་མ་ནུབ་པར་ན།
ཆོས་རྣམས་གཉིད་ལོག་ཡང་ན་ཤི།
ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་རྣམས་ད་གདོད་ལྡང་ངམ།།

(Dpag-bsam-ljon bzaṅ, p. 106).

If Dharmakīrti, the sun among disputants, sets and his doctrines sleep or die, the false doctrines of the Tīrthikas will then rise.

107. Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā.

Dharmakīrti is the author of numerous works on Logic. The Pramāṇa-vārtika kārikā is one of them A verse[7] of this work was quoted by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th century A D The following story[1] is told regarding the composition of this work —

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[1] *Vide* Wassilief, p 54, and Csoma de Koros's Tibetan Grammar, p 183

[2] Takakusu's I-tsing, p lviii

[3] *Vide* K. B. Pathak's "Bhartṛhari and Kumārila,' *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1892, vol. xviii, p 229

[4] Cf.

विषेय अविनाभावादिति यद्धर्मकीर्तिना ।
प्रत्यज्ञायि प्रतिज्ञेयं कीर्तेर्नाशो न संशयः ॥

(Sureśvara's Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika, chap vi)

[5] Vide *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xix, 1895—97, p. 50

[6] Cf यथाह धर्मकीर्तिः—

यथार्थार्थे न च ज्ञाने बाह्याभासस्य सम्भवः ।
एकत्र प्रतिबिम्बमादृश्येऽपि न सम्भवः ॥

(Vācaspati's Bhāmatī on Vedānta-sūtra, 2-2 28).

[7] The verse runs thus —

भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैः दृश्येतेन्दाविवाद्वये ॥

(Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā quoted in Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, chapter on Bauddha darśana)

The Tibetan version of the verse runs as follows —

རྣམ་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་བས་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས ॥
མེད་པར་ཐ་དད་མཐོང་བ་བཞིན ॥

(Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā embodied in the Bstan-ḥgyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 230 *Vide* Louis de la Vallee Poussin's Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques, p 34)

Composition of the work.

It is said that Dharmakīrti studied many dialectic śāstras, but his spirit was not satisfied. Once at the house of one Īśvara Sena,[2] a pupil of Dignāga, he heard the Pramāṇa-samuccaya Having heard it for the first time, he at once became as proficient as Īśvara Sena who had minutely studied the work. When he heard it the second time, he became like Dignāga, the author of the work, and when he heard it the third time, he recognized several errors in the work. When he mentioned them to Īśvara Sena, the latter so far from being displeased, told him that he was at liberty to condemn all the mistakes of the work and to prepare a critical commentary on it With the permission thus received he composed a metrical commentary on the Pramāṇa-samuccaya called the Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā

Subjects of the work

The Sanskrit original of the Pramāṇa-vārtika appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[3] of it in the Ḇstan-ẖgyur, section M̱do, volume Ce, folios 194—258 This translation was prepared by the Indian sage Subhūti-śrī-śānti and the Tibetan interpreter Ḏge-wahi-ḇlo-gros The work in Tibetan is called Tshaḏ-ma-rnam-ẖgrel-gyi-tshig signifying "Memorial Verses explanatory of *Pramāna* or Sources of Knowledge" The work is divided into four chapters as follows .—(1) Inference for one's own self (in Tibetan Raṅ-gi-don-rjes-su-ḏpag-pa, in Sanskrit *Svārthānumāna*), (2) Establishment of *Pramāṇa* (in Tibetan Tsaḏ-ma-grub-pa, in Sanskrit *Pramāṇa-siddhi*); (3) Perception (in Tibetan · Mṅon-sum, in Sanskrit . *Pratyakṣa*); and (4) Words for the sake of others (in Tibetan : G̱shan-gyi-don-gyi tshig, in Sanskrit · *Parārtha-vākya*) The colophon[4] of the work runs as follows :—"Here is finished the Pramāna-vartika-karikā of Śrī Dharmakīrti who was born in a family of the Deccan, who exposed largely the errors of all the vicious texts (of the Tīrthikas), whose fame filled the entire earth, and who as a great sage had no rival"

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[4] ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ།
ཕྱག་སྐྱོ་ཐོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲིད་དུ་བྱང་པ།
གཞུང་ལུགས་ངན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཚོམ་གཅིད་དུ་འཇུག་པར་འདུག་པ།
རྒྱུད་པའི་གྲགས་པས་ས་རི་ཁྱབ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་བརྒྱུད་པ།
འགྲན་དུ་མེད་པའི་མཁས་པ་ཉིད་པོ་དཔལ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་མཛད་པ་རྫོགས་སོ།།

(Pramāna-vārtika kārikā in Ḇstan-ẖgyur, M̱do, Ce, leaf 258).

Vide Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's Introduction to "Bilingual Index of Nyāyabindu" published in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta.

108. Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti

There was a sub-commentary on the Pramāna-vārtika-kārikā called *Pramāṇa vārtika-vṛtti* by *Dharmakīrti himself*. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost There exists, however, a Tibetan translation[1] of it in the B̲stan-h̲gyur, M̲do, Ce, folios 420-535 In Tibetan the work is named Tshad-ma-rnam hgrel-gyi-hgrel wa In the concluding lines of the work Dharmakīrti is described as "a great teacher and dialectician, whose fame filled all quarters of the earth and who was, as it were, a lion, pressing down the head of elephant-like debaters"[2]

109 Pramāṇa viniścaya

Pramāna-viniścaya, quoted[3] by Mādhavācārya, is another work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] of it in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 259—347 The translation was prepared by the Kāśmirian Pandita Parahita Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter Blo-ldan-śes-rab in the matchless city of Kāśmira The work in Tibetan is called Tshad-ma rnam-par-nes-pa signifying "Determination of Pramāna or Sources of Knowledge" The work is divided into three chapters as follows —(1) System of Perception (in Tibetan Mnon-sum gtan la-dwab-pa, in Sanskrit *Pratyaksa-vyavasthā*), (2) Inference for one's own self (in Tibetan: Ran-gi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sanskrit. *Svārthānumāna*), and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan · Gshan-gyi-don-gyi rjes-su dpag-pa, in Sanskrit *Parārthānumāna*) In the concluding lines Dharmakirti is described as a great sage of unrivalled fame born in Southern India

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[1] I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work embodied in the B̲stan-hgyur of the India Office, London.

[2] རིགས པ ཆེན པོ སྨྲ བའི སྐྱེད མ ཡུལ པ ན སྤྲ བའི གླང པོ ཆེའི སྤྱི བོ གནོན པར མཛད པའི སེང་གེ
ཕྱོགས མ ལུས པར རྒྱས པར གྲགས པ ཅན དཔལ སློབ དཔོན ཆོས ཀྱི གྲགས ཕྱུར པ །

(Pramāna-vārtika vṛtti opening lines)

[3] The following verses of Pramāna-viniścaya were quoted in the Sarvadarsana-samgraha, chapter on Bauddha darśana, by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th century A D —

नान्योऽनुभाव्यो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवोऽपरः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात् स्वयं सैव प्रकाशते ॥ (क)
सहोपलम्भनियमाद् अभेदो नीलतद्धियो ॥ (ख)
अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनै ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥ (ग)

(Pramāna-viniścaya, chap I).

Prof Louis de la Vallee Poussin in his "Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques," pp 32 and 34, identifies the above verses with their Tibetan versions as follows —

བློ ཡིས ཉམས མྱོང བ གཞན ཡོད མེད ॥
དེ ཡི མྱོང བ གཞན ཡོད མིན ॥
གཟུང དང འཛིན པ མེད པའི ཕྱིར ॥
དེ ནི དེ ལྟར རང ཉིད གསལ ॥ (ཀ)
ལྷན ཅིག དམིགས པ ངེས པའི ཕྱིར ॥
སྔོ དང དེ བློ གཞན མ ཡིན ॥ (ཁ)

110. Nyāya-bindu

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NYĀYA-BINDU

[illegible]

work in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 347—355. The work in Tibet[illegible]
Logic" [illegible]
tion (in [illegible]
ference f[illegible]
dpag-pa, [illegible]
sake of others (in Tibetan Gshan-gyi-don-rjes-su-dpag-pa, in Sans-

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ཀྱེ་ འདག་ཅེས་པར་ དཔྱར་མེད་གྲུང ॥
མཁོང་ བསྒྲུན་ རྗེ་ ཐོག་ རྣམས་ རྗེས ॥
གཟུང་བ་འཛིན་པ་རིག་པ་རྣམས ॥
ཐམས་ཅད་དང་ བཅས་བརྟེན་ རྟོགས་ འགྱུར ॥ (༡)

(Pramāṇa-viniścaya, chap. I, embodied in the Tibetan Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 272, 274 and 273 respectively).

[illegible]

krit *Parārthānumāna*) Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noted below

Perception.

Definition of Perception

In chapter I, it is stated that all objects of man are accomplished by perfect or valid knowledge Valid knowledge is of two kinds (1) Perception (in Sanskrit *Pratyaksa*) and (2) In- [illegible] knowledge

[illegible]

quick motion, journey by boat, shaking, etc , for instance, to a man journeying by boat, trees on both banks appear to move Perception is of four kinds (1) perception by the five senses; (2) perception by the mind, (3) self-consciousness, and (4) knowledge of a contemplative saint An object of perception is like itself (*sva lakṣana*) while an object of inference is like any one of its class (*sāmānya-lakṣana*), for instance, a cow which I see is a [illegible] which dis- [illegible] neral [illegible] that [illegible] neral knowledge According to the proximity or remoteness of an object, perception of it varies This is the peculiar characteristic of an object of perception, and this characteristic proves [illegible] shows that [illegible]

Inference for one's self

Definition of Inference for one's own self

In chapter II, Inference for one's own self (*Svārthānumāna*) is defined as the knowledge of the inferable derived through the reason or middle term bearing its three forms or characteristics In the instance 'this hill has fire because it has smoke,' the knowledge of the hill as having fire is derived through smoke which is the reason or middle term

Forms or characteristics of the middle term

The three forms or characteristics of the reason or middle term are the following —

(1) The middle term must abide in the minor term, e g

The hill has fire,
Because it has smoke,
Like a kitchen, but unlike a lake.

In this reasoning there must be 'smoke' on the 'hill'

(2) The middle term must abide only in cases which are homologous with the major term, e g in the above reasoning 'smoke' abides in a kitchen which is homologous with things that contain fire

(3) The middle term must never abide in cases which are heterologous from the major term, e g in the above reasoning 'smoke' does not abide in a lake which is heterologous from things that contain fire

Three kinds of the middle term

The middle term is of three kinds according to the relation which it bears to the major term, thus.—

(1) Identity (in Tibetan · Raṅ-ḇshin, in Sanskrit *Svabhāva*), *e.g*

This is a tree,
Because it is śiṁśapā

(2) Effect (in Tibetan : Ḻbras-bu, in Sankrit *Kārya*), *e g*

Here there is fire, because there is smoke

(3) Non-perception (in Tibetan Mi-ḏmigs pa, in Sanskrit · *Anupalabdhi*), which is of 11 kinds as follows —

(i) Non-perception of identity (Svabhāvānupalabdhi), *e.g*
  Here is no smoke, because it is not perceived (though smoke is of such a nature that it is perceptible if existent).

(ii) Non-perception of effect (Kāryānupalabdhi), *e g*
  Here there are no causes of smoke of unobstructed capacity, because there is no smoke here

(iii) Non-perception of the pervader or container (Vyāpakānupalabdhi), *e g*
  Here there is no Simśapā, because there is no tree at all

(iv) Perception contrary to identity (Svabhāva viruddhopalabdhi), *e.g*
  There is no cold sensation here, because there is fire

(v) Perception of the opposite effect (Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi), *e g*
  Here there is no cold sensation, because there is smoke

(vi) Perception of contrary connection (Viruddha vyāptopalabdhi), *e g*
  Even the destruction of the past entity is not certain, because it is dependent on other causes

(vii) Perception contrary to the effect (Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*
  Here there are no causes of cold of unobstructed capacity, because there is fire

(viii) Perception contrary to the container (vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi), *e g*

Here there [illegible] because there is fire

(ix) [illegible]

(x) [illegible] labdhi), *e g*

Hair on his body does not stand erect, because he sits near a fire

(xi) Perception of effect contrary to its cause (Kārana-viruddha kāryopalabdhi), *e g*

This place does not contain any person on whose body hair stands erect, because there is smoke here

Inference for the sake of others.

Definition of Inference for the sake of others

In chapter III, Inference for the sake of others (*Parārthānumāna*) is defined as the declaration of the three-formed middle term in words that is, when the reason is set forth in words with a view to producing a conviction in others, it is said to be an inference for the sake of others

Inference is a kind of knowledge, and words are here called inference by the attributing of effect to cause, for, though they [illegible] Inference for the [illegible] or homogeneous (in [illegible] r heterogeneous (in [illegible]

[illegible]

Because it is a product,

No non-non-eternal, *i e* eternal (thing) is a product as ether (negative)

Thesis

The minor term (*Pakṣa*) is that to which the relation of the major term is to be proved, as—This hill has fire, because it has smoke In this reasoning 'hill' is the minor term which is to be proved as having 'fire' which is the major term A minor term and its corresponding major term combined together, constitute a proposition which, when offered for proof, is called a thesis

Fallacies of the thesis or Pakṣābhāsa

There are four fallacies of the thesis (*Pakṣābhāsa*)

A thesis is fallacious if it is incompatible with—

(1) Perception, *e g* Sound is inaudible,
(2) Inference *e g* Sound is eternal,
(3) Conception, *e g* The moon is not *luna* (Śaśi a-candra); or

(4) One's own statement, e g Inference is not a source of knowledge.

Fallacies of the middle term.

It has already been stated that the middle term must possess three characteristics Fallacies of the middle term (*Hetvābhāsa*) occur even if one of the characteristics is unproved, uncertain or contradictory, thus—

A Unproved (*asiddha*)

(1) Sound is eternal, because it is visible

(Visibility of sound is admitted by neither party)

(2) Trees are conscious, because they die if their bark is taken off

(This peculiar kind of death of trees is not admitted by the opponent)

(3) The hill has fire, because it has vapour

(Vapour as an effect of fire is questioned)

(4) The soul is all-pervading, because it is perceived everywhere.

(It is a matter of doubt whether the soul is perceived everywhere).

B Uncertain (*anaikāntika*)

(1) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is knowable

(The knowable is too general, because it includes the eternal as well as the non-eternal).

(6) A certain man is omniscient,
Because he is a speaker

(The reason is not general enough, for speakers are not necessarily either omniscient or non-omniscient).

C Contradictory (*viruddha*)

(7) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product

(Here 'product' is not homogeneous with 'eternal,' that is, the middle term is opposed to the major term)

(8) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product

(Here 'product' is not heterogeneous from 'non-eternal').

Fallacies of the homogeneous example.

Example is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous and (2) heterogeneous. Fallacies of the homogeneous example occur as follows:—

(1) *Sound is eternal,*
Because it is incorporeal,
Like action.

(*Action* cannot *serve* as an example, because it is not eternal, that *is*, *because it is excluded from the major term*).

(2) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like atoms

(*Atoms* cannot *serve* as an example, because they are not incorporeal, *that is*, *because they are excluded from the middle term*)

(3) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like a pot

(Pot cannot *serve* as an example, because it is neither eternal nor incorporeal), that *is*, because it is excluded from both major and middle terms)

(4) This man is passionate
Because he *is* a speaker,
Like the person in the street

(The person in the street cannot serve as an example, as it is *questionable* whether he is passionate, that *is*, it involves doubt *as to the validity* of the major term).

(5) This man is *mortal*,
Because he is passionate,
Like the person in *the street*

(*This example* involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, *that is*, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate).

(6) This man is *non-omniscient*,
Because he is passionate,
Like the person in the street

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, that is, it is questionable whether the *person in* the street is passionate and non-omniscient)

(7) This man *is passionate*,
Because he is a speaker,
Like a certain person

(*This example* is unconnected (*ananvaya*), for there is no inseparable connection between *being 'passionate'* and *being* a 'speaker').

(8) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot

(This example involves the fallacy of 'connection unshown,' *apradarśitānvaya*: the connection should be shown as follows All products are non-eternal like a pot)

> (9) Sound is a product,
> Because it is non-eternal,
> All non-eternal things are products like a pot

(The example involves the fallacy of inverted connection, *viparītānvaya* · the real connection should be shown as follows All products are non-eternal like a pot)

Similarly there are nine fallacies of the heterogeneous example.

Refutation.

Refutation (*Dūṣana*) consists in pointing out in the reasoning of an opponent any one of the fallacies mentioned above The fallacies or semblances of refutation are the analogues or futilities called in Sanskrit *Jāti*.[1]

Concluding part

In the concluding lines of the Nyāyabindu it is stated by the translators that "Dharmakīrti vanquished the entire Tirthikas as Śākyamuni had subdued the large army of Māra; and as the sun dispels darkness, the Nyāyabindu has exterminated the Ātmaka theory (that is, the Tīrthika doctrine)—wonderful!"[2]

Dharmakīrti criticises Dignāga.

Implied contradiction

The opposition of the middle term to the major term is a kind of fallacy called contradiction which [illegible] [illegible]rma-kīrti [illegible] term (in the [illegible]d by Dignāga in his Nyāya-praveśa[3] as another kind of fallacy called implied contradiction (in Sanskrit: *iṣṭa-vighāta-kṛt viruddha*, and in Tibetan · chos-kyi-khyad-par-phyin-ci-log tu-sgrub-par-byed-pa). Dharmakīrti in his Nyāya-bindu rejects this view saying that this second contradiction is included in the first kind.[1]

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[1] For Jāti *vide* Nyāya-sūtra, Book I, aphorism 58

[2] ཤཱ་ཀྱ་ཐུབ་པས་བདུད་ཀྱི་སྡེ་བོ་ཆེ ॥
ཚར་གྱི་གྲགས་པས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་མ་ཐུབ་པ ॥
ཉི་མས་སྣང་ཀུན་རིགས་པའི་ཐིགས་པ་ཡིས ॥
བདག་གི་ལྟ་བ་རྒྱང་སྤྱང་ངོ་མཚར་ཆེད ॥
(Nyāya bindu)

[3] *Vide* Nyāya praveśa, Fallacies of the Middle Term, concluding lines.

An illustration of the second or implied contradiction is given thus:—

> The eyes, etc., are for the use of another,
> Because they are composite things,
> Like a bed, seat, etc.

Here the major term "another" is ambiguous, inasmuch as it may signify either a composite thing (e.g. the body) or a non-composite thing (e.g. the soul). There would be a contradiction between the middle term and the major term if the word "another" were used by the speaker in the sense of a non-composite thing, but understood by the listener in the sense of a composite thing. The reasoning would then involve a contradiction of the middle term to the desired or implied major term.

Dharmakīrti[2] in his Nyāyā-bindu considers this case as an illustration of the first or natural contradiction. A word, which is the major term of a proposition, can, as such, admit of only one meaning, and if there is ambiguity between the meaning expressed and the meaning implied the real meaning is to be ascertained from the context. If the meaning implied is the real one, there is a natural contradiction between the middle term and the major term.

Non-erroneous contradiction.

Dignāga[3] mentions yet another fallacy called the "non-erroneous contradiction" (*viruddhā vyabhicāri*, called in Tibetan hgal-wa-la-mi-hkhrul-pa) which he includes among the

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[1] ननु च तृतीयोऽपि इष्टविघातकृद् विरुद्धः ...स इह कस्मान्नोक्तः अनयोरेवान्तर्भावात्।
(Nyāya-bindu, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, chapter III, p 413

अयं च विरुद्ध आचार्यदिङ्नागेन उक्तः । स कस्मात् वार्त्तिककारेण सता अपि नोक्तः ।
(Nyāya-bindu-tīkā, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, chapter III, p 78)

[illegible] "in the

[illegible]

हेतुदोष उक्त इत्यर्थः । ... तस्मादवस्तुदर्शनबलप्रवृत्तमनुमानमाश्रित्य विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्युक्तः ।
(Nyāya-bindu tīkā, p 84

Compare also Journal, Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol XIX, p 40 "fallacies of uncertainty." It takes place when two contradictory conclusions are supported by what appear to be valid reasons, e g

A Vaiśeṣika philosopher says :—

> Sound is non-eternal,
> Because it is a product.

A Mīmāmsaka replies —

> Sound is eternal,
> Because it is audible

The reasons employed in the above cases are supposed both to be correct according, respectively, to the tenets of the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāmsā Schools, but as they lead to contradictory conclusions they are uncertain and, as such, fallacious

Dharmakīrti[1] in the Nyāya-bindu rejects this fallacy of "non erroneous contradiction," on the ground that it does not

[illegible]

contradictory conclusions inasmuch as a scripture can not override perception and inference, and is authoritative only in the

[illegible] on-

ex-

is

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[1] Nyāya-bindu, chap III, p 115

[2] त्रिरूपो हेतुरुक्तः। तावतैव चार्थप्रतीतिरिति न पृथग् दृष्टान्तो नाम साधनावयवः कश्चित् तेनास्य लक्षणं पृथक् [न] उच्यते गतार्थत्वात्।

(Nyāya-bindu, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, pp 115—116)

The omission of न is perhaps an oversight The न or negation appears in the Tibetan version which runs as follows —

གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་སྨོས་པ་དེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་དོན་རྟོགས་པས།
དཔེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཡན་ལག་ནི་ལོགས་ཤིག་ཏུ་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་དོ ॥
དེས་ན་དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ལོགས་ཤིག་ཏུ་མ་བརྗོད་དེ་དོན་གོ་བའི་ཕྱིར ॥

(Nyāya-bindu, Sher-batski's edition, St. Petersburg, p. 103)

The hill is fiery,
Because it is smoky,
Like a kitchen

In this reasoning the term 'smoky' includes a 'kitchen,' as well as other similar things, hence it is almost unnecessary to cite the example 'kitchen' Nevertheless, says Dharmakīrti, the example has this much value[1] that it points out in a particular way what has been expressed in a general form by the middle term thus, the general expression "all smoky things are fiery" is made more impressive by the particular example 'kitchen' which is smoky as well as fiery

111 Hetu-bindu-vivarana

The Hetu-bindu-vivarana is another excellent work on Logic by [illegible] there [illegible]

chapters as follows —

(1) Relation of identity between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan Ran-bshin-gyi-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit *Svabhāva-hetu*), (2) Relation of effect and cause between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan Ḥbras-buḥi-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit *Kārya-hetu*) and (3) Relation of negation between the middle term and the heterogeneous major term (in Tibetan Mi-dmigs-paḥi-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit *Anupalabdhi-hetu*).

112. Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya

The Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya is another treatise on Logic [illegible] but [illegible] Ce, [illegible] igs- [illegible] sla- [illegible] dra [illegible] ans- [illegible] ra- [illegible] in [illegible] 1040 A.D) and the interpreter-monk Dar-ma grags

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[1] … [illegible] .. [illegible] (Nyāya-bindu, p. 116).

[2] I have consulted the copy embodied in the Bstan-ḥgyur of the India Office, London.

[3] I have consulted the work embodied in the Bstan-ḥgyur of the India Office, London.

113. Santānāntara-siddhi

The Santānāntara siddhi, also called Tantrāntara-siddhi, is a philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan version[1] in the B̲stan-h̲gyur, M̲do, Ce, folios 416—420 The work in Tibetan is called R̲gyud-g̲shan-grub-pa signifying "Proof of the Continuity of Succession." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian sage Viśuddha Simha and the Tibetan official interpreter D̲pal rtsegs.

114. Sambandha-parīkṣā.

The Sambandha-parīkṣā is another philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there [illegible] was prepared by the Indian teacher Jñāna-garbha and the interpreter Vande-nam m̲khas

115 Sambandha-parīkṣā-vṛtti.

The Sambandha-parīkṣā vṛtti[3] is a commentary on the Sambandha-parīkṣā by Dharmakīrti himself The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the B̲stan-h̲gyur, M̲do, Ce, folios 377—384. The work in Tibetan is called H̲brel-wa-b̲rtag-pah̲i-h̲grel-wa.

116. DEVENDRABODHI
(ABOUT 650 A D.)

Devendrabodhi, called in Tibetan Lha-d̲waṅ-b̲lo, was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti,[4] and so lived about 650 A.D He wrote the following work on Logic [illegible] paḥi-ḥgrel-bśad, is an annotation on the Ālambana-parīkṣā of Dignāga The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Bstan-ḥgyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 186—200 The translation was prepared by the *Indian* sage Śākya-siṃha and the interpreter Vande-dpal-brtsegs of Shu-chen The work opens thus :—

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[1] I have consulted the Tibetan version embodied in the B̲stan h̲gyur of the India Office, London.

[2] I have consulted the copy embodied in the B̲stan-h̲gyur of the India Office, London.

[3] I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the B̲stan h̲gyur of the India Office, London.

[4] *Vide* Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 186—187

[5] I consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907

"Meditating on the merciful Omniscient One, and saluting him by my head, I compose the Ālambana-parīkṣā-ṭīkā"

It ends thus —

"Here is finished the Ālambana-parīkṣā-ṭīkā, which is a *clean work of the teacher Vinīta Deva who weighed* all sorts of ālambana (objects of thought), and is a lion of speakers confounding the brains of the Tīrthika elephants"

Santānāntara siddhi ṭīkā, called in Tibetan Rgyud-gshan-grub-paḥi-ḥgrel bśad, being a commentary on the Santānāntara siddhi of Dharmakīrti The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[2] in the Bstan-ḥgyur, Mdo, Tshe, folios 1—21 The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Viśuddha-siṃha and the interpreter of Shu chen named Dpal rtsegs rakṣita

119 Ravi Gupta
(about 725 A D)

Ravi Gupta,[3] called in Tibetan Ñi-ma-sbas, was born in Kāśmīra He was a great poet, dialectician and Tāntric teacher, who established 12 great religious schools in his native country and Magadha He was a contemporary of king Bharṣa of Varendra, and flourished before Jayanta, the author of Nyāya-mañjarī[4] He must have lived in the first quarter of the eighth century A D, for his disciple the famous Tāntric monk Sarvajña Mitra[5] lived in the middle of that century Ravi Gupta is mentioned in the inscription of Vasanta Sena[6] as the *Sarva-daṇḍa nāyaka* and *Mahāpratīhāra* in the Gupta samvat 435 corresponding to 754 A D He was the author[7] of the following work on Logic —

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[1] I have consulted the India Office copy

[2] I have consulted the India Office xylograph of the Tibetan version

[3] *Vide* Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 166, 167, 243, and Dpag bsam ljon bzaṅ, part i, pp 91, 113 119, xxxvii.

[4] [illegible]

[illegible]

(Nyāyamañjarī, chap VII, p 442, edited by M M Gangādhara Śāstri)

[5] *Vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's Sragdharā Stotra Introduction p xxx, printed in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta.

[6] Indian Antiquary vol IX, p 147

[7] For Ravi Gupta's *Āryā-s* see Peterson's Subhāṣitāvali, p 276, and for his

Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-

120 JINENDRABODHI
(ABOUT 725 A D)

In the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Re, there is the Tibetan version of a work called Viśālāmala-vatī nāma pramāṇa-samuccaya ṭīkā. This version was prepared by the Tibetan interpreter Rdo-rje-

dhi, called

ble to the

Bodhisattva (Bodhisattva-deśiya) He is perhaps the same person who wrote the well-known Nyāsa on the grammar of Pāṇini in the eighth century A.D

121 ŚĀNTA RAKṢITA
(749 A D).

Śānta Rakṣita,[2] called in Tibetan Shi-wa-htsho, was born in the royal family of Za-hor [in Bengal or near Lahor ?] The exact date of his birth is unknown, but it is stated that he was born at the time of Go Pāla who reigned up to 705 A D and died at the time of Dharma Pāla who became king in 765 A D He followed the Svatantra Mādhyamika school, and was a Professor at Nālandā He visited Tibet at the invitation of King Khri sroṅ-deu-tsan who was born in 728 A D and died in 804 A.D. The king, with the assistance of Śānta Rakṣita, built in 749 A.D the monastery of Sam-ye[3] in Tibet modelled after the Odantapura Vihāra of Magadha Sam ye was the first regular Buddhist monastery in Tibet and Śānta Rakṣita was its first abbot He worked in Tibet for 13 years, that is, until 762 A.D He was known there under the name of Ācārya Bodhisattva, and was the author of the following works on Logic :—

Vāda nyāya vṛtti-vipañcitārtha, called in Tibetan . Rtsod-pahi-rigs-pahi hbrel-pa-don-rnam-par hbyed-pa, an elaborate commen-

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works on Tantra, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's Sragdharā Stotra, Introduction, pp v—vii.

[1] I have consulted the copy of the India Office, London.

[2] *Vide* Dpag bsam ljon bzan edited by Sarat Chandra Das, C I.E , Calcutta, p 112

[3] For Sam-ye, [illegible] *vide* Csoma de Koros's Tibetan Grammar, p 183 ; Sarat Chandra Das in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1881, Part I, p 226 ; and Waddell's Lamaism, p 28

tary on the Vāda-nyāya of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Tshe, folios 21—131, and in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 63—186. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra-śrī-bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter monks venerable Ses-rab and Hbro-sen-kar (who was a native of the province of Hbro o Das) in the holy monastery of Bsam-yas (Sam-ye). The work opens thus:—

"Who constantly dispersing darkness by the ray of the heap of various pure precious qualities, exerted himself in fulfilling the desire of various sentient beings and rejoiced to do good to the entire world—to that Mañju-śrī bowing down in reverence, I compose this concise and stainless Vāda-nyā vṛtti vipañcitārtha."

Tattva-saṃgraha-kārikā, called in Tibetan De-kho-na-ñid-bsdus-paḥi tshig-leḥur-byas-pa, a work containing memorial verses on a summary of the Tattvas. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[2] in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, He, folios 1—146. The translation was prepared by the Indian Paṇḍita Guṇākara-śrī-bhadra (belonging to the re[illegible] at king Lalitāditya in the [illegible] great Tibetan interpreter [illegible] in the province of Guge [illegible] ous systems of philosophy such as the Sāṃkhya, Jaina, etc.[3]

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[1] I have consulted the xylograph of this work contained in the India Office, London.

[2] I have consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang, Sikkim, which I visited in June 1907. For a detailed account of this work vide my "Sāṃkhya Philosophy in the Land of the Lamas" in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new series, Vol. [illegible] No. [illegible]

[illegible]

प्रकृतीशोभयात्मादि [क्रियथा] रहितं चलम् ।
कर्मतत्फलसम्बन्धव्यवस्थादिसमाश्रयम् ॥
गुणद्रव्यक्रियाजातिसमवायाद्युपाधिभिः ।
शून्यमारोपिताकारशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरम् ॥
स्पष्टलक्षणसंयुक्तप्रमाद्वितयनिश्चितम् ।
अणीयसापि नांशेन मिश्रीभूतापरात्मकम् ॥

The subject-matter of the work begins thus —

"From *Pradhāna* (the primordial matter or nature) possessed of entire powers, all sorts of effects are produced"

असंक्रान्तिमनाद्यन्तं प्रतिबिम्बादिसंनिभम् ।
सर्व्वप्रपञ्चसन्दोहनिर्मुक्तमगतं परैः ॥
स्वतन्त्रश्रुतिनिःसङ्गो जगद्धितविधित्सया ।
अनल्पकल्पासंख्येयसात्मीभूतमहोदयः ॥
यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं जगाद वदतां वरः ।
तं सर्व्वज्ञं प्रणम्यायं क्रियते तत्त्वसंग्रहः ॥

The introductory part in the Tattvasaṁgraha is identical with the above, as is evident from the Tibetan version extracted below —

རང་བཞིན་དབང་ཕྱུག་གཉིས་ཀ་དང་ །།
བདག་སོགས་བྱེད་དང་བྲལ་གཡོ་བ །།
ལས་དང་དེ་འབྲས་འབྲེལ་པ་དག །
རྣམ་པར་བཞག་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྟེན །།
ཡོན་ཏན་རྫས་དང་བྱ་བ་དང་ །།
རིགས་དང་འདུ་སོགས་ཁྱད་པར་གྱིས །།
རྟེན་དང་སྒྲ་བཏགས་ཤེས་ཅན་ནི །།
སྒྲ་དང་ཤེས་པའི་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་ཅན །།
མཚན་ཉིད་གསལ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡི །།
ཚད་མ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་གཏན་ལ་དབབ །།
ཆ་ཤས་མེད་ཏུ་སྣ་བས་ཀྱང །།
འདྲེས་པ་གཞན་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་མིན །།
མི་འགྱུ་ཐོག་མཐའ་མེད་པ་ཅན །།
གཟུགས་བརྙན་ལ་སོགས་དག་དང་འདྲ །།
སྤྲོས་པ་ཀུན་གྱི་ཚོགས་དང་བྲལ །།
གཞན་གྱི་རྟོགས་པ་མཐོང་བཏེད་པ །།
བསྐལ་པ་གྲངས་མེད་མི་རུང་བས །།
ཐུགས་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོའི་བདག་གྱུར་པ །།
རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་ནི །།
གང་ཞིག་གསུངས་པ་སྨྲ་བའི་མཆོག །།
ཀུན་མཁྱེན་དེ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ནས །།
དེ་ཉིད་བསྡུས་ནི་བརྩམ་པར་བྱ །།

Dr. Bühler further observes that the first section of the Tarka-saṁgraha contains ईश्वर-परीक्षा (examination of God), कपिलकल्पितात्म-परीक्षा (examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul), औपनिषदकल्पितात्म परीक्षा (examination of the soul according to the Upaniṣads), स्थिरभाव परीक्षा (examination of permanent

The work is divided into 31 chapters, *viz.* (1) examination of nature (in Sanskrit *Svabhāva parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Raṅ-bshin-brtag pa) (2) examination of the sense organs (in Sanskrit: *Indriya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan Dwan-phyug-brtag pa), (3) examination of both (in Sanskrit *Ubhaya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan Gñis-ka-brtag-pa), (4) examination of the theory that the world is self-existent (in Sanskrit *Jagat-svabhāva vāda-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Ḥgro-wa-raṅ-bshin-du-smra-wa-brtag-pa), (5) examination of Brahma [illegible]

pa-can-dan-bye-brag-pas-kun tu-brtags-pahi-skyes-bu-brtag-pa); (8) examination of the Mīmāmsaka doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit *Mīmamsaka-kalpita-ātma-parīksā*, in Tibetan Spyod-pa-pas-brtags-pahi-bdag-brtag-pa), (9) examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit *Kapila-parikalpita-ātma-parīksā*, in Tibetan Ser-skya-pas-kun-tu-brtags pahi-bdag-brtag-pa), (10) examination of the Digambara Jaina doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit *Digambara parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan Nam-mkhahi-gos-can-[illegible]

Guna-śabdārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan Yon-tan-gyi-tshig-gi-don-brtag pa), (17) examination of the meaning of the word *Karma* [illegible]

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entity), etc. The last colophon appears to him to be [illegible] (examination of the doctrine of self-evidence) These are the very subjects treated in the Tattvasaṅgraha. So the two works are identical.

Sāmānya-viśesa-śabdārtha-parīksā, in Tibetan Ṣpyi-dan bye-brag-gi-tshig-gi-don ḇrtag pa); (20) examination of the meaning of the word 'co existent cause' (in Sanskrit *Samavāya-śabdārtha-parīksā*, in Tibetan · Ḻdu-waẖi tshig-don-ḇrtag pa), (21) examination of the meaning of the word 'sound' (in Sanskrit *Śabdārtha-parīksā*, in Tibetan Ṣgra yi-don-ḇrtag pa), (22) examination of the definition of perception (in Sanskrit *Pratyaksa-lak*[illegible] m gyi-m̱tshan-ñid-ḇrtag pa), [illegible] nskrit *Anumānaparīksā*, in [illegible] (24) examination of other kinds of valid knowledge (in Sanskrit *Pramānāntara-parīksā*, in Tibetan Tshaḏ ma shan ḇrtag-pa), (25) examination of the doctrine of evolution (in Sanskrit *Vivartavida-parīksā*, in Tibetan · Ḻgyur-war-ṣmra-wa-ḇrtag-pa) (26) examination of the three times (in Sanskrit *Kālatraya-parīksā*, in Tibetan Duṣ-gsum ḇrtag-pa), (27) examination of continuity of the world (in Sanskrit *Samsārā-santati-parīksā*, in Tibetan · Ḻjig-rten-ṟgyuḏ paẖi-ḇrtag-pa), (28) examination of external objects (in Sanskrit *Vāhyārtha-parīksā*, in Tibetan Phyi-rol gyi-don-ḇrtag-pa); (29) examination of Śruti or Scripture (in Sanskrit *Śruti-parīksā*, in Tibetan : Thoṣ-pa-ḇrtag-pa), (30) examination of self-evidence (in Sanskrit *Svatah-prāmānya-parīksā*, in Tibetan Raṅ-laṣ-tshaḏ-ma-ḏṟtag pa); and (31) examination of the soul which sees things beyond the range of senses (in Sanskrit *Anyendriyātītārtha-darśana-purusa-parīksā*, in Tibetan Gshan gyi-ḏwaṅ-po-laṣ-ḫdaṣ-paẖi-ḏon m̱thon-wa-can-gyi-ṣkyeṣ-bu-ḇrtag-pa)

122 KAMALA ŚILA
(ABOUT 750 A.D.).

Kamala Śila,[1] also called Kamala Śrīla, was a follower of Śānta Raksita He was for some time a Professor of Tantras in Nālandā whence he was invited to Tibet by king Khri-sron-deu-tsan (728—786 A.D) While in Tibet he vindicated the religious views of Guru Padma-sambhava and Śānta Raksita by defeating and expelling a Chinese monk named Mahāyāna Hoshang He was of wide fame and the author of the following works :—

Nyāya-bindu-pūrva pakse samksipta, called in Tibetan Rigṣ-paẖi-thigṣ-paẖi-phyogṣ ṣna-ma-m̱dor-ḇsduṣ-pa, a summary of criticisms on the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan hgyur, Mdo, She, Folios 106—115. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Viśuddha Simha and the interpreter monk of Shu chen named Dpal rtegs-rakṣita.

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[1] *Vide* Ḏpag-bsam ḻjon-bzan, part i, p 112, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, and also the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society* of Calcutta, vol i, part i, p 10, and Waddell's Lamaism, p 31

Tattva saṃgraha pañjikā, called in Tibetan De-kho-na-ñid bsdus-pahi dkah hgrel, a commentary on the Tattva saṃgraha of Sānta Rakṣita. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ of part I of this work in the Bstan hgyur, Mdo, He, Folios 146—[illegible], and part II of it in the Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ye, Folios 1—385. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Devendra Bhadra and the interpreter monk Grags hbyor ses-rab.

121. KALYĀṆA RAKṢITA
(ABOUT 829 A.D.)

Kalyāṇa Rakṣita,¹ called in Tibetan Dge-bsruṅ, was a great dialectician and teacher of Dharmottarācārya. He flourished during the reign of Mahārāja Dharma Pāla who died in 82[illegible] A.D. He was the author of the undermentioned works² :—

Sarva jña siddhi kārikā, called in Tibetan Thams-cad mkhyen-pa grub-pahi tshig-lehur-byas-pa, signifying memorial verses on the attainment of omniscience. It is contained in the Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 2[illegible]—212 and begins with a salutation to Sarvajña.

Vāhyārtha siddhi kārikā, called in Tibetan phyi-rol-gyi-don grub-pa [illegible] which means memorial verses on the reality of external things. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 2[illegible]—21[illegible]. The translation was prepared by [illegible] Mitra and the Tibetan interpreter monk [illegible] rakṣita.

[illegible] called in Tibetan Thos-pa brtag-pahi tshig [illegible] memorial verses on the examination [illegible]. The Sanskrit original of this [illegible] a Tibetan translation of [illegible] Mdo, Ze, Folios 21[illegible]—231.

[illegible]

[illegible]

nes-kyi-ṭikā, which is a commentary on the Pramāna-viniścaya of Dharmakīrti The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Ḅstan ḥgyur Mdo, Dse, folios 346, and We Folios 1—188 The translation was prepared by the Kaśmirian Paṇḍita Parahita Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter Ḅlo-ldan-śes-rab in the model city of Kaśmīra In the concluding lines of the work Dharmottara, the author of it is described as "the excellent subduer of bad disputants (quibblers)"[2]

125 MUKTĀ-KUMBHA
(AFTER 900 A D).

Muktā-kumbha,[3] called in Tibetan Mu-tig-bum-pa, was the author of a work called Ksana bhanga-siddhi-vyākhyā, which is a commentary on Dharmottarācārya's Ksana-bhanga-siddhi Muktā-kumbha must have flourished after 847 A D, when Dharmottara lived.

The Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga siddhi vyākhyā is called in Tibetan Skad-cig-ma-ḥjig-[illegible]

[illegible]

Grags-ḥbyor-śes-rab

126 ARCAṬA
(ABOUT 900 A D)

Guna-ratna Sūri,[6] the famous Jaina author of the Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti, who lived in 1409 A D, mentions the Tarkaṭikā of Arcaṭa[6] Arcaṭa is also mentioned by the Jaina philosopher Ratnaprabha Sūri,[7] the well-known author of Syādvādaratnākarāvatārikā, dated 1181 A.D In the Jaina Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti[8] it appears that Arcaṭa criticised Dharmottarācārya who lived about 847 A D. Roughly speaking he flourished in the 9th century A D

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[1] I have consulted the India Office copy.

[2] [illegible]

[illegible]

[6] [illegible] edition of the Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya-vṛtti, chapter on Bauddha darśana.

[7] [illegible] (Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā, chap 4, p 17, published in Jaina Yaśovijaya granthamālā of Benares)

[8] Vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's edition of the Nyāvāvatāra with vivṛti which has been published by the Indian Research Society of Calcutta

which is a commentary on the Pramāna-viniścaya of The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be ere exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Bstan hgyur folios 346, and We, Folios 1—188 The translation ed by the Kasmirian Pandita Parahita Bhadra and n interpreter Blo-ldan-ses-rab in the model city of In the concluding lines of the work Dharmottara, the it is described as "the excellent subduer of bad dis- quibblers)"[2]

125 MUKTĀ KUMBHA
(AFTER 900 A D)

kta kumbha,[3] called in Tibetan Mu-tig-bum-pa, was the f a work called Ksana-bhanga-siddhi-vyākhyā, which is a ntary on Dharmottarācārya's Kṣana-bhanga-siddhi Mukbha must have flourished after 847 A D, when Dharmotwed

he Ksaṇa-bhaṅga siddhi-vyākhyā is called in Tibetan Skad-

s-hbyor-ses-rab

126 ARCATA
(ABOUT 900 A D)

Guna-ratna Sūri,[5] the famous Jaina author of the Ṣaddarśana uccaya-vrtti, who lived in 1409 A D, mentions the Tarkatīkā

speaks that Arcata criticised Dharmottarācārya who lived about 47 A D Roughly speaking he flourished in the 9th century A D.

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[1] I have consulted the India Office copy.

[2] [illegible] (Bstan hgyur, Mdo, We, Folio 188)

[3] The name Muktākumbha is restored from Tibetan.

[4] I have consulted the work belonging to the India Office, London.

[5] Vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's Jaina Logic under "Gunaratna Sūri"

[6] Vide Dr Suali's edition of the Ṣaddarśana samuccaya vṛtti, chapter

published in Jaina Yaś P 240

nes-kyi-tikā, which [illegible]
Dharmakirti The
lost, but there exis
Mdo, Dse folios 3
was prepared by the Kasmirian Pandita Parahita Bhadra a
the Tibetan interpreter Blo-ldan-śes-rab in the model city
Kaśmira In the concluding lines of the work Dharmottara, t
author of it is described as "the excellent subduer of bad d
putants (quibblers) "[1]

125 MUKTĀ-KUMBHA
(AFTER 900 A D)

Muktā-kumbha,[2] called in Tibetan Mu-tig-bum-pa, was
author of a work called Ksana-bhanga-siddhi-vyākhyā, which i
commentary on Dharmottarācārya's Kṣana-bhaṅga-siddhi Mu
tā-kumbha must have flourished after 847 A D , when Dharm
tara lived

The Ksaṇa bhanga siddhi vyākhyā is called in Tibetan Ske
cig-ma-ḥjig-grub-paḥi-rnam-ḥgrel The Sanskrit original
[illegible]

Arcaṭa was the author of the following work on Logic —
Hetu bindu vivaraṇa called in Tibetan Gtan-tshi
ligrel wa, being a commentary on the Hetu-bindu of
The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be los
exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Bstan hgyur, Mdo
205—375 It is divided into four chapters treating
of (1) Identity (in Tibetan Raṅ-bshin, and in San
bhāva), (2) Effect (in Tibetan Ḥbras-bu, and in
Kārya), (3) Non-perception (in Tibetan Mi-dmigs-
Sanskrit Anupalabdhi), and (4) Explanation of Six C
ties (in Tibetan Mtshan-ñid-drug-bśad-pa, and in Sans
lakṣaṇa-vyākhyā) In the beginning of the work it is st
Arcaṭa was a Brāhmaṇa, and from the concluding part i
that he lived in Kāśmīra The Tibetan version ends thu
"In the city of Kāśmīra, the pith of Jambudvīpa,
mentary (on the work) of Dharmakīrti, who was the best
was translated From this translation of Pramāna the
holy doctrines, let the unlearned derive wisdom."[2]

127 AŚOKA
(ABOUT 900 A D)

Aśoka, otherwise known as Paṇḍita Aśoka or Ācārya
is called in Tibetan Mya-nan-med It is stated that throu
spiritual instructions[3] Candra-Gomin (q.v.) was able to beho
face of Avalokiteśvara the Lord of supreme mercy and Tā
saviouress

Aśoka quotes Dharmottara[4] (q.v.) and must therefore
flourished after 847 A D We may approximately place hi
about 900 A D

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[1] The volume She, containing this work, was brought down by the Br
Mission to Tibet in 1904 I borrowed it from the Government of India

[2] འཛམ་གླིང་སྙིང་པོ་ཁ་ཆེའི་གྲོང་ཁྱེར་དུ།།
མཁས་པའི་སྙིང་པོ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པའི་འགྲེལ།།
དམ་ཆོས་སྙིང་པོ་ཚད་མ་བསྒྱུར་བ་ལས།།
སྙིང་པོ་མེད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྙིང་པོར་ཤོག།
(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, She, folio 375)

[3] སློབ་དཔོན་ཙནྡྲ་གོ་མི་ནི། སློབ་དཔོན་མྱ་ངན་མེད་ཞབས་ལ་ཆོས་ཐུང་མཇལ་ཏེ་བསྒྲུབས་པ
གས་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོ་དང་སྒྲོལ་མའི་ཞལ་གཟིགས།
Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ, p 95, Sarat Chandra Das's edition, Calcutta)

[4] यदेतत् [illegible] अदृश्यानुपलम्भादित्येतदयुक्तम् । न चावयवा क्रियावन्तः । अवयवि
क्रियावत् क्रियातो जायते ।
(Avayavi-nirākaraṇa, in six Nyāya Tracts, edited by M M Hara Prasad
hastri, Calcutta p 8)

He wrote two logical treatises,[1] viz Avayavi-n[illegible] [illegible] s a mere collection of its parts (avayava) beyond which it has no separate existence[2] There is no eternal relation[3] called inherence (samavāya) existing between a whole and its parts

The second work, viz Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā, begins with a resolution to oppose those who maintain that there is a [illegible] eter- [illegible] hough [illegible] erness [illegible] ttacks of many Brāhmana philosophers is evident from the last verse of his Avayavi-nirākarana which runs as follows —

"Having uprooted the numerous thorns of criticism fabricated by wicked intellects, I have cleansed the broad moral path of our Teacher. Let people removing their spites, move on by this path"[4]

128 CANDRA GOMIN (JUNIOR)
(ABOUT 925 A D)

Candra Gomin,[5] called in Tibetan Zla-wa-dge-bsñen, was born in a Kṣatriya family in the east as Vārendra (modern Rajshahye in Bengal). He was endowed with a very keen intellect and acquired distinction in literature, grammar, logic, astronomy, music, fine arts and the science of medicine Under Ācārya St the Sūtra and Abhidharma Piṭakas of the Bud was converted to Buddhism by the Vidyādh He had an ardent faith in the Buddhist god the goddess Tārā.[1] He was offered in marriage king of Varendra Being told that she was n was the name of his tutelary deity, he, think accept her hand shrank from her with fear U became angry and put Candra Gomin into a thrown into the Ganges The chest was car stopped at an island at the place where the the ocean Candra Gomin with deep reverence to goddess Tārā by whose blessing he got out resided in the island which was in course Candradvīpa[2] or the island of Candra He as a (upāsaka) established there stone images of A Tārā At first only fishermen (kaivarta) settled afterwards other people came to live there Gra became a town

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[1] The two treatises Avayavi-nirākarana and Sāmānya-dūṣana-dik prasāritā are included in the "Six Nyāya Tracts," edited by M M Hara Prasad Shastri in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta

[2] ननु अवयविरूपेणैव अवयवी प्रतिभासते स कथं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धः ।

(Avayavi-nirākaraṇa, p 78)

[3] व्यापकमित्य मेकस्य सामान्यं यैः प्रकल्पितम् ।
मोक्षमार्गविरुद्धे तेषां तदभावः प्रसाध्यते ॥

(Sāmānya-dūṣana-dik-prasāritā, Calcutta, p 64)

[4] इत्थं मया बहुषु दुष्कृति निर्मितेषु
प्रत्युद्धृतेषु खलु दूषणकण्टकेषु ।
आचार्यकीर्तिपथ एव विशोधितोऽयम्
समुत्सार्य्य मत्सरमनेन जना व्रजन्तु ॥

(Avayavi nirākaraṇa, p. 93)

[5] Vide Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 145—146, 148—153; and Dpag bsam-ljon-bzaṅ edited in the original Tibetan by Sarat Chandra Das, Calcutta, pp 95—96

There was another Candra Gomin called C [illegible] who went to Ceylon and on his way Southern India in the house of Vararuci Nāga S Pāṇini on Pāṇini's grammar Finding that it words but few thoughts, he himself composed on [illegible] which was called Candra-vyākaraṇa he came to Nālandā [illegible] there Candrakīrti [illegible] Ārya Nāgārjuna Candra was a [illegible] system [illegible] Asaṅga [illegible] Tārā[3]

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[1] [illegible]

[2] [illegible]

[3] [illegible]

f Ārya Nâgârjuna is medicine to some but poison to others,
hereas the text of invincible Ārya Asanga is very ambrosia to
ll men " It is further stated that Candra Gomin threw the origi-
al manuscript of his grammar into a well at Nālandā, thinking
hat it was not better than the one which Candra Kirti had
[illegible]

heir intellect would become sharp Candra Kīrti was, however,
great admirer of Candra Gomin When the latter arrived at
Ialandā the monks refused to give him a reception, saying that
[illegible]

[illegible] The chariot passed through the town in a gre
rocession, attended by the whole body of priests who came really
o recite hymns to Mañjuśrī, but apparently to accord a fitting
relcome to Candra Gomin[1] It is not known as to whether the
andra Gomin lived at a time when Śīla, son of Śrī Harṣa, reigned
n Kanoj and Simha of the Licchavi dynasty reigned in Vārendra
he famous poet Ravi Gupta was a contemporary of Bharsa,
on of Simha Śrī Harṣa seems to be the same as king Harṣa
ardhana who was a contemporary of Hwen-thsang and reigned
n 647 A.D His son Śīla seems, on a rough calculation, to
ave reigned in 700 A D., when his contemporary Candra Gomin
nust also have lived. Jaina Hema [illegible]
.088—[illegible]
amous [illegible]
loes nc [illegible]

bhūsana[1] and Vācaspati Misra[2] on the subjects of *apoha* (exclusion) and *kṣana-bhaṅga* (momentariness)

He wrote two logical treatises,[3] *viz.* Apohasiddhi and Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi, one of which begins with a salutation to Lokanātha and the other to Samanta Bhadra The first work, which deals with the doctrine of *apoha*[4], propounds that a word while denoting a thing positive excludes it from all other things different from it, that is, a word bears a negative denotation along with a positive one The second work[5] attempts, through affirmative and negative inferences, to prove that all things are momentary by showing that they do not require three moments for their production, continuance and destruction

Ratnakīrti is said to have written two other treatises, *viz* Sthirasiddhidūsaṇa[6] and Citrādvaitasiddhi

133 RATNA VAJRA
(ABOUT 979—1040 A D)

Ratnavajra,[7] called in Tibetan Rin-chen-rdo-rje, was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Kāśmīra His ancestors were deeply versed in the śāstra of the Tīrthikas His father, Hari Bhadra, was the first convert to Buddhism in his family Ratnavajra, who was an *upāsaka* (lay devotee), studied by himself up to the 36th year of his life all the Buddhist sūtras, mantras and sciences After this he came to Magadha and Vajrāsana (Buddha-Gayā)

एतेन यदुक्तं भदन्तेन —आरोपितस्य बाह्यत्वस्य विधिनिषेधौ। तल्लौकिकम् अनागमम् अतार्किकीयं कथयति तदपहस्तितम् ।

(Apohasiddhi, pp 16—17)

[1] एतेन न्यायभूषणेन स्वार्थादिपक्षे तदुपकार्योपकारकत्वादिप्रसङ्गपक्षसङ्कलदुक्तं तदपि प्रायशस्त्वेनपास्तम्

(Apohasiddhi, pp 11, 14 Also Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi, p. 58)

[2] यदप्यपोहद् वाचस्पति जातिमतां अत्र

(Apohasiddhi, p 4, pp 7, 8, 10) Also Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi, p 68, Calcutta edition)

[3] The Apohasiddhi and Kṣaṇa bhaṅgasiddhi are included in the "Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts," edited by M M Hara Prasad Shāstri in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta.

[4] नास्माभिरपोहशब्देन विधिरेव केवलोऽभिप्रेतः । नापि अन्यव्यावृत्तिमात्रं किन्तु अन्यापोहविशिष्टो विधिः शब्दानामर्थः ।

(Apohasiddhi, p 3, Calcutta edition)

[5] प्रसङ्गे सर्वभावानां यदोपाख्यातिरिष्यते ।
स एव सोऽर्थक्रियायो लक्षणं यथाचित ॥

(Kṣaṇa bhaṅgasiddhi, p 77, Calcutta edition).

[6] Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, pp 68, 71.

[7] *Vide* Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p 240

where he beheld the face of Cakra-samvara, Vajravarāhi an many other deities, by whose grace he completely mastered the Buddhist śāstras He received the royal diploma of the Universit of Vikramaśīla and was appointed a gate-keeper of the universit Afterwards he came back to Kāśmīra, whence he went through Udyāna (Kabul) to Tibet, where he was known by the name of Ācārya He flourished during the reign of Canaka, and his approximate date may be placed between 970 A D and 1010 A D He was the author of the following work —

Yukti-prayoga, called in Tibetan Rigs-paḫi-sbyor-wa, ing "application of reasoning" The Sanskrit original work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translati the Bstan-ḫgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 372—373. The translatio prepared by the Indian sage Srī Śubhūti-śānta and the inter-monk of Shu-chen, named Tiṅ-ne-ḫdsin-bzaṅ-po

134 JINA MITRA
(ABOUT 1025 A D).

Jina Mitra[2] was a native of Kāśmīra who, together w Sarvajña Deva, Dāna-śīla and others, visited Tibet and help the Tibetans in the work of translating Sanskrit books in Tibetan Jina Mitra lived about 1025 A D, when his contemp rary king Mahī Pala reigned in Bengal. He wrote the underme tioned work on Logic —

Nyāya-bindu-piṇḍārtha, called in Tibetan Rigs-paḫi-thigs-paḫi don-bsdus-pa, which contains the purport of Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[3] in the Bstan-ḫgyur, Mdo, She, Folios 115—116 The translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Surendrabodhi, and the interpreter of Shuchen, named Vande-ye-śes-sde

135 DĀNAŚĪLA
(ABOUT 1025 A D)

Dānaśīla,[4] also called Dānaśrīla, was born in Kāśmīra about 1025 A D, when Mahī Pāla II was reigning in Bengal He was a contemporary of Parahita Bhadra, Jina Mitra, Sarvajña Deva and Tilopā He visited Tibet and co operated in the propaganda

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[1] I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of the India Office, London.

[2] Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p 326; and Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ, pp xcvi, 115.

[3] I have consulted the India Office copy

[4] Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp [illegible], and Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ, p xlvi.

of the translations of Sanskrit books into Tibetan He was the author of the following work on Logic —

Pustaka-pāṭhopāya, called in Tibetan Glegs-bam-hklag-pahi-thabs, signifying the method of reading books The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation [1] in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folio 270 The translation was prepared by the author himself.

136. JÑĀNA-ŚRĪ MITRA
(ABOUT 1040 A.D.)

same as Jñāna śrī Mitra He was the author of the following work on Logic —

Kārya-kāraṇa bhāva siddhi, called in Tibetan Rgyu-dan-hbras-buhi-no-wo-grub-pa, signifying 'establishment of the relation of cause and effect.' The Sanskrit original of th [illegible]
be
Md
gro
Sākya-hod. Subsequently, it was retouched and published by the Nepalese Pandita Ananta śrī and the interpreter-monk afore mentioned.

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[1] I have consulted the India Office copy

[2] Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 235—242, and Dpag bsam ljon bzan pp. 117—120

[3] Vide the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, chapter on Bauddha-darśana :—

तदुक्तं ज्ञानश्रिया

यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं यथा जलधरः सन्तश्च भावा अमी ।
सत्ता शक्तिरिहार्थकर्मणि मितेः सिद्धेषु सिद्धा न सा ।
नाप्येकैव विधान्यथा परकृतेनापि क्रियादिर्भवेत् ।
द्वेधापि क्षणभङ्गसङ्गतिरतः साध्ये च विश्राम्यति ॥

[4] I have consulted the India Office copy

137 JÑĀNA-ŚRĪ BHADRA

(ABOUT 1050 A D).

Jñāna-śrī Bhadra,[1] called in Tibetan Ye-śes-dpal-bzan-po was a great logician He was born in a Brāhmana family of Kaśmīra[2] and became afterwards a convert to Buddhism As junior to Naropā he lived about 1050 A D He visited Tibet where he was employed in translating Sanskrit books into Tibetan In the land of the Lamas he was well known under the name of "Kha-che-jñāna-śrī"[3] or Kaśmīrian Jñāna-śrī He was the author of the following work on Logic —

Pramāna viniscaya ṭīkā[4] called in Tibetan Tshad-ma rnam par-ṅes-paḥi-ḥgrel-bśad, which is a commentary on the Pramāna-viniścaya of Dharmakīrti and which begins with a salutation to Sarvajña The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo, We, Folios 188—322. The translation was prepared by the author himself with the co-operation of the interpreter-monk Chos-kyi brtson ḥgrus.

138 RATNĀKARA ŚĀNTI

(ABOUT 1040 A D).

Ratnākara Śānti,[5] called Kalikāla-sarvajña, was known to the Tibetans as Ācārya Śānti or simply Śāntipa He was ordained in the order of the Sarvāstivāda school of Odantapura, and learnt the Sūtra and Tantra at Vikramaśilā from Jetāri, Ratnakīrti[6] and others Thereafter he was appointed by King Canaka (who died in 983 A D) to be a gate keeper of the University of Vikramaśilā, where he defeated the Tīrthika disputants At the invitation of the king of Ceylon he visited that island where he spread the Buddhist doctrine He was the author of a work on

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[1] Jñāna-śrī Bhadra was perhaps the same as Jñāna siddha Bhadra mentioned in the Dpag bsam-ljon-bzan, p 117

[2] Vide the Colophon of Pramāna viniścaya-ṭīkā Vide also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet No 3" in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal New series, Vol III, No 7, 1907

[3] Vide Dpag-bsam ljon bzan, p 408

[4] I consulted the Tibetan version of this work in the monastery of Labrang Sikkim

[5] Vide Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 234 235, Dpag bsam ljon-bzan, pp. 117 etc The Tibetan equivalent for the name atnākara Śānti is [illegible]

[6] This Ratnakīrti is different from the sage of that name who was patronised King Vimala Candra of Bengal, Kāmarūpa and Tirhut, about 650 A D (vide ranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 171, 174; Dpag bsam ljon n, p 105 Calcutta edition, and my discussion under the head Vinīta Deva the Buddhist Logic). This earlier Ratnakīrti, known through a commentary the Madhyamakāvatāra wrote Kalyāṇakāṇḍa and Dharmaviniścaya etc ed in the Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo Ku

Chanda (prosody) called Chando ratnākara[1] and of the following works[2] on Logic :—

Vijñapti-mātra siddhi, called in Tibetan Rnam par-rig-pa-tsam-ñid-do-grub-pa, signifying 'establishment of a mere communication of knowledge' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 335—338. The translation was prepared by the Nepalese Pandita Śānti Bhadra, and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Śākya-hod of the province of Hbro (Do) Subsequently, it was published by the same Pandita and Klog-skya-śes-rab-brtsegs

Antar vyāpti,[3] called in Tibetan Nan gi-khyab-pa, signifying 'internal inseparable connection' It is embodied in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 338—344 The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra Kalasa and the interpreter-monk Śākya-hod The work argues that the inseparable connection [illegible]

cause smoky.

139 YAMĀRI
(ABOUT 1050 A.D).

Yamāri was specially versed in Grammar and Logic But he was very poor. Once, being unable to support his family and children, he came to Vajrāsana (Buddha Gayā) There he related his poverty to a Yogin, who replied. "You Pandits despise [illegible]

Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-rgyan gyi-ḥgrel-bśad, which is an annotation on the Pramāṇa vārtikālaṅkāra of Prajñākara Gupta The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a very voluminous Tibetan translation which covers volumes Phe pp 104—342 and the whole of volumes Be Me, and Tse of the Bstan-ḥgyur, Mdo The translation was prepared by Paṇḍita Sumati and the interpreter Blo-ldan-śes-rab in the monastery of Sñe-than near Lhasa The volume Be ends thus —"From the immeasurable merit acquired by me by composing this regular annotation, may the world subduing its adversary death, obtain the indestructible and perfected Nirvāṇa "[1]

140 ŚANKARĀNANDA
(ABOUT 1050 A D)

Sankarānanda,[2] called in Tibetan Bde-byed-dgaḥ-wa, was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Kāśmīra He was learned in all sciences, and was above all an expert in Logic. He intended to write an original work on Logic refuting Dharmakīrti, but in a dream he was told by Mañjuśrī "Since Dharmakīrti is an Ārya (an elect), one cannot refute him, and if thou seest mistake in him, it is the mistake of thine own understanding" Thereupon Sankarānanda repented and composed a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa vārtika in seven chapters He flourished[3] during the time of Naya Pāla, who reigned in 1050 A D He was the author of the following works on Logic —

Pramāṇa-vārtika ṭīkā, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi ḥgrel-bśad, being an annotation on the Pramāṇa-vārtika Dharmakīrti The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[4] which covers volumes pages 103—354 and Phe, pages 1—104 of the Bstan-ḥgyur,

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[1] ཚུལ་བཞིན་ངེས་བྱ་འདི་ནི་བྱས་པ་ལས། ༎
བསོད་ནམས་དཔག་མེད་བསགས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ། ༎
དེས་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གཤིན་རྗེའི་དགྲ་འཇོམས་ནི། ༎
མི་ཟད་མཐར་ཕྱིན་གཉིས་མེད་ཐོབ་པར་ཤོག ༎
(Bstan bgyur, Mdo, Be folio 303)

[2] e Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 247
Lsam ljon bzan pp 107, 120

[3] e maintain that Sankarānanda was a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti Lama Tārānātha observes —"The Brāhmaṇa Sankarānanda appe later time and to call him a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti woul nfusion."—Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schief

[4] ulted this work in the monastery of Labrang, in Sikkim, in 1907

Sambandha-parīkṣānusāra, called in Tibetan Ḥbrel-pa-brtag-paḥi-rjes-su-ḥbraṅ wa, which is a commentary on the Sambandha-parīkṣā of Dharmakīrti The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation[1] in the Bstan-ḥgyur Mdo, Ze, Folios 24—39 The translation was prepared by the great Indian Pandits Parahita, and the Tibetan interpreter monk Dgaḥ-waḥi-rdo-rje

The work begins thus —

"By whom connection with the world has been renounced, in whom there are no "I" and "mine," who is called free from concerns—to that Omniscient One I bow down "[2]

[illegible]

tha and the Tibetan interpreter Blo-ldan-śes-rab in the incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

The work opens thus —

"The Omniscient One who is free from all mistakes and who looks to the interests of living beings in all times, saluting him and relying on his mercy, I elucidate the puzzle of 'self' and 'others' connected with the doctrine of *Apoha*"[4]

Pratibandha-siddhi, called in Tibetan Ḥbrel-pa grub-pa, signifying "establishment of the causal connection" The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost but there exists a Tibetan translation[5] in the Bstan-ḥgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 334—335 The translation was prepared by Pandita Bhāgya-rāja and the interpreter Blo-ldan-śes-rab

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[1] I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of India Office, London

[2] གང་གིས་འབྲེལ་བ་སྤངས་གྱུར་པ ॥
འགྲོ་བ་བདག་དང་བདག་ཡི་མི ॥
གཟུང་འཛིན་མེད་པ་ཅན་གསུངས་པ ॥
ཀུན་མཁྱེན་དེ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ ॥
(Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 24)

[3] I have consulted the India Office copy

[4] ཀུན་མཁྱེན་འཁྲུལ་བྲལ་དུས་གསུམ་གཟིགས་པ་པོ ॥
དོན་རྣམས་རྗེ་གཉེན་གཟིགས་པ་ལ་བསྟུད་དེ ॥
བཙ་ལ་གནས་ནས་སེལ་བ་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི ॥
བདག་གཞན་རབ་ཏུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཁྲུལ་པ་བསལ་ཕྱིར ॥
(Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 308)

[5] I have consulted the India Office copy

141. SUBHAKARA GUPTA
(ABOUT 1080 A D)

Subhakara Gupta was a disciple of Abhayākara Gupta, high priest of the monastic University of Vikramaśilā He flourished during the reign of Rāma Pāla¹ and resided for some time at the shrine of Etāpurī erected by Rāma Pāla's wife As the reign of Rāma Pāla commenced about 1080 A D Subhakara Gupta must have lived at the end of the 11th century A D

He wrote a treatise on Logic in which he closely followed Dharmakīrti His logical views are quoted and criticised by the Jaina logician Haribhadra Sūri² who designates him as Subha Gupta

142 MOKṢĀKARA GUPTA
(ABOUT 1100 A D)

Mokṣākara Gupta, called in Tibetan Thar-paḥi ḥbyun-gnas sbas, was the High priest of the great monastery of Jagaddala¹ at the confluence of the Gaṅgā (Padmā) and the Karatoyā (perhaps near Bogra in North Bengal) He seems to have flourished early in the 12th century A D., after the termination of the rule of the Pāla kings He wrote the undermentioned work on Logic :—

Tarka bhāṣā, called in Tibetan Rtog-geḥi-skad, signifying 'technicalities of Logic' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the Bstan-ḥgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 373—413 The translation was prepared by the interpreter monk Dpal-ldan-blo-gros-brtan po without the co-operation of any Pandita The work is divided into three chapters named respectively (1) Perception, (2) Inference for one's own self, and (3) Inference for the sake of others It begins thus —

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[1] [illegible]
[illegible]

(Dpag bsam-ljon bzan, p 120, edited by S C Das)

[2] Haribhadra Sūri observes —
[illegible]
[illegible]

(Anekāntajaya patākāṭīkā, p 117)

[illegible]

(Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 413)

For the identification of Jagaddala see Rāma Pāla-carita

I have consulted the India Office copy

"Bowing down to the Teacher, the Lord of the world, I elucidate Tarkabhāsā for the sake of introducing children of small intellect to the system of Dharmakīrti"[1]

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[1] བླ་མ་འཇིག་རྟེན་དབང་བཏུད་ནས
བྱིས་པ་ཡིད་གཟུངས་ཆུང་བ་རྣམས།
ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པའི་ལུགས་འཇུག་ཕྱིར
རྟོག་གེའི་སྐད་ནི་རབ་གསལ་བྱ།།

(Bstan hgyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 373)

Jina Mitra, Prajñākara Gupta, Jetāri, Śankarānanda and Mokṣākara Gupta appeared in the field to vindicate the Buddhist Logic from the attack of Brāhmanas For nearly 800 years from 300 A D to 1100 A D. the Buddhists fought valiantly against the Brāhmanas But at last their principles of thought were almost entirely absorbed into the Brāhmanic Logic which left no room for an independent existence of the Buddhist Logic

144 LOSS OF ROYAL PATRONAGE

Patronage in the past

From time to time Buddhism received encouragement and favour from the rulers As already stated the first, second, third and fourth Buddhist Councils were held in Rājagṛha, Vaiśālī, Pāṭalīputra and Jālan- [illegible]

[illegible]

defended with much care and enthusiasm

[illegible]

King [illegible]

T [illegible] of Central Bengal and s [illegible] tree at Buddha-Gayā [illegible] t Pātalīputra and smashed numerous Buddhist temples and monasteries about 600 A D, Buddhism could not be totally extirpated by him The [illegible]

[illegible]

King Amoghavarṣa, whose reign extended from 815 A.D. to at

CHAPTER IV

The Decline of Buddhist Logic.[1]

143 THE CONTENTIOUS SPIRIT OF BUDDHIST LOGIC.

Antagonism between the Brahmana and Buddhist logicians

Unlike the Jainas, the Buddh
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m
Br
his
ya-sūtra in which there
including four means of valid knowledge and five membe
syllogism The Buddhist logician N
3rd century A D , affirm
gism consisted of three
tator Vātsyāyana (about
position of Aksapāda un
logician Dignāga who reduced was overthrown by the
sūtra to one, viz pramāna, and the sixteen categories of
to two viz pratyaksa and anumāna, and the four means of valid know
of Dignāga " that the Brāhmanic logician Uddyotakara wrot "It was to dispel the
Nyāya-vārtika about 635 A D the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti who defended Dignāga He in his turn was assailed

After Uddyotakara there occurred a long gap in the suc
sion of Brāhmana writers on Logic until in the 9th century
Vācaspati Misra wrote his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya tīkā By t
time the Buddhist Logic had achieved a great triumph as
evident from the Buddhist writings of Devendra Bodhi, Sā
Bodhi, Vinita Deva, Ravi Gupta, Jinendra Bodhi, Sānta Raks
Kamala Sīla Kalyāna Raksita and others In the 9th a
10th centuries Dharmottara, Arcata and other Buddhist logicia
having attacked the Brāhmanic authors, Udayanācārya, a B
mana of Mithila brought out, at the close of the 10th centur
A D his Ātma-tattva-viveka etc
Buddhists Subseq

[illegible]

least 877 A D was a follower of Digambara Jainism Under him and his successors Buddhism languished until it finally disappeared in the 12th century A D

Unlike the earlier kings the later rulers of the Pallava dynasty, from the 10th century onwards, became worshippers of Śiva, whose emblem the bull was adopted by them as their family crest

Revival of Brāhmanism in Mithilā

In 1019 A D Gāṅgeya Deva of the Celi race set up a kingdom in Tirhut (Mithilā). He died in 1040 A D and was succeeded by his son Karna Deva who was a contemporary of Naya Pāla about 1038--1065 A D) Nānya Deva who was a Pramāra Kṣatriya of Karnāta succeeded Karna Deva and reigned in Mithilā from 1089—1125 A D These kings, who overthrew Buddhism, brought about the revival of Brāhmanism in Mithilā

Brāhmanic revival in Bengal

Vijaya Sena, a member of the Karnātaka Kṣatriya race and a contemporary of Nānya Deva of Mithilā, wrested from the Pāla kings a large part of Bengal about 1119 A D. Vijaya and his successors Vallāla Sena, Lakṣmana Sena and others who ruled in Bengal up to 1197 A D re-established the Brāhmanic religion in Bengal in opposition to their predecessors the Pāla kings who had been Buddhists

Buddhism having thus lost all patronage, the Buddhist Logic could not prosper

145 ADVENT OF THE MAHOMEDANS

Mahomedans in Kāśmira

The Mahomedan invasion is said to have exerted a considerable influence on the disappearance of Buddhism from India About 1021 A D the Hindu Shahiya dynasty of Kāśmira was extirpated by the Mahomedans, and during the two centuries [illegible] occurred great political disorders in the country [illegible] ca [illegible] rves [illegible] that Magadha, a stronghold of [illegible] ism,

Mahomedans in Bengal and Behar

was attacked by the Turuṣkas (Mahomedans) at the end of the 10th century A D while the Buddhist University of Vikramaśilā was burnt by Bakhtiar Khilji about 1197 A D A large proportion of the Buddhist population thought it expedient to embrace the Mahomedan faith. The Buddhists having in large numbers turned Mahomedans it became impossible for their Logic to attain a further development

146 THE BRĀHMANIC PREACHERS ny Brāhmanic

n in Southern
In the seventh century A D and onwards m nanic religion
preachers began to flouris bout 630 A D)
In Southern India
India to revive the Brāh he Brāhmanic
there The attempts made by Kumārila Bhatta (a notice Early
and Śaṅkarācārya (about 785 A D.) to re-establish ated Vaisnava
faith there are too well known to need a detailed st north east of
in the 12th century A D Rāmānuja, the celeb of the Calukya
preacher, flourished in Srīperumātor, 18 miles ea
Kāñcīpura (Conjeeveram), and converted the kings referred to the
and Cola dynasties to his religion. ārya of Mithilā

As regards Northern India, I have already place Buddhism
efforts made by Udayanāc mon knowledge
In Northern India.
in the 10th century to re d the Vaisnava
by the Brāhmanic faith It is a matter of com ābāpurus a sect
how in the 15th century A D Caitanya founde ed account of
sect in Bengal and Śaṅkara Deva founded the M ant Buddhism
in Assam It is not necessary to give here a deta hus established,
the other sects that were founded in India to suppl d continue to

The Brāhmanic faith of new orders being tl
there were left very few Buddhist writers who co
work in the field of Logic

s

147 SHELTER IN FOREIGN COUNTRIE India it was

Thousands of
While Buddhism was undergoing persecution in ngolia, Corea,
accorded a warm reception in foreign countries. , where they
enterprising monks visited Nepal, Tibet, China, Mo ceptors The
Japan, Ceylon, Burmah, Siam, Sumatra, Java, etc, numbers, to
were cordially welcomed and accepted as revered pr a was entirely
Buddhist monks being thus attracted in large

least 877 A D was a follower of Digamba
and his successors Buddhism languished
in the 12th century A D

Unlike the earlier kings the later rule
asty, from the 10th century onwards,
Siva whose emblem the bull was adopted
crest

Revival of Brāhmanism in Mithilā.

In 1019 A D *Gāngeya Deva of t*
kingdom in Tirhut
1040 A D and was
Karna Deva who was a contemporary
1038 1065 A D) Nānya Deva who w
of Karnāta succeeded Karna Deva and r
1089—1125 A D These kings who overt
about the revival of Brāhmanism in Mith

Brāhmanic revival in Bengal

Vijaya Sena, a member of the Karnā
a contemporary of
wrested from the
Bengal about 111
successors Vallāla Sena, Laksmana Sena a
Bengal up to 1197 A D re-established th
Bengal in opposition to their predeces-
had been Buddhists

Buddhism having thus lost all p
Logic could not prosper

145 ADVENT OF THE M

Mahomedans in Kāśmīra

The Mahomedan invasion is said to
able influence or
Buddhism from
the Hindu Shahiy
extirpated by the Mahomedans, and
following there occurred great political
These circumstances led to the decline of

by the great Tibetan sage Bu ston of the monastery of Shālu near Tashi lhun-po under orders of the Tibeto-Chinese-Mongol Emperor

countries

Sumatra, etc

148 EXTINCTION OF THE BUDDHISTS AND THEIR DOCTRINES IN INDIA

Disappearance of Buddhism as a separate or-

I have shown that some of the Buddhists were received with hospitality in foreign countries while others became followers of Islam The few that re-

PART III.

THE MODERN SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

SECTION I.

Prakaraṇa—Manual of Logic.

CHAPTER I

The Nyāya-Prākaraṇa reduces its Categories to one.

1 THE NEO-BRĀHMANIC AGE (CIRCA 900 A D —1920 A D.)

In part II we have seen how Jainism and Buddhism exercised, for several centuries, a potent influence on the system of philosophy and culture of the Brāhmanas. In the Deccan, the decline of Buddhism commenced in the seventh century A D , while in North India the Buddhists became almost extinct by 1200 A D The Brāhmanas, who survived them, organized their society on a secure basis They took back into their folds some of their members who had embraced Buddhism or Jainism, but there arose the necessity of making strict rules for the maintenance of the integrity of their society and for the prevention of new admissions into it It was at this period that different Brāhmanic legislators of [illegible]

character and application. It may be observed that social exclusiveness became more marked in the Hindu Society at this period with the advent of the Muhammadans in India

2. COMPOSITION OF THE *Prakaranas*, MANUALS OF LOGIC.

[illegible]

The works so composed in this period were technically called *Prakaraṇas*[1] or Manuals of Logic. In the Parāśara Upapurāṇa quoted in the commentaries on Nyāya-sāra and Saptapadārthī, the *prakaraṇa* is defined as a book which concerns itself with the topics of a portion of a śāstra which may deal even with matters not included in the śāstra, e g the Nyāya-sāra and Saptapadārthī—two very early manuals of Logic—treat in a very loose way most topics of the Nyāya sūtra and Vaiśeṣika sūtra respectively, and at the same time some topics not included in those sūtras Many matters which are elaborately treated in the works of the ancient school have been dismissed with scant ceremony in the logical manuals, while some subjects which were merely referred to in the former, have been clearly explained in the latter, for instance, the topics of *chala* (quibble), *jāti* (analogue) and *nigrahasthāna* (points of defeat), which occupied so much space in the works of the ancient school, drew very little attention from the authors of the manuals On the other hand, the syllogism (*avayava*) which was briefly treated in ancient works has been elaborately explained in the manu This treatment of certain subjects in preference to other subje as most probably due to the influence of the Jaina and Buddhi rstems of Logic which intervened In respect of their style so the ancient works differed considerably from the manuals hile the style of the former was mostly aphoristic, the style the latter was expository The *prakaraṇas* (manuals) are m t remarkable for their accuracy and lucidity as well as for r direct handling of various topics in their serial orders nitions of terms are broad and accurate and not full of ries

3 FOUR CLASSES OF *prakaraṇas*

The manuals of Logic called Prakaraṇas may be principally d into four classes (1) The Nyāya works treating only of the ṇa in which the remaining fifteen categories were subor l, (2) the Nyāya works which embody in them the catego the Vaiśeṣika philosophy (3) the works which treat seven Vaiśeṣika categories assimilating in them the Nyāya of pramāṇa and (4) the works which treat certain the Nyāya and certain topics of the Vaiśeṣika Most of ors on manuals considered it necessary to combine such f the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as would give us a complete

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

theory of valid knowledge as well as of the objects which would give rise to that knowlege

4 NYĀYA-PRAKARAṆA DEVELOPING THE CATEGORY OF *pramāna*

The Jaina and Buddhist writers, who founded the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic, dealt with only one category, viz *pramāna*, the means of valid knowledge. Following them some of the Brāhmanic writers chose only one category, viz *Pramāna*, which they developed in such a way that it could assimilate in itself the remaining fifteen categories of the ancient school Certain categories, such as *Prāmeya* (objects of knowledge), *jalpa* (wrangling), *vitandā* (cavil), *jāti* (analogue), and *nigrahasthāna* (the point of defeat) had to be excluded, while other categories were conveniently stuck on to *Pramāna* as its sub-divisions These Brāhmana writers, of whom accounts will shortly be given, were the true representatives of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. The earliest of these writers seem to have been Bhā-sarvajña,[1] who flourished about 950 A D

5. BHĀ-SARVAJÑA
(ABOUT 950 A D.)

The first Brāhmanic writer, who attempted to reduce the sixteen categories to one, was Bhā-sarvajña, the celebrated author of Nyāya-sāra

His life

Nothing is definitely known about the age in which he flourished or the country which he adorned by his birth He seems to me to have been a native of Kāśmīra His name, which is very peculiar, bears a close resemblance to the names of Sarvajña Mitra[2] and Sarvajña Deva[3], who lived in Kāśmīra about 775 A D. and 1025 A D respectively

His date

As the reputed author of Nyāya-sāra, he is mentioned by the Jaina sages Gunaratna[4] (1409 A D.), and Maladhāri Rājaśekhara[5] (1348 A.D.).

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[1] Bhāsarvajña's Nyāya sāra with Jaya Simha's Nyāyatātparya-dīpikā has been edited by Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series of Calcutta.

[2] *Vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's edition of Sragdharā stotram, published in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Introduction, p xxx.

[3] *Vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "History of the Mediæval School of Indian Logic," pp. 134—135

[4] भासर्वज्ञ प्रणीते न्यायसारेऽष्टादशटीकाः । तासु मुख्या टीका न्यायभूषणाख्या न्याय कलिका जयन्तरचिता न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलितर्कश्च ।

(Gunaratna's Saddarśana-vṛtti, edited by Dr L. Suali, p. 94).

[5] भासर्वज्ञो न्यायसारतर्कग्रन्थविधायक ।
न्यायसाराभिधे तर्के टीका अष्टादशस्फुटाः ॥

During their times there were already eighteen commentaries the Nyāya-sāra One of them is named Nyāya bhūsana, wh I believe to be identical with the work of same name quot by the Buddhist sage Ratnakīrti,[1] preceptor of Ratnākara Śānt who lived about 1000 A D This is therefore the latest dat that we can assign to Bhā sarvajña The earliest limit may be fixed at 650 A D when there lived the Buddhist logician Dhar makīrti[2] whose controversy about the fallacy of "non-erron eous contradiction" (viruddhāvyabhicāri) is referred to in the Nyāya-sāra[4] Bhā sarvajña was evidently junior to Trilocana whose fallacies of example have, according to Rāghava Bhatta, been quoted by him[5] On these and other considerations I am inclined to believe that Bhā-sarvajña lived about 950 A D

Bhā-sarvajña who attempted to reconstruct Brāhmanic L on the plan of Buddhist Logic, must indeed have flourishe Kaśmīra in the 10th century A D when Brāhmanism and B dhism flourished there side by side

6. BHĀ-SARVAJÑA'S NYĀYA-SĀRA

Nyāya-sāra follows no particular work

The well-known logical treatise, which proceeded from th pen of Bhā-sarvajña, was designated a Nyāya-sāra, the Essence of Logic It occu pied a remarkable position in the history of Indian Logic Following the method current in his time, Bhā-sar vajña undertook in his Nyāya-sāra to treat only of Pramāna which he divided into three kinds perception (pratyaksa), inference (anu māna), and verbal testimony (āgama) This threefold division of Pramāna furnished a contrast to Aksapāda who recognized a fourth

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[illegible] ।

(Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya by Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri published in the Yaśovijaya Granthamālā Benares)

[1] Ratnakīrti observes —

[illegible] ...।

(Ratnakīrti's Apohasiddhi edited by M M Hara Prasad Sastri p 11, A S B)

[2] Vide Part II on Buddhist Logic

[3] Dharmakīrti observes —

[illegible] ।

(Nyāyabindu, edited by Peterson p 115)

[4] Bhā sarvajña writes —

[illegible] ...

(Nyāya-sāra edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, p 12)

[5] Vide Rāghava Bhatta's commentary on the Nyāya-sāra in reference to the passage:

[illegible] ।

(Nyāyasāra p 13 Vidyabhusana's edition)

kind named comparison (*upamāna*) It brought Bhā-sarvajña close to the Sāṁkhyas and Jainas who admitted three kinds of Pramāna, but distinguished him from the Buddhists who dealt with only two, viz perception and inference Like the Buddhist and Jaina writers, he divided inference into that for one's self [illegible]

with an inference for the sake of others Salvation (*moksa*) was described by him as the soul's attainment of eternal pleasure In this respect he agreed with the Prābhākaras who affirmed that pleasure could be eternal, but differed from Aksapāda who denied the eternality of pleasure.

The scheme laid down in the Nyāya-sāra, for the reduction of sixteen categories into one, may be exhibited in the tabular form thus —


Pramāna (1)
(the means for establishing *prameya*, (2) without a stain of *saṁśaya* (3) and *viparyaya*
Pratyaksa
Anumāna
Āgama
Yogi
Laukika
Ṣaḍvidha
Svārtha
Parārtha carried on through
Yukta
Ayukta
Ārṣa
Anārṣa
avayava (7),
which excludes *hetvābhāsa* (13) and leads to *nirnaya* (9), through the channels of *tarka* (8), *vāda* (10), *jalpa* (11), *vitandā* (12), *chala* (14), *jati* (15), and *nigrahasthāna* (16)

From the above it is evident that Bhā-sarvajña embodied in his *Pramāna* all the categories of the Nyāya-sūtra except *prayojana* (4) and *siddhānta* (6) which did not, according to him, constitute its integral parts and *dṛṣṭānta* (5) which was included in *avayava* under the name of *udāharana*

7 CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-SĀRA

Perception—*pratyaksa*

In the opening lines of the Nyāya-sāra, Bhāsarvajña says:—

Salutation. "Bowing down to Śambhū (Śiva) the supreme Lord of the universe, who by nature knows all truths, I shall explain *Pramāna*, and its division and definition in order that children may understand them well "[1]

Pramāna is defined in the work as the means of right know ledge freed from doubt and error It is of three kinds, viz perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*āgama*)

Perception, which is the means of direct cognition, may

Definition of Perception

either contemplative (*yogi-pratyaksa*) ordinary (*a-yogi pratyaksa*) *The ordina perception* is that which exhibits gross objects through their inte course with our senses brought about by a favourable combina tion of light, space, time, nature, etc

The intercourse may be of six kinds, viz, (1) union, (2) united

Intercourse

inherence, (3) united-inherent inherence, (4) inherence, (5) inherent inherence, and (6) particularity—all of which have been explained before

The *contemplative perception* exhibits objects which are too remote in time and space or too fine in nature It is the percep tion of a saint, who may or may not be in a state of contemplation at the time

While in a state of contemplation the saint perceives infinite objects through the mere union of his soul with his mind in consequence of his merit, etc But while he is not in contemp tion, he perceives objects through the union of four, three two causes, viz the soul, the mind, a sense and an object, the soul, the mind and a sense, or merely the soul and the mind n the olfactory, gustatory, visual and tactual perceptions there is union of four causes In the auditory perception there is a reefold union, viz the soul the mind and the ear (the sound hich inheres in the ear being identical with the same) In the rception of pleasure, etc, there is a union of merely two causes, the soul and the mind

Perception may also be divided as determinate or mediate

nds of Perception

(*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate or imme diate (*nirvikalpaka*) The determinate per on is knowledge of an object indicative of a relation of the t to its name, genus, quality, action etc, e g this is Deva The indeterminate perception is the knowledge which ex the mere essence of an object independent of its relation to a name, genus, etc, e.g the knowledge produced by the first union of a sense with its object or the knowledge of a saint while he is in a state of contemplation

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[1] [illegible]

Inference—*anumāna*

Inference defined

Inference (*anumāna*) is the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the senses through its inseparable connection with another thing which lies within their range "The hill is fiery, because it is smoky"—this is an inference in which we ascertain fire from smoke with which it is inseparably connected

Invariable concomitance—*vyāpti*

The inseparable connection (in Sanskrit *avinâbhāva*) is also designated as pervasion or invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). It is of two kinds (1) affirmative (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*). The affirmative invariable concomitance (*anvaya vyāpti*) is the accompaniment of the middle term by the major term in all cases The negative invariable concomitance (*vyatireka-vyāpti*) is the accompaniment of the absence of the major term by the absence of the middle term in all cases In the affirmative universal proposition "wherever there is smoke, there is fire"—smoke is the middle term which is in all cases accompanied by fire [illegible] "wherever [illegible] f fire is [illegible]

Kinds of Inference

[illegible] lf (*svārthānumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of [illegible]

[illegible] us to establish [illegible]

Terms of an Inference.

The subject or minor [illegible] ful [illegible] abic [illegible] which the quality of the [illegible] to abide A heterologue ([illegible] with certainty, that the quality of the major term does not abide The essential nature of a syllogism (*pakṣa-dharmatā*) refers to the character of the pervasion of the middle term by the major term

Take the following syllogism —

The hill is fiery,
because it is smoky,
like a kitchen or like a lake

Here "hill" is the subject or minor term on which existence of fire is to be proved, "kitchen" is a homologu which fire is known with certainty to abide, and "lake" i heterologue in which, we are sure, fire does not abide

Kinds of the middle term

Exclusively affirmative is the reason which abides in t minor term of which there are homologues but no heterologue e g, this is *nameable*, because it is knowable

Exclusively-negative is the reason which abides in the mino term of which there are no homologues and which is distinct from the heterologues, e g the earth is different from other elements, because it possesses *smell*

Affirmative-negative is the reason which abides in the minor term and its homologues but does not abide in the heterologues of the minor term, which is not counterbalanced and the sphere of which is not opposed by evidences, e g the hill is fiery, because it is *smoky*

Hetvābhāsa —fallacy of the reason

Fallacy of reason

Fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*) is that which possesses the appearance of a reason but not its essential characte It is of various kinds as mentioned b ow —

A UNPROVED (*asiddha*)

Unproved (*asiddha*) is the reason whose existence in the nor term has not been known with certainty It is of following ds —

(1) Unproved in respect of its nature (*svarūpāsiddha*), e g sound is non eternal because it is visible

(2) Unproved on account of its abiding in a different locus (*vyadhikaraṇāsiddha*), e g sound is non eternal because a jar is a product

(3) Unproved in respect of the substantive (*viśeṣyāsiddha*), e g sound is non eternal because it is a visible thing possessing generality, but it is not visible

(4) Unproved in respect of the adjective [illegible], e g sound is non eternal because it [illegible] possessing generality [illegible]

(5) Unproved in respect of a part [illegible], e g [illegible]

sound-wave is produced by effort, but the succeeding sound-waves do not, it is said, depend on it]

(6) Unproved in respect of the abode (*āśrayāsiddha*) e g there is primordial matter, because it evolves into the universe [The Naiyāyikas do not admit that primordial matter (Prakṛti) is the prime source of the universe]

(7) Unproved in respect of a part of the abode (*āśrayaikadeśā-* [illegible]

(8) Unproved on account of the substantive being useless (*vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddha*), e g sound is non-eternal, because it possesses *generality* which is a product [To say that "soundness is a product" is not only useless but also incorrect]

(9) [illegible]

(10) [illegible]

it *smoky* [Here if the smoke turns out to be mist, the inference will be invalid]

(11) Unproved on account of the substantive being doubtful [illegible]

passions because he is a person *who is always devoid of true knowledge.* [*It is doubtful as to whether he is always* devoid of true knowledge]

The fallacies called *unproved* mentioned above are of two lescriptions according as the lack of truth involved in them is ecognized by both the parties or one of the parties engaged in a lebate

B. THE CONTRADICTORY (*viruddha*)

Contradictory (*viruddha*) is the reason which abides in the nor term as well as in the opposite of it [illegible]

[illegible] are homologues to the minor term, the contradictory of four kinds as follows —

[illegible] he minor term as well as its homologue), e g sound is [illegible]duct [like ether (homologue) and like a pot (heterologue) Productivity abides in sound as well as in its heterologue the pot]

(2) The reason which abides in the minor term as well as in a part of its heterologue (but not in its homologue), e g sound is eternal because it is a thing which possesses generality and is cognized by our external senses [Here an instance of the heterologue is a pot (a) which is non eternal, (b) which possesses generality *potness*, and (c) which is cognized by our external senses "Pleasure" cannot be an instance of the heterologue, because though non eternal it is not cognized by our external senses So the reason abides only in a part of the heterologue We cannot cite *potness* as a homologue, because though potness is eternal and cognized by our external sense, it does not possess generality *potness-ness*]

(3) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term as well as in a part of its heterologue but not in its homologue, e g sound is eternal, because it is a product of effort [The first wave of sound is a product of effort, but the succeeding waves are not products of effort. So the productivity of effort abides only in a part of the minor term Similarly it abides only in a part of the heterologue "Pot" is a heterologue which is a product of effort, but "grass" is a heterologue which is not a product of effort]

(4) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term but in the whole of its heterologue (and not in its homologue) e g the earth is eternal because it is a product [Productivity abides in the earth which is gross, but not in the earth which is subtle or atomic At the same time it abides in all things which are non-eternal or heterologues to the minor term]

While there are no homologues, the contradictory reasons are follow —

(1) The reason which abides in the minor term as well as in its heterologues, e g sound is a special quality of ether as it is knowable [Knowableness abides in sound as well as in its heterologues such as smell There are no homologues because nothing but sound is a special quality of ether]

The reason which abides in a part of the minor term and in a part of its heterologues e g sound is a special quality of ether, because it is a product of effort [Productivity of effort abides in the first sound wave but does not abide in the succeeding sound waves it abides in some heterologues as pot etc but not in other heterologues as the soul etc]

reason which abides in the minor term and in a part of its heterologues e g sound is a special quality of ether

[illegible]

(4) [illegible] the whole of its heterologues, e g sound is a special quality of ether, because it does not arise from words [Some sounds arise from words such as those which we read in books, while others do not, such as the sounds of a drum No sound, which is not a special quality of ether, arises from words]

C. THE UNCERTAIN (*anaikāntika*)

Uncertain (*anaikāntika*) is the reason which abides in the minor term, its homologues and heterologues its subdivisions are the following .—

(1) The reason which abides in the minor term, its homologues and heterologues, e g sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable

(2) The reason which abides in the minor term, in a part of its [illegible]

not in mind which is an atom in dimension It abides in some homologues as soul, ether, etc , but not in other homologues as earth, water, fire and air It abides in all heterologues as quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence]

(7) The reason which abides in all homologues and heterologues, but only in a part of the minor term, e g ether, time [illegible] because they are [illegible] The [illegible] eter [illegible] oul, [illegible] cial

water, fire and air]

D NON-TRIED OR NON-CONCLUSIVE (*anadhyavasita*, or *anupasaṁhāri*) [1]

Non-tried (*anadhyavasita*) is the reason which abides in minor term alone, without a definite connection with the m term. It is subdivided as follows —

(1) The reason which abides in the minor term of which t are neither homologues nor heterologues, e g all are eternal, because they are existent [" All " having cluded every thing there is no homologue or heterolo left behind The reason " existence " does however al in " all "]

(2) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term which there are neither homologues nor heterologues all are non-eternal, because they are products [" A which includes everything, has neither homologues heterologues The reason " product " abides in non-et nal things but not in eternal things both of which comprised by " all "]

(3) The reason which abides in the minor term of which the [illegible] both homologues and heterologues e g sound is no [illegible] of ether [Sou [illegible] omologues whi

(4) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term which there are both homologues and heterologues e g substances are non eternal because they are possessed

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[1] Mr S P Vaidya observes — This hetvābhāsa is mentioned by [illegible] who about the 15th century says that it [illegible] alone, except by [illegible] which latter did not have the name [illegible] as anupasaṁhārin [illegible]

activity {There is activity in earth but not in ether although both are substances There is no activity in quality and action which are homologues and in generality particularity and inherence which are heterologues of the non-eternal}

(5) The reason which abides in the minor term and has homologues but no heterologues, e g all products are eternal, because they are originated {There is no heterologue of "all products" which constitutes the minor term Ether,

(6) Th

homologue but it is not composed of parts}

MISTIMED OR INCOMPATIBLE REASON (*Kālātyayopadiṣṭa*[1] or *bādhita*).

Mistimed or incompatible is the reason which abides in the inor term as opposed by evidences. It is subdivided as folws:—

(1) Opposed by perception, e g this fire is non warm, because it is a product

(2) Opposed by inference, e g the atoms are non eternal, be

not *omniscient*, because he is passionate like the man on the street

(3) An example of doubtful major and middle terms, e g this person *will* go to heaven, because he has accumulated merits, like Devadatta

(4) An example whose support is doubtful, e g this person is not *omniscient*, because he speaks evil, like Devadatta's son who will be *born*

Similarly there are *four* kinds [illegible] of the negative [illegible]

E [illegible]

Follow [illegible]

[illegible] (conclusion), *nirnaya* (ascertainment), *katha* (disputation), *vāda* (discussion), *jalpa* (wrangling), *vitaṇḍā* (cavil), *jāti* (analogue), *nigrahasthāna* (point of defeat), etc

Verbal testimony—*āgama*.

Kinds of verbal testimony

Verbal testimony or reliable assertion (*āgama*) is the means of knowing things accurately through indicatory signs (or convention) It is of two kinds, according as the assertion refers to matter open to our senses or to matter beyond our senses The authoritativeness of the first kind of assertion is evident from the action one takes on hearing the assertion, e g. a boy runs to receive a mango when he is asked by his father to do so The authoritativeness [illegible]

[illegible] explained

Other means of Knowledge

All other so-called means are included in them, e g presumption (*arthāpatti*) and probability (*sambhava*) are included in inference, rumour (*aitihya*) and muscular movement (*ceṣṭā*), in verbal testimony, and negation or non-existence (*abhāva*) in any of the three according to circumstances Muscular movement alleged to be a means of knowledge is only an action substituted for a word or assertion

Emancipation—*mokṣa*

Prameya.

The object of our knowledge (*prameya*) is of four kinds as follows —

---

[1] Bhāsarvajña uses the word *āgama* as a synonym for *śabda*. In reality one signifies "scripture" which enables us to know things beyond our senses, and the other signifies "the assertion of a reliable person."

(1) That which is fit only to be avoided, viz misery or suffering (*duhkha*), of which there are twenty-one varieties already explained

[illegible]

The soul is of two kinds, viz the individual soul (*apara ātmā*) and the supreme soul (*para ātmā*) The individual soul, which has to undergo sufferings from the bondage of the world, attains final emancipation (*mokṣa*) through the knowledge of the supreme soul called Śiva In the state of final emancipation the individual soul, being finally freed from misery, enjoys eternal pleasure

Soul

8. COMMENTARIES ON THE NYĀYASĀRA

Of the eighteen commentaries on Nyāyasāra enumerated by Jaina writers some are noticed below.—

(1) **Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa** the oldest commentary mentioned by Maladhāri Rāja Śekhara (1348 A D) and Gunaratna (1409 [illegible]

(2) **Nyāyakalikā** by Jayanta, mentioned by Gunaratna in the Saddarsana samuccaya Vrtti (1409 A D) No manuscript of it has yet been recovered

(3) **Nyāyakusumāñjali tarka** mentioned by Gunaratna in the Saddarsana samuccaya Vrtti (1409 A D) No manuscript of it has yet been recovered.

[illegible]

[1] (6) **Nyāyasārapadapañjikā** by Vāsudeva A manuscript of it has been recovered from Kāśmīra. (*Vide* S R Bhandarkar's Catalogue of MSS. in the Deccan College, 1888, p 95) Another manuscript of it written in Kāśmīrī character is to be found in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal bearing No 1552 In the opening lines [2]

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[1] *Vide* Rāja Śekhara's Ṣaddarśana samuccaya and Gunaratna's Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya vṛtti

[2] The opening lines of the Nyāyasārapadapañjikā run as follows.—

देवदेवमभिवन्द्य भास्करं
गोविन्दमुद्धरदेवमच्युतम् ।

Vāsudeva speaks of himself as the author of the
and in the colophon he is stated to be a
Kāśmīra

(7) **Nyāyasāravicāra** by Bhaṭṭa Rāghava. A manuscript of it dated[1] Śaka 1174 A D 1252 is contained in the Library of the Queen's College, Benares

(8) **Nyāyatātparyadīpikā**[2] by Jayasiṁha Sūri, a Jaina of the Śvetāmbara Sect, who lived in the fourteenth century A D as his Kumārapālacarita[3] is dated Saṁvat 1422 A D 1365

वासुदेवविदुषा विरच्यते
न्यायसारपदपञ्चिका मया ॥

[1] The Nyāyasāravicāra ends as follows —

शके वसुसप्तति संख्यके गते
शताधिकैरप्यधिके च पञ्चभिः ।
दिनाधिनेतव मधुव वासरे
भुव विचारः परिशोधि राघवः ॥

इति भारद्वाजवादीन्द्रविद्याधरविदुषनर्वविचारपद्मरुषभट्टराघवविरचिते न्यायसार
तीय परिच्छेद समाप्तः ॥

The verse may be interpreted to give Śaka 1174 (A D 1252) or Śaka 1352 A D)

[2] Nyāyatātparyadīpikā with the text of Nyāyasāra has been edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and published in the Bibliotheca Indica Calcutta.

[3]
श्रीविक्रमनृपाद् द्वि द्वि सम्वत्स्येयमजायत ।
ग्रन्थ षट्सहस्रमितोऽष्टसहस्रानुष्टुभाम् ॥
(Kumārapāla Caritra Praśasti, Chap. X)

CHAPTER II.

Nyāya prakaranas embodying Vaiśeṣika categories

9 THE NYĀYA INCORPORATES THE VAIŚESIKA

scence of the Nyāya and Vaiśesika

The Vaiśesika philosophy rendered considerable help to the
development of the Nyāya (Logic) and many
of the sūtras of the Nyāya philosophy pre-
[illegible]
ses
od
es
sili
ally coalesced The six or seven categories of the Vaiśesika
e entirely absorbed in the treatise on Nyāya philosophy and
Nyāya categories of pramāna in its developed form were
ally absorbed in th[illegible]
As instances of
nay cite the cases
sā by Keśava Miśra
gories of Nyāya,
ra, not only the tw

ount of the two works is given here

10. VARADARĀJA
(ABOUT 1150 A.D.)

wrote a work on Logic called Tārkikaraksā, or
Logicians" He seems to have been a native of
e Madras Presidency. Varadarāja must
century A.D, possibly also after the
ions Trilocana, Vācaspati Miśra,[1]

---

on ali called Nyāya

M.M Vindhyeśvari

[illegible] Jayanta, Nyāyācārya [illegible] the other hand [illegible] adarśana sam- [illegible] bably he flour- [illegible] 'ūrṇa or Jñāna [illegible]

Deva, a disciple of Viṣṇu Svāmin, wrote a commentary on the [illegible] said to have [illegible] times the [illegible] was Jñāna [illegible] a and the junior Trilocana[4] Perhaps there followed a few other preceptors before Vallabhācāryya, son of Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa of Andhra (Telingana), occupied the seat of guru at the end of the 15th century A D. As Vallabhācāryya lived between 1450 and 1530 A D, and as several preceptors intervened, the date of Varadarāja, if placed in 1150 A D., will not be far wrong[5]

11. TĀRKIKARAKṢĀ

Category

The Tārkikarakṣā, which at once begins its subject, is divided into three chapters the first of which deals with the first fourteen categories of Nyāya, viz. (1) *pramāṇa*, (2) *prameya* (3) *saṁśaya*, (4) *prayojana*, (5) *dṛṣṭānta*, (6) *siddhānta*, (7) *avayava*, (8) *tarka*, (9) *nirṇaya*, (10) *vāda*, (11) *jalpa*, (12) *vitaṇḍā* (13) *hetvābhāsa*, and (14) *chala* The second chapter deals with the fifteenth category, viz. *jāti*, while the third chapter treats of the sixteenth category viz *nigrahasthāna*

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Tārkikarakṣā p. 364, edited by M M Vindhyesvari Prasād Benares)

[illegible] Varadarāja quotes Bhāsarvajña thus —

[illegible] — [illegible] (Tārkikarakṣā p. 89).

[illegible] Vide Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, chapter on Pūrṇaprajña-darśana in which we read —

[illegible]

Tārkikarakṣā incorporates the Vaiśeṣika categories

Prameya, according to the Nyāya-sūtra, signifies *ātman*, *śarīra*, *indriya*, *artha*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *pravṛtti*, *doṣa*, *pretyabhāva*, *phala*, *duhkha*, and *apavarga*, but, according to Varadarāja, it incorporates also the six predicaments of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, viz the substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and co-existence or inherence (*samavāya*)

The scheme of combination

The categories of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are thus combined together, but the combination is far from being satisfactory It is evident that the categories of the Vaiśeṣika and objects coming under Prameya of the Nyāya overlap each other Moreover there is hardly any truth in the statement[1] that the knowledge of the sixteen categories of Nyāya is the direct means of our attaining emancipation whereas that of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika is only an indirect means, because *ātman* (the soul), *manas* (the mind), *buddhi* (intellect or knowledge), *duhkha* (pain), etc., are included in both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems

Varadarāja's scheme of combination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems is shown below —


Padārtha
Pramāṇa, prameya, saṁśaya prayojana dṛṣṭānta, siddhānta, avayava, tarka nirṇaya, vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti, nigrahasthāna.
1. Twelve objects of Nyāya
2 Six categories of the Vaiśeṣika

Valid knowledge—*pramāṇa*.

The Buddhistic definition of *pramāṇa* condemned

The sixteen categories of Nyāya have already been explained Varadarāja, in his Tārkikarakṣā, introduces here and there some peculiar discussions which are mentioned here For instance, the Buddhists define valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as that which is not non-correspondent with our practical activity,[2] e g my knowledge of a cup of water is valid if the activity prompted by it is fruitful. Varadarāja condemns this [illegible] w. For instance [illegible] a thing that existed [illegible] the future we can test the validity of our knowledge only of a thing that exists in the present time. With regard to a past or future thing[1] we can draw an inference, but cannot prove the validity of the inference inasmuch as there is no practical activity prompted by it

---

[1] मोक्षे साक्षादसाक्षाद्यदपवर्गे हि सूचितम् ।
तत्त्वज्ञानानुसारेण षट्क प्रमादि लक्ष्यते ॥
(Tārkikarakṣā, p 130)

[2] अविसंवादिविज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति सौगताः ।
Tārkikarakṣā, p 13, edited by M M Vindhyeśvarī Prasād, Benares)

Inference—*anumāna.*

Invariable concomitance, *avinābhāva* of the Buddhist, condemned

According to Varadarāja, inference (*anumāna*)[2] is the knowledge of a thing derived through its invariable concomitance with another thing. Invariable concomitance [illegible] also called [illegible] which is [illegible]

The [illegible] thing wit[illegible] presence and absence, e.g. smoke is in invariable concomitance with fire, because where there is smoke there is fire and where there is no f[illegible] and effect or identity in essence, e g there is rain, because there was cloud (cloud being the cause of rain); and this is a tree, because it is a simśapā (śimśapā being a species of tree which is its genus)

---

[1] अविसंवादकमिति सद्वत् ।
भूतभविष्यद्विषयेषु अनुमानेषु अव्याप्तेः ।

(Tārkikarakṣā, p 14)

[2] व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतावत्त्वं प्रसिद्धेः साधनं विदुः ।
अनुमानमिति ।

(Tārkikarakṣā, p 64)

[3] व्याप्तिः सम्बन्धो निरुपाधिकः ।

(Tārkikarakṣā, p 65)

[4] *Upādhi*, condition, is thus defined —

साधनाव्यापकाः साध्यसमव्याप्ता उपाधयः ॥

(Tārkikarakṣā, p 66)

It is of two kinds (1) sure (*niścita*) and (2) suspected (*śaṅkita*) I do not quote here the definition of these terms as they will recur in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*

[5] सौगतास्तु तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यामेवाविनाभावः । .. यथाहुः,——

कार्यकारणभावाद्वा स्वभावाद्वा नियामकात् ।
अविनाभावनियमो दर्शनान्न नदर्शनात् ॥

तदयुक्तम् । अकार्यकारणयो रूपरसयोरविनाभावस्य [illegible] लोके [illegible] ।

(Tārkikarakṣā, p 62)

This verse is quoted from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa vārtika-kārikā* The Tibetan version runs as follows:—

རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིས།
རང་བཞིན་ངེས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ལས།

Varadarāja condemns the Buddhists by saying that their definition is untenable We infer the form of an orange from its taste, though between the taste and form there is neither the causal relation nor the relation of identity in essence.

Syllogism—*avayava*

The Mīmāmsā form of syllogism, *avayava*

In explaining the seventh category, viz *avayava*[1] parts of a syllogism, Varadarāja says that according to the Mīmāmsaka, a syllogism, which consists of three parts may either begin with an example or end with the same, as follows —

All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,
The hill is smoky,
Therefore the hill is fiery
or
The hill is fiery,
Because it is smoky
All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen

The Saugatas (Buddhists) are said to maintain that a syllogism consists of only two parts, viz an example and an application in the following form·—

All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,
This hill is smoky

The sign—*linga*

Five characteristics of the middle term

A sign, reason or middle term (*linga* or *hetu*) which is in invariable concomitance with the predicate or major term (*sādhya*), possesses five characteristics as follows:—

(1) *Pakṣadharmatā*, the existence of the sign in the subject or minor term, e g the hill has smoke

---

མེད་ན་མི་འབྱུང་ངེས་པ་ནི།
མ་མཐོང་ཙམ་མིན་མཐོང་ཙམ་མིན།

(Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā, Bstan ḥgyur, Mdo, Ce, leaf 196, also Prof De La Vallee Poussin's French translation of Sarvadarśana saṁgraha, p 4, in La Bouddhisme)

[1] त्रीनुदाहरणान्तान् वा यद्वोदाहरणादिकान् ।
मीमांसका सौगतास्तु सोपनीतिमुदाहृतिम् ॥
(Tārkikarakṣā, p 175)

[illegible]

In the case of an exclusively affirmative or excl
tive inference the sign bears only four characteristi
not then abide in the heterologue or homologue

In the logical work called Lakṣaṇamālā a s
defined as that which is in in
concomitance with the major ter
any condition (upādhi), e g smoke is the sign of fir
not necessarily a sign of smoke unless it is nourished
(here wet fuel is the condition)

Upādhi

Debate—kathā

Rules of debate

In treating of the tenth category, viz vāda,
gives an elaborate exposition
(kathā)[1] which is defined as a
sentences spoken by more persons than one as cons
subjects for their judgment The six requisites for
debate are the following —

(1) A set of rules as to a certain thesis and its proof
(2) The method to be followed [illegible]
(3) [illegible]
(4) [illegible]
(5) [illegible]
(6) Agreement as to the stage of termination of a deb

Requisites of a debate

Some logicians hold that the requisites for a counc
are only four, viz (1) the disp
the respondent, (3) the presiden
the members

---

[1] [illegible]
[illegible] 179 edited by M M Vindhyesvari Pras
[illegible]

If it is intended to record a debate, a writer (*lekhaka*) must be employed with the approval of the disputant and his respondent

The disputant (*vādī*) must be equal to the respondent (*prativādī*) in respect of his learning A debate, in which an expert stands against an ordinary person, is useless, inasmuch as the conclusion drawn from such a debate could have been obtained from the expert alone

The members (*sabhya*), acceptable to both the parties and conversant with their tenets, must be freed from affection and aversion They must be capable of receiving, retaining and demonstrating the purport of others' speech, while their number must be uneven and not less than three Their duty is to control the debate, to point out the excellence or defect of the debates, to awaken one who is broken-hearted and to repeat a speech to one who is slow

The president (*sabhāpati*) must be satisfactory to the disputant, the respondent and the members Capable of showing favour or frown, he must not be influenced by affection or aversion His duty is to announce to the council the conclusion of a debate when it comes to a close

[illegible]

the [illegible]

They [illegible]

mem[illegible]

applies to a council[1] of fair debate or discussion, but in the case of wrangling and cavil even chance-comers act as regular members

Kind of debate

A debate is of three kinds, viz (1) discussion (*vāda*), (2) wrangling (*jalpa*), and (3) cavil (*vitaṇḍā*) A wrangling or cavil may be stopped by ex-[illegible] be pointed out in a discussion are :—(1) saying too little, (2) saying too much, (3) deviating from the tenet, (4) opposing the proposition, (5) silence, (6) repetition, and (7) the inopportune. The seven points of defeat which are not to be pointed out in a discussion are :—(1) evasion, (2) non ingenuity, (3) ignorance (4) shifting the reason, (5) overlooking the censurable, (6) shift-ing the topic, and (7) the admission [illegible]

---

[1] सभा च कारणि,——

रागद्वेषविनिर्मुक्ता पक्षपक्षयोरपि या ।
वयोधिका विप्राः स्यु र्या पञ्चसप्ती सभा ॥
(Tārkikarakṣā, p 208)
एते सभ्यविम सर्वे समुद्रायाश्च नियता ।
वितण्डायां कथायां च द्वयोर्जल्पवितण्डयोः ॥
(Tārkikarakṣā, p. 362)
वादे कथायामस्य चैषामाप्तो हि कारणम् ।
तथा नियमुषोत्साभावमुपोक्त इति द्वयम् ॥
(Tārkikarakṣā, p 363)

The six points [illegible] are :—(1) shifting th [illegible] proposition, (4) reno [illegible] and (6) the incoherent [illegible]

12 COMMENTARIES ON TĀRKIKARAKṢ[illegible]

Sārsaṁgraha.—A "summary of essences" (sārasaṁgraha) is the name of a commentary on the Tārkikarakṣā by Varadarāja himself. Varadarāja wrote also a commentary on *Nyāyakusumāñjali* called Sārasaṁgraha ṭikā.

Laghudīpikā.—Jñānapūrṇa is the author of a commentary on the Tārkikarakṣā called Laghudīpikā, "a light lamp." He seems to have flourished in about 1200 A D as he was a disciple of Viṣṇu Srāmin,[1] who lived in about 1200 A D. He mentions Jayanta[2] and Viśvarūpa.

Niṣkaṇṭakā.—A commentary on Tārkikarakṣā called Niṣkaṇṭakā, the thornless, was composed by [illegible] Mallinātha, who lived [illegible] on Kirātār[illegible] Mallinātha [illegible] a manuscript [illegible] was copied.[3] He [illegible] whose commentary [illegible] Mallinātha is gener[illegible] A D Mr A C [illegible] ring the reign of [illegible] Pratāpa Rudra,[4] of the Kākatīya dynasty in [illegible]10 A D

[illegible] edited by M M [illegible]

[illegible] Lakshmana Pandit.

[illegible] The copy of the manuscript is preserved in Benares College, Benares.

[illegible] Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, page 376 [illegible] edited by Mr A C Burnell and M M [illegible] page 13

13 Keśava Miśra

(About 1275 A D)

His life

Kesâva Miśra was the author of a Nyāya treatise called Tarkabhāsā He was a native of Mithilā and a preceptor of Govardhana Miśra who wrote a commentary on Tarkabhāṣā, called Tarkabhāsā Prakāśa Padmanābha Miśra, author of Kiranāvali Bhāskara and Kanādarahasya Muktāhāra, was an elder brother of Govardhana [1] Hence it follows that Keśava Miśra Padmanābha and Govardhana were contemporaries [2] Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar in his Reports of Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1882-1883, observed Cinna Bhaṭṭa *was the author of a commentary on Tarkâbhasā called* Tarkabhāsā Praveśikā and that he lived in Vijayanagar at the Court of King Harihara at the latter half of the 14th century Padmanābha, brother of Keśava, is said to have been younger to Vardhamāna whom he mentions in his Kiranāvalibhāskara So Padmanābha lived between the beginning of the 13th century and end of the 14th century A D Probably he lived at the end of the 13th century A D

14 Tarkabhāsā—Technicality of Logic

Categories—*padārtha*

Keśava Miśra opens his work thus—"In order that even dull people may get admittance into the science of Logic, I bring out this Tarkabhāsā (Technicality of Logic) replete with concise arguments"

Tarkabhāsā incorporated the Vaiśesika categories.

The Tarkabhāsā deals with the sixteen categories of the Nyāya sūtra, viz (1) *pramāna*, (2) *prameya*, (3) *samśaya*, (4) *prayojana*, (5) *drstānta*, (6) *siddhānta*, (7) *avayava*, (8) *tarka*, (9) *nirnaya*, (10) *vāda*, (11) *jalpa*, (12) *vitandā*, (13) *hetvābhāsa*, (4) *chala*, (15) *jāti*, (16) *nigrahasthāna*. The second

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[1] Govardhana Miśra, his Tarkabhāsā Prakāśa, observes —

विजयश्रीतनूजन्मा गोवर्धन इति श्रुतः ।
तर्कानुभाषी तनुते विविच्य गुरु निर्मितम् ॥
यो विश्वनाथानुज पद्मनाभानुजो गरीयान् बलभद्रजन्मा ।
तनोति तर्कानधिगम्य सर्वान् श्रीपद्मनाभाद्विदुषोविनोदम् ॥
उपदिश्य गुरुवरैरस्था वर्धमानेन ।
किरणावल्यामर्थालन्नं पद्मनाभेन ॥

(Quoted in preface to Tarkabhāsā, page 1, edited by Surendralal Goswami, Benares)

[2] Surendralal Goswami's preface to Tarkabhāsā, page 4.

The Tarkabhāṣā has also been edited with a learned introduction by Prof D R. Bhandarkar, in the Bombay Sanskrit Series The book has been translated into English by M M Dr Ganga Nath Jha, in the Indian Thought, Allahabad category, namely prameya, includes (1) ātmā, (2) śarīra, (indriya (4) artha, (5) buddhi, (6) manas, (7) pravṛtti (8) do (9) pretyabhāva (10) phala, (11) duḥkha, and (12) apavarga The word artha in the Nyāya-sūtra signified five objects of sense vi (1) gandha (smell), (2) rasa (taste) (3) rūpa (colour), (4) spar (touch), and (5) śabda (sound) In order to incorporate the Vaiśeṣika categories into Nyāya, Keśava Miśra explained artha as signifying (1) dravya, (2) guṇa (3) karma, (4) sāmānya, (5 viśeṣa, and (6) samavāya Though the sixteen categories of the Nyāya are included in the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika these sets of categories are separately stated and the Vaiśeṣika categories are explained identically with artha. Keśava confesses that he adopts this overlapping division for a special purpose The scheme of combination of the two sets of categories is shown below —

(1) pramāṇa, (2) prameya, (3) saṁśaya (4) prayojana, (5) dṛṣṭānta, (6) siddhānta,
(7) avayava, (8) tarka (9) nirṇaya, (10) vāda,
(11) jalpa, (12) vitaṇḍā, etc.

(1) ātman (2) śarīra, (3) indriya (4) artha, (5) buddhi, (6) manas, (7) pravṛtti,
(8) doṣa, (9) pretyabhāva, (10) phala,
(11) duḥkha, (12) apavarga.

(1) dravya, (2) guṇa (3) karma (4) sāmānya
(5) viśeṣa, (6) samavāya.

Instrument—karaṇa

ment (karaṇa)
esult A
if it is a
necessary antecedent of the latter, that is, it necessarily exists before the latter and does not bring about anything else, e g threads constitute the cause of
pose an ass had
, whose existence
existed
th
oth, and the ass
of the threads
is
inasmuch as it brings about something
is
the cloth In so far as the cloth itself is

essary consequence
e, e g a cloth is an
effect of threads.

Cause—kāraṇa

vāya) exists between its parts and a whole, the qualities and substance, action and an actor, the individual and a class, its specific qualities and the eternal substance

(2) The non-material, non-constituent or non inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇa*)—is that which inheres in the material cause and whose efficiency is well known, e g the conjunction of the threads is a non-material cause of the cloth, the colour of the threads is a non-material cause of the colour of the cloth Colour inheres in threads and its efficiency in producing the colour of the cloth is well known

(3) [illegible]

(*nimitta*) cause

Perception—*pratyakṣa*

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is of two kinds :—

(1) *Nirvikalpaka*, non-determinate, non-effective or abstract, and (2) *savikalpaka*, determinate, reflective or concrete The Buddhists admit only the first kind of perception and reject the second kind They say that our perception is certainly indeterminate and individual, it has for its object an individual which alone can come in contact with our senses A determinate percep-

[illegible]

as that which is excluded by non-cowness, i.e. which is not horseness, tigerness, etc

Now if we are unable to perceive cowness because it pertains to all cows, how can we perceive non-cowness which covers a still wider area? Keśava's reply to the objection of the Buddhists is that even a genus is to be regarded as an entity, like an individual, which is, as such, capable of coming in contact with our senses

Inference—*anumāna*

Inference is consideration from sign. A sign (*liṅga*) is that which indicates the predicate (*sādhya*) by the force of their invariable concomitance, e g smoke is a sign of fire, inasmuch as there is an invariable concomitance of smoke with fire in the form "wherever there is smoke there is fire" Consideration (parāmarśa) is the knowledge that the sign pervaded by the predicate abides in the subject. Inferential knowledge (anumiti) is the knowledge which is derived through consideration, e g the hill has fire, because it has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire Invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is the constant association of the sign with the predicate, e g the co-presence of smoke with fire The concomitance or co-presence must be natural and not conditional (aupādhika)[1]

Comparison—upamāna

Comparison or analogy (upamāna) is the knowledge of a certain thing as similar to another thing, derived through the remembrance of an indicative declaration on the subject, e g a man who has heard from a forester that a bosgavaeus (gavaya) is like a cow, goes into a forest and sees an animal like a cow Remembering the declaration of the forester, he ascertains that the animal he sees is a bosgavaeus This knowledge is analogical or comparative knowledge derived through an analogy or comparison

Word—śabda

Word (śabda) if it is the assertion of a trustworthy person, is a means of right knowledge, e g the Veda is a means of right knowledge, inasmuch as it was spoken by God who is supremely trustworthy

15. COMMENTARIES ON THE TARKABHĀṢĀ.

There are numerous comm
those b

[illegible] Linga, Sāramañjarī by Mādhava Deva, [illegible] Veṅkaṭa Buddha,
bhāṣā darpaṇa by Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa, Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā by
Candra, Yuktimuktāvalī by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa about 1700 A D
eśa was a contemporary of Hari Dīkṣita, a grandson of
oji Dīkṣita who lived between 1610 A D and 1659 A D)
bhāṣāprakāśikā by Cinna Bhaṭṭa about 1390 A D (Cinna
, son of Sahaja Sarvajña, and brother of Sarvajña, must have
hed about 1390[2] A D when his patron Harihara, King of

---

[1] condition (upādhi) will be explained later
[2] ds Śrīnivāsa Gosvāmi's preface to Tarkabhāṣā, page 3

Vijayanagar, lived) **Tattva Prabodhinī** by Ganeśa Dīksita, **Tarkabhāsā-prakāśikā** by Kaundinya Dīkṣita, **Tarkadīpikā** by Keśava Bhatta, **Tarkabhāsā-prākāśikā** by Govardhana Miśra, **Tarkabhāsā-prakāśikā** by Gaurīkānta Sārvabhauma, and **Nyāyapradipa** by Viśvakarmā.[1]

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[1] *Vide* Surendralal Goswami's Preface to Tarkabhāsā, pp 9-13

CHAPTER III

The Vaiśeṣika Prakaraṇa embodying the Nyāya Category of Pramāṇa

16 THE VAIŚEṢIKA INCORPORATES THE NYĀYA CATEGORY

There appeared numerous treatises on the Vaiśeṣika philo
sophy which incorporated in them the Nyāya category of
In some of the treatises the Nyāya category of
cluded in the Vaiśeṣika category of *guna*, while others bro
under *ātman*, which was included in the category *dravya*
ingenious writers kept the categories of the Vaiśeṣika separat
the Nyāya category of *pramāna*, but they made them the su
of distinct chapters of one and the same treatise. This incor
tion of the Nyāya category of *pramāna* into the categorie
the Vaiśeṣika philosophy must have commenced after the te
century A D Lakṣaṇāvalī, written by Udayana in that centu
deals with seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika, including *abhā*
without any reference to the Nyāya category of *pramāna* Th
Nyāya category of *pramāna* is included by Vallabhācārya in th
Vaiśeṣika category of *guna*.

17 VALLABHĀCĀRYA
(ABOUT 12TH CENTURY A.D.).

The exact date of Vallabhācārya is unknown He seems
have lived in the twelfth century A.D In the Nyāyalīlāvatī
mentions Kīrti (Dharmakīrti), Tutāti and Vyomācarya as
ll as Udayanācār a,¹ the famous author of Kiranāvalī, who
urished in 98 As Bhāsarvajña² and Bhūsana³ are also
ntioned, V ld not have flourished before the 10th
tury A.D limit of his time is the 13th century A D,
Vard lhyāya wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-
ati c alīlāvatī-prakāśa The Nyāyalīlāvatī is
ion se poem written by a poet of the time
ng Yādava dynasty who reigned in Devagiri

[illegible] इति [illegible] ।
by Mangeśa Rāmakṛṣṇa Telang (Nirnaya Sāgara
es 56 and 97 of the same
[illegible] । *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, page 33

[illegible] । *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, page 33.

(1) Nyāyalīlāvatī-prakāśa by Vardhamāna-Upādhyāya (abo
1225 A.D.)

(2) Nyāyalīlāvatī-dīdhiti by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1500 A.D.)

(3) Nyāyalīlāvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa by Śaṅkara Miśra (about 14
A.D.)

(4) Nyāyalīlāvatī-prakāśa-viveka (gloss on Vardhamāna) by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (about 1570 A.D.)

20. ANNAM BHAṬṬA
(1623 A.D.)

Annam Bhaṭṭa is the author of an excellent Vaiśeṣika treatise called **Tarkasaṃgraha** and of a commentary thereon called **Dīpikā**, which two, taken together, are often designated as Annambhaṭṭīyam. The Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa-prakāśa, a commentary on the Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa of Udayana, is also ascribed to him. The prevailing tradition in Sout [illegible] that Annam Bhaṭṭa was an Andhra
(Telugu) of Nor [illegible]
Benares at begi [illegible]
Dīpikā to King [illegible]
manuscript of *Tarkasaṃgraha*[2] was, as appears from Weber's
erlin Catalogue, copied in the year 1724 A.D.[3] He is supposed
some to have written a commentary on the Tattvacintāmaṇi.
e could not have flourished before the 17th century A.D.

21. Tarkasaṃgraha.

(*samavāya*), and (7) non-existence (*abhāva*) Quality is of twenty-four kinds, of which *buddhi* (intellect or knowledge) is one *Buddhi* or knowledge is of two kinds, experience (*anubhava*) and *smṛti* (recollection). *Anubhava* or experience may be right or wrong. The rig [illegible]
viz (1) perceptu [illegible]
ledge (*anumiti*), [illegible]
bal knowledge (*ś* [illegible]
knowledge are derived are called respectively (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) *anumāna* (inference), (3) comparison (*upamāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*)

Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, together called *pramāna*, are thus included in *buddhi*, which is one of the twenty-four qualities This sort of inclusion of the *pramāna* in the categories of the Vaiśesika is not altogether satisfactory, inasmuch as they do not completely fit into each other.

The scheme of incorporation is shown below —


padārtha
(1) dravya, (2) guṇa, (3) karma, (4) sāmānya, (5) viśeṣa, (6) samavāya, (7) abhāva
(1) rūpa
(12) buddhi
(24) adharma
anubhava
smṛti
right (pramā)
wrong (apramā)
(1) pratyakṣa, (2) anumiti, (3) upamiti, (4) śabda
pramāna.

The seven categories and their numerous subdivisons are most lucidly treated.

Right knowledge.

A right experience (*yathārthānubhava*) is defined as the experience of a generic nature as abiding in its subject, *e g.* in the case of a piece of silver, the experience that "this is silver," that is, this is the subject in which "silverness" abides, is a right experience

Instrument and Cause

An instrument (*karana*) is defined as a special cause which is in operation, that is, which brings about an effect, *e g*, he cuts a tree with an axe Here axe is the instrument. A cause (*kārana*) is that which invariably precedes an effect, which cannot otherwise take place, *e g* "clay is the material cause of a pot"

An effect (*kārya*) is the counterpart of an antecedent which dissolves into non-existence, *e g* "a pot is the effect of clay"

A cause is of three kinds (1) a material or intimate cause (*samavāyikārana*), (2) non-intimate or non-co-existent cause (*asamavāyikārana*), and (3) the instrumental cause (*nimittakārana*),[1] all of which will be explained later

Perception

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the knowledge which is produced from the intercourse of the sense organs with their objects It is of two kinds (1) indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and (2) determinate (*savikalpa*) The intercourse is of six kinds, which will be explained later

Inference

Inference (*anumāna*) is the means for deriving inferential knowledge Inferential knowledge is the knowledge which arises from consideration (*parāmarśa*) Consideration (*parāmarśa*) is the knowledge that the reason or the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor term, *e g* this hill has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with the fire Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the constant association of the middle term with the major term, *e g*, wherever there is smoke, there is fire *Paksadharmatā* (subjective law) refers to the fact that the smoke abides in the hill As the Vaiśeṣika philosophy does not form a subject of this volume, the topics of Tarkasamgraha are not treated here

22 COMMENTARIES ON TARKASAMGRAHA —

(8) Padakṛtya by Candraja Simha
(9) Tarkasamgraha-tattva-prakāśa by Nīlakantha (Perhaps he is the same person who wrote a commentary on the Mahābhārata in Mahārāstra in the 16th century A D)
(10) Nirukti by Jagannātha Śāstrin
(11) Nirukti by Pattābhirāma
(12) Tarkasamgraha vākyārtha-nirukti by Mādhava Padābhirāma
(13) Tarkasamgraha candrikā by Mukunda Bhatta Gādgil
(14) Tarkasamgrahopanyāsa (vākya vṛtti) by Meru Śāstri Godbolé
(15) Nyāya-bodhinī by Śuklaratnanātha
(16) Tarkasamgraha-tīkā by Ramānātha
(17) Tarkasamgraha [illegible]

[illegible] son of
[illegible] ved for

(27) Surata kalpataru (glosa) by Srinivāsa
(28) [illegible]

23 VIŚVANĀTHA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA
(1634 A.D.)

Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana or simply Pañcānana, was the author of a Vaiśeṣika treatise called Bhāṣā-pariccheda[1] (determination of categories), and of a commentary on the same called Siddhānta muktāvalī (rows of pearls of logical truths). Viśvanātha, as it appears from his Piṅgala-prakāśikā,[2] as also from other sources, was the son of Vidyānivāsa and a brother of Rudra Vācaspati. Vidyānivāsa lived in 1588 A.D.[3] when a book called Dānakāṇḍa was copied for him by a scribe called Kavicandra. Viśvanātha himself composed the Gautamasūtravṛtti at Vṛndāvana in the year 1634 A.D.[4] He was a native of Navadvīpa and an adherent of the Nyāya School of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.[5]

24 BHĀṢĀPARICCHEDA.

[illegible]

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[1] The Bhāṣāpariccheda has been edited and translated into English by Dr. E. Roer in the Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta.

[2] In the Piṅgala-prakāśikā Viśvanātha says :—

विद्यानिवाससूनोः कवितेः विश्वनाथस्य
विगुणमितिसुरुचिरा समासतामा मुदे भविता ॥

[3] सर्व्वेषां मौलिरत्नानां भट्टाचार्य्यमहात्मनां
[illegible] दानकाण्डपुस्तकम् ।
बाणेन्दुशरभौमांशुमितशाके लिखेत च
[illegible] कविचन्द्रेण [illegible] ॥

(*Vide* Eggeling's India Office Catalogue, Vol. III, page 409B, and M.M. Hara Prasād Śāstrī's Nepal Catalogue, Preface, p. xvi.)

[4] रसवाणतिथौ शकेन्द्रकाले
बहुले कामतिथौ शुचौ सिताहे ।
अकरोन्मुनिसूत्रवृत्तिमेतां
ननु वृन्दाविपिने स विश्वनाथः ॥

(*Vide* M.M. Hara Prasād Śāstrī's article on Bhāṣāpariccheda in the J.A.S.B., Vol. VI, No. 7.)

[5] एषा मुनिप्रवरगौतमसूत्रवृत्तिः
श्रीविश्वनाथकृतिना सुगमाल्पवर्णा ।
श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रचरणाम्बुजचञ्चरीक-
श्रीमच्छिरोमणिवचःप्रचयैरकारि ॥
(J.A.S.B., Vol. VI, No. 7, page 313)

[6] द्रव्याद्या निखिलाः [illegible] सदा मोदिताः ।
बालानां प्रमदाय [illegible] हरिं [illegible] ॥

ch seven categories, viz (1) *dravya* (sub-
ty), (3) *karma* (action), (4) *sāmānya*
articularity), (6) *samavāya* (inherence),
nce) *Dravya* or substance is subdivided
tejas (light), *marut* (air) *vyoma* (ether),
ātman (soul), and *manas* (mind) The
man or soul is the seat of intellect or
of two
Appre-
com-

[illegible]
f *pramāna*, as represented by perception,
rence, comparison and verbal testimony,
incorporated in the categories of the
śesika philosophy The scheme of incor-


padārtha
(4) sāmānya, (5) viśeṣa, (6) samavāya, (7) abhāva,
(5) vyoma, (6) kāla, (7) dik, (8) ātman, (9) manas
possesses
buddhi
anubhūti
smṛti
pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda
the Nyāya category of pramāṇa

Viṣṇu [1] A man who is desirous of attaining emancipati according to Jagadīśa, possess a true knowledge of (ātman) In acquiring this knowledge, one should also l sant with things which are connected with and oppo soul

Subjects of Tarkāmṛta

In the first part of the Tarkāmṛta called *Viṣaya-kāṇḍ* on subjects), Jagadīśa divides thing kinds, viz (1) positive (*bhāva*) and tive (*abhāva*) The positive things or *bhāvas* are substance quality (*guna*), action (*karma*), generality (*samānya*), part (*viśesa*), and inherence (*samavāya*) The negative tl *abhāvas* are of two kinds, viz (1) relative non-existen *sargabhāva*), and (2) reciprocal non-existence (*anyony* The first kind is subdivided as (1) antecedent non-e (*prāgabhāva*), (2) subsequent non-existence (*pradhvams* and (3) absolute non-existence (*atyantābhava*)

The second part of the Tarkamrta, called *Jñāna-kār* [illegible] *ramā*), v [illegible] (1) [illegible] son ([illegible] and (1) [illegible]

The scheme of amalgamation

The manner in which the seven categories of the V and the four *pramanas* of the Nyā been combined, is ingenious and The categories do not coalesce wit other, but are treated as a consistent whole

A scheme of combination of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya gories is given below —


Tarkāmṛta
viṣayakāṇḍa
jñānakāṇḍa
dravya, guna, karma, sāmānya, viśesa samavāya, abhāva
pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabd
Vaiśeṣika combined with Nyāya

---

[1] [illegible]

26 LAUGĀKṢI BHĀSKARA.

Laugākṣi Bhāskara, well versed in Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mī-
nāmsā philosophies, was the son of Mudgala and nephew of the poet
Rudra His proper name was Bhāskara, his surname being Lau-
gākṣi. From the fact that he mentions the temple of Viśveśvara
nd the pool of Manikarnikā, —the two most sacred spots in Benares,
—we may reasonably suppose that Laugākṣi Bhāskara lived in
hat sacred city [1]

His age may be placed probably in the 17th century

27. TARKAKAUMUDĪ.

His Tarkakaumudī, which opens with a salutation to Vāsudeva,
ays due obeisance to Akṣapāda and Kanāda He divides cate-
ories
guna),
arity
abhāva
he soi
ion (sn
(apramā) The means of
ā is pramāna, which is of
inference (anumāna)
forms the main subject of
he Nyāya philosophy, is thus amalgamated with the doctrine of
even categories, forming the subject-matter of the Vaiśeṣika
philosophy.

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[1] Laugākṣi Bhāskara mentions Maṇikarnikā, the bathing place, and Viśveśvara,
he presiding deity of Benares, in quite a familiar tone —यथा वा मणिकर्णिका, विश्वेश्वर etc. (Tarkakaumudī, page 8 edited by Vāsudeva Lakṣmaṇa Śāstrī
Panaikar, Bombay).

CHAPTE

Works treating of certain t
topics of the Va

28 THE NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA FU

Some manuals of logic dealt n
notice of the Vaiśeṣika, nor with those
tant topics or sub-topics of the two sys
and elucidated in an abstruse and pre
assumed more or less the nature of crit
or controversial topics of the Nyāya an
Śaśadhara's Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa (ab
important work of this kind

29 ŚAŚADHAR
(ABOUT 1125 A D

Śaśadhara, styled Mahopādhyāya
have been a native of Mithilā The tim
is not definitely known Probably he
but after Udayana whose words he quotes
kecit (some) Śaśadhara and Maṇidhara w
tradition, two logicians, whose definitio
concomitance) were criticised by Gaṅge

Maṇidhara According, however, to the I
hara lived in the 12th century A D

30 NYĀYA-SIDD

The only logical treatise of Śaśadhara
us, is Nyāya
cal truths) which op

Subjects of the work

---

[1] *Vide* the colophon of the Nyāya-siddhānta-dī
Vindhyeśvarī Prasād Dvivedi of Benares. It runs th

इति महोपाध्याय शशधरकृतं न्यायप्रकरणं समाप्तम् ।

[2]
अखिलमदर्शिविद्याभ्यासे
गौतममतैकविद्यानाम् ।
मत्वा नित्यमपौर्वं
शशधर शर्मा प्रकाशयति ॥

From the manuscript of Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa,
Society of Bengal

Adhīśa (Śiva). It deals with the topics of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy in a promiscuous way This is evident from the titles of the various chapters of the work, *viz* (1) invocation of blessings (*maṅgalācaraṇa*), (2) controversy on darkness (*andhakāra-vipratipatti*), (3) examination of causality (*kāraṇatā-vicāra*), (4) the power in generality as maintained by the Tautātikas (*jāti-śakti-vādi-*

nirūpaṇa, etc) The work ends with an examination of non-existence (*abhāva*) as a means of knowledge

Commentary

There is a commentary on the Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa called Nyāya siddhānta-dīpa-ṭīkā by Śeṣānanta.

31. MĀDHAVĀCĀRYA
(ABOUT 1331—1391 A D)

Mādhavācārya flourished in 1391[1] A D (1313 Śaka) He

to have been brother of Sāyana, while others hold that he was the same as Sāyana,[2] though essentially he was a writer on Mīmāṁsā philosophy. His preceptor was Sarvajña Viṣṇu, son of Śārṅgapāṇi.[1] He is mentioned here because he has supplied, among other things, some important information about the Nyāya philosophy. Besides giving a complete exposition of the Nyāya system under the head of Akṣapādadarśana, Mādhava throws a good deal of light on logic of the Cārvākas and Buddhists.

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[1] *Vide* Preface to Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha printed in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.

[2] Preface to Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, translated by E B Cowell and A. G Gough, pp vii–viii

[3] Perhaps Mādhava was born in the family of Sāyana Compare—

श्रीमत्सायणदुग्धाब्धिकौस्तुभेन महौजसा ।
क्रियते माधवार्येण सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहः ॥
पूर्वेषामतिदुस्तराणि सुतरामालोड्य शास्त्राण्यसौ

32. SARVADARŚANA-SAMGRAHA, AKṢAPĀDA DARŚANA

Why Nyāya was so called.

In the Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha under the title of Akṣapāda-darśana, Mādhava has given a brief exposition of the sixteen categories treated in the Nyāya-sūtra. The Nyāya philosophy was so called, because it specially treated of Nyāya otherwise called avayava (syllogism) which formed the predominant feature of the system and proved useful in the acquisition of all kinds of knowledge.[2]

INFERENCE AS A MEANS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

The view of Cārvāka darśana.

Cārvāka denies inference as a means of right knowledge. Those who maintain the authority of inference (*anumāna*), accept something as a sign or middle term, which is supposed to abide in the minor term, and to be in invariable concomitance with the major term. The invariable concomitance must be freed from all conditions, whether they are sure (*niścita*) or suspected (*sandigdha*). Now this concomitance by its mere existence cannot produce inference. The concomitance, if it is to produce inference, must be known. How do we then know this concomitance? We cannot know the concomitance by means of perception, which does not cognize past and future events. We cannot employ inference, the validity of which has not yet been established. Verbal testimony, which is included in inference cannot help us in this matter. Comparison is useless. Hence, the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term cannot be known by any of the so called four means of knowledge.

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[1] श्रीशार्ङ्गपाणितनयं निखिलागमज्ञं
सर्वज्ञविष्णुगुरुमन्वहमाश्रयेऽहम् ॥
(Sarvadarśana saṁgraha opening lines)

[2] ननु प्रमाणादिषोडशपदार्थेषु प्रतिपाद्यमानेषु कथमिदं न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते सत्यं तथाप्यसाधारणेन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति न्यायेन न्यायस्य परार्थानुमानापरपर्यायस्य सकलविद्यानुग्राहकतया सर्वकर्मानुष्ठानसाधनतया प्रधानत्वेन तथाव्यपदेशो युज्यते । Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, Akṣapādadarśanam, p. 130, edited by Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati, Calcutta.

Equipollent and non-equipollent concomitance

Similarly, the invariable concomitance has also been described as freed from conditions (*upādhi*). A condition (*upādhi*) is that which constantly accompanies the major term, but does not constantly accompany the middle term, *e g* the hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel (where wet fuel is a condition). A condition may be fully defined as that (1) which does not constantly accompany the middle term, (2) which constantly accompanies the major term, and (3) is constantly accompanied by the major term That the condition must be *equipollent in extension with the major term* is evident from the statement of the Great Doctor (probably Udayanācārya) who says "When an equipollent concomitance and a non-equipollent concomitance do both abide in an object, the non-equipollent concomitance, if it is not covered by the equipollent concomitance, is inadmissible, that is, not conducive to the true conclusion "[1]

[illegible]

[illegible] "this hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel," where "smoke" and "fire nourished by wet fuel," are equal in their extensions, that is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire nourished by wet fuel, and wherever there is fire nourished by

[illegible]

the fire is greater in extension than smoke, that is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen, but wherever there is fire there is not necessarily smoke, as in a red-hot iron ball

Now an equipollent concomitance and a non-equipollent concomitance do both abide in smoke in the following instances — (1) the hill has smoke because it has fire, and (2) the hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel

In the first instance smoke is in non-equipollent concomitance with fire, whereas in the second instance smoke is in equiphilosophy. His preceptor was Sarvajña-viṣṇu, son of Śārṅ-pāṇi.[1] He is mentioned here because he has supplied, amc other things some important information about the Nyāya ph sophy. Besides giving a complete exposition of the Nyāya syste under the head of Akṣapādadarśana, Mādhava throws a g deal of light on Logic of the Cārvākas and Buddhists.

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[1] Varadarāja in his commentary on Tārkikarakṣā called Sārasaṃgraha quotes this verse as an example of the fallacy *hetvābhāsā*, called *aprayojaka* (inadmissible), which is identified in the conditional (*upādhimāna*) quoted in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha chapter I, Cārvāka darśana

समासमाविनाभावावेकत्र स्तो यदा तदा ।
समेन यदि नो व्याप्तस्तयोर्हीनोऽप्रयोजकः ॥

The portion which is added to the middle term or subtracted from the major term is called an upādhi (condition), *anyathāsiddhi* (conditionality) or *aprayojaka* (inadmissible) Tārkikarakṣā, page 252, edited by Vindhyeśvarī Prasād, Benares.

32. SARVADARŚANA-SAMGRAHA,—AKṢAPĀDA DARŚANA.

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[1] शार्ङ्गपाणितनयं निखिलागमज्ञ
सर्वज्ञविष्णुगुरुमन्वहमाश्रयेऽहम् ।
(Sarvadarśana saṃgraha, opening lines)

[2] ननु प्रमाणादिपदार्थषोडशके प्रतिपाद्यमाने
थमसाधारण्येन व्यपदेशो भवतीति
ग्राहकतया सर्वकर्मानुष्ठानसाध
graha, Akṣapādadarśanam

न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते एवं
परप्राधान्यस्य सकलविद्यानु
पद्यते । Sarvadarśana saṃ-
na Tarkavācaspati Calcutta.

identity between the jars We cannot predicate one thing of another thing, if there is no difference whatever between the two It is therefore proved that we can infer one thing from another thing through the relation of cause and effect or when the two things are in essence the same

The Buddhists further maintain that inference as a means of knowledge can on no account be denied It would be a mere assertion, if a person were to say that inference is not a means of knowledge. To think of inference as a means of knowledge and yet to deny it involves him in an absurdity, as if, he were saying *that his mother was barren*

SECTION II.

Tarka-Śāstra—the Science of Dialectics.

CHAPTER I

Formation of the Tarka Śāstra.

33. THE NYĀYA CANNOT BE COMBINED WITH THE VAIŚES

[illegible]

Nyāya and Vaiśesika

34. ADOPTION OF *Pramāna* ALONE.

[illegible]

tion [illegible]
Gre[illegible]
pra[illegible]
were [illegible]
mā[illegible]
of verbal testimony.

35. ADOPTION OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA PRINCIPLES.

The theory of *pramāṇa* became very subtle when it adop
the principles of generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*),
[illegible]
that thing is also perceptible by the same sense

Thus the Nyāya theory of perception, etc., considered from the standpoint of the Vaiśesika philosophy, became very subtle and intricate

36. SUBTLETY OF MEANINGS AIMED AT.

A hair-splitting subtlety in the discussion of meanings of *terms is the distinguishing characteristic of the Tarka-śāstra (the* science of dialectics) Thus Akṣapāda defines a proposition in quite a simple style as "the laying down of what is to be established." But in elucidating the meaning of a proposition Gangeśa, Raghunātha, Gadādhara and others produce definitions which are terribly long and intricate. The subtle explanation is, however, an excellent training for the intellect.

37 FINE DEFINITION OF TERMS.

The technicalities of Tarka-śāstra have repelled students of Sanskrit from its study. The immemorial practice has been for Nai- [illegible]

Modern Logicians do not trouble themselves about the nature of things. They are satisfied if they can evolve a correct definition, and in their verbal definitions they evince a subtlety and skill, which to a certain extent compensate for the paucity of their materials.

38 THE USE OF TECHNICAL TERMS.[1]

In bringing out the subtlety of meanings and in giving fine *definitions, the modern logicians have invented numerous techni*cal terms of which some are given here.

ativyāpti—Being too wide

anugata-dharma—Common property.

anugama—Generalisation

anuyogitā—The quality of being an *anuyogi*. When a thing stands to another thing in a particular relation, that upon which it stands is called *anuyogi*, while it itself is called *pratiyogi* (counterpart) in regard to the relation. Thus a jar standing on the ground in the relation of union is called *pratiyogi* and the ground is the *anuyogi* of the relation.

anyathā-siddhi—Concomitant circumstances which are not causes.

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[1] Vide [illegible] Candra Śāstrin's [illegible] Vol. II, and Mahāmahopādhyāya [illegible]'s *Brief notes on the modern Nyāya system of* [illegible] *Indian Thought.*

CHAPTER II

Tattva-cintāmaṇi the earliest Work on Tarka-śāstra

39. IMPORTANCE OF TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI.

The Tattva-cintāmaṇi ("a thought-jewel of truth"), otherwise known as Pramāṇa cintāmaṇi ("a thought-jewel of valid knowledge"), of which a short summary in English is given in the following pages, was written by a Brāhmana logician of Mithilā named Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya It introduces a new era in the development of Logic in India and is justly reckoned as the first work on the Modern School of Hindu Logic In modern India Sanskrit scholarship is not considered of any worth unless it is accompanied by a knowledge of the Tattva-cintāmaṇi or at least a portion of it. The study of this work develops to an enormous extent the discursive faculty in the reader and enables him to argue with hair-splitting distinctions and subtleties

The book, since its first composition in the 12th century A D, has been a subject of close study by the Pandits of Mithilā, and about the middle of the 15th century its study was introduced into Bengal by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, who had been educated in the academies of Mithilā Since 1503 A D, when the university of Navadvīpa was established, the Tattva-cintāmaṇi was much popularised in Bengal *through the endeavours of the famous* Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others Gradually the book was intro-

made to present the contents of the work in English, Bengali, Hindi or any other modern language, perhaps on account of the bewildering abstruseness of its style and thought.

40 GAṄGEŚA—THE AUTHOR OF THE TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI (1200 A D)

pitiated the goddess Kālī, on the cremation ground adjacent to his uncle's house, and acquired from her, as a boon, deep erudition in the science of Logic

Gangeśa mentions the name of Śivāditya Miśra,[1] the well-known author of Saptapadārthī, and makes frequent quotations from Ratna-koṣa,[2] which is a work on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy [illegible] Gauda Mīmāṁsaka[3] of [illegible] ust have flourished after [illegible] Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri,[4] whose opinions he has quoted, flourished. As he criticises [illegible]

son Vardhamāna Upādhyāya lived, in other words Gangeśa is assigned to the last quarter of the 12th century A.D.[5]

[illegible]

tions of pupils Bhagiratha Thakkura was seventh in descent from Gangeśa Upādhyāya, and allowing an average life of thirty years for each generation, we may assume that Gangeśa lived 180 years before Bhagiratha, that is, about the year 1178 A.D.

The succession of pupils from Gangeśa is as follows:—

1 Gangeśa, 2. Vardhamāna, 3 Yajñapati 4 Hari Miśra, 5 [illegible] 6. (a) Vāsudeva, (b) Rucidatta, (c) Candrapati (?), 7 (a) Maheśa Thakkura, (b) Bhagiratha Thakkura, 8. A pupil, 9. Bhavanātha 10. Śankara Miśra.

The inscription is found on a stone-slab attached to a well at the village Dhanukhā near Janakapura in Darbhanga. It runs thus:—

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[Those who maintain that Gaṅgeśa lived in the fourth quarter of the 12th
tury A.D[1] base their contention on the mention of Vardhamāna, son of Gaṅgeśa,
he Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha in the 14th century A D.[2] and upon an interpreta-
of the expression *śakābdā la saṁ 1509*, occurring in a manuscript of Pakṣa
ra Miśra's commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Tattva-cintāmaṇi, as equivalent to 1278
).[3] Now the verse on the authority of which Vardhamāna is supposed to have
n mentioned in the Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha is obviously an interpolation, and
expression *śakābdā la saṁ 1509*, written in very modern characters, refers in
opinion *not* to Lakṣmana saṁvat 159, corresponding to 1278 A D , but to *śaka*
r 1509 corresponding to 1587 A.D , the word *la saṁ* being either redundant or
ufying simply a year In fact, if Gaṅgeśa had been older than the author of
Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, his work would have been reviewed, or at any rate
rred to, in it]

41 THE TEXT OF TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI

Book I.—Perception—*Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa.*

The Tattva-cintāmaṇi is divided into four books dealing res-
ctively with (1) Perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anu-
na*), (3) Comparison (*upamāna*), and (4) Verbal testimony
bda), which are the four means of deriving valid knowledge
e first book, which treats of perception, opens with stanzas
uting God Śiva[4]

---

hat Maheśa Ṭhak-
he opening lines

for 1915, p 265,

[2] *Vide* Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, *Pāṇiniya darśana.*

[3] प्रत्यक्षालोक (Pratyakṣāloka), which is a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Tattva-
āmaṇi by Pakṣadhara Miśra, was, according to its colophon, copied in the
a year 1509 (corresponding to 1587 A D) and *not* in the Lakṣmana saṁvat 159
rresponding to 1278 A D), as the date contained in the colophon runs thus —

स्तु श्रीरस्तु शकाब्दा ॥ ल स १५०९ में भादवदि ६ ॥

[4] सुधांशोर्यो भ्रुकुटिघटितखण्डपरमम
चिहूर्णितं सर्वक्षितिविलसदर्चिः सततं ।
कृपापारावार परममितिकृत्प्रणमतां
मतस्ते संचित्रमितमखिलं पुरभिदे ॥ १ ॥
यन्नीचान् धनाश्रयाः सुरभिलांता गुरवो मतं
चिन्तादिव्यविलोपनेन च गतो धर्मं विशेषाविलम् ।
तस्मै दीपवचेन पुरंदरे चिरान्तरीकामुक
अंशुमत्कुते विवेक दक्षता नीतव्यविचारकविम् ॥ २ ॥

Invocation of Blessings—*Maṅgala-vāda*

Salutation is offered to Śiva to invoke his blessings. The invocation is of three kinds, *viz.* bodily, vocal, and mental. The bodily invocation [illegible] ing the eulogy o [illegible] "All polite peop [illegible] invoking blessings if they wish to bring their work to a successful completion." Though we do not find any explicit text in the Veda enjoining inv [illegible] practice of good peo [illegible] of such a text. It [illegible] ings is not the imm [illegible] is the means of removing obstacles which beset the work. In the case of an atheist finishing his work successfully without any invocation of blessings we are to suppose that there were no obstacles in his way or that he performed the invocation in his previous life. The case of a theist invoking blessings and yet failing to finish his work is explained on the supposition that he encountered enormous obstacles which his feeble invocation could not remove. The Kādambarī which opens with a profuse invocation of blessings furnishes an illustration of a work remaining unfinished, owing to the excess of obstacles in its way.

The Validity of Knowledge—*Prāmāṇya-vāda*

Pramā or valid knowledge.

In determining the true meaning of *pramāṇa* (the means of valid knowledge) one must understand the true meaning of the word *pramā* (valid knowledge). *Pramā* or valid knowledge is the knowledge of a thing as it is; it is the knowledge of the generic nature as abiding in its own subject that is abiding in every one of the individuals [illegible]. For instance, to know a [illegible]

[illegible]

knowledge were derived from the general grounds of knowledge

owledge of a dubious character, and the Mīmāṃsakas cannot tisfactorily explain the production of this dubious knowledge or ubt If there is consciousness of knowledge, there is, according them, along with it a consciousness of its validity which leaves room for doubt, and if on the other hand, there is no con- iousness of knowledge, there cannot arise any consciousness of dubiousness Hence Gaṅgeśa concludes that the validity of owledge is not derived from its general grounds (or causes) It according to him, derived through its special cause called instru-

emisses), that of comparison is the knowledge of similarity, and at of verbal testimony is the knowledge of consistency. Our

atever *is not conducive to activity which is fruitful is not* lid knowledge" Suppose for instance, a person cognises from stance a white thing to be a piece of silver His knowledge ll be valid if it harmonises with his actual experience when he proaches the piece of silver Our consciousness of the validity a particular knowledge arises therefore from our consciousness of e fruitful correspondence or harmony between the particular owledge (idea) and the activity which it leads to

Invalid Knowledge—*Anyathākhyāti*

pramā, anyathākhyāti, rama, or invalid know- ge.

Gaṅgeśa says that invalid knowledge or error, in Sanskrit *apramā, anyāthā-khyāti* or *bhrama*, is the knowledge (experience) of a thing as it is not,—it is the knowledge (experience) of a generic nature, which does not abide in its own subject, but which abides in the subject of another generic nature For instance, to know a pearl to be a piece of silver is invalid knowledge, inasmuch as the generic nature "silverness" does not abide here in the piece of silver which is its own subject but abides in a pearl which is the subject of another generic nature viz "pearlness"

How is activity in error caused?

The Mīmāṁsakas (Prābhākaras) do not admit invalid knowledge or error All knowledge, according to them is valid and as such prompts us to activity In the case of a person who takes a pearl to be a piece of silver by saying 'this is silver' we should bear in mind that he acquires the knowledge of 'this' (pearl) through perception and that of 'silver' through recollection But he owing to some defect, is not conscious of the distinction between "this" (pearl) and "silver" that is, between 'perception' and 'recollection' and this non-consciousness of distinction leads him to activity

Gaṅgeśa opposes the Mīmāṁsakas by saying that the in a subject As already stated when the generic nature abides in its own subject, the knowledge is valid, but when it abides in the subject of another generic nature, the knowledge is invalid A valid determinate knowledge (*pramā*) leads us to activity which is fruitful, while an invalid determinate knowledge (*apramā*) leads us [illegible]

[illegible] there is only one kind of knowledge, *viz* determinate knowledge, and it will be cumbrous to assume two kinds, *viz* perception and recollection

Intercourse between Senses and their Objects—*Sannikarsa.*

Ordinary Preception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*).

Perceptual knowledge, (*pratyakṣa*)

Perceptual knowledge, or, more simply, perception, has been defined (by Akṣapāda) as knowledge which *arises from the intercourse of a sense with* its object, and which is non-erratic, being either reflective (mediate) or non-reflective (immediate). This definition, according to Gaṅgeśa, is too wide in so far as it includes recollection and inference of the soul, and is also too nar- [illegible]

[illegible] direct" Perception is further defined by Gaṅgeśa as knowledge *whose intrumental cause is not knowledge* *The instrumental* causes of inference, comparison and verbal testimony are respectively the knowledge of premisses, the knowledge of similarity and the knowledge of consistency, but the instrumental cause of the perception is a sense-organ which is not knowledge.

The word *perception, which ordinarily signifies perceptual* knowledge or rather the means by which we derive perceptual knowledge, does sometimes stand for the whole process in which a sense in intercourse with its object produces knowledge. The senses are six, *viz* (1) the eye, (2) the ear, (3) the nose, (4) the tongue, (5) the tactual surface, and (6) the mind Their objects are respectively the following:—(1) colour, (2) sound, (3) odour, (4) savour, (5) touch (of warmth, coldness, hardness, softness, etc.), and (6) feeling (of pleasure, pain, etc). Correspondent with the senses there are six kinds of knowledge (perception), *viz*. the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual and mental (internal).

eye and "smokeness" (the generic nature of smoke) is also an ordinary one which is called united-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*). But the intercourse between our eye and all cases of smoke is not an ordinary one. It is a transcendent intercourse, as there is no ordinary union of our eye with all cases of smoke of all times and all places. The intercourse consists here of the knowledge of "smokeness", a generic nature which is possessed by all cases of smoke of all times and all places. This sort of intercourse which consists of the knowledge of a generic nature, is called a transcen

perceive their mutual differences, and as such cannot be omniscient.

Intercourse (perception) whose character is knowledge.—If in the perception of a thing the knowledge of the thing itself constitutes the intercourse, it is called an intercourse whose character is know-

intercourse whose character is general, and there is no necessity for our assuming another intercourse whose character is knowledge. On seeing a piece of sandal-wood there arises in us the
recollection of fr ʻfr y" (the generic nature of
d in the relations of inherence
(*samaveta-samavāya*) respec-
y", through the inter-
us the perception
of this particular

c intercourse
e perception
lain the per
ness" (which
, through the inter-
perception of "fra
fragrancy", wh
heref

ceived since it is not perceived, there is no pot here The non-perception of a pot is therefore the means of knowing the non-existence of the pot Gangeśa does not admit non-perception to be a means of knowledge Non-existence, according to him, is perceived by our senses through the intercourse of particularity For instance, in the perception of non-existence of a pot on the floor, there is the union of our eye with the floor in which abides non-existence of the pot as a particularity, that is, there is perception of the floor as possessed of the non-existence of the pot The

existence by the tactual surface, and pleasure and its non-existence by the mind

Non existence (or negation)—*Abhāva-vāda*

existence of the thing, and that the intercourse through which we perceive the thing, must be the same as that through which we perceive its non-existence, *viz* union, etc. For instance, our perception of the non-existence of a pot (in the form "there is no pot on the floor") does not presuppose a separate entity called "non-existence", but rests entirely on "the floor" which is the locus of the non-existence of the pot, and is carried on through the inter-

does not rest on "the floor", that is, the non-existence of the pot is not identical with the floor Had the one rested on the other, or had the two been identical, there would have been perception of the non-existence of the pot even when the pot was on the floor and further there would have been a disturbance of the relation of container and contained that exists between the two. Since this contingency is disastrous, we must admit that there is something on the ground which operates in our failure to perceive the

Non-existence is of two kinds (1) universal and (2) reciprocal. The universal non-existence is subdivided into (a) the antecedent, (b) the subsequent, and (c) the absolute. The antecedent non-existence is that which has *no beginning but has an end, e.g.* a jar is in antecedent non-existence before it is made up. The subsequent non-existence has a beginning but no end, *e.g.* a jar is in subsequent non-existence after it is destroyed. The absolute non-existence is that whose counterpart is viewed in relation to all the three times past, present, and future, *e.g.* there is no jar on the floor. The reciprocal non-existence is the non-existence of identity, *e.g.* a jar is not a pot.

Causes of Perception—*Pratyakṣa-kāraṇa-vāda*

The causes of perception are the following :—

Causes of knowledge in general

(1) A union of the mind with the tactual surface and the soul. While a person is in deep sleep there is produced in him no knowledge as there is then a union of his mind with the soul alone but not with the tactual surface. The mind abides at [illegible]

nāḍī called

e. In recol-

the tactual

(2) [illegible] with the senses and [illegible]

the senses with their objects, *e g* in the perception of a colour there is a union of our mind with the eye which is in intercourse with the colour

(3) Proportionate extension of the objects of sense, that is, the *objects must not be of infinite extension as* ether, or of no extension as atoms The ether and atoms are not [illegible]

Special causes of perception

cannot be perceived Similarly, a fire which exists in the latent condition in a heated frying-pan, is not perceptible

(5) A special connection of light with the object of sense, *e g* a pot, if it is to be perceptible, must have sufficient light on its front rather than on its back.

Special causes of visual perception

(6) Absence of obstacles, *e g* too much proximity or too much *distance, is often obstructive to our perception*

The Atomic Nature of the Mind—*Manonutva-vāda*

The senses through the instrumentality of which we perceive colour, sound, odour, savour and touch, are the eye, ear, nose, tongue and tactual surface respectively. The sense which operates as an instrument in our perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and volition, is the mind, which is called the internal sense in contrast to the other five senses which are external

The mind is atomic in extension, inasmuch as we cannot perceive various objects at one and the same time Although there [illegible]

union with all the five external senses at once so as to give rise to the five kinds of perception simultaneously But everybody is aware that it is impossible for more than one kind of perception to arise at one and the same time This shows that the mind can come into union with only *one* external sense at a time, or in other [illegible]

senses simultaneously, should be told that the operations, which they suppose to be simultaneous, do really take place in succession, as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pierced one after another by a needle.

27

The Doctrine of Self-consciousness—*Anu-vyavasāya-vāda.*

Some philosophers maintain that any particular kind of knowledge performs by itself all its practical functions and does not depend upon another knowledge for the same. For instance, all practical functions connected with a pot can, according to them, be performed when there is knowledge of the pot, but we cannot perform those functions when there is no such knowledge. It is therefore knowledge which performs all its practical function We must not however suppose that all practical functions ar

promiscuously. In fac

nature, related to a par

its corresponding func

tions

Some others, who hold the doctrine of triangular perception (*tripuṭī-pratyakṣa-vādinah*), say that each kind of knowledge is self-manifest and that it manifests itself in the form "I know this," which involves an assumption of a knower (the soul), a knowable (the object), and knowledge (the act), and as such performs all its practical functions

Gangeśa, in opposing the above views, says that a particular kind of knowledge cannot by itself perform its practical functions, but is dependent upon another sort called self-consciousness (*anu vyavasāya*) which enables it to perform the same. Our knowledge, continues Gangeśa, arises in the form "this" or "pot," but not in the form "I know this" or "I know the pot", and until it assumes the latter form no practical functions can be performed. He therefore lays down that after the origination of knowledge of the form "this" or "pot," there arises another knowledge called self-consciousness of the form "I know this" or "I know the pot," which performs all practical functions. This latter variety, called self-consciousness, arises through the intercourse of the previous knowledge with our mind. The intercourse is united-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*), inasmuch as there is a union of the mind with the soul in which resided the previous knowledge in the relation of inherence. *In fact the latter knowledge or self-consciousness is the mental (or internal) perception of the previous knowledge.*

Immediate Perception—*Nirvikalpaka-vāda.*

Perception is of two kinds, viz. (1) *the immediate, non reflective or abstract (nirvikalpaka) and* (2) *the mediate, reflective or concrete (savikalpaka). The immediate is perception of an indeterminate character. It is perception of a subject and its generic nature as separate from each other, e.g. the perception of a " or 'mere' potness" without any mutual connection.*

Even the mere "pot" or mere "potness" is of the form "something" of which it is absurd to talk as a "pot" or "potness." On the intercourse of a sense with its object the first perception that takes place is immediate or non-reflective It is supersensuous, that is, not cognisable by any of our senses, not even by the mind It has been defined as knowledge which is devoid of all connection with name, generic nature, etc, which indicates no relation and involves no specification

Mediate Perception—*Savikalpaka-vāda*

The mediate or reflective perception is of a determinate character. It indicates a subject and its generic nature through their relation to each other, *e g* "this is a pot" where "potness" (the generic nature) abides in "this" (the subject) in the relation *of inherence The perception of the form "this is a pot" is* therefore mediate or reflective

The doctrine of mediate or reflective perception may be set forth as follows —

- *Immediate perception*—the perception of "pot" and "potness" as separate from each other
- *Mediate perception*—the perception of "potness" as abiding in "this" in the form 'this is a pot"
- *Self-consciousness*—the mental perception of the knowledge of 'potness" as abiding in "this," in the form "I know this is a pot"

Book II —Inference—*Anumāna-khanda*

THE DETERMINATION OF INFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE—*Anumiti-nirūpana*

Inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) is that knowledge which is derived through another kind of knowledge, *viz* that the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor term, *e g*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here "hill" is the minor term which is also called the subject, locus or side; "fire" is the major term, also called the

This other knowledge, viz. that smoke, in invariable concomitance with fire, abides in the hill, is an instance of what is called

(1) There cannot be any knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term,
(2) The middle term may be erratic owing to its connection with a condition accepted or disputed, and
(3) We often associate the middle term with the major term through a mere probability which involves no certainty.

Gangesa sets aside the above view by saying that there are other means of knowledge over and above perception, and that inference is at any rate one means of knowledge. The doctrine of invariable concomitance etc. will be treated later. In support of inference as a means of knowledge it will suffice at present to observe the following arguments:—

1. One cannot establish the invalidity of an inference unless one infers the invalidity from the similarity of the inference with those previously known as invalid. This process presupposes inference as a means of knowledge.

2. The statement that "inference is not a means of knowledge" would be of no use to an expert who is aware of the invalidity of inference. It may be also used [illegible] but on a [illegible] erring person. Now how are we to know that the person is [illegible] or erring? It is certainly not through perception but through inference.

3. "Inference is not a means of knowledge" [illegible]

4. [illegible]

[illegible]

necessary to define the phrase "invariable concomitance." In Sanskrit it is called *vyāpti* which is rendered by such expressions as pervasion, inseparable connection, perpetual attendance, constant co-presence, etc.

Five Provisional Definitions of Invariable Concomitance—*Vyāpti-pañcakam.*

1 Invariable concomitance is the non-presence of the middle term in the locus of the non-existence of the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

Diagram I


REGION OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF FIRE AS WELL AS OF SMOKE
FIRE
FIRE
FIRE
FIRE
FIRE
SMOKE

Diagram II.


NAMEABLE
KNOWABLE

Here smoke (the middle term) is absent from all regions outside the region of fire (the major term) as shown in diagram I. Gangeśa observes that the definition is defective inasmuch as it does not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference, such as "all are nameable, because they are knowable", illustrated in diagram II, in which outside the region of the nameable there is nothing from which the knowable may be absent.

Diagram III.


THE TREE AND NOT OCCUPIED BY THE APE. THE REGION LYING OUTSIDE
NOT OCCUPIED BY THE APE. THE
THE TREE OCCUPIED BY THE APE.

2. Invariable concomitance is the non-presence of the middle term in that locus of [illegible]xistence of the [illegible] is not [illegible] major

[illegible]y the ape, because it is the tree.

Here "the tree" is the middle term, and "occupied by the ape" is the major term. In diagram III the tree is totally absent from the region not occupied by the ape. The part of the tree not occupied by the ape is excluded from the locus of the non-existence of the major term by the clause "which is not the locus of the major term itself" This definition too is defective, because it, like the previous one, does not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference

the non-co-presence of the
-existence whose counterpart
major term, e g

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

In diagram I. we find that smoke is not co-present with anything which is non-existent in reciprocity to fire Water, book, cloth, table, etc, are all non-existent in their reciprocal relation to fire, that is, they are not fire.

Gangeśa observes that this definition too is defective as it does

4. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term forms the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the locus of the non-existence of the entire major term, e g

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

Here smoke forms the counterpart of the non-existence of smoke which abides in the region of the non existence of entire fire

According to Gangeśa this definition is defective, as it fails to explain the case of an exclusively affirmative inference In diagram II. we find that there is no non existence of the knowable which abides in the region of the non existence of the nameable.

5. Invariable concomitance is the non presence of the middle term in what is not the locus of the major term, e g

The hill is full of fire
because it is full of smoke

Here smoke is not present in anything which is not the abode f fire. This definition too according to Gangeśa, is defective as t does not meet the case of an exclusively affirmative inference In diagram II we find that there is no non-presence of the know-[illegible] in what is not included in the region of [illegible]

Definition of Invariable Concomitance given by "Lion" and "Tiger"—*Simha-vyāghrokta-vyāptilaksana*

1. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term has not a locus in which there is the non-co-presence of the major term, *e g*

The hill is full of fire
because it is full of smoke

Here fire is always co-present with smoke in the locus of the latter It never occurs that in the locus of smoke there is no fire

2. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term has not a locus which is different from the locus of the major term, *e g*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

The locus of smoke is never different from that of fire, that is, the former never extends beyond the latter

Gangeśa observes that both these definitions are defective, inasmuch as their import is to show that the middle term has not a locus which is also not the locus of the major term On the contrary we find that the middle term has often a locus which is not the locus of the major term. For instance, smoke on a hill has a locus which is not the locus of fire in a kitchen

Non-existence whose Counterpart is Qualified by a Nature abiding in a Different Locus—*Vyadhikarana-dharmāvacchinnābhāvah.*

Most of the definitions of invariable concomitance given above were defective inasmuch as they did not cover the case of an exclusively affirmative inference. They involved such phrases as "non-existence of the major term" and "difference of locus of the major term" which could not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference in which the major term was all pervading To make the "non existence of the major term" and "difference of locus of the major term" possible, even in an exclusively affirmative inference, some logicians assume a non existence whose counterpart is qualified by a nature abiding in a locus different from the counterpart The expression "there is no fire possessing the nature of a pot" signifies that "there is non-existence of a fire as qualified by the nature of a pot" which, according to them, is quite correct inasmuch as the nature of a pot abides in the relation of inherence in a pot and not in fire Similarly "there is no nameableness possessing the nature of a pot" signifies that "there is non existence of nameableness as qualified by the nature of a pot." Though nameableness (major term) is all-pervading we have, they say, been able to talk of its non existence by assuming the nature of a pot to abide in it (instead of it in the pot).

Here "the tree" is the middle term, and "occupied
ape" is the major term. In diagram III the tree is totally
from the region not occupied by the ape. The part of th
not occupied by the ape is excluded from the locus of th
existence of the major term by the clause "which is n
locus of the major term itself" This definition too is def
because it, like the previous one, does not apply to an exclu
affirmative inference

3 Invariable concomitance is the non-co-presence of
middle term with that reciprocal non-existence whose counte
abides in the locus of the major term, e g.

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

In diagram I we find that smoke is not co-present with a
thing which is non-existent in reciprocity to fire. Water, be
cloth, table, etc, are all non-existent in their reciprocal rela
to fire, that is, they are not

Here there is co-presence of smoke (the middle term) with fire (the major term) which is not qualified by the nature of a pot, and the absolute non-existence, whose counterpart is the pot, abides in the same locus with smoke, but abides in a different locus in respect of the pot.

This definition covers the case of an exclusively affirmative inference inasmuch as it does not involve a non-existence of the major term, and the major term is not the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the same locus with the middle term. Looking at diagram V, we find that there is co-presence of the knowable with the nameable which is not qualified by the nature of a pot (though the pot is qualified by the nature of the nameable), and the absolute non-existence, whose counterpart is the pot, abides in the same locus with the knowable, but in a different locus in respect of the pot.

Non-existence of the General Form—*Sāmānyābhāvaḥ*

Some say that even the conclusive definition given above is defective inasmuch as in seeking to establish the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire we notice that fires are manifold owing to the difference of their loci, e.g. the fire of a kitchen, of a sacrificial ground, and so on. There is non-existence of these fires, except one, in the locus of a particular case of smoke. This, by making fire the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the same locus with smoke, altogether upsets the conclusive definition.

Gangeśa in reply says that though in the locus of smoke there is the non-existence of various fires, the natures which qualify the counterparts of those non-existences are not one and the same, viz. the nature of fire in general. They are different, that is, particular fires have particular natures, as for instance, the nature of the fire of a kitchen is different from that of the fire of a sacrificial ground, and so on. It is therefore necessary to admit a non-existence of fire of the general form—such as 'there is no fire' distinguished from non existences of particular forms as 'there are

---

have arisen in us a doubt of the form—'is not there a colour in air?' It is perfectly known to us that in air there are no particular colours as red, yellow, etc., yet we entertain a doubt in our mind as to whether there is not in air a non-existence of colour of the general form.

hending invariable concomitance of the one with the other, *e g.* *we apprehend the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire* after we have observed repeatedly that the one accompanies the other.

Gangeśa opposes the above view on the following grounds —

(1) Of the repeated observations each one separately cannot

to

va-

her

but they cannot produce apprehension [illegible]

which involves unequal things such as occurrence of smoke in a kitchen, a sacrificial ground, a hill, etc

(2) What again is the meaning of repeated observations? Does it mean observation in numerous places, or observation of numerous instances, or observation of the same instance numerous times? None of these alternatives are of any help to us in apprehending invariable concomitance Can we establish invariable concomitance of colour with savour, even if we have observed them together in numerous places? Can numerous instances of colour observed along with savour in the same place (as a pot) entitle us to establish invariable concomitance between them? As regards the observation of an instance numerous times, it may be asked how many times? There is certainly no fixity as to the number of times There cannot in fact be an invariable concomitance *of a pen with the floor even if they have been observed*

serve the former co-accompanied by the latter, and by apply-

fire.

all cases of fire We can establish the invariable concomitance of

[illegible]

the knowledge of a generic nature is called an intercourse whose character is general It is described by some logicians as an ordinary intercourse of particularity, while others describe it as a transcendent intercourse The logicians, who hold the first view, say that in perceiving a particular smoke by means of our eye there is the intercourse of union, while in perceiving "smokeness" there is the intercourse of united-inherence, and in perceiving all cases of smoke (at all times and in all places) through the know-

[illegible]

ordinary intercourses of union and united-inherence respectively, but in the perception of all cases of smoke through the know

[illegible]

ance of a particular case of smoke with a particular case of fire refers through the intercourse whose character is general to all cases of smoke and all cases of fire.

Conclusion about the Intercourse whose Character is General.—*Sāmānya-lakṣana siddhāntah*

If the intercourse, whose character is general, were not accepted, there could not arise any doubt as to whether there were instances in which smoke (the middle term) did not accompany fire (the major term) As to the cases of smoke which were present, we could perceive their co-accompaniment with cases of fire, and they could leave no room for doubt regarding any case of exception As for the past and future cases of smoke, or the

[illegible]

any doubt as

being impossible, there could not be any reasoning employed to remove it. Hence we could not apprehend an invariable concomitance. But if the intercourse whose character is general, is admitted, we can explain the perception of all cases of smoke through the intercourse of "smokeness" It is possible for doubt to arise in respect of some of these cases of smoke through non-recognition of their special properties We must therefore admit intercourse whose character is general

The Conditional Middle Term—*Upâdhi-vâdah*

The middle term, if it is to be in invariable concomitance with the major, should be devoid of condition, that is, should be unconditional A condition (*upâdhi*) is that which constantly accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle term, *e g.*

The hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire (nourished by wet fuel)

Diagram VI



Here smoke is the major term, fire is the middle term and wet fuel is a condition The wet fuel constantly accompanies smoke, but does not always accompany fire. For instance, the fire in an ignited iron-ball is not accompanied by wet fuel at all

"Accompanying the major term" signifies the state of not being the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which abides in the locus of the major term, that is, the state of not being absent from the locus of the major term. "Not accompanying the middle term" is the state of being the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which abides in the locus of the middle term, that is, the state of being absent from the locus of the middle term In diag- [illegible] is not absent from the [illegible] regions of fire and ab- [illegible] complexioned [illegible] one is black, and the rest fair- [illegible] tables, is black, [illegible] not eat vegetab- [illegible] diagram VII. we [illegible] accompanies Mitrā's black son, but does not accompany her fair-complexioned sons

Diagram VII



He is black,
because he is a son of Mitrā
(who eats vegetables)

Some say that "eating vegetables" is not a condition inasmuch as it does not always accompany blackness; for instance, the blackness of a pot is not the result of eating vegetables Gaṅgeśa meets the objection by saying that the blackness marking Mitrā's son is not of the same nature as the blackness which abides in a pot A "condition" is, according to him, to be clearly defined as follows —

A condition is that which constantly accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle term, in respect of an entity of a fixed nature.

Condition is of two kinds, viz (1) sure, and (2) suspected A condition is said to be "sure" when we know with certainty that it constantly accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle term, and it is said to be "suspected" when there is doubt as to its accompanying the major term or as to its not accompanying the middle term. An instance of a suspected condition is given below —

The earth has a maker,
because it is a product (caused by a body)

Here "caused by a body" is a condition which constantly accompanies a maker (if the maker is a person, but not if the makis a collection of atoms), but does not always accompany a product (for instance, a product like a pot is caused by a body, but a product like a lightning is not so caused) The condition, *viz* "causing by a body", is therefore a suspected one

A condition is not in itself a defect but its attachment to the middle term indicates that that term is erratic and the conclusion drawn therefrom wrong

The State of Being the Locus or Minor Term—*Pakṣatā*

The state of being the locus or the minor term (*pakṣatā*) has been defined by some logicians as the state in which it is doubtful whether the major term abides in it or not Seeing that the connection of the major term with the locus or minor term, may not necessarily involve a doubt, Gangeśa prefers to define the minor term as that whose connection with the major term is not known with certainty in consequence of the absence of a desire to know the connection *E g* in the proposition "the hill is full of fire", the hill is the minor term whose connection with fire was hitherto neither investigated nor known The minor term is so named not merely if there is an absence of knowledge of its connection with the major term, but also if the absence of knowledge is due to the absence of a desire to arrive at the knowledge We cannot treat the minor term as such merely by establishing with it a connection of the major term if that connection has already been known, but we shall be justified in treating it as the minor term if there is in us a desire again to establish the connection.

A homologue, a similar locus, a homogeneous affirmative or positive example (*sapakṣa*), is that in which the major term is known with certainty to abide, *e g* the hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke, as *a kitchen*.

A heterologue, a dissimilar locus, a heterogeneous or negative example (*vipakṣa*), is that in which the major term is known not to abide, *e g* the hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke, where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as *a lake*

Consideration or Knowledge of Premises—*Parāmarśaḥ*

Consideration (*parāmarśaḥ*) is the knowledge that the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor, *e g*

> The hill is full of fire,
> because it is full of smoke

Here consideration consists of the knowledge that in the hill abides smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire. This knowledge (consideration) is the cause of inference.

Tl [illegible]

[illegible] actually perceived together with the knowledge that it is in invariable concomitance with fire, is not the cause of inference, but consideration or knowledge that in the minor term abides the middle term which is, in invariable concomitance with the major term, such a cause.

An Exclusively Affirmative Inference—*Kevalānvayyanumānam*

[illegible] ffirmati [illegible] negati [illegible] ive neg [illegible] there i

no negative example It may also be defined as an inference in which the major term is not the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which has an abode, or, as an inference in which there is no non-presence of the major term, *e g.*

> This is nameable,
> because it is knowable—(*vide* diagram II)

An Exclusively Negative Inference—*Kevalavyatirekyanumānam*

An exclusively negative inference is the inference in which the major term has no affirmative example. It may also be defined as the inference in which the major term does not abide in anything else but in the minor term, *e g.*

Diagram VIII



The earth is different from other things,
because it possesses smell

An Affirmative Negative Inference

The affirmative-negative is an inference in which the major term has both affirmative and negative examples, *e g.*

The hill is full of fire
because it is full of smoke,
as a kitchen and not as a lake

Presumption—*Arthāpatti.*

The Mīmāṁsakas say that presumption (*arthāpatti*) is a separate means of knowledge On hearing that "Devadatta, who is fat, does not eat in the day", we at once conclude that he eats in the night *Since a person cannot become fat unless he eats* either in the day or in the night, and, since he does not eat in the day, it follows by presumption that he eats in the night

Gaṅgeśa does not admit presumption to be a separate means

ed with non-eating in the day

Inference for One's Self—*Svārthānumāna*

Inference is of two kinds (1) inference for one's self (*svārthānumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*) A person having himself repeatedly observed in the kitchen and other places the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, goes near a hill and sees smoke on it He recollects that, wherever there is smoke there is fire, and thereupon knowledge arises in him that "this hill has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire" This knowledge is called "consideration of the sign" (*liṅgaparāmarśa*) or simply "consideration" (*parāmarśa*), from which follows the knowledge that "this hill has fire", which is called inferential conclusion (*anumiti*) This is the process of inference for one's self

Inference for the sake of Others—*Parārthānumāna.*

When a person, having inferred fire from smoke, demonstrates it to others by the employment of a syllogism, it is called "an *inference for the sake of others.*" *The process of this inference is* as follows —

---

[1] A person to be fat must take his food either in the day or in the night—(A proposition)

Devadatta who is fat, does not take his food in the day—(E proposition).

Therefore Devadatta must take his food in the night (This is a disjunctive categorical syllogism)

(1) The hill is full of fire,
(2) Because it is full of smoke
(3) All that is full of smoke is full of fire as a kitchen,
(4) This hill is full of smoke,
(5) Therefore this hill is full of fire

The demonstration given above produces in other pe "consideration of the sign", which necessarily makes them ac that the hill has fire

Syllogism—*Nyāyah*

Syllogism (*nyāya*) is the name for a collection of five senten which give rise to knowledge that produces consideration It set forth as follows —

(1) This hill is full of fire—*Proposition*
(2) Because it is full of smoke—*Reason*
(3) All that is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen—*Examp*
(4) This hill is full of smoke—*Application*
(5) Therefore this hill is full of fire—*Conclusion*

After these five sentences have been employed there arises i the mind of the listener consideration of the form "this hill is full of smoke, which is in invariable concomitance with fire", from which follows the conclusion, "this hill is full of fire" Syllogism is therefore the name for the entire collection of these five sentences each of which is called a part or member

Parts of a Syllogism—*Avayavah.*

A part or member (*avayavah*) is a sentence that gives rise to knowledge which contributes to the production of an entire knowledge which produces consideration On the employment of the five sentences there arises, at first, knowledge from each of them separately Then arises collective knowledge from the five sentences combined together This collective knowledge which produces consideration is based on each of the five sentences called a part or member The parts are five, *viz* (1) the proposition, (2) the reason, (3) the example, (4) the application, and (5) the conclusion

The Proposition—*Pratijñā.*

The proposition (*pratijñā*) is a sentence which causes knowledge, whose object is the same as that of the conclusion and which contributes to the production of the entire knowledge which produces consideration, *e g.*

This hill is full of fire

It may also be defined as a sentence which gives rise to an inquiry necessitating the mention of the reason, *e g* this hill is full of fire (Why so? because it is smoky)

The Reason or Middle Term —*Hetuh*

The reason or middle term (*hetuh*) is a word, with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge whose object is not the *probandum* (major term) but which contributes to the production of the entire knowledge that gives rise to consideration *e g* because it is full of smoke (*i e* by or from smokiness).

The reason is of two kinds (1) the affirmative (*anvayi*) and (2) the negative (*vyatireki*) The affirmative reason is a member with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge that necessitates the mention of the member expressive of an affirmative invariable concomitance, *e g* because it has smoke (*i e.* by or from "smokiness"), all that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen The negative reason is a member with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge that necessitates the mention of the member expressive of a negative invariable concomitance, *e g.* because it has smoke, (*i e* by or from "smokiness"), all that has no fire has no smoke as a lake

Example—*udāharanam*

The example (*udāharanam*) is a word which, while producing knowledge of connection of the form that the locus of the middle term is constantly occupied by the major term causes another knowledge which proceeds from the sentence expressive of consideration,[1] *e g.*

All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen
[So this hill has smoke]

Application—*upanayah*.

The application (*upanayah*) is a member which produces consideration, *e g.* All that has smoke has fire, this hill too has smoke

Conclusion—*Nigamanam.*

Conclusion (*nigamanam*) is a sentence which, while causing the ' wledge which gives rise to consideration, produces know- · major term as indicated by that of the middle term able concomitance with the major term and

---

) the sentence expressive of consideration

its nature of abiding … all there
smoke … Therefo

Fallacies—*Hetvābhāsāḥ*.

A General Definition of Fallacy—*Hetvābhāsa-sāmānya-nirukti*

A person can ascertain truths and achieve victory by exposing fallacies in the …

… *anaikānta*), (2) the contradictory (*viruddha*), (3) the counterbalanced (*satpratipakṣita*), (4) the unproved or inconclusive (*asiddha*) … defects … g —(1) … diction … proof

The Erratic Reason

The … in the *probandum* or major … to the constant accompaniment with, or … The … l (sa- … (asā- … s of

This hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire

Here the reason "fire" abides in the region of smoke (as in a kitchen) as well as in the region of the absence of smoke (as in an ignited iron-ball)

A reason is said to be *non-general or not general enough*, if it abides neither in the *locus* of the *major term* nor in that of its absence, *e g*

This hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of ether

Here the reason is ether, which has no locus Ether abides neither in the locus of fire nor in that of the absence of fire

A reason is said to be *non-exclusive*, if it is destitute of an example, whether affirmative or negative, *e g*

> All things are impermanent,
> because they are knowable

Here we cannot cite any example, as "all things" is the subject

The Contradictory Reason—*Viruddhah.*

The contradictory (*viruddhah*) is a reason which is the counterpart of that non-existence which constantly accompanies the major term, *e g*

> This hill is full of fire,
> because it is full of water

Here the reason is contradictory, inasmuch as water is the counterpart of the *non-existence of water*, which constantly accompanies fire

The contradictory may also be defined as a reason (middle term) which is constantly accompanied by the absence of the *probandum*, major term.

The Counterbalanced Reason—*Satpratipakṣitah.*

If, at the time of the consideration of a reason which seeks to establish the *existence* of the *probandum* or major term, there occurs the consideration of another reason which seeks to establish the *non-existence* first reason is a counterbalanced one,— ounterbalanced, *e g*

nse it is audible.
use it is a product.

the sides pre-
one reason
ne two in-

ah.

ree kinds (1) un-
(*āśrayāsiddhah*), (2)
āpāsiddhah), and (3)
yatvāsiddhah).

he part of its locus, if
not belong to it

This golden hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

Here the reason "smoke" is unproved, as its locus is on account of the "*goldenness*" *not belonging to a hill*

(2) *A reason is said to be unproved with regard to its own nature if it does not abide in the locus of minor term, e g*

The lake is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

Here the reason is unproved, as smoke from its very natur does not abide in a lake.

(3) *A reason is said to be unproved in respect of constant accompaniment, if its generic nature is not useful in establishing its invariable concomitance with the major term It is subdivided as follows —*

(a) Unproved on the part of the major term (*sādhyāsiddhi*) which occurs when there is a useless adjective appended to that term, *e g.*

This hill is full of golden fire,
because it is full of smoke

"Golden" is useless

(b) Unproved on the part of the reason (*hetvasiddhi*) which *occurs when there is a* useless adjective appended to it *e g*

This hill is full of fire,
because it is full of blue smoke.

"Blue" is useless.

(c) *Unproved* in respect of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyasiddhi*) which occurs when there is a condition attached *to the reason, e g*

This hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire nourished by wet *fuel* (*which* is a condition attached to the reason)

The Incompatible Reason—*Bādhitah.*

An incompatible reason (*bādhitah*) occurs when there *is the* knowledge that the major term, which is assigned to the minor term, does not really abide in it *e g.*

Fire is cold,
because it is a substance

The incompatible reason, which is of ten kinds, occurs under the following circumstances —

(1) The minor term being incompatible with perce [illegible] *tah pratyaksa bādhitah*), *e g*

A pot is all pervading,
because it is existent

(2) The minor term being incompatible with inference (*paksah anumāna-bādhitah*), *e g*

An atom has parts,
because it has a shape

An atom has in fact no shape and no parts

(3) The minor term being incompatible with verbal testimony (*paksah śabda-bādhitah*), *e g*

The golden mountain (Meru) is stony
because it is a mountain

(4) The minor term being incompatible with perception which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*paksah sādhya-pratiyogi-pratyaksa-bādhitah*) *e g*

Fire is non-warm,
because it is a product.

(5) The minor term being incompatible with the inference which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*paksah sādhya-pratiyogyanumāna-bādhitah*), *e g*

Sound is inaudible,
because it is a quality (of ether)

(6) The minor term being incompatible with comparison which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*paksah sādhya-pratiyogyupamāna-bādhitah*), *e g.*

Bos-gavaeus-ness is not the connotation of the term *bos-gavaeus*,
because it is a general notion

(7) The minor term being incompatible with the evidence which is analogous to the evidence that establishes the major term *paksah sādhya-grāhaka-pramāna-jātiya-pramāna-viruddhah*), *e.g*

The skull of a deceased person is pure,
because it is the limb of a being that had life, as a conch shell.

[The scripture declares a conch-shell to be pure but not the skull of a deceased person.]

(8) The minor term being incompatible with perception which establishes the middle term (*paksah hetu-grāhaka-pratyaksa-bādhitah*), *e g.*

Water and air are warm,
because they are possessed of touch, unlike that of the earth.

(i) The middle term being incompatible with inference which establishes the middle term (pakṣa-hetu-grāhakānumāna-bādhita), e.g.

> The sound is not perceptible,
> because it is a seat of quality which is a non-eternal cause of knowledge.

(ii) The middle term being incompatible with verbal testimony which establishes the middle term (pakṣa-hetu-grāhaka-śabda-bādhita), e.g.

> The Rājasūya sacrifice should be celebrated by Brāhmaṇas,
> because it is the means of conquering heaven.

[From verbal testimony the Rājasūya sacrifice is ascertained to be a duty of the Kṣatriyas and not of the Brāhmaṇas].

Fallacies are serviceable as they point out Inefficiency—Hetvābhāsānām asiddhatvā-sādhakatva-nirūpaṇam.

argume
fetched
respect

Inference of God—Īśvarānumānam.

By inference we can prove the existence of God, the Maker of the universe. The inference employed for this purpose is as follows:—

> The universe has a maker,
> because it is a product, as a pot.

The causes which operate in the case of a product may be stated thus:—

There must be (1) a direct knowledge (perception) by an agent himself of the materials which constitute a product, (2) a desire on the part of the agent to make it, and (3) an act of

m
(2)

Book III Comparison—*Upamāna-khanda.*

How knowledge is derived through comparison

A man, who does not know the signification of the word [illegible] the instructive assertion of the elder, he institutes a comparison by which he arrives at the *conclusion* that the *animal* which he sees is the thing signified by the word *bos-gavaeus* The means by which this conclusion has been arrived at is called comparison (*upamāna*) This means is the knowledge of likeness between a cow and a bos gavaeus The word comparison is ordinarily taken to signify the whole process

[illegible]

Likeness explained

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that likeness (*sādṛśya*) is a distinct object which is not included in the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. The [illegible] refer. The real signification of the word *bos gavaeus*, according to Gaṅgeśa, is not an animal which possesses likeness to a cow *but* an animal which possesses the generic nature of a bos-gavaeus (that is, which is a type of all *bos-gavaeus*) Hence the result of comparison consists of knowledge of the relation between the word *bos-gavaeus* and the animal which possesses the generic [illegible] called bos-gavaeus may be perceived in a particular case with which our *eyes are in union, it is impossible for us to perceive such* a relation in other cases which are beyond our eyes Therefore the knowledge of signification of the word *bos-gavaeus* is not derived through perception, but through a separate means of knowledge, called comparison

(c) Verbal testimony is not included in perception

Gangeśa holds that speech which is attended with expe
ancy, etc , and produ
must be
from perce
means or
and the perceptual knowledge is the result, so in verbal testi
mony, speech is the *means or instrument*, the *recollection* of
things signified by it is the intercourse and the verbal knowledge
is the result Speech therefore serves the same purpose in verbal
testimony as the sense-organs do in perception, in other words,
speech
ledge, and considering the
admit verbal testimony

(d) Is verbal testimony included in inference?

The Vaiśesikas maintain that verbal testimony is not a distinct means of valid knowledge but is included in inference In deriving knowledge from speech we first hear the words constituting *the speech* and *then* recollect the things signified by the words The knowledge of the mutual connection of things thus *recollected*, which is designated as verbal knowledge, is according to the Vaiśesikas derived from inference Suppose one utters a *speech thus* "he beat the cow with a stick." On hearing this speech the listener may, say the *Vaiśesikas*, infer as follows .—

(1) The words constituting this speech must have been preceded *by knowledge* of the mutual connection of *things* as intended by the speaker and recollected by his words —*proposition*

(2) Because they are possessed of expectancy etc , and convey the intention of the speaker —*reason*

(3) The words of all speeches possessing expectancy etc and conveying the intention *of a speaker* are preceded by the knowledge of the mutual connection of things as intended by the speaker and recollected by his words, just as the words of a speech, *viz* " bring a pot" uttered by me (the listener),—*example*

If we can thus derive knowledge of the speech by means of inference, there is, according to the Vaiśesikas, no necessity for admitting a separate means of knowledge called verbal testimony

(e) Verbal knowledge is not included in inference.

Gangeśa opposes the above view as follows

The inference as shown above is not valid, inasmuch as it does not involve knowledge (recollection) of actual things as in the case of verbal testimony, but the knowledge of things recollected, i.e. the knowledge of knowledge (recollection) of the things This is not only cumbersome but also fallacious Our activity in respect of a thing arises from our knowledge of the thing itself, but not from our knowledge of knowledge of the thing,

tency, etc., existing among them have been known Again, after verbal knowledge has been produced, there arises self-consciousness of the form "I know from *the speech*" but not of the form "I know through *inference*"

It has already been observed that a speech cannot produce verbal knowledge unless the words composing it possess expectancy, consistency contiguity and potentiality and convey intention.

Expectancy—*Ākāṅkṣā-vādaḥ*

A word is said to bear the relation of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) to another word if it cannot without the latter produce knowledge of its interconnection in a speech For instance *Devadattaḥ grāmaṁ gacchati* (Devadatta goes to the village) is a speech in which the word *Devadattaḥ* (in the nominative case) is expectant for the word *gacchati* ('goes', the verb), and this latter in its turn is expectant for *grāmaṁ* ('village,' in the objective case) In the same way the crude word *Devadatta* is expectant for *ḥ* (the same as *su*, the first-case-ending), the crude word *grāma* for *am* (the second-case-ending) and *gam* (the root) for *ti* (the verbal suffix) A crude word (*nāma*) and a case-ending (*vibhakti*), a root (*dhātu*) and a verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*), and a verb (*kriyā*) and a case (*kāraka*) are expectant for each other.

Consistency—*Yogyatā*

Consistency (*yogyatā*) consists in a word not bearing a meaning which is incompatible with the meanings of other words in a speech. For instance, no verbal knowledge is derived from such a speech as *agninā siñca* (sprinkle with fire) because it is incompatible with fire being an instrument in the act of sprinkling. Consistency may be certain or doubtful, but in either case there will be verbal knowledge

Contiguity—*Āsattiḥ*.

Contiguity (*āsattiḥ*) consists in the enunciation of words, which are connected with each other, without a long pause between them, e g the speech [illegible] bring water", will convey no meaning if one utters the word "bring" now, and the word "water" after an hour

Intention Tātparyam

Intention (tātparyam) which indicates the wish of a speaker, consists in the utterance of a word to convey knowledge of a special thing. If at the time of eating a meal, one says "bring saindhava" we are to understand by the word saindhava a quantity of salt and not a horse

The Non eternity of Sound Śabdānityatā-vādah.

[illegible]
them to be non eternal [illegible]
that arose in the market h [illegible]
that sound is liable to destruction

Sound destroyed and not concealed Ucchanna-pracchanna-vādah

[illegible] the speeches, must
also [illegible] es is consequently
non-[illegible] ugh the Veda as a
collection of speeches is liable to destruction, as it has come
down through succession of teachers, its continuity is uninter-
rupted Gangeśa opposes the above view by saying that from
allusions occurring in the socio-religious institutes (smṛti) and
from usages that have prevailed from olden times we can infer
that once there existed certain branches of the Vedas which have
since disappeared Therefore the Veda is non-eternal

[illegible]
an verbal testimony

Injunction— Vidhi-vādah

[illegible]
is
inci
perform [illegible]
"Let a person, who wishes to go to heaven, perform a horse-
sacrifice" is an injunction "Let not a man drink wine" is
another injunction.

According to Kumārila the conviction, which in an ordinary

directs me to perform or to desist from performing the act signified by it "

Prabhākara says that the conviction consists of the belief that merit or demerit that accrues from the act signified by the speech, is capable of being earned by our efforts

explana-
rson con
ne speech
rmance of
ous incon-

venience will accompany the performance

All logicians agree, however, in holding that the conviction is produced by the potentiality of the hortative particle *lin* (corresponding to the English word ' let") in the speech itself

Merit and Demerit—*Apūrva-vādah*

Prabhākara says that the conviction produced by a Vedic speech, consists first of the belief that the merit or demerit that accrues from the act signified by the speech, is capable of being acquired by our efforts This belief is followed by the presumption that the act from which merit or demerit accrues, is such as can be performed by us. Gradually there arise two other beliefs, viz (1) that the act if performed, will fulfil the object of our desire, and (2) that there is no serious inconvenience involved in the act

This belief in the theory of Gangeśa includes in it two other beliefs, viz. that the act is capable of fulfilling our desire and that there is no serious inconvenience involved in it.

Potentiality—*Śakti-vādah*.

The relation that exists between a word and the thing referred to by it is a special relation[1] called *indication* (*vṛtti*). It is on account of this special relation that we are, on hearing the word *pot*, able to recollect the thing known as a pot. The special relat[illegible]

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[1] The relation is not an ordinary one, e g the word (sound) jar does not produce in us the recollection of either although the former abides in the latter in the relation of inherence (samavāya).

potenti[illegible]

this m[illegible]

kinds, [illegible]

the capacity of a word to refer to (*i.e.* produce recollection of) a particular th[illegible]

[illegible] not from the will of God but [illegible] will of man There is according to them as much potentiality in an ordinary word as in a technical one. The potentiality of a word is ascertained from the following sources —

(1) *Grammar* (*vyākaraṇa*), *e g* in the sentence, *Caitraḥ pacati* (Caitra cooks) the potentiality of the crude word *Caitra*, the nominative case ending *ḥ*, the root *pac* and the verbal suffix *ti* is ascertained from grammar

(2) *Comparison* (*upamāna*), *e g* in the sentence, "a bos gavaeus is like a cow," the potentiality of "bos gavaeus" is ascertained through comparison.

(3) *Dictionary* (*kośa*), *e g* the potentiality of the word *nīla* to refer to the quality of blueness is ascertained from dictionary

(4) *Reliable assertion* (*āpta-vākya*), *e g* that the word *pika* signifies a black cuckoo is ascertained from the word of a competent scholar

(5) *Usage* (*vyavahāra*), *e g* on hearing "bring a table," "take away a table" etc, and on seeing the table brought and taken away one understands the potentiality of the word 'table.'

(6) *Context* (*vākya-śeṣa*), *e g* if in a sentence the meaning of the word *yava* (which may refer to a [illegible]

[illegible]

If we suppose that the potentiality [illegible] shall have to assume, say the Mīmāmsakas, an infinite number of potentialities corresponding to the individuals to which they refer If, on the other hand, we assume that the potentiality refers to a genus, we shall have to assume only one potentiality corresponding to the genus which will also include individuals without which it cannot stand

Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view by saying that we could not recollect individuals unless the potentiality resided in them On the supposition of the potentiality referring to an individual, it is not, continues he, necessary to assume an infinite number of potentialities, as one and the same potentiality refers to all the individuals which are comprehended under one genus Hence, he concludes that the potentiality really refers to the individuals coming under a genus and possessing a form.

Words possessed of potentiality may be specified as follows —

(1) The *etymological* (*yaugika*) is a word which is understood by [illegible]

[illegible] ifice [illegible]

[illegible] to a thing which is [illegible] ificati [illegible] of [illegible]

word Ganges in the sentence, 'the cow keeper dw
the Ganges,' does not signify the current which is referred
the potentiality of the word but signifies the bank which bas
the current the relation of proximity Similarly the word 'cr
in the sentence protect the curd from the crow's
implication any thing that injures the curd.

Compound Words– *Samāsa vidah.*

In Sanskrit the comp
(1) ar

[illegible]

aggregative compound (dvandva) comprising the
tive compound (samāhāra) *compound (itaretara)*, the *unified aggre*
(ekaśeṣa) and (6) an *indeclinable compound (avyayībhāva)* *residual aggregative compound*

In the attributive compound the first word possesses its
fixed potentiality and the second word, which through its poten-
tiality points out a thing, refers also by implication to another
thing, e g *citragum ānaya* (lit bring the brindled-cow-man) signi-
fies "bring the man having a brindled-cow" The first word *citra*
(brindled) refers through its potentiality to the quality of
"brindledness" while the second word *go* (cow) besides point-
ing out, through its potentiality, the thing called "cow" refers
also by implication to its owner

Grammarians m

[illegible]

er and above
angeśa holds
n the words
and there is

possesses its
potential-

which the word signifies an officer belonging to the king in
tion with him" *rāja* refers to a "king" as well as to "connec-

In the descriptive compound in which the component words
stand to each other in the relation of identity, there is no special
rule for the possession of potentialities by them, e.g. *nīlotpalam*
(blue-lotus) The same is the case with the numeral compound,
e g *pañca-gavam* (five cows).

In the aggregative compound there is no special rule for the assumption of potentiality or implication by the component words, e.g. *yama varuṇau* (Yama and Varuna).

In an indeclinable compound there are both potentiality and implication in the last word, e.g. *upakumbham* (near the jar).

Verbal Suffixes—*Ākhyāta-vādaḥ*

A verbal suffix (*ākhyāta—ti, tas, anti* etc.) used after a root, refers to the effort favourable to what is signified by the root, e.g. *Caitraḥ pacati* (Caitra cooks) signifies that Caitra is possessed of efforts favourable to cooking. If the agent is an inanimate thing the verbal suffix refers by implication to the operation favourable to what is signified by the root, e.g. *ratho gacchati* (a chariot moves) signifies that the chariot is possessed of the operation favourable to moving.

The Roots—*Dhātu-vādaḥ*

The root (*dhātu*) of a verb refers to the operation favourable to the effect of what is signified by the verb, e.g. the root *gam* (going) in the sentence, viz. *sa grāmaṁ gacchati* (he goes to the village) refers to moving, which is favourable to his connection with the village, which is the effect of his going. In the case of an intransitive verb the root refers merely to the operation, e.g. *sa tiṣṭhati* (he stays) in which *sthā* signifies merely staying.

Prefixes—*Upasarga-vādaḥ*

The prefix (*upasarga*) by itself does not bear any meaning but points out the speciality of meaning borne by the root that follows, e.g. *vi* in *vijayate* (completely conquers) signifies a completeness of conquest.

Validity of the Four Means of Knowledge—*Pramāṇa-catuṣṭaya-prāmāṇya-vādaḥ*

Some say that a gesture (*ceṣṭā*) is a means of valid knowledge. But this is absurd, inasmuch as a gesture merely reminds us of words which produce knowledge. That a deaf person is sometimes prompted to activity by a gesture, must be due to the fact that he infers the desire of the man who makes the gesture. So a gesture is included in either verbal testimony or inference. Similarly tradition (*aitihya*) and rumour (*janaśruti*) are not distinct from verbal testimony, while presumption (*arthāpatti*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) are comprised in inference.

CHAPTER III

COMMENTARIES ON THE TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI

42 THE POPULARITY OF TATTVA CINTĀMAṆI

The popularity of the Tattva-cintāmaṇi is attested in takable terms by the numerous commentaries, sub-comment and glosses that have grown around the book since its first app ance The text of the work covers about 300 pages, but its expo tory treatises extend to over 1,000,000 pages In the follow pages are enumerated some of the important expository treatis and the accompanying table shows their mutual relationship

43 THE MITHILĀ SCHOOL.

The Mithilā School of Nyāya flourished from the 12th to the 15th century A D The great masters were Gaṅgeśa, Vardhamāna, Paksadhara and others Their style of writing was terse and they discussed the meaning of *vyāpti* more than did their predecessors In the 16th century Nyāya studies waned in Mithilā and made progress in Nadia The Principal Naiyāyikas[1] of Mithilā School are mentioned below.

44. VARDHAMĀNA UPĀDHYĀYA

(1250 A D)

Vardhamāna Upādhyāya was the son[2] of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, and surnamed Mahopādhyāya[3] or Mahāmahopādhyāya[4]. He was the author of the following works —

(1) Tattva cintāmaṇi-prakāśa, commentary on Tattva-cintāmaṇi

(2) Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa, a commentary on Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya pariśuddhi

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[1] Vide

), Yaśovijaya Gaṇi from the ngal, No 9, 1910 Also His- anmohan Chakravarti Baha- anskrit College verse 2 —

as mahāmahopādhyāya-caraṇāḥ dana. otheca Indica, I—6—674. Vide

(3) **Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa-prakāśa,** commentary on Udayanācārya's Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa
(4) **Prameya-nibandha-prakāśa,** which may be the same as the Prameya-tattva-bodha
(5) **Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa.**
(6) **Nyāya-kusumañjali prakāśa.**
(7) **Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa**
(8) **Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-prakāśa**

Vardhamāna Mahopādhyāya is named in the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Mādhavācārya, under No XIII, Pāṇini-darśana, so he must be older than the second half of the 14th century[1] He must be older than Jayadeva, who commented on two of his Vaiśeṣika works. Jayadeva's time cannot be later than the third quarter of the 13th century. He speaks of Varddhamāna reverently as *Mahāmahopādhyāya-caraṇāḥ* and so a fair interval must have elapsed between the two. Vardhamāna's time thus falls probably in the first quarter of the 13th century.

45. PAKṢADHARA MIŚRA
(1275 A D.).

Paksa[illegible] in Saisava, [illegible] father's na[illegible] Sumitrā [illegible] Paksadhara on account of his [illegible] ith regard to Pakṣa- [illegible] pati are comparable to [illegible] could be compared [illegible] following works.—

(1) **Tattva cintāmaṇyāloka.**
(2) **Dravya-padārtha on the Dravya-kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa.**
(3) ***Līlāvatī viveka on the Līlāvatī prakāśa***

In spite of his being a logician, he was the author of two charming Sanskrit plays, viz *Prasanna Rāghava* and *Candrāloka*[2]

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[1] [illegible]

[illegible]
तत्त्वचिन्तामणेरिह आलोकोऽयं प्रकाश्यते।
(तत्त्वचिन्तामण्यालोक, opening lines)

[2] शङ्करवाचस्पत्योः सदृशौ शङ्करवाचस्पती। पक्षधरप्रतिपक्षो लक्ष्यीभूतो न च क्वापि।
येषां कोमलकाव्यकौशलकला लीलावती भारती।
तेषां कर्कशतर्कवक्रवचनोद्गारेऽपि किं हीयते।
(Prasanna Rāghava, Introduction)

[illegible]

Pakṣadhara had two disciples named Vāsudeva Miśra (his nephew) and Rucidatta Miśra. He must be older than la sam 1509[1] the date of copying of his Pratyakṣāloka, which, according to some corresponds with 1278 A.D. He might be placed in the third quarter of the thirteenth century.[2]

It is traditionally known that Pakṣadhara lived in the court of Raja Bhairava Simha of Mithilā and was a class-fellow of Vidyāpati. But as Bhairava Simha lived in 1435 to 1450 A.D., Pakṣadhara if the tradition be true must have lived in the middle of the 15th century A.D. He is said to have copied a manuscript of Viṣṇupurāṇa in 1452 A.D.[3]

16. VĀSUDEVA MIŚRA
(ABOUT 1275 A.D.)

He was nephew and pupil of Jayadeva Miśra, and he wrote a commentary on the famous Tattva cintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya called Tattva cintāmaṇi ṭīkā in order to vindicate the work of his teacher, Jayadeva or Pakṣadhara Miśra.[4] He is called Nyāya siddhāntas[illegible] truth) in the colo[illegible] hara he probably [illegible]

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[1] R. Mitra Notices V p. 291 No. 1976 (प्रत्यक्षालोक). The date is written curiously, and runs thus :—[illegible] Some think that 1509=159=la sam 159+1119=1278 A.D. But I think it probable that 1509= 1509+78=1587 A.D. la sam means a year.

[2] [illegible] this work.

[3] बाणैर्वेदयुते, चन्द्रनयमे [illegible] प्यातते पादने ।
श्रीमद् गोकुलदीक्षितो गुरुदिने मासे च पत्रोषिते ॥
(A palm leaf manuscript of Viṣṇupurāṇa from Mithilā, colophon)

[4] जयदेवगुरोर्वापि ये केचिद्दोषदर्शिनः ।
प्रबोधाय मया तेषां टीकेयाभिर्दीयते ।
(Introductory Verse)

[6] इति न्यायसिद्धान्तसारामिश्रमिवर्द्धमानपक्षधरमिश्रभ्रातृपुत्रन्यायसिद्धान्तसारामिश्रवासुदेव-[illegible]विरचितो चिन्तामणिटीकायाम्...
[illegible] nda)

47 RUCIDATTA MIŚRA
(ABOUT 1275 A D)

He was a pupil of Pakṣadhara or Jaydeva Miśra[1] His parents were named Devadatta and Renukā and he had two brothers named Śaktidatta and Matidatta[2] The name of his family is given as Sodarapurakula[3]

Two of his works are now extant (1) **Tattva cintāmaṇi prakāśa**, a commentary on the famous work of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, (2) **Nyāya-kusumāñjali-prakāśa-makaranda**, a commentary on the commentary of Vardhamāna on the Nyāya-kusumāñjali of Udayanācārya.

A Ms copy of a portion of his Tattva-cintāmaṇi prakāśa is said to be as old as 1370 A D[4] He had the title Mahāmahopādhyāya added to his name As a pupil of Pakṣadhara he may be placed in the fourth quarter of the 13th century A D

48 BHAGĪRATHA OR MEGHA ṬHAKKURA
(ABOUT 1400 A D)

of Maheśa
lled **Jalada**,
alled **Kusu**
[illegible] prakāśa prakāśikā. Besides this, he prepared two other commentaries on Vardhamāna's work They are (1) **Kiraṇāvali-prakāśa-prakāśikā**, (2) (**Nyāya**) **līlāvati prakāśa vyākhyā** He seems to have lived about 1400 A D

49 MAHEŚA ṬHAKKURA
(ABOUT 1400 A D)

He was born in Bhaur, 17 miles N E of Darbhanga on the Kamalā. He was son of Dhīrā and Candrapati,[5] and younger

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[1] अधीत्य यस्मिन्दन अप्रैवाक्षद्गुरो ।
पितामहो प्रकाशो प्रकाशेन प्रकाश्यते ॥
(Tattva-cintāmaṇi prakāśa, Introductory verse 2

[2] श्रीदेवदत्ततनयो विमलोपकूल
श्रीरेणुका विदितमंगुलोपजात ।
श्रीमच्छिदत्तमतिदत्तसहोदरो य-
स्तेनं चकार रुचिदत्तकवी प्रकाशम् ॥
(Tattva cintāmaṇi-prakāśa, Śabda-khaṇḍa verse 2 at the end)

[3] इति श्रीसोदरपुरकुलसमुद्भूतमहामहोपाध्यायश्रीरुचिदत्तविरचिते तत्वचिन्तामणिप्रकाशे (Colophon of Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa Pratyakṣa khaṇḍa)

[4] See Peterson's Sixth Report, p 76, No. 190.

[5] चन्द्रपतितनया धीरानन्दन पार्वं

brother of Mahādeva, Bhagīratha and Dāmodara.[1] He be
to the Khandwāl family He wrote a commentary called D
on the Āloka of Pakṣadhara Miśra on Gaṅgeśa's work, of
only the chapter on perception is extant. He was also the
of several Smṛti works, such as Tīrtha cintāmaṇi.

His work on logic, the Darpaṇa, is held as an author
Śaṅkara Miśra's Tri-sūtri-nibandha-vyākhyā.[2] He lived be
Pakṣadhara and Śaṅkara or between 1270 and 1450 A D.

One of his pupils, Raghunandanadāsa Rāya, was a great
cian, who at the suggestion of Akbar went out to all quarte
discussion Akbar, being pleased, installed him in the provi
Mithilā, which he however made over to Maheśa Thakkur
teacher as preceptor's fee (गुरुदक्षिणा). So the latter became a
holder and founder of the Darbhanga Raj family

50. ŚAṄKARA MIŚRA
(1450 A.D).

Raghudeva Upādhyāya or Kaṇāda[4] as of well as Maheśa Thakk

अस्ति श्रीचन्द्रपत्योस्तनूजः ।
कमलापदनुमाता श्रीकमापतेश्च मित्र-
प्रमथित तत्कृती दुर्वेद्यो महेश ॥
(Anumānāloka-darpaṇa, verse 1 at the end)

भ्रातुः महादेवभगीरथदामोदरा यस्य यशोऽनुबन्धाम् ।
(स) दर्पणं विनिर्मितवान्मनीषी महेशठक्कुरो विभुधो महेश ॥
(Anumānālokadarpaṇa of Maheśa Thakkura, verse 2 at the end)

प्रकाशदर्पणोद्योतमकरन्दिकाकृता ह्यमीमताः ।
तथापि बालकानामनुग्रहाय करोम्यहम् ॥
(Tri-sūtri nibandha-vyākhyā, Introductory verse 2.)
Quoted by H Śāstri, Notices, Vol III, pp 64-9, No 130.

अधीतमप्यादिमतानतिन यतो
न शोभनीय विमलेन पुनये ।
चान वर्ण बोधनाय मदीयो
अतीवमोदादिति भावयेतके ॥
याभ्यां वैशेषिके तन्त्रे सम्यग् व्युत्पादितोऽस्म्यहम् ।
कणादभवनाथाभ्यां ताभ्यां मम नमः सदा ॥
(Vaiśeṣika-sūtropaskāra, Intro. verse)

He was a contemporary of Narendrasimha Rāya. He was the author of various works on various subjects.

(1) Paṇḍita vijaya, in which he speaks of himself thus

बालोऽहं जगदानन्द, न मे बाला सरस्वती ।
अपूर्णे पञ्चमे वर्षे वर्णयामि जगत्त्रयम् ॥

(2) Ātma-tattva-viveka-kalpa-latā, a commentary on Udayanā-

(4) Tattva cintāmaṇi mayūkha, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's famous work on Nyaya

(5) Tri-sūtri-nibhanda-vyākhyā, a commentary on the commentary of Udayanācārya on the first three sūtras of Gotama

(6) Nyāya-līlāvatī-kaṇṭhābharāṇa, a commentary on the Nyāya-līlāvatī of Vallabhācārya

(7) Bheda-prakāśa or Bheda ratna-prakāśa, a criticism of the non-dualistic Vedānta It is criticised in its turn in the

the mar-

at the in-

(9) Vaiśesika-sūtropaskāra, a popular commentary on the Kaṇāda-sūtras

(10) Vedi-vinoda, contains a discussion on the categories of Nyāya.

(11) Bauddha-dhikkāra-tīkā

(12) Abheda-dhikkāra, a refutation of non-dualistic Vedānta

[illegible]

māna-Upādhyāya he cannot be much older than this time. He may be placed in the second and third quarters of the fifteenth century.

51 VĀCASPATI MIŚRA (THE YOUNGER OR JUNIOR) (ABOUT 1450 A.D)

He is known as Abhinava Vācaspati Miśra Though he is more famous as a smṛti-writer, yet he wrotes ten works in philosophy, as he himself has said in his Pitṛ-bhakti-taranginī. He flourished in Mithilā about 400 years ago, and was the Pariṣad or court-officer of the kings Bhairavendra and Rāmabhadra (who reigned in the third and fourth quarters of the fifteenth century)

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[1] H Śāstri, Notices, vol. III, p. 52, No 83

Of the ten works four at least are traceable —

(1) Anumāna khaṇḍa ṭīkā, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's [illegible] Nyāya sūtra [illegible]

(2) [illegible] sūtras

(3) Nyāya sūtroddhāra, a gloss on the Nyāya sūtras

(4) Śabda nirṇaya, a treatise on the nature of words

No MS has yet been found of this last work, but the name is known from his smṛti work called Dvaita-nirṇaya

52 MISARU MIŚRA
(ABOUT 1475 A D)

He is the author of an original treatise on the Vaiśeṣika system, named Padārtha-candra The work deals, as the name [illegible] ial authorship [illegible] ids candraḥ [illegible] en of Candra [illegible] Deva. So it [illegible] r of the 15th century

It is to be noted here that Misaruka, the author of the Nyāya dīpaka, is a different person

53 DURGĀDATTA MIŚRA
(ABOUT 1550 A D)

He wrote the Nyāya-bodhinī*, an elementary work, on the first principles of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems combined Though we have as yet no data to fix his exact time, it seems most probable that he flourished in the 16th century

54 DEVANĀTHA THAKKURA
(1562 A D)

He is the author of the Tattva cintāmaṇyāloka pariśiṣṭa, which, as the name implies, aimed at supplying the shortcomings of Jayadeva's Āloka on Gaṅgeśa's work From the date of a copy

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[1] श्रीचन्द्रभिषक्पतद्धिया श्रविमामस्वाद्वौ ।
रचयति पदार्थचन्द्र मिश्रर्षमिश्रोपदेशेन ॥
R Mitra, Notices, IX, 12, No 2901, introd verse 2.

† R Mitra, Notices, V, p 54, No 1764 and IX, p 129, No 3020 H Śāstri, Notices III, p 75, No 11c

of his work (*viz. la samvat* 443 or 1562 A D)[1] made by his order, it is ascertained that he must have lived in the third quarter of the 16th century.

55 MADHUSŪDANA THAKKURA
(1575 A.D)

He is the author of the Tattva cintāmaṇyāloka kaṇṭakoddhāra,[2] a refutation of the hostile criticisms of Pakṣadhara in his Āloka on Gaṅgeśa's work.

His date must fall between that of the younger Vācaspati Miśra on whose Dvaita-nirṇaya he wrote another Kaṇṭakoddhāra and *la samvat* 491 or 1610 A.D., the date of a Ms of his work Thus roughly *speaking*, he flourished *in the third quarter of the* 16th century

56. *THE NADIA SCHOOL*
(1600—1800 A D)

The Nadia School of Nyāya flourished during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries under the great masters Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Mathurānāth Tarkavāgīśa, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya They explained the Tattva-chintamani of Gaṅgeśa in a critical way

Before the Navadvīpa Naiyāyikas, the Mithilā Logicians stooped down Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others made the language of Nyāya quite stereotyped and made the use of *avacchedaka* and *avacchinna* very extensive Their pride and abnormal growth of critical faculty put the logicians of all other provinces into the shade. The principal logicians of Nadia School are mentioned below.

57 VĀSUDEVA SĀRVABHAUMA
(ABOUT 1450—1525 A D)

Vasudev [illegible] century A D [illegible] education in [illegible] With a view [illegible] while about [illegible] into the academy of Pakṣadhara Miśra, the foremost logician of the place at that time. After finishing his studies in Mithilā he was subjected to a difficult test called Śalaka-parīkṣa, "probe-examination," in the course of which he had to explain any leaf of a manuscript that was pierced last by the probe as it was pushed into the manuscript One by one he explained one hundred

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[1] See R Mitra, Notices, V, p. 84, No 1764, IX, p 129, No. 3029 See H Śāstri, Notices, III, 75, No 116.

[2] See Śāstri, Notices, III, p 75, No. 116

Logical works broug to Nadia

[illegible] to conv their works on Logic, Vāsudeva [illegible] Kusumāñjalī, and, [illegible] the way back from Mithilā, he, on the pretext of coming to Nadia, went secretly to Benares where he studied for some years the Vedānta philosophy returning home at the close of the 15th century A D

The first academy of Logic in Nadia.

Having transcribed the above mentioned two works from memory Vā [illegible] out on the first great [illegible] distinguished pupils, [illegible] ity on modern Logic, [illegible] in Bengal

In his old age Vāsudeva is said to have accepted the Vaiṣṇava tenets preached by his pupil Caitanya He passed the closing portion of his life in Orissa, where he was patronised by king Gajapati Pratāpa Rudra about 1520 A D* He was the author of a work on Logic called Sārvabhauma nirukti, which is a commentary on Gaṅgeśa

Though an academy of Logic was thus for the first time opened outside Mithilā and schools of it gradually multiplied in the

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[illegible] became a convert to Vaiṣṇavism

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Madhya līlā

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Ib, VI, 31

* Vide Rājendra Lāl Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit MSS, Vols [illegible] Śāstri X XI.

heart of Bengal, all was not gained It yet remained for the academies of Nadia to acquire a university character and authority To procure that power for Nadia, it was necessary that a representative from it should vanquish the teachers of Mithilā in philosophical controversy That honour it was reserved for the genius and patriotic perseverance of Raghunātha Siromani to win for his country.

58 Raghunātha Śiromaṇi
(1477—1547 A D).

Raghunātha was born in Nadia about the year 1477 A D While he was about four years old he lost his father. His mother supported him with the greatest difficulty When a boy of five years, Raghunātha once at the order of his mother had to fetch fire from the academy. He did not take with him any vessel for

reserved to be done by him, took up the entire charge of maintaining and educating the boy While Raghunātha began to learn the consonants he used to ask why *k* should precede *kh*, and his teachers had to explain to him the rules of phonetics and grammar along with the alphabet After finishing grammar, literature, lexicon and jurisprudence Ragunātha began assiduously to study Logic under Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and discussed with him the knotty points of that branch of learning. He used sometimes to sit in deep mediation on problems of Logic under banyan trees in the neighbouring field, which he did not quit until his doubts were cleared. Soon he surpassed his teacher in many respects and demonstrated the worthlessness of the latter's commentary on Logic. To exact a charter for the academy of Nadiya to confer degrees, Raghunātha went with the permission of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma to Mithilā in the disguise of a pupil, and entered the academy of the famous teacher, Pakṣadhara Miśra, who was still alive. Raghunātha who was blind of one eye was ridiculed by the students of the academy "Indra is thousand-eyed, Siva is three-eyed, all others are two-eyed, verily why art thou one-eyed?"

However, getting admittance into the academy, Raghunātha very soon demonstrated his own worth and was promoted to the highest class The teacher found him a hard pupil to deal with, and many were the controversies the brilliant pupil carried on with him. Matters soon came to a crisis. One day in the course of a hot and protracted disputation before all the numerous students and doctors, the renowned teacher, foiled and exasperat-

(2) Tattva cintāmaṇi prakāśa, a commentary o famous work

(3) Maṇyāloka-ṭippaṇī (or °vyākhyā), a sub-gloss o commentary, the Āloka.

In the Śankara Maṭha of Purī there is a copy of work prepared during 15[illegible]9, 1600 and 1607 A.D.[1]

60

He wrote the [illegible] on the four kinds [illegible] A.D. This work [illegible] Cintāmaṇi He has been commented upon a dozen times [illegible] Śivāditya Miśra, Murāri Mi called Bhaṭṭācārya Cūḍāmaṇi or Nyāya-cūḍāmaṇi.

61. KAṆĀDA T[illegible]

[illegible] Rag a [illegible] In [illegible] 1600 A.D. [illegible] Cūḍāmaṇi? [illegible] Kaṇāda salutes one Cūḍāma In that case Kaṇāda's date is Kaṇāda wrote the following works:—

(1) Maṇi-vyākhyā,[2] a commentary on Gangeśa's Tattva-cint maṇi.

(2) Bhāṣā-ratnam, on the seven Categories of the Vaiśeṣik system

(3) Āpa-śabda-khaṇḍanam, another Vaiśeṣika work.[3]

62 RĀMAKṚṢṆA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA CAKRAVARTI
(ABOUT 1560 A.D.)

Hall says that he was the son of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. He himself calls Śiromaṇi his Guru[4] or preceptor. He must be older

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[1] [illegible]
[illegible]
(Quoted in Navadvīpa-mahimā)

[2] For the Maṇi-vyākhyā, see R Mittra, Notices IV, p. 167, Sans. Coll. Cat. III, p. 327, No 582 (Śaka 1705), and H Śāstri, Notices V, p. 13, No. 14 For the Bhāṣā-ratna, see R Mittra, Notices IV, p. 119 No 1531, intro. verse 1:—
[illegible]
[illegible] ॥ १ ॥
For No. 3, See Peterson's Sixth Report, p. 74, No. 773

[3] For some traditionary account of Kaṇāda, see H. Shāstri's Introduction to his Notices, Vol. I, p. xviii.

[4] Ind. Off Cat. No 2068, introd. verse 2;

han 1603 A.D., the date of a manuscript of his Guṇa-Śiromaṇi-pra-
śa. He in all probability flourished in 1560 A D. He was the uthor of Guṇa-śiromaṇi-prakāśikā[1] and possibly also of Nyāya-
ipikā.

63. MATHURĀNĀTHA TARKAVĀGĪŚA.
(ABOUT 1570 A.D.).

general name
this reason are
He was the

(1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi rahasya.[4] This work is familiarly known in Bengal as Phakkikā or Māthurī
(2) Tattvacintāmaṇy āloka-rahasya, a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's Āloka.
(3) Dīdhiti rahasya.
(4) Siddhānta-rahasya
(5) Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-rahasya, a sub-commentary on Vardhamāna's work
(6) Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa-rahasya, a sub-commentary on Vardhamāna's Prakāśa
(7) Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa-dīdhiti-rahasya.
(8) Bauddha-dhikkāra-rahasya
(9) Ayur daya bāvanā.
(10) (?) ādi-kriya-viveka.

Mathurānātha mentions Sundara Upādhyāya and Harinātha Jpādhyāya, but nothing is known about these.

(?) [illegible]
[illegible] ।
[illegible]
[illegible] ॥ २ ॥

[1] Ind. Off. Cat., No. 2069.

[2] Vide Notices of Sanskrit Mss. in Bengal, 2nd series, Vol. I, p. xvi.

[3] The beginning of the Tattva-cintāmaṇi-rahasya runs thus.—

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥ १ ॥
[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥ २ ॥

[4] This work has been published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series.

64. Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma Bhaṭṭācārya
(About 1575 A.D)

(1) Tattva cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti prasāriṇī, a sub-commentary on Raghunātha's commentary
(2) Anumānāloka-prasāriṇī, a sub-commentary on Jayadev Āloka (Anumāna khaṇḍa)

65 Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa
(About 1570 A D)

He has been criticized by the Jaina logician, Yasovijay Gaṇi[2] (1608—1688 A D), in his Nyāya-khaṇḍana-khādya Gunā nanda must be older than 1622 A D, in which year a manuscrip of his Gunavivṛti-viveka was copied He was considerably late than Raghunātha Śiromani whose works he commented on, and he may be placed roughly at about 1570 A D. He was the author of the following works —

(1) Anumāna-dīdhiti-viveka
(2) Ātma-tattva viveka-dīdhiti ṭīkā
(3) Guṇa-vivṛti-viveka.
(4) Nyāya-kusumāñjali-viveka.[3]
(5) Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa dīdhiti-viveka.
(6) Śabdāloka-viveka.

66 Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma
(About 1680 A.D.).

Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, son of Bhavanātha and Bhavānī praises his father's teachings as better than those contained in

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[1] This work is being printed in the Bib Ind Series; for No. 2 see p 8 —
विचारद्य अनुमानालोकप्रसारिण्यामनुक्रमेण ।

[2] Guṇānanda is mentioned by Yasovijya in his Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khādya, leaves 2, 11, 50, 70, 80.– Satis Chandra Vidyabhuṣaṇa's Yasovijaya Gaṇi (1910,) p 468

[3] He was the author of Nyāya-kusumāñjali-viveka, which begins:—

[illegible]
[illegible]
गुणानन्देन विदुषा विवादं [illegible]
क्रियते सर्वैः कुसुमाञ्जलिविवेकिता ॥

the Prakāśa and the Makaranda.[1] From his famous *tol* were produced such learned scholars as Jayarāma Nyāya-pañcānana and Jagadīśā Tarkālankāra He is older than 1613 A.D.[2], when, a manuscript of his Padārtha-tattva-vivecana-prakāśa was copied. He was later than Raghunātha. He probably flourished in 1680 A D He was the author of the following works —

(1) **Dīdhiti ṭīkā.**
(2) **Nyāya rahasya.**
(3) **Guṇa-rahasya.**
(4) **Nyāya-kusumāñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā.**
(5) **Padārtha-viveka-prakāśa,** a commentary on Raghunātha Śiromani's Padārtha-khandana
(6) **Saṭ-cakra-krama-dīpikā**

67 JAGADĪŚA TARKĀLAṄKĀRA
(ABOUT 1625 A.D).

om Sanā-
Caitanya
the same
hat Jaga-
y activity
ate agrees
well with the fact that a work of his named Kāvya-prakāśa-rahasya

where he finished his studies in Logic Jāgadīśa Tarkālankāra calls himself the pupil of a Sārvabhauma,[3] who should be identified with Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, as Jagadīśa quotes his Nyāya-rahasya with the remark that it was his Guru's.[4] Jagadīśa

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[1] The Kusumāñjali-vyākhyā, Sans. Coll. Ms. Cat. III 318, intro verses and 3 :—

भवानीभवनाथाख्यौ पितरौ प्रणमाम्यहं ।
यत्प्रसादादिदं सार्वं करबदरोपमं जगत् ॥ १ ॥
मकरन्दप्रकाशे या व्याख्या भक्तिमतोऽस्य वा ।
ममोऽधिका पितुर्व्याख्यामात्रानुभवयुक्ता ॥ २ ॥

[2] Sans. Coll. Cat., III, p 241, No 399, final colophon.

इति श्रीरामभद्र सार्वभौमकृतपदार्थतत्त्वविवेचनप्रकाश समाप्तः ॥
संवत् १६७० शकवे [illegible] लिखितमिदं पुस्तकं परोपकारार्थम् ॥

[3] The Mani mayūkha, Sans. Coll. Cat , III, p 324, No 575, intro. verse 2

सार्वभौमस्य गुरोः पदाब्जं विद्यार्थिनां कल्पतरोः प्रणम्य ।
विविच्यते श्रीजगदीशविज्ञैर्विद्योत [illegible] ॥ १ ॥

[4] For his Guru's work, see the Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, Cal. ed., p 25 :—

इति गुरुचरणविरचिते [illegible] ।

Tarkālaṅkāra was older than 1631 A.D., the date of a
his manuscript of Tarkāmṛta. As he was a pupil of Rāma
Sārvabhauma, his date falls about 1625 A.D.

He was the author of the following works.—

(1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi dīdhiti prakāśikā, familiarly kno Jāgadīśī.[†]

(2) Tattva-cintāmaṇi mayūkha, a commentary directly on gesa's works, of which only portions have survived.

(3) Nyāyādarśa or Nyāya sārāvalī, dealing with the do of causality

(4) Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā on the force of words, etc, a g matico-philosophical treatise.[‡]

(5) Tarkāmṛta.

(6) Dravya-bhāṣya-ṭīkā or Padārtha tattva-nirṇaya.

(7) Nyāya-līlāvatī dīdhiti-vyākhyā.

68. ŚABDA-ŚAKTI-PRAKĀŚIKĀ (ELUCIDATION OF THE POWER O

[illegible], I give belo
[illegible] give some idea of the śabda, verbal know-
ledge, as explained by Jagadīśa —

VERBAL KNOWLEDGE (śabda-bodha).

1. The Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, delighting the learned, is composed by Jagadīśa, who was versed in debate as well as in the dogmas

2. The goddess Sarasvatī who is gracious and approaches all persons and is able to fulfil their ends, makes herself manifest immediately, when she is worshipped.

or,

Words, which possess the three requisites of mutual interdependence, juxtaposition and compatibility in their signification, become at once a means of knowledge to any man who hears them.[*]

3. Knowledge of the mutual connection of things signified by correspondent words is neither perception nor inference, being limited in its scope.

4. Word or verbal testimony is the knowledge of the mutual connection of things signified (presented) by correspondent words. This knowledge is neither perception nor inference, for, in the case of

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[†] Published in the Chowkhamba series.

[‡] Printed in Calcutta (Saka 1709) and in Benares; later (1918) by the Calcutta University

ception, knowledge of things is derived through the contact of se and in the case of inference through consideration (recogni of sign). Such is not the case here Here arises the knowge only of those things which are signified by corresponding rds.

In the case of verbal testimony there is (1) the hearing of rds, then (2) there is the recollection of things signified by the rds, *e g* *ghaṭo'sti* Here from *ghaṭa* + *su* + *as* + *ti*, there is recoltion of *ghaṭa* a pot, *su* one, *as* existing and *ti* abode; (3) there is owledge of the mutual connection of the four things thus recol-

[illegible]

s no perception of the mutual connection of those things nce it is necessary to admit an extra means of knowledge, mely, "verbal knowledge"

Verbal knowledge is not inference, compatibility pertains to ngs, whereas correspondence pertains to words. These two nbined together do not abide in any one thing, and cannot theree be the cause (sign) in an inference Each one of these parately too cannot be the cause, for compatibility can abide in n-correspondent words where there is no verbal knowledge rrespondence does not abide in things at all and cannot there-

ıe Vaiśeṣika position

to the knowledge of the mutual connection between itself and existence, just like a t.

ollected

means

means

Naiyāyika's reply.

In verbal testimony the recollection of things signified by words is the cause (sign), but not the knowledge of things recollected by words. In ference the knowledge of sign is the cause. Therefore, where have such knowledge as "the word *cow* is not the thing of which am reminded by the word *cow* connected with the word *existence*" [illegible] expression *there is a* [illegible] cause there is no knowled[illegible] [illegible] of the connection of [illegible] and existence) in the abode.

That is, where we have no previous knowledge of a cow connected with existence, we can on hearing, "there is a cow" draw verbal knowledge, but not inference, because the knowledge of a cow as connected with existence is not recollected by me, having seen *cow* and *existence* together previously. Therefore verbal testimony is a means of knowledge different from inference.

Inference cannot serve the purpose of verbal knowledge so far as mental perception of the knowledge (अनुव्यवसाय) is concerned *There is a cow* by this expression we first draw knowledge of the mutual connection of *cow* and *existence* (in the form · *a cow exists*), and then we have mental perception of the knowledge as· I hear that a cow exists If you say that this form of mental perception is wrong and that verbal knowledge is really included in inference, I may say, as there is no fixed rule, that inference is included in verbal knowledge. Just as you incorporate verbal knowledge in inference by contriving a general proposition on the recollection of things through words, I shall include inference too in verbal knowledge by postulating correspondence between words recollected by things

Objection

In an inference where the thing signified by the major term is unfamiliar, knowledge of the general proposition (major premise) is derived by means of a heterogeneous example, *e g* "the lake has not smoke because it has not fire" This inference [illegible] hetero[illegible]

[illegible]

expression, "the lake has not smoke because it has not fire", is not drawn through verbal testimony but through inference Therefore inference is to be admitted as a separate means of knowledge

Reply 1.

It is true there was no knowledge of the thing signified by the major term, but the word of which the thing was a sign could be recollected by means of an association Hence there is no necessity for admitting inference as a separate source of knowledge

Reply 2.

All verbal testimony cannot be included in inference The expression "being different from a pot" affords the verbal knowledge (testimony) of the [illegible] "possessing [illegible]

This knowledge cannot be drawn from inference, for inference cannot take place where there is no minor term, as here Hence it is necessary to admit a separate means of knowledge named verbal testimony

If you say that the knowledge can be drawn from inference thus, the distinction is counterpart of a pot as it is recollected by another word correspondent with the same distinction This is absurd, for the inference merely affords knowledge of distinction which is counterpart of the pot, but not of the thing which possesses the distinction But, if you admit a separate means of knowledge named verbal testimony, then the peculiar knowledge of the expression can be easily drawn from correspondence, etc.

Objection.

"Being different from a pot", here *different* may, by a secondary application ([illegible]), refer to anything other than a pot, *i e*, non-pot As a single word cannot afford any verbal knowledge, we may form connection with any other word, such as a "cloth." Consequently now we can make the inference of this form "a cloth is non-pot."

[illegible]

If you say so, statements arrive at absurdity, *e g* if the word "different" itself could afford the know- [illegible]

[illegible] be useless.

Op [illegible] sakas.

On h [illegible] verbal knowledge only if he is conscious that it is the expression of a competent person, otherwise not; or, in other words, the consciousness that a certain expression is that of a competent person precedes verbal knowledge Now if the conclusion (*viz*, that *there is a pot*) thus precedes verbal knowledge and there is no desire for drawing an inference, there cannot be any Consequently it is to be admitted that verbal knowledge is a separate [illegible]

Objection.

[illegible] of perceptions right knowledge cannot abide in the series beginning with the second perception For the thing already known by the first perception is the object of knowledge at the second perception

Right knowledge which concerns itself with things unknown

Reply [illegible] is the correct knowledge which is different

edge of the same form [illegible] from that which is produced after knowl-

In the case of a series

with the second [illegible] a series of [illegible]

[illegible]

assertion [illegible] form or kind, [illegible] for that succeeds a know

of a compet[illegible] viz. the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] con

[illegible] unknown [illegible] sentence. [illegible] because it verbal knowledge unknown before verbal knowledge occurs. The meaning of a sente certain assertion is that of a competent person. If the cause verbal knowledge occurs even when there is doubt as to whethe verbal knowledge was the belief that something was the assertio of a competent person who was aware of the meaning of a ser tence as signifying connection of one thing with another thing then verbal knowledge could not be inference as the knowledg of the conclusion preceded the same In fact it is not necessary that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence should precede verbal knowledge. Otherwise the Vedic text which is a competent assertion would be a mere reiteration, not being a source of right knowledge because it would indicate what was already known. Therefore the belief in the assertion [illegible] competent person is not the cause of [illegible]

The belief, viz

Objection [illegible] on, is the

[illegible] derived

[illegible] that verbal

[illegible] the Veda

[illegible] competent person is the assertion

[illegible] place but not in the other. This difference

[illegible] hypothesis is unnecessary. The belief that it is the assertion [illegible] a competent person is not the cause of verbal knowledge, [illegible] because that knowledge takes place even where there is doubt of [illegible] connection of one thing with another or where there is [illegible] doubt that a certain expression is the assertion of a competent [illegible] person

Objection.

In verbal knowledge, even if the assertion of a competent person is not the cause, context must be admitted to be the cause. Otherwise the word *ghaṭa* would have afforded the verbal knowledge, *viz*, "an object connected with *ghaṭa*", even though we had not the belief that it was pronounced with the desire of expressing

Answer

Even if knowledge of the context was the cause of verbal knowledge, the true meaning of the expression (*viz*, one thing as connected or qualified by another thing) is not contained in the former when there is the knowledge, *viz*, the word *ghaṭa* is not pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as *ghaṭa*, even if there be verbal knowledge of *ghaṭa* (*viz.*, an object specified as *ghaṭa*); because there is knowledge of context of the form, it is pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as "knowable." But this does not take place, wherefore knowledge of context of the form: "it is pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as *ghaṭa*" must be admitted as the cause of the verbal knowledge of an object specified as *ghaṭa* Now, the true meaning is not contained in the knowledge of the context. Therefore there is no harm in admitting an inference beyond verbal knowledge

The word *saindhava* in the expression "bring *saindhava*" would indicate salt and not a horse if the expression is used at the hour of meal. Hence the cause of such verbal knowledge is admitted to be the knowledge of context of the form "This word *saindhava*
with the desire of indicating salt."
arises from knowledge of
the
that of meal, etc. Therefore in
wledge of the occasion
e of context.
comprehensive,
as being com-
of context too

the desire of ex-
where in the word
d n

expressing an object called *ghaṭa*"; and suppose the belief, "it is," exists in the word *ghaṭam* which existed at another time, but not in the one which exists now, in such cases there is no verbal knowledge. Therefore each expression must be taken as indicating an object called *ghaṭa* which exists at the time of the expression Hence owing to the expressions being different on different occasions, knowledge of context becomes different Therefore we may rather admit knowledge of occasion as the cause, but not knowledge of context

Refutation of Prabhākara

Knowledge of context must be admitted as the cause of verbal knowledge, because where there is [illegible]

Therefore [illegible] context, the conclusion [illegible]

[illegible] of context is not the cause of verbal knowledge

Naiyāyikas' reply

A poet uses a word in one sense, while thoughtful person may take it in a different sense, though the poet had no knowledge of context in that sense A parrot which [illegible] ters words which [illegible] verbal knowledge [illegible] d be added that [illegible] sponding words

A certain word is significant in a certain sense, if that word with the association of another word produces verbal knowledge of the thing which is presented by its own power or by the power of its marks Significant words are of three kinds crude word, suffix and indeclinable In the expression *paṭaḥ* (पट), the word (पट) *paṭa* in association with the suffix *su* (सु) produces verbal knowledge of the form पट (cloth) as possessing oneness, i.e. one piece of cloth

62 RUDRA NYĀYAVĀCASPATI.

Rudra Nyāyavācaspati was son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya grandson of Vidyāvācaspati[1] who had been honoured by the ung of Gauda Viśvanāthā Siddhāntapañcanana was his younger rother, and Govinda Bhaṭṭācārya Cakravarti was his son By rder of his father, Vidyānivāsa, copies of the *Kalpa-taru*, the mṛtic digest of Lakṣmīdhara (*Naiyatakālika and Dāna-khandas*) vere copied in Śaka 1510 or 1558 A D. His time is further fixed y the poem composed in honour of Bhāvasimha, whose father, [illegible] the 50th [illegible] ra must [illegible] Rudra [illegible] Tarka- [illegible] philoso- [illegible] chaspati [illegible]

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[1] Vidyāvācaspati is named as a master writer [illegible]

[illegible] Bengal

(5) Bhramara dūtam.
(6) Vṛndāvana-vinoda-kāvya

70 JAYARĀMA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA
(ABOUT 1700 A D)

Jayarāma was a pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvābhauma[1] His itle Nyāyapañcānana is sometimes shortened into Pañcānana

Jayarāma, with Devanātha Tarkapañcānana, is mentioned as an authority in the rhetorical Eka-ṣaṣṭhyalankāra-prakāśa, and n the Alankāra-sāra-sthiti of Bhīmasena Dikṣita[2], composed in Samvat 1712 during the rule of Ajitasimha in Jodhpur. He is older than 1659 A.D., the year in which the Padārthamālā was composed. *As pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, he lived about 1700 A D.*

He was patronised by Rājā Rāmkrsna of Krishnagar who obtained from the Pandits of Nadia the hereditary title of Nava-

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[1] The Anumāna-dīdhiti-gudhārtha-vidyotana (Ind. Off Cat., p 620, No 7900, and Peterson's Sixth Report, p 15) introd verse —

श्रीविद्येश्वरसार्वभौमसुवं भूयोऽभिवन्द्यादरात्
श्रद्धाभाव च रामभद्रचरणद्वन्द्वारविन्दद्वयम्।
गूढार्थावकलनासकविपक्षोद्बोधिनी दीधितिम्
तस्याः श्रीजयराम एव तनुते गूढार्थविद्योतनम् ॥ १ ॥

[2] Madras Catalogue, No. 43037, introd. verse 2:—

मतिमें मतिवादमाला या सुलकारकौ ।
मरणं जयरामगुरोश्चरणं स्मरणम् वहिभीकरणम् ।

dvīpādhipati (Lord of Nadia). Jayarāma's Nyāya-siddhān
was composed in Samvat 1750 or 1693 A.D.

He was the author of the following works.—

(1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-gudhārtha-vidyotana, a sub
mentary on Śiromaṇi's Dīdhiti

(2) Tattva-cintāmaṇyāloka-viveka, a sub-commentary on
deva's Āloka

(3) Nyāya siddhānta-mālā, a commentary on sūtras 4 to
Gotama's Nyāya-sūtra

(4) Sabdārtha-mālā, on śabda or words.

And in Vaiśeṣika—

(5) Guṇa-dīdhiti-vivṛti a sub-sub-commentary on the Dīdh
the sub-commentary of Varddhamāna's commentary o
Udayanācārya's Kiraṇāvalī.

(6) Nyāya kusumāñjalī-kārikā-vyākhyā, a commentary o
Udayanācārya's Kārikās or verses.

(7) Padārtha-maṇi-mālā, or Padārtha-māla, an original treatise
examining the Vaiśeṣika categories. It was the best
known of his works and was commented upon by Janā
dana Vyāsa and Laugākṣi Bhāskara

And in rhetoric :—

(8) Kāvya-prakāśa-tilaka, a philosophical commentary on the
rhetorical work of Mammata

71 GAURĪKĀNTA SĀRVABHAUMA
(ABOUT 1725 A.D)

Gaurikānta Sārvabhauma was born in the northern part of
Gaur* and got favours from the king for composing many nibandhas
He was older than 1714 A D, the date of a manuscript of his
Ānanda-laharī-tarī He was later than Tāntrika Pūrṇānanda
whose Shyama Rahasya is quoted in the said Tarī and who
wrote the Sākta-krama in 1571 A D Gaurikānta must have flour-
ished in the first quarter of the 17th century A D He was the
author of the following works :—

(1) Bhāvārtha dīpikā, a commentary on the Tarkabhāṣā of
Kedara Miśra.

(2) Sad yukti muktāvalī.

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* The Ānanda-laharī-tarī (H. Mss. Volume VII, p. 243, No. [illegible]), [illegible]
[illegible] —

[illegible]

(3) Ānanda-laharī-tarī
(4) Vidagdha mukha-maṇḍana-vṛtikā

72. BHAVĀNANDA SIDDHĀNTAVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1625 A.D.).

[illegible] 17th century. He was the author of the following works —

(1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi dīdhiti prakāśikā, familiarly known as Bhavānandī.
(2) Pratyak āloka-śāra-mañjarī.
(3) Tattva-cintamaṇi-ṭīkā.
(4) Kāraka-vivecana

73. HARIRĀMA TARKAVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1625 A.D)

[illegible] the following works :—

(1) Tattva cintāmaṇi-ṭīkā-vicāra
(2) Ācārya mata-rahasya-vicāra.
(3) Ratna-koṣa-vicāra or vāda as it is sometimes named
(4) Sva prākāṣa rahasya-vicāra or Bhatta-mata-siddhānta-vicāra.

74. VIŚVANĀTHA SIDDHĀNTAPAÑCANANA
(ABOUT 1634 A.D.).

Viśvanātha was the son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya and a younger brother of Rudra Nyāyavācaspati Bhaṭṭācārya. He composed his Bhāṣāpariccheda in 1634 A.D He was the writer of the following works :—

(1) Alaṅkārā-pariṣkāra
(2) Nañ-vāda-ṭīkā.
(3) Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti.[1]

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[1] Published under the authority of the General Committee of Public Instruction, Bengal.

77 RAGHUDEVA NYĀYĀLANKĀRA

(ABOUT 1650 A D)

Raghudeva was a disciple of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa[1] Raghu-va is older than 676 A D, the date in which Anumiti-parā-rśa-vāda was copied He is older than Yaśovijaya Gaṇi (1608-38 A.D) who quotes him in his Aṣṭa-sāhasrī-vivaraṇa[2] He obably flourished in 1650 A D. He was the author of the lowing works.—

(1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi gūḍhārtha dīpikā
(2) Navīna-nirmāṇa
(3) Didhiti ṭīkā
(4) Nyāya kusumāñjali-kārikā vyākhyā
(5) Dravya-sāra saṅgraha
(6) Padārtha-khaṇḍana vyākhyā

78. GADĀDHARA BHATTĀCHĀRYA

(ABOUT 1650 A D)

Gadādhara, whose father was Jīvācārya, was born in the ddle of the 17th century A D in the district Lakshmipasa, gra, in Eastern Bengal He came to Nadia and became a pupil the famous logician Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa On the death the teacher, Gadādhara became the head of his academy. t the students in Nadia did not at first accept him as their acher as he was a man of Eastern Bengal and did not belong to amily of hereditary Pandits Gadādhara left the academy and ablished a new college on a public street, where he also set up a rden of flowers. As soon as any student came to collect flowers om the garden, Gadādhara used to deliver lectures on logic, dressing a tree there Charmed with his exposition of the

stead of thinking
"atoms, atoms,
Logic which are

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[1] The Nañ-vāda-vyākhyā (Madras Catalogue, No. 4234) introd verse, 1 —

शिवं प्रणम्य तत् पश्चात् सर्वतन्त्रौघरं गुरुम् ।
क्रियते रघुदेवेन नञ्वादे सुविवेचनम् ॥ १ ॥

[2] J A S.B, 1910, p 468. Satis Chandra Vidyabhushana's article on Yasovijaya ni.

80 RĀMDEVA CIRAÑJĪVA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D.).

Rāmdeva *who is generally known as Cirañjīva must be* older than 1703 A.D., when his Kāvya-vilāsa was composed He is generally believed to have lived about 1700 A D He was the author of the following works.—

(1) Vidvānāmoda-taraṅgiṇī.
(2) Kāvya-vilāsa.
(3) Mādhava-campu.
(4) Vṛtta ratnāvalī.

81. RĀMARUDRA TARKAVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1700 A D).

Ramrudra, or simply Rudra, was the grandson of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīsa and son of Śrī Rāma or Rāmeśvara. He was probably a pupil of Madhusūdana He probably lived about 1700 A.D He was the author of the following works —

(1) Tattva cintāmaṇī-didhiti-ṭīkā,
(2) Vyutaptti vāda-vyākhyā.
(3) Kārakādyartha nirṇaya-ṭīkā.
(4) Dinakarya prakāśa-taraṅgiṇī.
(5) Tattva-saṅgraha-dīpikā ṭippaṇī
(6) Siddhānta-muktāvalī ṭīkā.

82. ŚRĪ KṚṢṆA NYĀYĀLAṄKĀRA
(ABOUT 1650 A D)

Śrī Kṛṣṇa Nyāyālankāra was a son of Govinda Nyāyavāgīśa and author of the Bhāva-dīpikā, a commentary on the Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī

83 JAYARĀMA TARKĀLAṄKĀRA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D).

Jayarāma Tarkālankāra was born in the district of Pabna in Eastern Bengal. His father was a court pandit at Putia. He was a pupil of Gadādhara and wrote a commentary on the Śaktivāda in the year 1700 A.D.

तस्यानुर्व्वेदिव एव सुकृती भावं तु पञ्चाननो
वाचावां विवेकोपाया स्फुरयति न्यायार्थविद्यान्विते ॥

And the final colophon : संवत् १७१० जेष्ठ वदि ॥ शाके समाप्तोऽयं पुस्तक ॥

84 RUDRARĀMA
(ABOUT 1760 A.D.).

Rudrarāma was a son of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa and therefore lived about 1725 A D. He was the author of —

- (1) **Vāda-pariccheda.**
- (2) **Kāraka vyūha.**
- (3) **Citta rūpa.**
- (4) **Adhikaraṇa candrikā.**
- (5) **Vaiśeṣika-śāstrīya-padārtha nirūpaṇa**

85 "BUNO"[1] RĀMANĀTHA
(ABOUT 1780 A D).

At the close of the 18th century there were two scholars in Nadia who both bore the name of Rāmanātha Tarkasiddhānta—one was versed in Logic and the other in Jurisprudence. The logician, who had his school in a wood on the outskirts of the town, was called *Buno* (wild) Rāmanātha in contradistinction to the jurist, who lived at the centre of the town

Buno Rāmanātha was a pupil of Rāma Nārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana. He was a man of extraordinary genius, but has left no work behind him His circumstances were very poor, yet he did not seek help from any body. He had sometimes to live on boiled tamarind leaves only

Once Mahārāja Śiva Chandra of Krishnagar, wishing to patronise him, came to Nadia and asked him, "Are you in any difficulty?" Buno Rāmanātha replied "No, thanks; I have repeatedly gone through the Tattvacintāmani but have met with no difficulty." Then the Mahārāja said, "I did not enquire of any difficulty of yours in Logic, but I desire to know whether you have any pecuniary wants." The reply again was: "No, thanks."

86 KṚṢṆA KĀNTA VIDYĀVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1780 A D)

He was a pupil of Rāma Nārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana and was equally versed in Logic and Jurisprudence. He wrote the following works :—

- (1) ***Nyāya ratnāvalī***
- (2) ***Dāyabhāga ṭīkā.***
- (3) ***Gopāla līlāmṛta.***
- (4) ***Caitanya candrāmṛta.***
- (5) ***Kāminī kāma-kautuka.***

---

[1] *Buno* is the Bengali colloquial equivalent for Sanskrit *vanya* signifying "wild."

(6) Upamāna cintāmaṇi ṭikā.
(7) Śabda sakti-prakāśikā-tikā.

He flourished during the time of Maharajā Giriśa Chandra of Krishnagar. He was too conscious of his genius. On his deathbed when he found that his end was drawing nigh, he said —

"Let many stars shine in the sky, let lamps too spread their lustre in every house, let the little fireflies glitter from quarters to quarters, alas! the sun having set, what things do not shine before people!"[1]

87. RĀJACUḌĀMAṆIMAKHIN

Writers of Navya Nyāya have spread all over the country In Madras Rājacūḍāmaṇimakhin[2] who was a minister in the Court of Raghunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore, wrote a Tattva cintāmaṇi darpaṇa in 1630 A D

88. DHARMARĀJĀDHVARIN.

Dharmarājādhvarin, a native of Kandaramāṇikkam, wrote a commentary on the Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa of Rucidatta[3]

89 GOPĪNĀTHA MAUNI
(ABOUT 1650 A D.).

He wrote Śabdāloka rahasya, Tarkabhāṣā-ṭikā, and Padārtha-viveka-ṭikā. He was a Maratha and lived in Benares during the time of Raja Jai Singh He calls himself Lord of the Lily of Logic[4]

---

[1] उदयतु गगनेऽनेकास्तारका दीप्तिभाजः
प्रतिगृहमपि दीपा दर्शयन्तु प्रभुत्वम् ।
दिशि दिशि विलसन्तु क्षुद्रखद्योतपोताः
सवितरि परिभूते किन्न लोकैर्विलोकि ॥

[2] अधीत्य निखिलं [illegible] ।
राजचूडामणिमखी कुरुते मणिदर्पणम् ॥
तत्र [illegible] ।
मणिप्रकाशविवृतिर्धर्मराजेन तन्यते ॥
[illegible] भङ्गं कुर्वन् क्वचित् क्वचित् ।
अनुमानप्रकाशस्य विवृतिं करवाण्यहम् ॥

[4] Śabdāloka begins thus —
[illegible] परिपोषकरः प्रकाशः ।
[illegible]
[illegible] विराजितं यशो ।
मल्लारकरतनयो गोपीनाथो विवेचयति ॥

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] In one of the opening lines he states as follows :—

[illegible]

[illegible]

92 RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĀSTRI (PARVATA)
(ABOUT 1815 A.D.)

He was a Maratha, who wrote a gloss on Gadādharī-pañcavāda[1] while residing at Poona about 70 years ago

---

[1] व्याप्तिपञ्चकं, पक्षता, अवयव, सामान्य निरुक्ति।

The Jesuit missionaries, who lived in India in the seventeenth nd eighteenth centuries, took a great interest in Sanskrit and uch valuable information is available from the accounts which hey have left. The Portuguese Jesuits, while sending manu- cripts from Pondicherry and Chandernagore to the King's ibrary at Paris, remark in 1732, that most of the manuscripts re collected from Navadvipa. One missionary says: "The under of the Nyāya School, which means disputation is a nous Brāhmana called G

The missionary goes on to observe.—

"Gaṅgeśa is very famous: he is the author of the Cintā-

[illegible] known since the decadence of letters under the Mogols."[1]

Father Pons remarks —

"The School of Nyāya (reason or judgment) has surpassed all the others in Logic, especially from the time, some centuries back, that the Academy of Nadia, in Bengal, became the most celebrated of India, thanks to its famous Professors, whose works have spread in every direction . . Nowadays they teach in the Nyāya schools hardly anything else besides Logic, which the Brāhmanas have stuffed with an endless number of questions, a great deal more subtle than useful It is a chaos of minutiæ, as Logic was n [illegible]
spend several [illegible]
ties on the me [illegible]
the genera, the [illegible]
trifles and go away without having acquired any other knowledge. The Nyāya has in consequence been given the name of *Tarkashāstram*."[2]

Anquetil Du Perron, who had known Father Mosac at Chandernagore since 1756, says that Father Mosac learnt Sanskrit at Nadia University and that his translation of the four Vedas, specially the Yajur Veda forms a part of his vast and learned collections.[3]

At the time the Portuguese searched for the books, the following works of Nyāya were prevalent in Bengal —

(1) Kusumañjâli, of Udayana
(2) Commentary on Kusumâñjali by Vardhamāna.
(3) Dravya-kiraṇāvali of Udayana
(4) Commentary on Dravya-kiraṇāvali by Vardhamāna
(5) Guṇa kiraṇāvali of Udayana
(6) Commentary on Guṇa kiraṇāvali by Vardhamāna.
(7) Commentary on Gotama-sūtra of Vacaspati

[illegible]

[illegible] translated by Father H Hosten.

(10) [illegible]

(11) Vādārtha-khaṇḍana showing that there is no other cause but God.
(12) Ākhyāta-vāda of Mathuranātha, on some points of grammar
(13) Apūrva-vāda, on fate
(14) Śakti-vāda, on power
(15) Siddhānta-muktāvalī
(16) Cintāmaṇi by Gangesa
(17) Pratyakṣa and Anumāna-khaṇḍa by Raghunātha.
(18) Commentary on Pratyakṣa and Anumāna-khaṇḍa of Mathurānātha.
(19) Mathurānātha on Vidhi-vāda
(20) Bhavānanda on Anumāna
(21) Bhavānanda on Śabda
(22) Gadādhara the Master on the Pratyakṣa of Śiromaṇi.
(23) Gadādhara the Master on Anumāna of Śiromaṇi.
(24) Some special works of Gadādhara the Master
(25) Jagadīśa on Anumāna of Śiromaṇi [1]

96. BRITISH GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES NYĀYA.

[illegible] in 1830 by the Governor-General in Council at the request of H. H. Wilson, the great orientalist.[2]

[illegible] given to Tols —

THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF REVENUE IN CALCUTTA

The humble petition of Sib Chandra Siromani and other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit College.

[illegible]

The Government is spending lots of money for the maintanance of the chairs of Nyāya in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, at [illegible]

[illegible] etc., and by such an act of benevolence your petitioners [illegible] ever pray.

CALCUTTA,
February 1830

To

A. STERLING, ESQ.

The humble petition of Sib Chandra Siromoni and other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit College

[illegible] called and by your such an act of humanity your [illegible] for your welfare and increase of wealth.

CALCUTTA.

(No. 1031)

To

W. W BIRD AND W. FAME, ESQ.,
Sudder Board of Revenue

GENTLEMEN,

With reference to your letter, dated the 12th February last, relative to a monthly allowance of 100 rupees paid from Treasury of the Collector of Nuddea for the support and instruction of students, resorting from distant parts of the country to that place, I am directed by the Governor in Council to transmit to you for information the accompanying copy of a letter and of its enclosures from the Deputy Persian Secretary to Government, dated the 16th ultimo, on that subject. You will be pleased to instruct the Collector to continue the pension in question to the Nuddea students and to discharge the arrears which may have accrued from the date on which the payment of it was stopped

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
(SD.) W. H. MACNAGHTEN,
Off. Deputy Secy to Govt.

FORT WILLIAM,
The 3rd August, 1830

Navadvīpa, Bhātpārā, Puri and other places. Public examinations have been instituted for the encouragement of Nyāya along with other branches of learning

A subsidy has also been granted to the Asiatic Society of Bengal for publication of Sanskrit books, including dialectical works

At present all the works and dialectics are being collected English, French, German and other scholars are collecting Sanskrit books including books on dialectics

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97 RISE OF VERNACULAR DETRIMENTAL TO NYĀYA.

On account of the great attention given to vernaculars at th [illegible] ining Great encourage [illegible] The Dacca Universit [illegible] language has made grea [illegible] ther development shoul [illegible]

[illegible] organized societies such as the Bangiya Sāhitya Pariṣad and th Sāhitya Sabhā have been founded to cultivate the Bengali languag Nyāya written in Sanskrit is not much appreciated. Nyāy written in an easier language is acceptable, but even then th diction of such works cannot be easy

97. THE UNIVERSITIES ON THE WESTERN MODEL

As a result of long controversies dating from 1792 A.D. th
Ca [illegible]
Ca [illegible]
th [illegible]
te [illegible]
ac [illegible]
en [illegible]
Imperial British Government, with the object of encouragin eastern and western learning side by side In spite of the strenuou efforts made by the British Government to foster study and re search in indigenous Logic, it is at its lowest ebb, as the degrees of

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1 *Dacca University Committee Report, Chap VII, p. 31.*

[illegible]
ge, and less profitable in its material results

khanda, ch 263), Yājñavalkya-samhitā (I, 3), etc., in passages which are presumed to have been written after the second century A D We are not surprised to find that the Mahābhārata mentions even a syllogism,[1] called a speech of five parts, in which Nārada is said to have been an expert, when we consider that the Great Epic refers also to the voracious Romans called Romaka,[2] [illegible] with helmets and clad in [illegible] udhisthira on the occasion [illegible] possible that the passage which refers to the syllogism was written after the intercourse of Rome with India had commenced and possibly after the second century A D

[illegible]

a son of Somaśarmā, who resided at Prabhāsa, near Broach, in Kathiawar, on the sea-coast

3 WHEN WAS THE SYLLOGISM FIRST USED IN INDIA?

Though Aksapāda introduced into the Nyāya-sūtra the doctrine of the syllogism, he was by no means the first promulgator of the doctrine—nay, not even its first disseminator. The doctrine known since the decadence of letters under the Mogols."¹

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[1] Pañcāvayava yuktasya vākyasya guna-dosavit (Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 51, verse 5)

[2] Ausnikānantavāsāmśca Romakān purusādakān (Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 51, verse 16).

[3] Vide the concluding verse of the Nyāya bhāsya (about 400 A D), the opening verse of the Nyāya-vārttika (about 630 A D), and the opening lines of the Nyāy-vārttika tātparya-tīkā (about 976 A D).

[4] Padma-purāna, Uttara-khanda, ch. 263

[5] Vide Weber's *History of Indian Literature*, p 85.

[6] Nyāya koṣa, 2nd ed., Bombay

[7] The Brahmānda-purāna, published under the name of Vāyu-purāna by A.S B., adhyāya 23, verses 201 3.

[8] Seeing that the Greek word "Syllogismos" and the Sanskrit word "Samkhyā" or "Sāmkhya" are identical in signification, one may say that Aristotle derived his doctrine of the Syllogism from the Sāmkhya Philosophy of Kapila. But the Sāmkhya Philosophy is not known to have dealt with the doctrine of the syllogism at all.

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āna.

rdhamāna.

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(7) Commentary on Gotama-sūtra of Vacaspati.
(8) Līlāvāti with Commentary
(9) Vādārtha in one volume comprising (i) Devatā vāda, on the nature of the gods, (ii) Mukti vāda, on salvation; (iii) Prāgabhāva, on future contingent things, (iv) Visistha-

Vaiśeṣika vāda, on the qualities, (9) Vidhi vāda on meaning of laws etc
(10) Bauddhādhikāra of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in the volume Kusumāñjali
(11) Vādārtha khaṇḍana showing that there is no other [illegible] but God
(12) Ākhyāta vāda of Mathurānātha on some points of grammar
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90. BRITISH GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES NYĀYA.

India came into the possession of British in 1757 A.D. Since then the students of Navadvipa have received grants from the British Raj. In the year 1829 this was stopped, but was again restored in 1830 by the Governor-General in Council at the request of H. H. Wilson, the great orientalist.[2]

Cha [illegible]
the [illegible]
Jour [illegible]
H. H. [illegible]
[illegible]
noint [illegible]
for Sanskrit [illegible]
given to Tols —

THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF REVENUE IN CALCUTTA

The humble petition of Sib Chandra Siromoni and other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit College.

RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH,

they al [illegible]
Kissen [illegible]
petitio [illegible]
Compa [illegible]
had p [illegible]
and w [illegible]
tion [illegible]
poor petitioners [illegible] Nuddea and who has been pleased [illegible]

The Government is spending lots of money for the maintainance of the chairs of Nyāya in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, at

[illegible]

[illegible] to retain and continue their said pension as they have obtained all along and thereby they might be able to acquire a competent knowledge of their progress etc., and by such an act of benevolence your petitioners as in duty bound shall ever pray.

CALCUTTA,
February 1830.

To

A. STERLING, ESQ

The humble petition of Sib Chandra Siromoni and other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit College

[illegible]

[illegible] their said allowance through the Collector of that district as that is has been all along carried and by your such an act of humanity your petitions shall ever pray for your welfare and increase of wealth.

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97. RISE OF VERNACULAR DETRIMENTAL TO NYĀYA.

On account of the great attention given to vernaculars at the present day the study of Nyāya is declining. Great encouragement is being given to vernacular studies. The Dacca University Committee observes[1] that "the Bengali language has made great progress under British Rule, and its further development should

Nyāya written in Sanskrit is not much appreciated. Nyāya written in an easier language is acceptable, but even then the diction of such works cannot be easy.

97. THE UNIVERSITIES ON THE WESTERN MODEL.

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[1] Dacca University Committee Report, Chap VII, p. 31.

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Navadvīpa Bhāṭpārā, Puri and other places Public examinations have been instituted for the encouragement of Nyāya along with other branches of learning

[illegible] aries of Europe,

such [illegible] nperial Academy of V [illegible] Musée National of P [illegible] d great facilities are

97. RISE OF VERNACULAR DETRIMENTAL TO NYĀYA

[illegible]

Nyāya written in Sanskrit is not much appreciated. [illegible] written in an easier language is acceptable, but even then the diction of such works cannot be easy

97. THE UNIVERSITIES ON THE WESTERN MODEL

[illegible] n the

eastern and weste [illegible] side. In [illegible] te of the stren- efforts [illegible] study and search by the Śaka satraps in Taxila, but the princes continued to hold the Kabul valley until the last vestiges of their rule, which had survived the attacks of the Śakas, were swept away by the Kushans

There is a copper-plate inscription of the satrap of Taxila, Pātilā by name, which records the deposit of the relics of Buddha and a donation made in the 78th year of some (Parthian ?) era

[illegible]

one Heliodorus, a Greek [illegible] which runs as follows —

"This Garuda-column of Vāsudeva (Vishnu) the god of gods, was erected here by Heliodorus, a worshipper of Vishnu, the son of Dion and an inhabitant of Taxila, who came as Greek Ambassador from the great king Antialcidas to king Kasiputra Bhāgabhadra, the Saviour, then reigning, prosperously in the fourteenth year of his kingship"

B

"Three immortal precepts (footsteps) . . when practised lead to heaven—self restraint, charity, conscientiousness." [1]

Taxila the great seat of Hindu learning and culture

Taxila was one of the great cities of the East, and was famous as the principal seat of Hindu learning in Northern India, to which scholars of all classes flocked for instruction, especially in medical science[2] In the *Mahāvagga* VIII. 3 (Dr Oldenberg's ed), we find Jivaka, who was a physician to Buddha, was educated in surgery and medicine at Taxila Ample references have been met with in the Jātakas that people received education in lieu for school-fees or service rendered to their teachers. Jivaka, the physician of Buddha is said to have received education by rendering service to the physicians at Taxila[3] Generally the three Vedas and eighteen Vidyās or *sippas* were taught there.

Mutual exchange of Hindu and Greek culture at Taxila.

Philostratus in his life of Apollonius of Tyana gives an account of that philosopher's visit to India The account tells us that the philosopher had a Babylonian guide, named Damis; that Phrontes, king of Taxila, spoke in Greek and that up to 12 years of age he was educated in the Greek fashion and was sent afterwards to the Brahmins. Also that Taxila was about the size of Nineveh and walled like a Greek city

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[1] Sir John Marshal, K.C.I.E., in the journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1909, p. 1053.

[2] Vide Archaeological discoveries at Taxila by Sir John Marshall.

[3] Vide my Buddha-deva, pp. 160—170 and 220—223, also Jātakas, Vol. I, p. 259, Vol. V, pp. 161, 210, 457.

APPENDIX A.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TAXILA.

A

Taxila. Its political history

(i) Persian conquest of Taxila.

Takṣaśilā or Taxila was the capital of a province of Gāndhāra and is situated near the river of Sadheri in the Rawalpindi district. The high antiquity of Taxila can be best gathered from the fact that it was famous in the time of Buddha as a University town in India and that Gāndhāra of which it forms a part, is mentioned in both the Rig veda and the Atharva-veda, and in the Upanishads and Buddhist literature In historical times[1] we notice it came under the sway of Cyrus the Great (558—530 B C), who is said to have conquered it along with other provinces of Gāndhāra. It is said to have remained in the possession of his successor, [illegible] from 530 to 522 B C [illegible] two centuries; and after [illegible] of the empire in 331 B.C, it, along with other provinces, came under the sway of Alexander the Great. Herodotus relates that Skylax was first sent by Darius (probably about 510 B C) to conduct a fleet of ships from a tributary of the Indus into the Gāndhāra country Ctesias (415-319 B C.) resided at the Persian Court for 17 years as physician during the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes Memnon, during which time Gāndhāra is said to have remained a Persian province An interesting relic of Persian influence at Taxila is an inscription in Aramaic character of the fourth or fifth century B C., which is the only Aramaic record that has yet been found in India.[2]

(ii) Greek régime Alexander the Great

Early in the spring of 326 B C. Alexander with his army entered into the territories of the king of Taxila, who had already tendered his submission. Later on we find it to be a part of the Magadha Empire under the Mauryas, which is clearly evidenced by the fact that Aśoka was viceroy of Taxila Th territory of Gāndhāra, including Taxila, was again conquered by Euthydemus or Democritus and was subsequently wrested from the family of Greek princes by Eucratides. The inscriptions and coins further show that the family of Eucratides was supplanted y the Śaka satraps in Taxila, but the princes continued to hold e Kabul valley until the last vestiges of their rule, which had urvived the attacks of the Śakas, were swept away by the [illegible]

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[1] E. J Rapson's 'Ancient India.'

[2] 'A Guide to Taxila' by Sir John Marshall.

nd a donation made in the [illegible] year [illegible] probably corresponding to 93 B C) during the reign of king Mogo r Manes There has been discovered a column-inscription of one Heliodorus, a Greek native of Taxila and a Vaishnava convert which runs as follows :—

[illegible]

B.

"Three immortal precepts (footsteps) . when practised lead to heaven—self restraint, charity, conscientiousness "[1]

Taxila the great seat of Hindu learning and culture

Taxila was one of the great cities of the East, and was famous as the principal seat of Hindu learning in Northern India, to which scholars of all classes flocked for instruction, especially in medical science.[2] In the *Mahâvagga* VIII. 3 (Dr. Oldenberg's ed), we find Jivaka, who was a physician to Buddha, was educated in surgery and medicine at Taxila Ample references have been met with in the Jātakas that people received education in lieu for school-fees or service rendered to their teachers. Jivaka, the physician of Buddha is said to have received education by rendering service to the physicians at Taxila[3] Generally the three Vedas and eighteen Vidyâs or *sippas* were taught there.

Mutual exchange of Hindu and Greek culture

Philostratus in his life of Apollonius of Tyana gives an account of that philosopher's visit to India The account tells us that the philosopher [illegible]

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[1] Sir John Marshal, K.C.I.E., in the journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1909, p. 1053.

[2] *Vide* Archæological discoveries at Taxila by Sir John Marshall.

[3] *Vide* my Buddha-deva, pp. 160—170 and 220—223, also Jātakas, Vol. I, p. 259, Vol. V, pp. 161, 210, 457.

APPENDIX A.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TAXILA.

A

Taxila — Its general history

(i) Persian conquest of Taxila

Takshasila or Taxila was the capital of a province of G
dhara and is situated near the river
Saraikala in the Rawalpindi district. T
high antiquity of Taxila can be best
inferred from the fact that it was famous
the time of Buddha as a University to
in India and that Gandhara of which it forms a part, is mention
in both the Rig veda and the Atharva veda, and in the Upanisha
and Buddhist literature. In historical times[1] we notice it cam
under the sway of Cyrus the Great (558—530 B.C.), who is sa
to have conquered it along with other provinces of Gandhar
. is one of his successo
from 530 to 522 B.C
wo centuries; and afte
the downfall of the empire in 331 B.C., it, along with other provinces, came under the sway of Alexander the Great. Herodotus relates that Skylax was first sent by Darius (probably about 510 B.C.) to conduct a fleet of ships from a tributary of the Indus into the Gândhâra country. Ctesias (415-319 B.C.) resided at the Persian Court for 17 years as physician during the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes Memnon, during which time Gândhâra is said to have remained a Persian province. An interesting relic of Persian influence at Taxila is an inscription in Aramaic character of the fourth or fifth century B.C., which is the only Aramaic record that has yet been found in India.[2]

(ii) Greek régime. Alexander the Great.

Early in the spring of 326 B.C. Alexander with his army entered into the territories of the king of Taxila, who had already tendered his submission. Later on we find it to be a part of the Magadha Empire under the Mauryas, which is clearly evidenced by the fact that Asoka was viceroy of Taxila. The territory of Gândhâra, including Taxila, was again conquered by Euthydemus or Demetrius and was subsequently wrested from family of Greek princes by Eucratides. The inscriptions and oins further show that the family of Eucratides was supplanted

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[1] E. J. Rapson's 'Ancient India.'
[2] 'A Guide to Taxila' by Sir John Marshall.

APPENDIX B

INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYLLOGISM IN INDIAN LOGIC

1 TARKA-ŚĀSTRA OF GOTAMA
(ABOUT 550 B.C.).

[illegible] *mata-parīkṣā*) The first subject, ample references to which are met with in the old Brahmanic, Buddhistic, and Jaina works, seems to have been first handled by a sage named Gotama or Gautama, who is reputed to have flourished in Mithilā (North Behar) about 550 B.C. The second subject, which is also referred to in old books, was associated with the art of debate at a very early stage. These two subjects, combined together constitute the Tarka-śāstra (the philosophy of reasoning), popularly known as Gautamī-vidyā (the Gotamide learning)[1]

2 THE NYĀYA-SUTRA OF AKṢAPĀDA
(ABOUT 150 A.D.)

The third subject, the doctrine of the Syllogism, does not appear to have been known in India a considerable time before the Christian era. The fourth subject refers to numerous philosophical doctrines that were propounded from time to time up to the second century A.D.[2] Gotama's Tarka-śāstra, after these two subjects had been introduced into it, became, about the second century A.D., designated as the Nyāya-sūtra—the aphorisms on logic. The term "Nyāya" in the sense of logic occurs in the Mahābhārata (Ādi-parva, adhyāya 1, verse 67; adhyāya 70, verses 42-4, and Śānti-parva, adhyāya 210, verse 22), Viṣṇu-purāṇa (3rd pt., adhyāya 6), Matsya-purāṇa (3, 2), Padma-purāṇa (Uttara-

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[illegible] making fathered upon Akṣapāda."

was carried to great perfection in Greece by Aristotle in the fourth century B C (384–322 B.C) That it was known even in India prior to Akṣapāda is apparent from a notice of the same in the Caraka-saṃhitā,[1] about 78 A D In fact, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the exact date at which the syllogistic reasoning was first used in India It is also a problem of enormous difficulty to determine whether there is any genetical connexion between the syllogism as propounded in the Indian Logic and that propounded in the Greek Logic Of the four subjects treated in the Nyāya-sūtra already referred to, the first, second, and fourth are undoubtedly of Indian origin As to the third subject (syllogism), *some scholars say that it, too, is of indigenous growth, as it forms* a part of inference, a kind of *pramāṇa*, which originated in India But on investigation into the history of the development of inference and the syllogism we find that in origin they were altogether distinct, though ultimately there was an amalgamation between them.

4. NO CONNEXION BETWEEN AN INFERENCE AND A SYLLOGISM AT THEIR EARLY STAGE

The notice of inference (*anumāna*) in old books such as the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra (3, 1, 9 and 9, 2, 1) and the Caraka-saṃhitā (Sūtra-sthāna, ch xi, and Vimāna-sthāna, ch. viii) is very meagre. The Nyāya-sūtra (1, 2, 5), which gives a more comprehensive account, defines inference as knowledge which is preceded by perception and as being of three kinds, viz. (1) (knowledge which arises from the perception of what is) like the prior (*pūrvavat*), e g on seeing clouds one infers that there will be rain, (2) (knowledge which arises from the perception of what is) like the posterior *śeṣavat*, e g on seeing a river swollen one infers that there was rain; and (3) (knowledge which arises from the perception of what is) commonly seen (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*) e g. on seeing an animal possessing horns one infers that it also possesses a tail. The inference, as illustrated here from [illegible]

controlling them.

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[1] Concerning the date of the Caraka-saṃhitā see *Journal Asiatique*, tom. viii, pp 447-51, 1896, where M. Sylvain Lévi maintains on the authority of Chinese books that Caraka, the author of the Caraka-saṃhitā, lived at the Court of Kaniṣka (in Jālandhara, Punjab) I provisionally take the date of Kaniṣka to be 78 A D.

khanda ch 263) Yājñavalkya samhitā (I, 3), etc., in pas
which are presumed to have been written after the second cent
A D We are not surprised to find that the Mahābhārata m
tions even a syllogism[1] called a speech of five parts, in wh
Nārada is said to have been an expert, when we consider that t
Great Epic refers also to the voracious Romans called Romaka
who according to it "came adorned with helmets and clad
endless garments to pay tributes" to Yudhiṣṭhira on the occasio
of his coronation at Delhi. It is quite possible that the passage
which refers to the syllogism was written after the intercourse of
Rome with India had commenced and possibly after the second
century A D

In the early commentaries[3] [illegible]
of the sūtra [illegible]
purāna[4] [illegible]
authorshi [illegible]
Pitṛmodha [illegible]
same person, [illegible] es that Gautama [illegible] in his commentary on the
for the name as applied according to it, to Gautama As
credible evidence has been adduced in either case I consider t
identification as fanciful and maintain that Gotama or Gautam
was quite different from Akṣapāda, but that both of them contr
buted to the production of the Nyāya-sūtra, one at its early stag
and the other in its final form Indeed, Akṣapāda, unlike Gotama
or Gautama, is reported in the Brahmāṇḍā-purāna[7] to have been
a son of Somaśarmā, who resided at Prabhāsa, near Broach, in
Kathiawar, on the sea-coast

3 WHEN WAS THE SYLLOGISM FIRST USED IN INDIA?

Though Akṣapāda introduced into the Nyāya-sūtra the doctrine of the syllogism, he was by no means the first promulgator of the doctrine—nay, not even its first disseminator The doctrine[8]

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[1] Pañcāvayava yuktasya vākyasya guna-doṣavit (Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 51, verse 5)

[2] Ausnikānantavāsāmśca Romakān puruṣādakān (Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 51, verse 16)

[3] Vide the concluding verse of the Nyāya-bhāṣya (about 400 A D), the opening verse of the Nyāya-vārttika (about 630 A D), and the opening lines of the Nyāy vārttika tātparya-ṭīkā (about 976 A D).

[4] Padma-purāṇa, Uttara-khanda, ch 263.

[5] Vide Weber's *History of Indian Literature*, p 85

[6] Nyāya-koṣa, 2nd ed., Bombay

[7] The Brahmāṇḍa-purāna, published under the name of Vāyu purāna by S B , adhyāya 23, verses 201 3.

[8] Seeing that the Greek word "Syllogismos" and the Sanskrit word "Samyā" or "Sāmkhya" are identical in signification, one may say that Aristotle derived his doctrine of the Syllogism from the Sāmkhya Philosophy of Kapila. But the Sāmkhya Philosophy is not known to have dealt with the doctrine of the syllogism at all.

(3) Example (*dṛṣṭānta*) That which is non-produced is eternal, as ether.

(4) Application (*upanaya*) The soul is non-produced

(5) Conclusion (*nigamana*) Therefore the soul is eternal

COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION (*pratiṣṭhāpanā*)

(1) The soul is non-eternal

(2) Because it is cognized by the senses

(3) That which is cognized by the senses is non-eternal, as a pot

(4) The soul is cognized by the senses

(5) Therefore the soul is non-eternal

The Caraka saṃhitā, which analyses demonstration and counter-demonstration into five members, does not give any clear definition of those members "Dṛṣṭānta," which in the old Tarka-śāstra signified an instance familiar to the learned and the fool alike, was adopted designate the third member, although in its old sense it did not indicate the principle of connexion (between the middle term and the major term) involved in the member refutative enthymeme of Aristotle, like the counter-demonstration of the Caraka-saṃhitā, consists in drawing conclusions which are inconsistent with those of one's adversary

The enthymeme is defined by Aristotle (in his Rhetoric, bk i, p 16, Welldon's ed) as a syllogism with its constituent parts fewer than those of a normal syllogism, that is, a syllogism of which the major premise, minor premise, or the conclusion is suppressed as being well known to the audience, who can supply the same of their own accord

The demonstration in the Caraka-saṃhitā is obviously a combination of an enthymeme which comprises the first two parts of the demonstration and an example which comprises the last three parts of it This is quite in conformity with the rule of Aristotle, who (in his Rhetoric, bk ii, p 184, Welldon's ed) observes that an example may be used as a supplement to an enthymeme to serve the purpose of a testimony which is invariably persuasive This rule may be illustrated as follows —

Enthymeme

(1) The soul is eternal,

(2) Because it is non produced.

Example,

(3) That which is non-produced is eternal, as ether,

(4) The soul is non-produced,

(5) Therefore the soul is eternal.

B. The Syllogism in Indian Logic is it due to the influence of Aristotle?

A. Caraka-samhita (78 A.D.)

a. Demonstration and Counter-demonstration

The Caraka-samhita in Vimana-sthana which is the earliest work available on Nyaya analyses a demonstration (sthapana) and a counter-demonstration (pratisthapana) as follows

DEMONSTRATION (sthapana)

(1) Proposition (pratijna) The soul is eternal

(2) Reason (hetu) Because it is not produced

B. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

a. Demonstrative and Eristic Enthymemes.

Aristotle, in his [illegible] p 124, [illegible] speaks of two species of enthymemes demonstrative and refutative which correspond respectively to the demonstration and counter-demonstration of the Caraka-samhita. The demonstrative enthymeme of Aristotle, like the demonstration of the Caraka-samhita, consists in drawing conclusions from admitted propositions, while the

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Dr B M Barua a distinguished pupil of mine, differs from me on this point. He would however hold that syllogistic forms existed prior to the time of the Greek influence. As an authority he points out the following passage from the Mahapadana Suttanta (Digha II No 1) where the Dhamma doctrine put in the syllogistic forms involves the double process of deduction and induction —

Deductive method :—

All Buddhas are equal in all respects,
One Buddha lost his mother on the seventh day of his birth.
All Buddhas lost their mothers on the seventh day of their birth.

Inductive method —

All past Buddhas had lost their mothers on the seventh day of their birth.
The present Buddha lost his mother on the seventh day of his birth.
All future Buddhas will lose their mothers on the seventh day of their birth

Thus by the law (*Dhammatā*) all Buddhas lose their mothers on the day of their birth This conclusion though formally correct is materially al

My other pupil, Mr Harendra Lal Sen Gupta M.A., a distinguished of the Mahāyāna philosophy, in the Calcutta University, agrees with t view and as illustrations he alludes to the numerous passages of the Digha Nikāya, Vol I, Suttas 1 and 2, one of which having a c syllogism thus

My being wrong is a hindrance to me
The sense of remorse is due to my being wrong
The sense of remorse is a hindrance to me.

These illustrations according to Dr Barua and Mr Sen Gupta that the ancient Hindus knew the syllogism before the Greeks came t

In reply I may say that one may use language involving Syl may not be aware of the art of Syllogism Syllogism being a sn reasoning, men all over the world may use expressions illustrative It was the Hindus and the Greeks that systematised the express law out of them and I believe the Greeks preceded the Hindus in

Affirmative Example.

(1) The hill is full of fire
(2) Because it is full of smoke
(3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen (affirmative conclusion).

(1) The hill is not smoky.
(2) Because it is non-fiery
(3) *That which is non-fiery is* not smoky, as a lake (negative conclusion)

Negative Example

(1) The hill is full of fire.
(2) Because it is full of smoke
(3) That which is not full of fire is not full of smoke, as a lake.

The reason (*hetu*), as expounded by Akṣapāda (in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 34, 35), is of two kinds, *viz* affirmative and negative. An affirmative reason is the means which, through its homogeneity or connexion with the example, establishes what is to be established, while a negative reason is the means which, through its heterogeneity or separation from the example, establishes what is to be established The definitions may be illustrated as follows —

Affirmative Reason.

(1) *The hill is full of fire*
(2) Because it is full of smoke
(3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen

Negative Reason

(1) The hill is not full of smoke
(2) Because it is not full of fire
(3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

The negative example and *negative reason expounded by* Akṣapāda (in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 35, 37) possess apparently no counterparts in the *Organon* (Prior Analytics) of Aristotle From the illustration of the example and reason (affirmative and negative) given by Akṣapāda it appears that he admitted the universal affirmative conclusion in what is called by Aristotle the "first figure" and the universal negative conclusion in the first and second figures Now, if a conclusion in the first figure is to be negative, the major premise must be *negative*, and, if a conclusion in the second figure is to be negative, the minor premise must be negative (*vide* Prior Analytics, bk i, chs iv, v, pp 85–94) Considering that the major and minor premises of Aristotle correspond respectively to the example and reason of Akṣapāda, it becomes absolutely necessary to admit a negative example and a negative reason as counter-parts of the negative major premises and the negative minor premises

B AKSAPĀDA (ABOUT 150 A D)[1]

b. *Analysis into five members (Avayava)*

Akṣapāda in his Nyâya-sûtra (1, 1, 32) mentions the five parts of a demonstration under the name of *avayava* (members) as follows —

(1) Proposition (*pratijñā*) This hill is full of fire

(2) Reason (*hetu*) Because it is full of smoke

(3) Example (*udāharana*) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen

(4) Application (*upanaya*) This hill is full of smoke

(5) Conclusion (*nigamana*) Therefore, this hill is full of fire

B. ARISTOTLE

Analysis of syllogism and demonstration (analytics)

The term *avayava*, used by Akṣapada to signify parts or members of a syllogism or demonstration, corresponds to the term *analytics*, which refers to the section of the *Organon* in which Aristotle analyses the syllogism and demonstration into their principles (*vide* O F. Owen's translations of the *Organon*, Prior Analytics, bk i, ch i, p 80).

c *Example (udāharana)*

Akṣapâda calls the example an *udāharana* which he divides into two kinds, *viz* affirmative (*sâdharmya*) and negative (*vaidharmya*) An affirmative example is defined in the Nyâya-sûtra (1, 1, 36) as a familiar instance, which, being similar to the minor term, possesses the property of that term as co-present (with the reason) A negative example is defined (in the Nyâya sûtra 1 1, 37) as a familiar instance, which is contrary to what has been stated in the case of the affirmative example, that is, in which there is an absence of the property implying an absence of the reason The definition may be illustrated as follows —

c. *Example (paradeigma)*

The affirmative example (*sâdharmya udâharana*), as defined by Akṣapâda corresponds exactly to the example (*paradeigma*), as explained by Aristotle (in his Prior Analytics, bk ii, ch xxiv, p 232) An example, according to Aristotle, occurs when the major term is shown to be present with the middle, through something similar to the minor; but it is necessary to know that the middle is with the minor, and the major with what is similar, *e g* —

(1) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

(2) The hill is full of smoke.

(3) Therefore the hill is full of fire

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[1] Concerning the age of Akṣapâda, *vide* introduction to Daśapadârthî, translated by Mr Ui and edited by Dr F W Thomas (in the press).

(1) The hill is full of fire.
(2) Because it is full of smoke
(3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen

D. VASUBANDHU
(ABOUT 450 A D)

e. Syllogism of two members

Vasubandhu in his Tarka śāstra (Chinese version, ch 1) treats of syllogism as consisting of five members, but in his Ronki (Vādavidhi), as quoted by Kwei-ke[2] he is said to have maintained that a syllogism consists of two members only, viz. the proposition and the reason, and that the terms necessary for a syllogism are only three, viz the minor, the major, and the middle In the Nyāya-vārttika (1, 1, 37) and the Nyāya-vārttika - tātparya - ṭīkā (1, 1, 37)[3] Vasubandhu, designated as Subandhu, is stated to have held that a syllogism consists of only two members, and that the example is quite superfluous The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara[4] (in his Nyāyāvatāra, v. 20) refers to Vasubandhu, when he says that according to experts in logic a

We may also regard the syllogism expounded by Nāgārjuna and Maitreya as comprising an enthymeme and an example, for the example sometimes consists of only one proposition[1]

D ARISTOTLE

e A perfect Syllogism

The form of syllogism laid down by Vasubandhu conforms in the main to the rules laid down by Aristotle with regard to a perfect syllogism, viz that every syllogism consists of two premises and one conclusion, so that there are altogether three terms in a syllogism (vide Prior Analytics, bk i, ch xxv pp 140—2) A syllogism is defined by Aristotle (in Prior Analytics, bk i, ch i, p 92) as a sentence (or speech) in which, certain things being laid down, something different from the premises necessarily results in consequence of their existence, e g

Premises

(1) All that is full of smoke is full of fire.
(2) This hill is full of smoke.

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[1] George Grote, in his *Aristotle*, vol. i, Analytica Priora, ii, ch xi, p. 275, observes in a footnote as follows "If we turn to ch xxvii, p 70, a 30—4, we shall find *Aristotle* on a different occasion disallowing altogether the so-called syllogism from example"

[illegible]

C NĀGĀRJUNA (250–300 A D.) MAITREYA (400 A D)[1]

d Function of an Example

The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, in his Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra (Chinese version, ch I, sect I), gives an elaborate explanation of example (*udāharana*), which is either affirmative or negative, and which must, according to him be mentioned to make clear the reasons of the disputant and his respondent. The Buddhist philosopher Maitreya, in his Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra (Chinese version, vol xv), treats of proofs (*sādhaka*) which include a proposition (*siddhānta*), a reason (*hetu*), and an example (*udāharana*, affirmative or negative) Though in the commentaries (Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1 1, 37, and Nyāya-vārttika, 1, 1, 37) on the Nyāya-sūtra the "application" and "conclusion" are considered as essential parts of a syllogism, inasmuch as these on the strength of the general principle involved in the example reassert the reason and restate the proposition in a decisive way Nāgārjuna and Maitreya on the other hand, reject them as superfluous on the ground of their not being different from the reason and proposition[2] The three members of a syllogism expounded by Nāgārjuna and Maitreya are as follows

C. ARISTOTLE.

d. Use of an Exampl

The three members of a sy logism, as explained by Nāgār juna, Maitreya, and others, con stitute what is called an ex ample Aristotle, in his Rhe toric (bk ii, p. 184, Welldon' ed), observes that it is proper in default of enthymemes, to make use of examples as logica proofs, these being the natural means of producing conviction In the Prior Analytics (bk. ii, ch xxiv, p 233, O F Owen's ed), it is further observed that the example differs from induc tion in that the latter proves the universal from a complete enumeration of individuals, while the former attempts to prove it from a single individual or from some selected indivi duals, and in that the induction steps at the universal, while the example draws syllogistically a conclusion in respect of the minor term, *e g*

(1) That which is full of smoke is full of fire as a kitchen

(2) The hill is full of smoke

(3) Therefore the hill is full of fire

The above may also be put in the reverse order as follows

(1) The hill is full of fire

(2) Because it is full of smoke

(3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire as a kitchen

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[1] [illegible] Vidyabhusana's [illegible] School of Indian Logic, pp [illegible]

[2] It is perhaps the view of Nāgārjuna and Maitreya, and [illegible] of Buddhism that is referred to under the name of "[illegible]" in the Nyāya-[illegible]

predicated. The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara [1] (500–550 A.D), in his Nyāyāvatāra, verse 14, says that in an inference for the sake of others the minor term is to be defined as that of which it is assumed that the major term is predicable In an inference for one's self, on the other hand, the minor term is to be defined, according to old Indian logicians, as that of which it is questionable whether the major term is predicable

h Three characteristics of the middle term

In an inference for one's self, as well as in that for the sake of others, the middle term, if it is to lead to a valid conclusion, must possess the following characteristics [2] .—

(1) The middle term must cover the minor term e g. the hill is smoky.

(2) The middle term must be present in places in which there is the major term, e g. that which is smoky is fiery.

(3) The middle term must be absent from places where there is an absence of the major term, e.g. that which is not fiery (non-fiery) is not smoky

tion or doubt, while in an inference for the sake of others it is a matter of assumption, so also in the *Organon* of Aristotle (Prior Analytics bk i, ch i, p 81) the dialectic is an interrogation of contradiction, while the demonstration is an assumption of one part of the contradiction In the *Organon* (De Interpretatione, ch xi, pp 67–8, O F Owen's edition) a dialectic is stated indeed to be an interrogation, for a choice should be given from the interrogation to enunciate this or that part of the contradiction This statement coincides with the definition of Dignāga, according to whom the debater chooses the major term as predicable of the minor

h The middle term in a syllogism.

The characteristics laid down by Dignāga correspond exactly to those laid down by Aristotle In the *Organon* (Prior Analytics, bk. i, ch iv, pp 85-6 O F Owen's edition) it is stated that, when three terms so subsist with reference to one another that the minor is covered by the middle and the middle is or is not covered by the major, then there is necessarily a perfect syllogism of the major and the minor.

This statement may be illustrated as follows .—

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[1] Sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣaḥ (Nyāyāvatāra, verse 14, edited by S C Vidyābhusana) Sandigdha-sādhya-dharmatvam pakṣatvam (quoted in the Tattvacintāmaṇi, anumāna-khaṇḍa, p. 407, *Bibliotheca Indica*)

[2] (1) Phyogs kyi chos-ñid dan, (2) *Mthun*-paḥi-phyogs-ñid la yod par-nes-pa-dan, (3) Mi-mthun-paḥi phyogs la-med-pa-ñid-du-nes pa-yan no, (Dignāga's Nyāya-pravesa, Tangyur, *Mdo*, xcv, fol. 183b)

proposition can be proved without any example, if there is invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term, and in the absence of such invariable concomitance the proof is impossible even with the example

Such being the view of Vasubandhu, his syllogism is of the following form —

(1) This hill is full of fire

(2) Because it is full of smoke

(3) All that is full of smoke being full of fire

Conclusion.

(3) Therefore this hill is full of fire

E. DIGNĀGA
(ABOUT 590 A D)[1]

f Inference for one's self and inference for the sake of others

Asanga in his Prakaranārya-vācā-sūtra (Chinese version, vol xi) omits inference altogether and substitutes for it a syllogism of five members Dignāga in his Pramāna-samuccaya retains inference under the name of an inference for one's self and affiliates syllogism to inference by calling it an inference for the sake of others[2]

E ARISTOTLE

f The dialectic proposition and demonstrative proposition

The distinction made by Dignāga between an inference for one's self and that for the sake of others corresponds exactly to the distinction made by Aristotle (in his Prior Analytics, bk 1, ch 1, p 81) between a dialectic proposition and a demonstrative proposition

g. Definition of the minor term

In the Pramāna-samuccaya,[3] ch. iii, Dignāga defines a minor term (paksa) as that of which the major term is chosen to be

g. Explanation of a proposition

Just as in an inference for one's self the predicability of the major term in respect of the minor term is a matter of ques

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[1] Vide S C Vidyabhusana's Mediæval School of Indian Logic, p 81

[2] Ran-don-ni tshul gsum rtag las don-mthon waho (Pramāna-samuccaya, ch ii, Tangyur, Mdo, xcv, fol 8) Gshan-gyi-don-ni rjes-dpag-ni ran-gis mthon-don-gsal byed yin (Pramāna-samuccaya, ch. iii, Tangyur, Mdo, xcv, fol 9).

[3] Vide Tangyur, Mdo xcv, fol 7

ect (middle term) stand to each
other in the relation of cause
and effect e g all that is smoky
is fiery

(3) Non-perception[1] (*anupalab-*
dhi), *e.g* whatever thing (being per-
eptible) is not perceived is non-
xistent

j. Nature of the universal preposition

The relations which estab-
h invariable concomitance of
middle term with the major
n are the bases of universal
positions "Invariable con-
itance" is designated in
krit as *vyāpti* (pervasion or
esence), *nāntarīyaka* (non-
ation), and *avinābhāva* (the
n owing to which one can-
st without the other)

term), is said to be the cause of the latter

j. Nature of the universal proposition

The proposition in which the predicate is related to the subject *per se* or *causally* is a universal one Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics (bk i, ch iv, pp 253-5, O F. Owen's edition) calls that (the) universal (major term) which is predicated "of every" and "*per se*", that is, which being predicable of the middle term *per se* is predicated of it in every instance. In the Posterior Analytics (bk i, ch xxiv, p 301) Aristotle further observes that the universal (major term) is the cause of the middle term, which is essentially co-present within it. In Prior Analytics, bk i, ch. xxiv, pp 138-9, Aristotle says that in all syllogisms we must have a universal proposition (premise) which is shown by the universal term

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atmakirti and his followers, who say that non-existence is *inferred*
perceived, assume non perception as a middle term (sign). But the
y of Indian logicians maintain that non-existence of a thing is *perceived* by
me sense by which the thing itself is perceived Hence non-perception is
knowledged by them as a middle term (sign)

The above characteristics as applicable to an affirmative or negative syllogism may be illustrated as follows:

I

(1) This hill is fiery
(2) because it is smoky
(3) That which is smoky is fiery

II

(1) This hill is not smoky
(2) because it is non-fiery
(3) That which is non-fiery is not smoky

F Dharmakirti[1]
(600-50 A D)

Demonstration through three kinds of middle term[2]

The Buddhist logician Dharmakirti, in his Nyāya-bindu, ch ii, divides the middle term (*liṅga*, sign)[3] into three kinds in accordance with the relations which it bears to the major term The relations are as follows —

(1) Selfsameness inherence or "being the essence of that" (*svabhāva, samavāya, tādātmya*), which occurs when the predicate (or major term) is in essence wholly included in the subject (or middle term), e g this is a tree, because it is *śiṃśapā*

(2) Effect, also called "origination from that" (*kāryya, tadutpatti*), which occurs when the predicate (major term) and the sub-

I

(1) That which is smoky is fiery
(2) This hill is smoky
(3) Therefore this hill is fiery

II

(1) That which is non-fiery is not smoky
(2) This hill is non-fiery
(3) Therefore this hill is not smoky

F Aristotle

Demonstration through the medium of essence and cause

The two relations, viz "self-sameness" (or "inherence") and "effect" as expounded by Dharmakirti, correspond to the two relations, viz. "*per se*" (inherence) and "causal", as expounded by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics (bk i ch iv, pp 253-5, and bk. i ch xxiv, p 301)

(1) *Per se* (essence or inherence) —The predicate (major terms) is said to be related to the subject (middle term *per se* essentially), if the properties of the former are inherent in the definition of the latter.

(2) The causal —The predicate (major term), which is essentially present with the subject (middle

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[1] *Vide* S C Vidyabhusana's *Medieval School of Indian Logic*, pp. 103-5

[2] Dignāga in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Chap II.

[3] Trīṇyeva ca liṅgāni, anupalabdhiḥ svabhāva-kāryye ceti (*Nyāyabindu*, ch. ii, p. 104, *Bibliotheca Indica*)

called by Uddyotakara *parāmarśa*[1] (syllogism) or *linga-parāmarśa* (syllogism from a sign), and all the three parts combined together are designated as *parāmarśa rūpanumāna*[2] (a syllogistic inference) Since the time of Uddyotakara no further development has been made in the *form of the syllogistic inference*, except that the three parts of it have been called respectively the instrument (*karaṇa*), operation (*vyāpāra*), and consequence (*phala*) The first two parts (premises) combined together have been uniformly designated as *parāmarśa* (syllogism or enthymeme).

puted to have been derived from the *Organon* of Aristotle, as taught in a developed form in the Syro-Persian School of Gundeshapur[3] in Susiana about 350 A D

According to certain Roman commentators[4] too, the premises alone constitute the *syllogism*

6 *Migrations of the Logical Theories of Aristotle from Alexandria into India* (175 *B.C*-600 *A D*)

[illegible]

to 30 B C., when the Greeks occupied the north-western parts of

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[1] Tasmāt smṛtyanugṛhīto *linga parāmarśo* 'bhiṣtārtha pratipādako bhavatīti (Nyāya-vārttika, 1, 1, 5, p. 47, *Bibliotheca Indica*)

[2] Tad idam antimam pratyakṣam pūrvābhyām. Pratyakṣābhyām smṛtyanugṛhyamāṇam *parāmarśa-rupam anumānam* bhavati (Nyāya-vārttika, 1, 1, 5, p 46, *Bibliotheca Indica*)

[3] *Vide* C. Huart's *Arabic Literature*, pp 137, 280

[4] George Grote, in his *Aristotle*, vol. i, Analytica Priora, i, ch. v, p. 200, says that Aristotle includes in a syllogism the two premises as well as the conclusion. But on the same page he quotes in a footnote the opinion of Julius Pacius (ad. Analyt Prior i), who said that the syllogism consisted of the two premises alone and the conclusion was not a part thereof, but something distinct and superadded.

[5] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. i, p. 498.

G UDDYOTAKARA
(600-50 A D)[1]

k Syllogism from a sign (linga-parāmarśa)

Uddyotakara, who completely incorporated syllogism into inference in his Nyāya-vārttika,[2] defines inference as knowledge which is preceded by the perception of the middle term (sign) and recollection of its invariable concomitance with the major term in the following form: "I perceive that this hill has smoke, which I remember to be invariably concomitant with fire, and hence I infer that this hill has fire" The above may be properly put in the following form —

(1) Whatever is smoky is fiery
(2) This hill is smoky
(3) Therefore this hill is fiery

The first part (major premise) of the above inference is called *vyāpti* (a universal proposition); the second part (minor premise) is called *upanaya* (an application of the universal); and the third part is called *anumiti* (inferential knowledge or conclusion) The first two parts (premises) constitute what is

G. A

k Enthym

Aristotle,
tics (bk. ii,
40), speaks
enthymemes
meme from
from a like
enthymeme
the first figu
sign is infalli
to a conclus
sarily true
enthymeme f
responds to t
sign[4] (linga
pounded by
Just as in
of Uddyota
(*parāmarśa*)
first two P
ence, so a
Logic,[5] (e g i
lah Shamsi
1250 A D) t
comprises on
and not the
be added tha
of the school
century A D
and Bassora

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gives a lucid explanation of a sign
[4] Dr. George Grote, in his (r
states in a footnote as follows
one premises only of the
added, it becomes a s
of the Enthymeme t

l, i, Analyti
rows in t

library of Alexandria, where they were duly appreciated and whence they gradually spread to India and other countries To the scholars at Athens and Rome these works were practically ost, until copies of some of them reached the island of Rhodes, where they were edited by Andronicus in 50 B C Even the edition of Andronicus was not available in the Middle Ages to the Greeks and Romans, who depended for their knowledge of Aristotle on the Latin translation of Boethius (480–525 A D) But the original works of Aristotle seem to have been carefully preserved in Alexandria, and on the downfall of the Greeks and Romans they found their way into Syria and Persia, whence they reached the Arabic school of Bagdad about the beginning of the ninth century A D. *The original Greek texts of Aristotle's works after these* strange vicissitudes reached the country of their birth via Constantinople about 1204 A.D The presumption, therefore, is that from the third century B C to 1200 A D Aristotle's works were more extensively read and better appreciated in the East than in the West

India [1] and had their capital at Śākala, officially c
demia (modern Sialkot) in the Punjab. The work of
which we find a trace in this period is the Art of Rh
was evidently a favourite subject of study among
Greeks and from which the syllogism of five mem
trated in the Carak
be
of
wa

masters of Alexandria, Syria, and Pe
on a brisk trade between Alexandria and India
Aristotle which comes to our notice in this period
and Posterior Analytics (and possibly also the De Inte
from which Akṣapāda, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, a
seem to have, as shown above, borrowed
of the

-apada and Dignāga, were inhabitants of
(Prabhāsa) and Conjeeveram (Kāñchi), which were t
seaports on the eastern and western coasts of India,
by merchants and travellers from Alexandria It
that the Prior Analytics was widely read in those day
the original or in vernacular translation The intr
different parts of the Greek Prior Analytics into I
must needs have been gradual, as these had to be
into and harmonized with the parts previously ing
Indian thought and language The third period ex
about 450 A D to 600 A.D when the Syro-Persia
Gundeshapur, [2] established in Susiana (Persia) in 350 A
dispersion there of some of the best works of the
Al was in the height of its glory and spread
it is not quite certain whether any in
period
eavoured in the preceding pages to sho
otle were very well known in India duri
the Christ

ught up by Callimach

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p 599 [2] *Vide* Huart's *Arabic Literature*, p
Grant's article on Aristotle in the *Encyclopaedi*
nnica 9th ed, vol ii p 494.

hey admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nâlandâ to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the ame of Nâlandâ students in order that they might be received verywhere with honour "Of those from abroad who wished o enter the schools discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew; and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only wo or three out of ten succeeding"[1] Hwen-thsang mentions ome celebrated men of Nâlandâ, such as Dharmapâla and Candrapâla, Gunamati and Sthiramati,[2] Prabhâmitra and Jinamitra, and Jñânacandra and Sîlabhadra

Another Chinese pilgrim named I-tsing, who resided in Nâlandâ for ten years (probably 675—685 A D), says that there were ight halls and 300 apartments in the monastery of Nâlandâ with more than 3,000 resident monks The lands in its possession contained more than 200 villages which had been bestowed upon the monastery by kings of different generations[3]

Nâlandâ assumed the character of a university from about 450 A D[4] Bâlâditya, king of Magadha, who built a monastery at Nâlandâ, was a contemporary of the Hun king Mihirakula, who reigned first in Śâkala and afterwards in Kâśmîra Now Mihirakula[5] began his reign in 515 A D, and his contemporary, Bâlâditya, must also have lived about that time There were three predecessors of Bâlâditya who built monasteries at Nâlandâ. Of them, the earliest, named Sakrâditya, must have reigned about 450 A.D if we suppose 25 years as the average duration of the reign of each of them The year 450 A D is then the earliest limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nâlandâ. The latest limit which we know with certainty is

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[illegible]

APPENDIX C.[1]

THE UNIVERSITY OF NALANDA

(About 300—[illegible] A.D.)

Nālandā was a village which is identified with modern Baragaon[2] 7 miles north of Rajgir in Behar. Though occasionally mentioned in the Pali literature, Nālandā was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahāyāna at the beginning of the Christian era. Nāgārjuna about 300 A.D., and Ārya Deva, about 320 A.D. were the earliest scholars to take an interest in the educational institution at that village. A Brāhmaṇa named Suviṣṇu, a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, is said to have established 108 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahāyāna might not decline.[3] About 400 A.D. the Chinese pilgrim, Fahian,[4] visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo." He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Sāriputra, the right-hand disciple of Buddha, had entered Nirvāṇa. Early in the 7th century A.D. another Chinese pilgrim, the famous Hwen-thsang, visited Nālandā and halted[5] there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Silabhadra. According to him[6] the site of Nālandā was originally a mango garden which was bought by 500 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha.[7] After the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, five kings, named Sakrāditya, Buddha Gupta, Tathāgata Gupta, Bālāditya, and Vajra, built five Saṅghārāmas or monasteries at Nālandā. A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery, and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate. A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hwen-thsang in 637 A.D. the whole was "truly marvellous to behold." In the establishment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing, they found the day too short, day and night they admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nâlandâ to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the name of Nâlandâ students in order that they might be received everywhere with honour. 'Of those from abroad who wished to enter the schools discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew; and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only two or three out of ten succeeding'' Hwen-thsang mentions some celebrated men of Nâlandâ, such as Dharmapâla and Candrapâla, Guṇamati and Sthiramati,[1] Prabhâmitra and Jinamitra, and Jñânacandra and Silabhadra

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[illegible] limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nâlandâ The latest limit which we know with certainty is

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[illegible]

[3] Dr. D. B Spooner observes —

Nâlandâ, as is widely known, was one of the principal seats and centres of Buddhist culture and Buddhist learning in the Gupta period of Indian history, and for some centuries thereafter. The precise date of its foundation as "University" is now unknown, but from the circumstance that the Chinese pilgrim Fa Hien, makes no particular mention of the place, whereas the pilgrim who followed him, Hieun Thsang, describes the place at length, leads modern scholars to infer that it must have risen in the interval between the visits of these two, namely, somewhere about the middle, perhaps, of the fifth century A D (p 33 of the "Annual report of the Archæological Survey of India, Eastern Circle, for 1915-16

APPENDIX C.[1]

THE UNIVERSITY OF NALANDA.

(About 200—1200 A.D.)

Nālandā was a village which is identified with modern Bar-gaon[2] 7 miles north of Rājgir in Behar. Though occasionally mentioned in the Pāli literature, Nālandā was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahāyāna at the beginning of the Christian era. Nāgārjuna, about 300 A.D., and Ārya Deva about 320 A.D. were the earliest scholars to take an interest in the educational institution at that village. A Brāhmaṇa named Suvisnu, a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, is said to have established 104 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahāyāna might not decline[3]. About 400 A.D. the Chinese pilgrim, Fahian[4] visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo." He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Sāriputra, the right-hand disciple of Buddha, had entered Nirvāṇa. Early in the 7th century A.D. another Chinese pilgrim, the famous Hwen-thsang, visited Nālandā and halted[5] there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Silabhadra. According to him[6] the site of Nālandā was originally a mango garden which was bought by 500 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha.[7] After the Nirvāṇa of Buddha five kings, named Sakrāditya, Buddha Gupta, Tathāgata Gupta, Bālāditya, and Vajra, built five Saṅghārāma or monasteries at Nālandā. A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery, and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate. A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hwen-thsang in 637 A.D the whole was "truly marvellous to behold." In the establishment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing, they found the day too short, day and night

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70—86.

165—170

have been given to a Buddhist saint of a later age and not to dha himself they admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nālandā to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the name of Nālandā students in order that they might be received everywhere with honour 'Of those from abroad who wished to enter the schools discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew, and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only two or three out of ten succeeding.'[1] Hwen-thsang mentions some celebrated men of Nālandā, such as Dharmapāla and Candrapāla, Gunamati and Sthiramati,[2] Prabhāmitra and Jinamitra, and Jñānacandra and Sīlabhadra

Another Chinese pilgrim named I-tsing, who resided in Nālandā for ten years (probably 675—685 A D), says that there were eight halls and 300 apartments in the monastery of Nālandā [illegible] its posses- [illegible] n bestowed [illegible] from about 450 A D.[4] Bālāditya, king of Magadha, who built a monastery at Nālandā, was a contemporary of the Hun king Mihirakula, [illegible] limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nālandā. The latest limit which we know with certainty is

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[illegible] the middle, perhaps, of the fifth century A D [illegible] report of the Archaeological Survey of India, Eastern Circle, for 1915-16

APPENDIX C.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NĀLANDĀ.[1]

(Circa 300—650 A.D.)

Nālandā was a village which is identified with modern Baragaon[2] 7 miles north of Rajgir in Behar. Though occasionally mentioned in the Pāli literature, Nālandā was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahāyāna at the beginning of the Christian era. Nāgārjuna about 300 A.D., and Ārya Deva, about 320 A.D. were the earliest scholars to take an interest in the educational institution at that village. A Brāhmaṇa named Suvishnu, a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, is said to have established 108 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahāyāna might not decline.[3] About 400 A.D. the Chinese pilgrim, Fahian[4] visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo." He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Sāriputra, the right-hand disciple of Buddha, had entered Nirvāṇa. Early in the 7th century A.D., another Chinese pilgrim, the famous Hwen-thsang, visited Nālandā and halted[5] there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Sīlabhadra. According to him[6] the site of Nālandā was originally a mango garden which was bought by 500 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha.[7] After the Nirvāṇa of Buddha five kings named Sakrāditya, Buddha Gupta, Tathāgata Gupta, Bālāditya, and Vajra, built five Saṅghārāma or monasteries at Nālandā. A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery, and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate. A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hwen-thsang in 637 A.D. the whole was "truly marvellous to behold." In the establishment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing, they found the day too short, day and night

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[1] From the author's "Indian Logic: Mediæval School" (Appendix A).
[2] *Vide* Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India, p. 468.
[3] *Vide* Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 70—86.
[4] *Vide* Beal's Fa-hian, p. 111.
[5] *Vide* Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India, p. x.
[6] *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. ii, pp. 165—170.
[7] It must have been given to a Buddhist saint of a later age and not to Buddha himself.

APPENDIX D.[1]

LIST OF KINGS OF THE PĀLA DYNASTY OF BENGAL AND BEHAR

(From Tibetan sources.)

[illegible]
he south to the Vindhya ranges It is stated that during his
eign Śānta Rakṣita died. Now Śānta Rakṣita visited Tibet
uring the reign of Thi-srong-deu-tsan in 749 A D, and worked
here for 13 years, that is, till 762 A D His death must
herefore have taken place after 762 A D Dīpankara Śrījñāna
lias Atiśa,
ong Naya
sho-lotsava
ion of Lha-lama-yo-ses-hod, [illegible]
These facts throw a good deal of light on the dates of the Pāla
ings.[3] It is further stated that the death of Mahī Pāla is
xactly synchronous with that of the Tibetan king Khri-ral
Now Khri-ral (or Ral-pa-can) died in 899 A.D[4] This fixes the
late of the death of Mahī Pāla As the period of reign of each of
he kings that preceded and succeeded Mahī Pāla is definitely
stated by Lama Tārānātha, and also by the author of the Pag-sam-jon-zang, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the dates of the Pāla kings Proceeding in this way, we can fix the dates as follows :—

1.	Go Pāla	660—705 A D
2.	Deva Pāla	705—753 A D
3.	Rasa Pāla	753—765 A D

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[1] From the author's "Indian Logic, Mediæval School" (Appendix B)

[2] *Vide* Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus, von Schiefner, pp 202—252, and Pag-sam jon zang, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C I E, pp 112—121.

[3] *Vide* the 16th volume of Klon-rdol-gsun hbum, and Sarat Chandra Das's "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow," pp 50—76.

[4] *Vide* the Chronological Table extracted from the Vaiḍuryakarpo in Csoma de Koros's Tibetan Grammar, p. 183.

750 A D, [illegible] Nālanda [illegible] there was [illegible] and Nālan[illegible] approximately until 850 A D [illegible] suppose that the latter continued to exist

According to Tibetan accounts[1] the quarter in which the Nālandā University, with its grand library was located was called Dharmagañja (Piet[illegible] ings called [illegible] tively In [illegible] sacred scrip[illegible] Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, [illegible] such as Samāja-guhya etc After the Turuṣka raiders had made incursions in Nālandā, the temples and *Caityas* there were repaired by a sage named Mudita Bhadra. Soon after this, Kukutasiddha, minister of the king of Magadha, erected a temple at Nalandā, and, while a religious sermon was being delivered there, two very indigent Tīrthika mendicants appeared Some naughty young novice-monks in disdain threw washing-water on them This made them very angry After propitiating the sun for 12 years, they performed a *yajña*, fire sacrifice and threw living embers and ashes from the sacrificial pit into the Buddhist temples, etc This produced a great conflagration which consumed Ratnodadhi. It is, however, said that many of the Buddhist scriptures were saved by water which leaked through the sacred volumes of Prajñapāramitā-sutra and Tantra

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[1] *Vide* Pag-sam jon-zang, edited in the original Tibetan by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C I E, at Calcutta, p 92

APPENDIX E.[1]

THE ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF VIKRAMAŚILĀ.

(About 800—1200 A D)

Vikramaśilā,[2] mentioned in Sanskrit Sragdharāstotra-ṭīkā,[3] Vṛhat-svayambhū-purāṇa,[4] Tibetan Tangyur,[5] etc, was a great collegiate monastery, or rather University, founded by King Dharma Pāla at the close of the 8th century A D It was situated on a precipitous hill[6] in Behar at the right bank of the Ganges, possibly at Śila-saṃgama, now called Pātharghāṭā near Colgong in the Bhagalpur district Dharmapāla endowed the university with rich grants sufficing for the maintenance of 108 resident monks besides numerous non-resident monks and pilgrims. At the head of the university was always a most learned and pious sage Thus at the time of Dharma Pāla, Ācārya Buddha-jñāna-pāda directed the affairs of the university, and during 1034—1038 A D Dīpankara or Śrījñāna Atiśa

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[illegible]

[3] [illegible] colophon of the Sragdharā [illegible] श्रीमद्विक्रमशीलदेवमहाविहारीय राजगुरुपण्डितभिक्षु श्रीजिनरक्षितकृता स्रग्धरास्तुति-टीका परिसमाप्ता (Sragdharā-stotra, edited in the Bibliotheca Indica series by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, p 50)

[4]

मागधस्यां समस्थां च विहारे धन धार्मिके ।
महा विक्रमशीलेति विहारे बहुतुत्तम ॥
धर्मश्रीमित्र आचार्य भिक्षुः पण्डितकर्मक ।
धर्मं दिदेशयामास श्रावकौति च कदाम् ॥

(Vṛhat-svayambhū-purāṇa, edited by M M Hara Prasad Sastri chap. vi, 320—321).

[5] Numerous Sanskrit works such as तारैकविंशतिकास्तवे सचेष, तारा विंशकोषम्, [illegible]

[illegible] with modern Silao, which is a small village [illegible] Bargaon (ancient Nālandā) and six miles to the north of Rajgir in the subdivision of Behar (vide Report of the Archæological Survey, vol. viii p. 83). But this identification does not tally with the description found in Tibetan books, for the Ganges never passed by Silao, nor is there any hill near to it.

4	Dharma Pāla	765— 829 A.D.
5	Masu Rakṣita	829— 837 A.D.
6	Vana Pāla	837— 847 A.D.
7	Mahī Pāla	847— 879 A.D.
8	Mahā Pāla	879— 940 A.D.
9	Śamu Pāla	940— 952 A.D.
10	Śrestha Pāla or Prastha Pāla	952— 955 A.D.
11	Canaka	955— 983 A.D.
12	Bhaya Pāla	983—1015 A.D.
13	Naya Pāla	1015—1050 A.D.
14	Amra Pāla	1050—1063 A.D.
15	Hasti Pāla	1063—1078 A.D.
16	Kṣānti Pāla	1078—1092 A.D.
17	Rāma Pāla	1092—1138 A.D.
18	Yakṣa Pāla	1138—1139 A.D.

The researches on the Pāla kings, by the late Dr Rājendra Lal Mitra, arrived at a conclusion which is somewhat different from mine. Dr Mitra's list of Pāla kings[2] is given below:—

1	Go Pāla	855— 875 A.D.
2	Dharma Pāla	875— 895 A.D.
3	Deva Pāla	895— 915 A.D.
4	Vigraha Pāla I	915— 935 A.D.
5	Nārāyana Pāla	935— 955 A.D.
6	Rāja Pāla	955— 975 A.D.
7.	Pāla	975— 995 A.D.
8	Vigraha Pāla II	995—1015 A.D.
9	Mahī Pāla	1015—1040 A.D.
10	Naya Pāla	1040—1060 A.D.
11	Vigraha Pāla III	1060—1080 A.D.

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[1] Probably the same as Nārayaṇa Pāla who, in the Bhagalpur plate, is styled "the lord of Aṅga."

[2] *Vide* Dr. Rājendra Lāl Mitra's "Indo-Aryans," vol. ii, p. 232.

APPENDIX F.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MITHILÂ

(1175–1575 A D)

Modern history of Tirhut.

In the Râmâyana, Mahâbhârata and in Buddhistic literature, Mithilâ or Tirhut figures as a renowned kingdom. Mithilâ was protected on the north by the impenetrable jungles of the Himalayas. On the other three sides the three rivers Gandaki, Ganges and Kauśaki[1] surrounded it, while the land itself is intersected by small rivers. On account of the natural protection, Tirhut was not attacked by foreign invaders frequently though we hear that in the 13th century it was attacked by the ninth Malik Izzud-din-Tughril (1233–1244 A D.) When Vijaya Sen was reigning in Bengal, Nânyadeva[3] of the Karnatak dynasty was ruling in Mithila in 1097 A D. He was defeated by king Vijaya[4] [illegible]

[illegible] whose reign extended from [illegible] Kameśvara, (2) Bhâgîśvara, (3) Ganeśvara, (4) Visimhadeva (5) Kirtisimha (6) Bhavasimhadeva (7) Devasimha, (8) Sivasimha, (9) Padmasimha, (10) H [illegible] simha, (12) Dhîrasimha [illegible] (15) Lakṣmînâthadeva [illegible] founded a line of Rajas in [illegible] was at its head, and Sthavira Ratnākara was the superior of the monastery. The famous Tibetan scholar Nag-tshul-khrims-rgyal-wa, better known as Nag-tsho Lotsava, who came to take Dīpankara Śrījñāna *alias* Atīśa to Tibet, resided in the monasteries of Vikramaśilā for three years 1035–1038 A.D.[1] Kamalakuliśa, Narendra-śrī-jñāna, Dāna Rakṣita, Abhayākara Gupta, Subhākara Gupta, Sunayakaśrī, Dharmākara Śānti and Śākya-śrī Paṇḍita also belonged to the university of Vikramaśilā. Provision was made specially for the study of grammar, metaphysics (including logic) and ritualistic books. On the walls of the university were painted images of paṇḍitas eminent for their learning and character. The distinguished scholars of the university received a diploma of "Paṇḍita" from the kings themselves. For instance, the distinguished logicians Jetāri of Varendra and Ratnavajra of Kāśmīra, were granted such a diploma. The most erudite sages were appointed to guard the gates of the university. These were six in number, each of which had to be guarded by scholars designated "Gate-keepers" (called in Tibetan Go-srun, corresponding, perhaps, to our Dvāra-paṇḍita). During the reign of Canaka (955–983 A.D.) the undermentioned eminent logicians acted as gate-keepers:

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[1] History of Mithilâ during the pre-Mughal period and History of Navya-Nyâya and Smṛti, November and December, 1915. Rai Monmohan Chakravarti Bahadur; *vide* also University of Nadia by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana.

[3] नन्देन्दुबिन्दुविधुसम्मितशाकवर्षे
सच्छ्रावणे सितदले मुनिसिद्ध तिथ्यौ
स्वातौ शनैश्चरदिने करिवैरि लग्ने
श्रीनान्यदेव नृपतिर्व्यदधीत वास्तुम् ॥

Vide the Rock Edicts on the ruined walls of the ancient fort of *Simrâon*.

[4] सं नान्यवीर विजयीति गिरः कवीनां
श्रुत्वान्यथाननन निरुद्ध रोष ।

Deopara Vijaya Sen Inscription.

(1)	At the eastern gate	Ācārya Ratnākara Śānti
(2)	At the western gate	Vāgīśvarakīrti of Benares
(3)	At the northern gate	Paṇḍita Nāro-pa
(4)	At the southern gate	Prajñākaramati
(5)	At the first central gate	Ratnavajra of Kāśmīra
(6)	At the second central gate	Jñānaśrīmitra of Gauḍa

The university of Vikramaśilā is said to have been destroyed by the Mahomedan invader Bakhtiyar Khilji about 1203 A.D. when Śākyaśrī paṇḍita of Kāśmīra was at its head.

[illegible]

APPENDIX G.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NADIA

(1575—1920 A D)

Situation of Nadia.

Navadvīpa, which is popularly known as Nadia, is a small town in Bengal situated on the river Bhāgīrathī (Ganges) at the point of its junction with the Jalāngi. It occupies the north-western part of the Gangetic delta and literally signifies "a new isle" Once it was a very important centre through which trade was carried on by the Bhāgīrathī between Saptagrāma (a port on the river Sarasvati, a little to the north-west of Huglī and nearly 15 krośas south of Nadia) and the United Provinces and by the Jalāngī between Saptagrāma and Eastern Bengal

Traces of the Pala Kings in Nadia.

Nearly four miles to the east of the modern town of Nadia there is a small village called Suvarna-vihāra *(golden hermitage) which is often pointed* out as the place where the Buddhist Kings of the Pāla dynasty used to reside in the days of yore, when a branch of the Bhāgīrathī, flowing from the north of the modern village Māyāpur, rolled below the hermitage Even now the ruins of the ancient buildings can be found here and there, silently testifying to the former grandeur of the place The decaying

[illegible]
10th century A D.

Nadia raised to the status of a town under the Sena Kings

But, practically speaking, Nadia was unknown in history until it rose to importance for the first time in 1063 A D (or rather about 1106 A D) when, according to a local legend cited in the Imperial Gazetteer[1] of India and Statistical Account of Bengal[2] it was selected by Mahārāja Lakṣmana Sena of Gauda[3] as the place of his residence in consideration of the sanctity of the Bhāgīrathī flowing by it. The ruins of the palace of Lakṣmana Sena are still extant in Nadia at the south of the village Bilpukur and north of the village Samudragada which has continued up to the present time Most of the later productions of Mithilā appeared in these periods

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[1] W. W Hunter's Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol VII p 13.

[2] W W. Hunter's Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol *II*, p. *142*

[3] Lakṣmaṇa Sena is said to have reigned in Bengal between 1106 and 11 A.D *For the date of the kings of the Sena dynasty, vide Rajendra Lal Mitra* Indo-Aryans, Vol. II, p. 258

The Modern School of Nyāya commenced with Gaṅgeśa on the eve of the 12th century Similar is the case with Smṛti writers who began with Graheśvara in the 13th century

Writers of the Mithilā in modern times

The most important scholar of the Kāmeśvara period is Jagaddhara who besides writing commentaries on a variety of subjects, such as the Gītā, Devīmahātmya, Meghadūta Gīta Govinda and Mālatī Mādhava and others, wrote original treatises on erotics (Rasika Sarvasva Saṅgīta Sarvasva) The next is Vidyāpati whose name is associated with Maithili songs or Padāvalī generally His works stirred up the later Vaiṣṇava writers of Bengal The next scholar to be mentioned is Śaṅkara Miśra His works on the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya are of high value His other works on Smṛti are also of great value

The next scholar of great importance is Vācaspati Miśra who flourished in the time of Bhairavendra and Rāmabhadra and wrote mainly on the Smṛti But the great influence of the age did not spare him and he wrote also on Nyāya His works on the latter subject are the Nyāya-sūtrādhāra, Khandana khanda dhāra and the Anumāna khanda ṭīkā his other works being the Nīti cintāmaṇi a work on the morals

Many other scholars flourished at this time But they are overshadowed by the glory and achievements of the scholars named above It was an age of great scholastic activities The [illegible] fame spread throughout [illegible] 'Hindu learning in the 14th and 15th centuries A D and was the resort of a large [illegible]ber of students who flocked there from all parts of India to study specially Logic or Nyāya philosophy'[1] him. Then came the turn of Mahāmahopādhyāya Rājakṛṣna Tarkapañcānana, who took up the same questions and explained them fully, steadily and clearly He elucidated each difficult word and that so thoroughly and clearly that every point in the argument was driven home to the audience He then assailed the arguments put forward by his rival and thoroughly exposed his hasty exposition. Mahāmahopādhyāya Rajakṛṣna, in recognition of his lucid exposition and convincing logic, was declared senior logician by the Council

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[1] Students who finished their education in Mithilā had to undergo an examination [illegible] [illegible] They were asked to explain the page [illegible] by a needle In this way they had to show their [illegible] After passing the examination they received the diploma of the [illegible] University

Chair of Smriti.

In Smṛti there is a chair[1] of the Senior Smārta (Jurist), which *was inaugurated by Raghunandana, the most* famous jurist of his time Raghunandana flourished in the sixteenth century A.D His Jyotiś-tattva was [illegible] Saka or 1567 A D After him there flourished [illegible]

Tāntrik studies flourished under [illegible] his followers.

Chair of Astronomy

A chair of astronomy was established in Nadia a long time ago. As late as 1718 A.D there was born in Gārgya gotra an astronomer named Rāmarudra Vidyānidhi who was the author of Jyotiṣa-sāra-sangraha and Court-Pandit of Pañcakota From the time of Mahārāj [illegible] Rāmarudra Vidyānidhi, who is related by [illegible]

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[1] Vide Navadvipa Mahimā, by Kanti Chandra Rarhi and "Nadia Kāhini," by Kumudanath Mullick

Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and the tutor of the Lama went to the Government College to make a preliminary examination of the Brahminic Sanskrit manuscripts, copies of which had already been translated into Tibetan at various dates between 629 A D and

December Captain O Connor, accompanied by Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and others, made a preliminary inspection of the sacred sites in Buddha Gaya The Tāshi Lama offered his worship to the Bodhi tree and the image of Buddha on the 21st December, one of the most auspicious days according to the Tibetan calendar. On entering the sacred shrine His Holiness bowed down before the great image and sat down himself An hour after His Holiness came out of the temple and changed his dress for a yellow one and sat in meditation in the *vajrāsana* under the Bodhi tree for about three hours from 9 A M to 12 A M, while his numerous devotees stood round him in deep silence At noon the Lama opened his eyes and received ovations and gifts from his followers

The Tāshi Lama left Buddha Gaya at 10 P.M. on the 25th December and reached Calcutta by a special train on the 26th at 7-30 A M He was greeted by a salute of 17 guns and was received by the Aide-de-Camp of the Viceroy. His Holiness was

APPENDIX H.

THE TASHI LAMA'S VISIT TO INDIA

During the year [illegible]

Tashi Lama and his party

and Princess of Wales

for India early in November (8th Nov) The Governme

India made ample provision for the reception and escort o

party Accordingly Captain W. F O'Connor, C.I.E , B

Trade Agent, Gyantse (Tibet) [illegible]

[illegible] easy stages halting at various stations At Gangtok

Holiness and his follow

Sikkim who placed his

[illegible] At Siliguri, all round the camp lay camps devout Bhutias, who, clad in their motley dress, had ridden for miles to pay their respects to the Lama. His Holiness an suite arrived at Rawalpindi on the 7th December at 2-30 P M an on the same day His Holiness had an audience with His Roya Highness the Prince and Princess of Wales On the 10 December, 9-30 A M, His Holiness left for Taxila, called in Tibeta Do-Jog, about 26 miles north of Rawalpindi, whence he started fo Agra, which place he reached on [illegible] w-covered lake at conspicuous posi- the Grand Lama less beauty of the d impressive The ing, can better be imagined than described

There are very few human habitations here, still there is a bazar where rice, *dal*, *ghee* and even potatoes are available Besides, there are a post office, a telegraph office, a medical hospital, a police station and an excise patrol and a magnificent Dak Bungalow—all testifying to the great importance of the place.

Gangtok

In the morning of 2nd June I left Rung-Po Valley for Gangtok The river Rung-Po falls into the Teesta at a place called Bhotang which is about a mile down the Rung Po Valley Again following up the

north of Rung-Po Valley. It is the present capital of Sikkim situated on the peak of a hill girt by two rivers on its sides There is a good road from Gangtok The good natured Maharaja of Sikkim and the intelligent Maharani are both very much interested in Buddhism and showed me the kindest consideration

Mr. J. C White, C I E, Political Resident of Sikkim, to whom I was already known in connection with the Tashi Lama's pilgrimage in India, received me very kindly and gave me letters of introduction to the Lamas at Labrang and Phodang, a copy of it is given below —

ལམ་ཡིག།

༄༅། འཛམ་གླིང་སྤྱི་བའི་གླིང་མཆོག་ནས། སྲིད་ཟང་དབུས་མཆོག་
རེ་ཁྲིམ་བཀའ་སྲུ། ཧྭའས་འབྲུག་ དཔལ་ལྡན་ནམ་ཚང་རུ་སྦྲུ་ཏེ་ཏི་མི་ཧྲུང་
ཇེ་སི་ཧི་ཡ་འབྲུམ་རྡེ་ཞིར་རིག་རྩང་དུ་བཞུགས་ཀྱིས་ཕྱོགས་རྡེ་ཟེ་ཡོད་ཤིང་ཆ་ཏུ
ཁྲིམས་བྱང་བ་འགྲོ་ཚམ་ཡོད་པའི་བྱང་སྐྱ་ཞིང་ནམས་ལམ་བཞི་ཁྱད་ཞབས་ཐོག

APPENDIX I

REMINISCENCES OF A VISIT TO LABRANG, [illegible] CHI AND [illegible]

Journey to Labrang

Having been associated with Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., in the compilation of the Tibetan Dictionary, I heard of the fame of Labrang and Pa[illegible] [illegible]. About 1907 I learnt that there were [illegible] and [illegible] at Labrang and [illegible] [illegible], I undertook my journey there with the express purpose of examining the manuscripts and endeavouring [illegible] Sanskrit through the study of the Tibetan.

Teesta Bridge

I started with credentials from Mr. (afterwards Sir) Earle, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, and Mr. C. H. Bompas, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling. On the 31st May, 1907, I left Darjeeling at 10 a.m. At the time of my departure from my residence at Darjeeling Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das came to see me, offering me a dozen of oranges and a lantern. He said, "Accept these as a traveller's humble gifts." I received them with delight and found them very useful on the way.

Ruling a distance of about 22 miles I arrived in the evening at the Teesta Bridge. This is a very important frontier station between Tibet, Sikkim, and India, and through it the British mission passed to Lhasa in 1903-04. There is a magnificent bridge over the river Teesta and there is a small bazar where edibles are procurable. I was welcomed here by the Deputy Forest Ranger, who accommodated me in the upper flat of a new building erected by a Marwari trader in the centre of the bazar. Within a mile of the bazar there is a Triveni junction, where the Rangeet and another river flow into the Teesta. Nepalese and other hillmen attach great sanctity to these junctions, where they wash themselves every year at *Pous Sankranti* (about the middle of January). On this occasion they sacrifice goats and sheep and hold a fair which continues for three days. Teesta Bridge is a very charming place surrounded by hills and dales.

Rung-Po

In the morning of 1st June, I left the Teesta Bridge Valley and following up the course of the river Teesta, by the Tibetan trade route, I arrived in the evening at the Rung-Po Valley. It is fifteen miles to the north of Teesta Bridge and is situated on the river Rung-Po, on which there is an artistic drawbri the river, all around. We sa [illegible] never reach them, [illegible] like will-o'-the-wisp At last at about [illegible] glow of a lamp, coming out from a humble cottage The Lama, who was our guide and interpreter, knocked at the door, but the inmate would not open the door easily "Are these ghosts or elves that come to me at so late an hour in the night?" That was the first murmur that reached our ears, and we came to know that it was a woman that spoke We had no breath to argue with her. We begged and implored, and to our relief the door flew open and we saw she was preparing barley flour then She received us very hospitably and gave us plenty of milk she had kept reserved for selling in the following morning. Our cook got this milk properly warmed on the fire and some of our attendants prepared tea with it I drank a quantity of milk and felt somewhat refreshed She supplied us with water which she kept in very big bamboos from which the soft portions had been carefully scooped out These bamboos contained e [illegible] hands and feet, etc. We lear [illegible] Lama that is, one who is d [illegible] which he serves for six day [illegible] keep his connection with his [illegible] on the seventh day Next morning we were going to take leave [illegible]

Labrang and Phodang. [illegible] of Khangri There is an old monastery belonging to the oldest religious sect of Tibet, named *Nying-ma-pa* or the unreformed sect It contains images of Buddha, Bodhisatvas and saints, and a very large collection of the Tibetan Buddhist manuscripts and block prints including the encyclopædias of the Kangyur and the Tangyur.

Phodang is nearly a mile below Labrang Here, too, there is an old monastery (which is being reconstructed) belonging to the Karma-pa sect of Tibet This monastery is said to have been

བཅུག་དགོས་དང་། ལྷག་པར་ཁོང་ལ་རོགས་རམ་གང་དགོས་ཅི་ཡོད་བྱ་རོགས་བ
དེ་ཕྱོགས་ཐུགས་འཇགས་ཞུ། མེ་ལུག་ཟླ་བ་བཞི་པའི་ཚེས་ཉེར་ལྔ་ལ་སྒང་ཏོག་ཀོ
ཋི་ནས། ཕུལ།

འབྲས་ལྗོངས་སྤྱི་ཁྱབ་ཧྲོར་ས་ཧེབ་ཀྱི་ས་ཡིག།

PASS-PORT

From

WARA SAHIB,
Political Resident of Sikkim

To

The Council of Monks,
Labrang

Communication

Now from here Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana is going to Labrang *to see and examine* Bstan-ḥgyur how much of it is there. For that purpose *the Lamas* must let him read the Puthis. Moreover *whatever assistance* he wants must be given. In this direction keep your *heart—I request.*

Fire sheep year, fourth month, date 25th, *from* Gangtok Kuthi sent letter from

WARA SAHIB,
Political Resident, Sikkim.
1907
(SD.) C. J. WHITE,
Political Officer
Gangtok, 4th June, 1907

A similar letter was written to the Phodang Lama's monastery

Hospitality of a lady

I got this letter at about 2 P.M. and started in the company of my attendants towards Labrang. The weather that day was extremely foul and some inhabitants of Sikkim advised us not to set out that afternoon. But as the time at our disposal was rather short, and we could ill afford to lose even a single day, we felt constrained to start that very afternoon, even in the face of the stormy weather. We had not gone far when the sky began to pour forth in torrents. Taking the reins of the horse in one hand and the umbrella in the other we tried to brave the elemental frowns as best as we could. But we got terribly drenched and thoroughly exhausted after a short time and to our consternation we saw the shades of the evening were falling fast. Swiftly we rode on but no trace of human habitation was to be found. At last the darkness of the night made it absolutely impossible for us to keep the horses on the roads, and every moment they began to stumble. Thoroughly exhausted and horribly frightened, we heard for human abodes but none could be found—it was dreary and a waste from Tibet to spread Lamaism By efforts of the priests and their followers and patronage of the king and his successors Buddhism or rather Lamaism, was firmly established and became the state religion in Sikkim People from Tibet, Bhutan, China, Mongolia and Nepal migrated to Sikkim and were mixed up with the Lepchas to give rise to a new race called Bhuteas They profess Lamaism and have built numerous monasteries, temples, *chaityas*, etc. The Tibetan term for a monastery is *gompa*, meaning a

kkim

and

this

1908

d in

1697 A D, is a most democratic institution which is open to all classes of Tibetans, Lepchas, Limbus, etc, both male and female It consists of several two-storeyed stone-buildings with

of curios and

founded in 1716 A.D It is the holiest place resorted to by pilgrims from all quarters Phodang, 13 miles north east of Gangtok and facing the snow of Khangri, was founded in 1740 A D on the site once occupied by the fort of the Bhutanese invaders. All its Head Lamas were disturbed by evil spirits that appeared in the shapes of scorpions, rock-snakes, etc, until one named Dumchot totally destroyed them by his magic powers The monastery has recently been rebuilt, and its Head Lama at the time of my visit was the late Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, Sid-kayong-tul-ku.

Labrang, 2 miles

founded by a p

teries, built on th

on the tops of hi

sect, with the exc

sect. They contain a large collection of

xylographs, but the famous encyclopædia called the Tangyur is contained only in Labrang and Pamiangchi Almost every family in Sikhim is bound to spare at least one boy for devotion to the founded in 1725 A D by the then Maharaja of Sikkim who visited the headquarters of the Karma-pa sect in the north of Lhasa and was asked by the head of that sect to establish some Karma-pa monasteries in Sikkim In the Phodang monastery too there are numerous images and books but the Tangyur is not to be found h

shown here by

Karma-pa, the

very centre

pa or Buddha, who preached

years ago There are images

Chong-kha-pa, Gye-chag rim-

po-che and others

print

the

the

exha

even

their

tsam-pa or flour from the parched barley A dish of bamboo offshoot being regarded as a great delicacy Their only luxury is tea unmixed with milk or sugar The Marwaris, whom one can see in almost every hill or wood where there are three or four householders or coolies, have totally failed in their enterprise here I heard that a Marwari retail-dealer had once set up a small shop here, but finding demand of no kind had to break it up

Both Phodang and Labrang are solitary places almost abandoned by men On the way from Gangtok to Labrang—a distance of thirteen miles—I found no human habitation and came across only three cowherds who had come from distant villages to graze their cattle Sikkim is very thinly populated I asked an old man at Labrang why the road from Gangtok to that place was bad and there were no shops The reply was "because no Englishman treads the path There are very few people here Our only hope is that with the increase of population in the plains men might revert to the hills to make them comfortable"

I passed a week at Phodang and Labrang very happily I have never seen people more simple or more charitable than the Lamas there.

Sikkim Monasteries.

Sikkim was inhabited by Lepchas who were a mild pastoral race without any settled government Buddhism was unknown in the country and the

APPENDIX J.

REMINISCENCES OF A VISIT TO PAMIYANGCHI

Invitation from the Maharaja of Sikkim

During the Puja vacation of the year 1908, I received a letter of invitation from the Maharaja and Maharani of Sikkim His Highness the

on my behalf I also received the following letter from Her Highness the Maharani of Sikkim enquiring the date on which I might start —

Bhutia Sa Tel
Year, 4th month
GANGTOK,
20th June 1909

MY DEAR PROFESSOR,

Last year when you came up about this time to go through the Tengyur at Labrang, you told me that you were so much interested that you would come up again this year to Pamiangchi. Do you think that you will be able to do so, and if you do about what time will it be? You must let me know beforehand, as to when you intend coming up, so that I may make some arrangements about making your journey and sojourn in Sikkim as easy as we can. At present we are having copious rains here, but we are all in sound health Trusting you also to be in perfect health

I remain,
Yours truly
[illegible],
MAHARANI.

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA, M A,
Secy. to the Buddhist Shrine Restoration Society,
CALCUTTA

Reception on the way

The letter was very kind, and I at once made up my mind to undertake a journey to Pamiyangchi I started from Darjeeling on the 10th of October with a passport from Mr. Crawford, Deputy Commissioner Darjeeling, and on first setting foot on the territory of the Maharaja of Sikkim I was simply surprised to notice the extraordinary arrangements that had been made by the Maharaja to provide me with all possible necessaries and comforts on the way. The royal mandate had gone forth to furnish us with all possible help and at every stage of our halt, we found numbers of men waiting for us with various articles of provision and fuel—all much too great for us to carry. Rice, *dal*, oranges, fruits, vegemonastery, and he has to undergo various grades of training before attaining the exalted position of a Lama It is to be regretted that the pure Lepchas are rapidly dying out, and the Bhuteas cannot stand the heat of Sikhim below the height of 6,000 feet



The original letter of introduction in Tibetan given by the Mahārāja of Sikkim tables, hay, butter, milk, etc., almost in cartloads, were placed freely and abundantly at our disposal. On the third day we arrived at Pamiyangchi. Here we saw three European Consuls, who had come here on a pleasure trip, mainly for sight-seeing. Pamiyangchi commands an excellent view of the lofty and snow-covered hills of Kanchanjanga and the Europeans were enjoying themselves immensely seeing sights and taking photos. They were a large company being attended by a good many servants and camp followers. They were however badly in need of provisions, and as we had more than what was necessary for ourselves we gave them a quantity of our own.

Pamiyangchi Monastery.

When I reached the monastery I was wonder-struck at the majestic and imposing sight which was presented from the lofty heights of the peak of Pamiyangchi which commands an excellent prospect of the picturesque and snowy peaks of Kanchanjangha from which silver-white liquid streams seem to be perpetually running out. On entering the monastery I introduced myself to the monks and presented before them the following letter of introduction, which had been sent to me by the Maharaja of Sikkim before I started from Calcutta :—

(TRANSLATION.)

TO

THE INCOMPARABLE SCHOOL OF PRECIOUS MONKS.

Communication

[illegible] important. Bear this in mind.

From Gangtok Palace Earth Ape Year month 8 date 8.

The monks received me well and gave me a ready access to the Bs-tan-h-gyur Block Prints. They offered me a seat there for the night. But this I thankfully declined and put up in the Dak Bungalow. I stayed at Pamiyangchi for eight days during which time I had every opportunity and facility for making a searching examination of and for studying of the Bs-tan-h-gyur.

then read an address in Sanskrit in forty stanzas describing my reminiscences of Ceylon

Estimate of Ceylon by common people

One of the incidents on my way to Ceylon may here be narrated At Tuticorin I stayed at a Dharamsala, which was a very big building [illegible] The

building covers [illegible]

sand people. [illegible]

three days It [illegible] question is asked of any one who enters its precincts We were offered food and shelter when we went there But, as we had enough provisions with ourselves, we would take no articles from them but merely sought shelter for the night One elderly supervisor of the Dharamsala happening to find me a foreigner there was curiously speculating with a countryman of his as to where I [illegible] Wishing to

[illegible]

versation evidently shows how poor an opinion common people themselves have about Ceylon being a seat of learning, although scholars from Siam, Burma, Bombay, Calcutta and even Europe go there for the study of Pali and Buddhism

How I lost my way and a strange Bengali song saved me.

Another of my reminiscences with regard to Ceylon is put down in detail, as the incident made a rather deep impression on my mind then One evening I was taking my usual walk in the Victoria Park which is surrounded on three of its sides by the sea [illegible]

[illegible] many pathways and groves [illegible] of my direction and found myself in a labyrinth as it were I then wanted to go near the sea, but the sea seemed to be on every side of me. I walked for a time towards one direction and then

APPENDIX K

[illegible]

[illegible] Bengal [illegible]
[illegible] Hon Justice [illegible]
having deputed me to prosecute [illegible] Sir [illegible] Mukerjee
six months in Ceylon [illegible] Thomas CIE
1909 Starting at 6 P M [illegible] I started for the island [illegible]
25th June via Madras and Tuticorin 29th June I arrived at Colombo on the 29th June
Ceylon making researches in the Pali language [illegible]
ance of Venerable Sri Sumangala [illegible] I passed six months in
western Ceylon and Prof Venerable [illegible] under the guid-
in my research work Sir P Arunachalam [illegible] Mahathero High Priest of
Council Ceylon kindly helped me [illegible] Deva Mitta helped
tion I also derived much help from Rev Anagarika Dharmapala Executive
Secretary Maha Bodhi Society with various books and informa-
back for Benares via Colombo On the 25th November I started
Chidambaram Madras and Calcutta Pamban Madura Trichinopoly
ber at 10 A M In Ceylon I visited arriving on the 11th Decem-
dhist monasteries and remains at Galle on the 27th October, the Bud-
gamo and on 1st 7th July Anuradhapur, Dodandwa and To-to-
Kandy, etc Mihintale Hill and

I received addresses from all the important monasteries
ddress at To-to-gamo including the To-to-ge-mo (Tirthagrāma), in
an 450 years after which the Bhikkus observed that for more
arned Pandit had come from India the demise of Rāmacandra Kavibhāratī, no
nature On one side rolls the limitless ocean Tirthagrāma is a chosen spot
e rise the eternal hills and in front is spread and on the other
e stone-walls of the monastery I found a charming lake
e of my visit eleven years ago, though still standing at the
nastery has been erected in the midst of a grove in ruins But a new
cocoanuts and flowers innumerable and of areca-nut-
therein honoured me with an address here the monks resi
d me with a simplicity most befitting to monks, of welcome and
Chandra, a Bengali Brahmin, was a relation to whether I
green was the memory of the Kavibhāratī in their Rāmacandra
The Venerable Sumungala Mahāthero convened minds

Departure vious to my departure a grand on the day pre-
which most of the learned meeting in
were present I first addressed the gentlemen of
meeting in [illegible]

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Page
Abandonment of a proposition 35
Abhayadeva Sūri 196f
—particulars about 196 (ftn. 2)
Abhayākara Gupta 347
Abhayatilakopādhyāya 151
Abhihitānvaya-vāda (connection of the expressed) 146
Abhinanda 147 (ftn 2)
Absolute (Śūnyatā) 254
Absolute non-existence 184, 394, 416
—Deva Sūri on 203
Absolute truth 253
Abstract perception 383
Ācāra's monastery 272
Ācārya Buddhajñānapāda 519
Ācārya Bodhisattva 323
Action .. 37, 114
— bodily 55
— mental 38
— three kinds of 38
— vocal 38
Activity . 58
—grounds for 410
Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhadeva 159
Admission .. 35
—of an opinion 89
Advaita-vedāntins .. 139
Affection . 114
Affirmative-negative inference 131, 435
Affirmative reason . 437
Agniveśa , .. 23 (ftn 1)
—in Tibetan 23 (ftn 1)
Ahalyā . . 17f
Ahalyā-sthāna (Ahiria) .. 18
Ahaṃkāra or Puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya philosophy 245 (ftn. 2)
Ajātaśatru . 226, 349
Ajaya Deva 223
Ajita Siṃha .. 477
Akalaṅka Deva, age of 186
—works of 185

Page
Akhyāti (non-manifestation) 139
Akṣapāda (see Gautama, his doctrine embodied in Nyāya Sūtra of Akṣapāda) 16, 28, 47, 112, 348, 358, 359, 396
—age of 50, 502 (ftn 1)
—Akṣapāda darśana . 48, 398
—attacked by Jaina logicians 221 (ftn 2)
—birth place of 512
—compiler of the Nyāya Sūtra 50
—(his) definition of perception criticised by Dignāga . 278
- designated as Naiyāyika 278
—different from Gautama 49
—(his) identification with Gautama 48
—not conversant with the Yogācāra 110 (ftn. 3)
—Nyāya philosophy as the philosophy of . 48
—Nyāya Sūtra of 497f
—on the relation of thought and language 65
—real author of the Nyāya Sūtra 50
—redactor of the Ānvīkṣikī of Gautama 50
—son of Soma Śarmā 155
—(in) Tibetan .. 47
Akṣapāda and the Mīmāṃsakas, their definition of proposition criticised by Dignāga 283 (ftn. 2)
Alarka . - .. 10
Ālaya-vijñāna, explanation of 249 (ftn 3)
Alexander 352
Amaracandra Sūri 207, 396, 406 (ftn. 5)
—details about .. 207 (ftn. 5)
Amaradeva Sūri 210
Amṛtacandra Sūri . .. 195
Analogue 65
—application of 518
—kinds of .. 67, 361, 505f.
—principles to be applied to .. 51f

Page
[illegible], a mala parīkṣā (examination of the learning of others) . 21f
[illegible] (converse [illegible]) 152
[illegible] (knowledge of a thing by the existence of its opposites) [illegible] by Jayanta .. 149
[illegible] (upamāna) 37, 61, 437 (fn. 1)
[illegible] .. 61
[illegible] .. 292
— as an essential part of a syllogism .. .. .. [illegible]
— kinds of 61, 285
— [illegible] of 385
— [illegible] 61
— of the [illegible] . . 91
— and the meaning of the disputant to be one and same .. . 220
[illegible] (famous treatise) . 3
[illegible] 221, 231f., 248
[illegible] 59
[illegible] (Tarka) .. 149
[illegible] 291
[illegible] . .. 294 (fn. 1)
— and [illegible] .. . [illegible]
— and [illegible] .. [illegible]
— and Dharmakīrti . .. [illegible]
— and [illegible] .. .. [illegible]
— and [illegible] . [illegible]
— and [illegible] . [illegible]
and [illegible] .. .. [illegible]
— and [illegible] .. . [illegible]
[illegible] of [illegible] .. 512
[illegible] 249 252 [illegible], 334
— [illegible] of . 253 (fn. 1)
— [illegible] of . [illegible]
[illegible] . 544, [illegible]
[illegible] . [illegible]
[illegible] and [illegible] 547 [illegible]
[illegible] and [illegible]
[illegible]

Page
[illegible] [illegible]
Ābhāsa [illegible]
[illegible]
— (of) [illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
— and [illegible] [illegible]
— (of) [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] theory (i.e. [illegible]) [illegible]
Ātma[illegible] (manifestation of the self) [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
Avayava (constituents of a syllogism) [illegible]
— corresponding to [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
— [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

Page

Analogue—
—test of
Ānanda 61f
Ānanda Sūri 112 (ftn 2) 406 (ftn 5)
—details about 207, 396
Ananta virya 207, (ftn 5)
Ananta-yajvan 122 (ftn 1), 98
Ancient School of Indian Logic 408
termination of
Andhra Dynasty 157
Andhras 272 273 (ftn 1), 274 251 (ftn 2 3)
Anga 274 ftn 3)
Angirasa name of Buddha Gau 160
tama
Āngirasa tribe 19 (ftn 2)
Annambhatta 19
Anirvacaniya-khyāti (manifesta 388
tion of the undefinable)
Annihilation of things impossible 139
Annihilationists followers of the 105
Lokāyata philosophy
Antecedent non existence 228f
—Deva Sūri on 184 416
Antigonos Gonotas 203
Antiochos 152
Anuruddha Thera 352
Ānvīkṣikī (see Hetu-śāstra and 352
Tarka vidyā)
—accepting Vedas 38
—bifurcates into Philosophy and 39
Logic
—Brāhmana addicted to 5
—called Nyāya-Śāstra 37
—called Nyāya Śāstra when Nyāya 8, 40
constituted its special scope
—condemned by certain Brahmanas 40
—condemned by Manu 36
—condemned by Vālmīki 36
—condemned in certain circles 16
—dealt with two subjects 16
—Dharma should be ascertained 5
by
—distinction between Ātma-vidyā 18
and
—(as) expounded by Dattatreya 10f

Ānvīkṣikī—
—followers of
—formation of
—founding of ..
—generally designated as, in
first stage
—(in a) general sense ..
—held in high esteem in so
quarters
—Kali satirising the founder of
—(in) Kautilya
—known as Nyāya śāstra in t
second stage ..
—(as the) lamp of all sciences
—(in its) logical aspects
—(in) Manu .
—Mānavas description of
—meant by Nyāya . .
—(as a) necessary study .
—not a part of the original Āyur
veda .
—not in Brahma Sūtra .
—opposed to the Vedas
—par excellence is Logic
—penalties for studying
—philosophical aspect of
—principal topic of . .
—replacable by the word Darśana'
—(used in) special sense of Logic
—(as) Science of inquiry .
—(as) Science of true reasoning
—(in) Sulabhā
—teachers of
—(in) Tibetan ..
—training prescribed in 3
—unfavourable criticism of . 9
—useful for ascertaining truths 3
—utility of 37f
—Vātsyāyana on .. 5
—Vyāsa arranges I padas with
the help of . 31
Ānvīkṣikī vidyā of Gautama . 40
—styled the Nyāya sūtras . 60
Anvitābhidhāna vada (expression

Page
nya-mata-parikṣā (examination of the doctrines of others) 51f
nyathā-khyāti (converse manifestation) 139
poha (knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites) criticised by Jayanta 149
pplication (upanaya) 32, 61, 437 (ftn 1)
—affirmative 61
—Deva Sūri on 202
—(as an) essential part of a syllogism 504
—kinds of 61, 395
—means of 395
—negative 61
—of the example 60
—of the reasoning of the disputant to his own case 236
Āranyakas (Forest treatises) 1
Arcata 211, 331f, 348
Ardashir 20
Argumentation (Tarka) 189
—Deva Sūri on 201
Aristotle 295 (ftn. 2)
—and Akṣapāda 502f
—and Caraka Samhitā 500f
—and Dharma kirti 503
—and Dignāga 506
—and Maitreya 504
—and Nāgārjuna 504
—and Uddyotakara 510f
—and Vasubandhu 505
Art of Rhetoric 512
Ārya Āsanga 249, 262, 265f, 334
—age of 265 (ftn. 5)
—logical views of 265f.
Ārya Deva 248, 261f.
—names of 261
Ārya Mahāsamghika and its subsects 247, 248
Ārya Sammitīya and its subjects 246, 247 (ftn. 2)
Sarvāstivāda and its subjects 248
and its sub-sects 247, 248
of the
139

Page
Ascertainment 33, 62
Aśoka 222, 226, f, 335, 349-51, 352 53
Assembly—
—(of) fools 29
—friendly 29
—hostile 29
—how to influence 29
—indifferent or impartial 29
—(of) wise men 29
Assumption, based on doubt 34
Aṣṭāvakra, his debate with Vandin 13ff
—his ingenuity 16f, 114 (ftn 1)
—shouts of victory for 15f
—a violent debator 13ff
Āsuri 10
Aśvaghosa 248
Atheistic doctrine 9
Ātmaka theory (i e Tīrthaka doctrine) 315
Ātma-khyāti (manifestation of the self) 138
Ātma-tattva-viveka, analysis of 145f
Atom 105f
—what it is 105
Ātreya 11f
—mentioned in Tibetan 11
—(the) original author the Caraka-samhitā 6
Attribution of censure 35
Augustus Caesar 352
Avadhi 169 (ftn 1)
Avalokiteśvara 332, 334, 335
Avayava (members of a syllogism) 51
—corresponding to analytics 502
Avesta 20 (ftn. 4)
Avoidance of defeat 35
Ayodhyā 262, 265, 266
Āyurveda 11
—eight books of 11

Bakhtiar Khilji 358
Bālāditya 349, 515
Bālāditya Narasimha Gupta 267
Balancing the alternative 70
—(the) co-presence 71

Page

Balancing—
—(the) counter-example 73
—(a) deficit 69
—(the) demonstration 78
—(the) doubt 74
—(the) effect 81
—(the) eternal 80
—(an) excess 68
—(the) heterogeneity 68
—(the) homogeneity 67
—(the) infinite regression 73
—(the) mutual absence 72
—(the) non-difference 77
—(the) non-eternal 79
—(the) non-perception 79
—(the) non-produced 74
—(the) non-reason 75
—(the) perception 78
—(the) point at issue the controversial 75
—(the) the presumption 76
—(the) question 11
—(the) questioned in 69
—(the) subject 342
—(the) unquestionable 70
Bāṇa, date of 176
Barygaza 352
[illegible] 526 (fn. 1)
[illegible] doctrine of the [illegible] 137 (fn.)
[illegible] 344
[illegible] of the question 34
[illegible] 213
Bengal, [illegible] of 396
[illegible] 172
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Page
Bhairavendra 438, 521
Bharsu 521
Bhartṛhari 138
Bhāṣā-pariccheda (a manual of logic by Viśvanātha) 392
Bhāsarvajña 133, 357, 346
—date of 357
—life of 35[illegible]
Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas 147
Bhavānanda Rāya 455 (fn. 1)
Bhavānanda Siddhānta Vāgīśa 474
Bhavanātha 406 (fn. 7)
Bhikṣu Nāga Sena 461
Bhoja Deva 331
Bhora Śāla 372 (fn. 1)
Bhūṣana 354
Birth 38
—a source of pain 102
Blo-ldan-śes-rab 213, 310, 344
Bodhi Sattva of Za-hor 314
Body 37
—made of earth 58
Brahmā, region of 5
Brahman (the Pervading Essence) 6
Brāhmaṇa and Buddhist logicians antagonism between 348
Brāhmaṇas [illegible]
Brāhmaṇa [illegible] [illegible]
Brāhmaṇic logic, elements of [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
Brāhmaṇism in Bengal, revival of [illegible]
Brāhmaṇism in Mithilā, revival of [illegible]
Brāhmaṇism, in Northern India [illegible]
—in Southern India [illegible]
—prevalence of [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
Buddhist logicians [illegible]
—list of [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

Page

Buddhism—
—in other countries 353
—in Tibet 352f.
—persecution of 349
—reception in foreign countries of 351ff
—royal patronage received by 349
—spread of, in Asia, Europe and Africa 351f
—Śrāvaka School of 341

Buddhists—
—eighteen sects of 246f
—heretical sects of 226

Buddhist and Jaina Scripture—
—condemned by Vācaspati Miśra 141

Buddhist Council 225f
—account of 225 (ftn. 3)
—fourth 50

Buddhist denial of the soul—
—criticised by Uddyotakara 125

Buddhist doctrines of 'apoha,' 'kṣaṇabhaṅga' etc.— criticised by Udāyanacārya 143

Buddhist Logic 158
—contentious spirit of 348f.
—rise of 251
—triumph of 348

Buddhist Philosophy, four schools of 247

Buddhist Sabbath (uposatha) 232ff
—preliminary acts of 233
—preparation for 232f.
—recitation of the code of monastic laws in (pātimokkhuddeśa) 233
—right season for 233
—three kinds of 233

Buddhist Sūtras, quoted by Brahmana authors 126 (ftn. 2)

Buno Rāmanātha 484

Burden and the burden-bearer 127 (ftn.)

Bu ston 270, 253

Bzaṅ pahi-dgon-pa 262

Caitanya 62 (ftn. 1)
340

Page

Calukya kings 349

Canaka 336, 340, 341, 342, 520

Candra Dvipa 334 (ftn. 2)

Candra Gomin 332

Candra Gomin the Junior 334f
—date of 335f
—life of 333f

Candra Gomin the Senior, date of 335

Candra Gupta 261

Candra Gupta II 117

Candrakīrti 334

Candra Pati 406 (ftn 7)

Candraprabha Sūri 206
—particulars about 206 (ftn 3)

Candra Sena Sūri 211

Candra Simha 460

Candra's well 335

Canonical Scriptures of the Jainas divisions of 160f

Canons of speech 12f

Canons, logical subjects in 161ff

Canton 301

Caraka 25, 26, 499 (ftn 1)
—according to Pāṇini 25
—borrowed terms from Vaiśeṣika philosophy and incorporated them into Vādamārga 27
—date of 26 (ftn 4)
—introduces terms unknown to Gautama into Vādamārga 27
—lived in the court of Kaṇiṣka 26 (ftn. 3)
—(a) name for śākhās of the Yajurveda 25
—(a) physician named 26
—(the) wandering sect named 26 (ftn. 1)

Caraka Saṃhitā—
—also called the Agniveśa-tantra 25 (ftn. 1)
—contains for the first time an exposition of the doctrine of syllogism 42
—(its) exact meaning unknown 26
—means the Āyurveda 26
—older in logical doctrines than Nyāya Sūtra 50

Page

Caraka Saṁhitā—
—terms explained in 27
Cārvāka 9, 398ff
—followers of 9
—not the name of any individual 9
Cases for settlement (adhikaraṇa) 229f
(A) Case presented by a disputant in a regular form (anuloma) 235
(A) Case presented through an analogy 238
(A) Case presented through a simple comparison .. 237f
(A) Case presented through the fourfold method 239
Casuiste 227
Category 374ff, 387, 393, 395
—defined in Nāgārjuna's Pramāṇa Vihetana 258
—definition of 54ff
—examination of 90ff
—reduced to one 357
—treatment of 53
Category of pramāṇa, (means of knowledge) in the prakaraṇas 357
Causality 400f
Cause 390
—kinds of 392f, 390
Causes of Inference—
—ancient on 434
—Gaṅgeśa on 434
Cavil 62, 63
Caviller 63
Cola race 350
Censuring the non-censurable 90
Ceylon—
—an incident of Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa in .. 541f
—Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa's departure from .. 540
—Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa's experience in 540
—estimate of 541
Candra Kīrti 128 (ftn. 2)
[illegible] 33
Cera Dynasty 348
Chinese Mission, sent to Magadha 306

Page

Chos-grags 305
Chos-mchog 324
Chos mi-ru Them-dpe-ltar-gnas-pa 296 (ftn. 1), 297 (ftn. 1)
Cinna Bhatta 334
Cirakārin (son of Gautama, see Gautama as mentioned in the Mahābhārata) 18
Clearing the meaning of terms 234
Cola Dynasty 351
Collective Nyāya (Saṁgraha) 171
Colour 67
Commentaries—
—nature of 115
—(as) store-houses of informations 115
Comparative estimate of the Ānvīkṣikī and the Nyāya 132
Comparison 33, 56, 334, 443
—Dignāga on 357
—(a) distinct means of right knowledge 94
—instrumental causes of 411
—(a) mere inference 94
—(a) mere perception 94
—not a means of right knowledge 93f
—operation of 443
—process of 443
—really a means of right knowledge 94
—result of 443
—(a) Seperate means of knowledge 60, 443
—special cause of 449
Complainant or Plaintiff (vādin) 231
Complaint (āvedana) 13
Compound—
—attributive 432
—kinds of 433
—potentiality of aggregative 431
—potentiality of attributive 433
—potentiality of descriptive 431
—potentiality of determinative 431
—potentiality of indeclinable 431
[illegible] 175
Conclusion (nigamana) 32, 61, 167, 237, 447

Page

Compound—
—as an essential part of a syllogism 504
—Deva Sūri on 202
—kinds of 259
Concrete cause 383
Condition (upādhi) 140, 376 (ftn. 4), 378, 399, 431, 432
—kinds of 432f.
—sure 432
—suspected 432
Conditionality 255
Conditional middle term 431
Conditional truth 254
Conflicting testimony 59
Confutation 61
Conjoined inherence (saṁyukta-samavāya) 130
Conjoined inherent-inherence (saṁyukta-samaveta samavāya) 130
Conjunction (saṁyoga) 130
Consideration (parāmarśa) 384, 390, 420, 433
Consistency 447
Context 113
Contiguity 447f
Contradiction 34
Contradictory fallacy 63, 64
Contradictory reason 439
Controversial fallacy 63, 64
Council of Discussion—Deva Sūri on 204
Counter-activity
—grounds for 410
Counter-balanced reason 439
Counter demonstration 32
—analysis of 501
Counter-proposition 166
Counter-questioned fallacy 63, 64
Cūḍāmaṇi 303
Cunningham 124 (ftn 7)

Dad pahi-śes-rab 275
Dāna Pāla 352
Dāna Śīla 340f.
Dar-ma-grags 318

Page

Darśana—
—(a) branch of philosophy 6
—(an) explanation of the term 6
—literal sense 6
Dattātreya
—(his) parable of a tree 10f
—(his) proper name 10
Death 58
Debate (vāda) 31
Debate—the art of (Tarka-vidyā), (see also Vāda-vidya) 6

Debate—
—attending a place of 264
—categories for the knowledge of the course of 31
—(a) congenial 29
—(a) council of (pariṣad) 29
—(the) course of (see Vāda-mārga) 31
—defects of 163
—disputant of 379
—(the) expedients of (see Vādopāya) 30f
—expedients in 163
—kinds of 29, 31, 379
—(a) hostile 29
—(the) limits of (see Vāda-maryādā) 31
—means of 264
—members of 379
—method of 25f
—or dialogues in the Upaniṣads 23
—place of 263
—president of 379
—several terms of 162
—technical terms of 23ff
—requisites of 378
—requisites of a council of 378
—respondent of 376
—rules of 378
—rules of, according to Deva Sūri 204f
—subjects of 263
—utility of (see sambhāṣā praśaṁsā) 25f.

Debater—
—confidence of 264f

Page
Debater—
—qualifications of . 264
Debts, three kinds of . 102 (ftn. 1)
Defeat—
—points of (see points of defeat) 379
—eight kinds of 237
Defect of speech 34
—various types of . 34
Definition 53
—of terms 238
—*of the minor term and explanation of a proposition* 506f
Demonstration (sthāpanā) 32
—and counter-demonstration of Caraka-Saṁhitā compared with demonstration and refutative Enthymeme of Arts to the 300
—analysis of 30f
—*through three kinds of middle terms and through the media of essence and cause* 508
Deprecating description 103
Description
—kinds of 108
Desert (merit or demerit) 37
—grounds for the existence of 143 (ftn. 1)
Desire 37
—and aversion 113
Determinate 55
Determinate knowledge 414
Determinate perception (see Savikalpaka) 124
Deva Bhadra 211
Deva Nātha Thakkura 464
Deva [illegible] 317
[illegible] known as [illegible] 173
[illegible] 163
Deva [illegible] 316
Deva Sūri—
—[illegible] 198
—[illegible] of Naya 204
—[illegible] 203
—[illegible] 204

Page
Deva Sūri—
—on superimposition .. 201
—on the method of debate 204
—on the soul .. 204
—(his) Pramāṇa nayatattvālokālankāra .. 200
Devendra Bodhi . 318
Deviating from a tenet 90
Dgah-wabi-rdo-rje . 313
Dge-brtun 326
Dgra-las rgyal-wa 337
Dhammatā doctrine 300 (ftn. 1)
Dhammuttariya or Dhammottara 248 (ftn. 4)
Dhaneśvara Sūri 197 (ftn. 3)
Dhanukha Inscription 404 (ftn. 7)
Dharma Bhūṣaṇa 216f 237 (ftn. 2)
—his references to other philosophers 215
—his references to works on logic 215
Dharma Deva 332
Dharmagañja 316
Dharma Ghoṣa 306
Dharmākara Gupta 3.9
Dharmakirti 124, 133, 135, 136 (ftn.), 275 (ftn. 1) 303f 344 346, 319, 3.6
—age of 124 (ftn. 3), 303f, 3.6
—birth place of 303 (ftn. 4)
—criticises Dignāga 311f
—designated as a Bhikṣu Saṅgata Buddha or Śākya 1.9
—[illegible] division of the points of defeat (nigrahasthāna) criticised by Vācaspati Miśra 134
—[illegible] of [illegible]
Dharmakīrti and Kumārila 304
Dharmapāla 117 302f 304 3.6 317 319
—[illegible] 308
[illegible] 308
[illegible] 74
[illegible]
[illegible]

Page
Dharmottarācārya . 329
Dialogue . 62
—three kinds of 62
Digambaras .. . 159f
Dignāga 116, 117, 125, 135, 307 (ftn. 2), 348, 349
—age of .. 116, 135, 272f
—birth place of .. 512
—called Bhadanta . 125, 135 (ftn 3)
—(his) definition of balancing the effect (kārya-sama) criticised by Vācaspati Miśra . 135
—(as) founder of the Mediaeval Logic . . 158, 270ff.
—fuller accounts of .. 272 (ftn. 1)
—life of . 272f
—(a) portrait of . . 271
—(his) criticism of the definition of perception as given by Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana . . 278
—(his) theory of examples 295ff
—(his) theory of Nine Reasons criticised by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra .. 283 (ftn 2)
—(his) views on inference 281ff
Dignāga and Īśvara Kṛṣṇa 274f.
Dinakara Miśra .. 380
Dīnāra (the Roman coin denarius) imported into India 45 (ftn. 2)
Diodotus .. . 352
Dīpankara or Śrījñāna Atīśa 337, 341, 352, 517, 519f
Direct knowledge (Pratyakṣa) 169, 174, 184
—Deva Sūri on . . 201
—kinds of . . 174
Discussion . . 62
—art of (Vāda-vidyā).. .. 6
(See also Tarka vidyā)
Deva Suri on .. 204
—with whom to hold 104
Disjunctive categorical syllogism 435 (ftn. 1)
Disputation, methods of, as illustrated by the Kathāvattan ..235ff
Dissentients 62

Page
Divine Science (Brahma-vidya) 4
Doctrine of Impermanence 239
Doctrine of inter-relation leading to the doctrine of voidness 117 (ftn. 3)
Doctrine of momentariness 246, 262f
—criticised by Vātysāyana 121
Doctrine of Mutual Dependence (Paticca samuppāda) 227 (ftn. 2)
Doctrine of Nyāya (method) 217 (ftn 1)
Doctrine of Phonetic Explosion (sphotavāda) 131f
Doctrine of Self-consciousness 418
Doctrine of Voidness . 262f
—time of . 119 (ftn.)
Dogma . 59
—hypothetical . .. 60
—implied . 60
—of all the schools . . 59
—peculiar to some schools .. 60
Doubt 33, 58f
—Deva Sūri on . . 201
—grounds for . 104
—impossibility of . 103
—possibility of . 104
—sources of . 428
Dpal ldan-blo-gros brtan po 349
Dravali (Drāvida) . 305
Dress of monks . . 271
Dr H Jacobi—
—on commentaries of the Nyāya Sūtra . .. 116 (ftn. 1, 3)
—on the date of the Nyāya Sūtra 50 (ftn. 2)
—on Hari bhadra Sūri 209 (ftn.)
Dr Sherbatski 120 (ftn. 3)
Dṛṣṭivāda .. 161, 161 (ftn 3)
Dul lha .. .. 320f.
Durgādatta Miśra . .. 460
Dvividha Sambhāṣā (see Debate—kinds of) 29
Dwyiggñen 206
Ear 57
Eastern Cālukya dynasty 273 (ftn. 1)
(An) Ecclesiastical act . .. 232

Page
Effect 280, 311, 322, 390
Efficient Cause 383, 390 (ftn 1)
Ego 245, 246, 249
Ego or Ālaya—
—of the Vijñāna-vādins 245 (ftn 2)
E Harding—
—on the Sūtra of the Burden and the Burden bearer 127 (ftn)
Elements 57
Emancipation or release 57, 58, 246, 370
—attainment of 102
—definition of 103
—means of attainment of 103
Emperor Kublai Khan 353
Enthymemes 500f
—definition of 501
Entreaty 113
Enunciation 53
Equipollent concomittance 309
Erratic fallacy 63
Erratic reason 438
—non general 438
—too general 437
Etapurī 346
Eternalists (sassata vādins)—
—followers of the Sāṁkhya philosophy of Kapila 229
Eternalists non eternalists (ekaccasassatikā ekacca-asassatikā)—
—followers of the Ānvīkṣikī of Medhātithi Gautama 228
Evasion 89
Examination 53
—different means for 28
—four standards of 28
Example (dṛṣṭānta) 32 59 167, 226f 304f 437
—affirmative or homogeneous 502
—and major premise 503
—and paradigms 504f
—converted into universal proposition 226f
—function of 504
—heterogeneous or negative 61, 191, 193, 257, 259, 368, 502
Example—
—heterogeneous, fallacies of
—homogeneous or affirmative
191, 259, 28
—homogeneous, fallacies of 29
—fallacies of 368f, 163, 176,
289,
—kinds of .
—superfluous .
—theory of
—uselessness of, according to D
Sūri
Excellence of speech
Excess . .
Exclusively affirmative (anva
inference ..
Exclusively negative (vyatire
inference
Exercise
Existence, as a thing 97
Expectancy
Explanation of the truths
Explanatory example .
Extrinsic inseparable connectio
(bahir-vyāpti)
—Deva Sūri on
Eve 57,
—(a) material substance 111
—(a) non-material substance

Fa hian 241 (ftn 1),
—his description of Ārya Nāgār-
juna 231 (ft
Fallacy 63f 362, 4
—general definition of
—kinds of 102f, 260f .
—of absence of connection
—of absence of disconnection
—of affirmative example 36
—of argumentation .
—of balancing the controversy 36
—of balancing the predicate .
—of balancing the point in dispute
or begging the question . 26
—of example 174, 191, 364, 3

Page

Fallacy—
—of false assumption 260
—of implied contradiction 315f
—of included major term . 297
—of included major and middle terms . . 298
—of included middle term 297
—of inverse connection 297
—of inverted negation 298
—of 'Naigama,' according to Deva Suri 203
—of negative example . 369
—of non-erroneous contradiction 316, 368
—of perception .. 192
—of quibble in respect of a term 260
—of regressus ad infinitum . 257
—of reason . 63f, 90
—of reasoning (see fallacies of the thesis, middle term and example) 298
—of recognition . 193
—of recollection .. . 193
—of Sādhya-sama .. 250 (ftn 1)
—of showing absurdity 260
—of the adoption of a fallacious reason 261
—of the collective, Deva Sūri on 203
—of the contradictory . 260
—of the contradictory middle term 294f., 313
—of the contradictory reason .. 363
—of the contradictory reason, kinds of .. .. 363ff.
—of the excluded major term .. .96
—of the excluded major and middle terms 296
—of the excluded midde term .. 296
llacy of the heterogeneous ex-
—kinds of 180
of the homogeneous ex
.. 178
. 180
.. 180
180

Page

Fallacy of the homogeneous example—
—of connection unshown 179
- of inverted connection 179
—three kinds of 179
—unconnected 179

Fallacy of the immediate, Deva Sūri on 203
Fallacy of the middle term or reason 178, 193, 293

Fallacy of the middle term or semblance of reason—
—contradictory 178
—kinds of 178
—uncertain 178
—unproved 177

Fallacy of the minor term 177, 193
—of the mistimed 260
—of the mistimed reason and its subdivision 367
+-of the non tried reason 66
—of the non tried reason, subdivisions of . 366f
—of the practical, Deva Sūri on 203
—of the subtle, Deva Sūri on 204
—of the such like, Deva Sūri on 204
—of the uncertain middle term 293f., 313
—of the uncertain reason .. 365
—of the uncertain reason, subdivisions of 365f
—of the undistributed middle . 260
—of the unproved middle term 293, 313
—of the unproved reason .. 362
—of the unproved reason, kinds of 362f

—of verbal testimony .. 193
—of verbal testimony, Deva Sūri on 204
—services of 442
Faults 58
—subdivisions of .. 101,
.. 113
Fear 223
Tughlak .. .

Page
First academy of Logic in Nadia 462
Five Skandhas (aggregates of being) 126, 127 (ftn.)
Fixed signification of numbers 114
—[illegible] on 114.
[illegible]
(the) path of the
[illegible] . 3
[illegible] cause 111
[illegible] 390 (ftn. 1)
[illegible] (adhikara-
[illegible]) 229
Four schools of Buddhists—
(as) mentioned in the Chinese Tripiṭaka 243f
[illegible] . 58
Future time 106
[illegible] Bhaṭṭācārya
—date of 481
—(the) prince of Indian schoolmen 482
[illegible] Bhaṭṭācārya . 481
[illegible] . 462
[illegible] Upādhyāya . 263, 266, 351
[illegible] (Padma) .. 155
[illegible] Deva . 316
[illegible] .. 521
—date of .. 396, 405ff, 522
. 406 (ftn 7), 407
—[illegible] account of .. 488f
—[illegible] of people from 406 (ftn 7)
[illegible] Deva 350
[illegible] .
—Dr. [illegible]'s journey to . 531
—hospitality of a lady to Dr. [illegible] at .. . 532f
[illegible] . .. 337
[illegible] .. . 21
[illegible] 341, 524
[illegible] 478f.
[illegible] (see Gautama Medhātithi)
—[illegible] 21
—[illegible] to be the author of the
[illegible] 45

Gautama— Page
—birthplace of 17
—Buddha .. 19
—(as) described in the Rāmāyaṇa 18
—(his) doctrine embodied in the Nyāya sutra of Akṣapāda (see Akṣapāda) . . 26
Gautama—
—Gotamaka, his followers 21
—(his) identification with Akṣapāda 43
—(and) Medhātithi the same person 18
—mentioned in old Persian scripture . 20f
—Naciketas 19
—Nodhā
—(his) theory of reasoning
—(his) theory of soul 2
—(his) wife Ahalyā .. 17f
—(his) work on Ānvīkṣikī - .. 20
Gautama-Medhātithi (see above)—
—age of . 21
—(his) doctrines as reproduced in the Caraka Saṃhitā . 25ff
—family and tribe of .. 19
—(the) founder of Ānvīkṣikī 17ff
—(and) Gautama or Gotama the same person (see Ahalyā) . 20
—mentioned in the Mahābhārata 20
—(his) Nyāya 20
—terms unknown to 27
Gautamī-vidyā 20, 497
Generality (samavāya) 32, 333
Genus or type 111
Gestures .. 57
—as means of knowledge .. 453
God—
—(the) giver of fruits 101
—proof of the existence of . 143f
—path of . . 3
Gopāla . .. 323, 517
Gopīnātha Mauni . .. 465
Gotama (see Gaut[illegible] 37, 497 (ftn [illegible]

Page

Gotama—
—descendants of 19
—Tarka Śāstra of .. . 497
Gotamaka (see Gautama, his followers) . . 21
Govardhana Miśra . 381
Govicandra . 320
Govinda Nyāyavāgīśa .. 480
Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-le zan 289
Graheśvara 522
Graus-cao-pa´ . 278
Gser-gyi-go cha 275
Gtan-tshigs-ltar-snan . 293 (ftn. 1)
Gtan-tshigs ni-tshul-gsum 291 (ftn. 1)
Guge 324
Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa 468
Guṇaratna 151, 206 (ftn. 4), 214, 357, 371
—his references to other philosophers 214f
—his references to works on logic . 215
Gupta Dynasty, kings of . 349

Halāyudha . 524
Hamsa . 210
Han Dynasty . 243 (ftn. 1)
Hanumat . 391
Haramohan Cūḍāmaṇi .. 526
Haribhadra . . 337
Haribhadra Sūri 152, 154, 208, 346
—age of .. . 209
Haribhadra Sūri II 209 (ftn.)
Haridāsa Nyāyālankāra Bhaṭṭācārya . .. 465
Hari Dīkṣita 384
Hari Miśra .. 406 (ftn 7)
Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa .. 479
Harṣa Vardhana 335
Ḥbro or Do .. 324, 337, 343
Hellenistic monarchies . 352
Hemacandra Sūri (surnamed Kalikāla Sarvajña) .. 205, 335
—details about 205
Hema (or Kanaka) Varmā .. 275
H[illegible]l sects of the Buddhists 226, 226 (ftn. 2)

Page

Heretical—
—names and subdivisions of 226 (ftn. 2)
Heterogeneous or negative example 176
Heterologue . 361, 433
Hetu (reason) . 162
—(as) identical with valid knowledge . . 162
—(in the) sense of inference 162
—kinds of . .. 162
Hetu-śāstra (see Ānvīkṣikī) 7, 25
Hetu-vidyā (see Ānvīkṣikī) 7, 240, 243, 274 (ftn 3)
Hetu-vidyā-śāstra 274 (ftn. 3)
Hīnayāna .. 247, 272
—spread of . 241
Hindu Logic—
—Aristotelian influence on . 511f
Hīravijaya 216
History of Jaina literature . 172
Homogeneous example 176
Homologue . 361, 433
Huen-Thsang 124, 241 (ftn 1), 248, 261, 265, 266f, 267, 274 (ftn 3), 302, 302 (ftn. 4), 303, 306, 335
Hurting the proposition .. 84f
Hymn .. 108

Idealism (vijñāna-vāda) 120f.
—in the Lankāvatāra 245
Identity . 311
Ignorance . 89
Illustrative description . 108
Immediate perception . 418f.
Immediate subsequency . 113
Imperceptible reason in the affirmative form—
—three subdivisions of . 191
Imperceptible reason in the negative form—
—seven subdivisions of .. 191
Implication (of a word) 450, 451f.
Imposition .. 218
Inadequacy 34
Incoherence 34
Incoherent 87

First academy of Logic in India 513
Five Skandhas (aggregates of being) 124, 157 (ftn.)
Fixed signification of numbers 116
—Akṣapāda on 116

Forefathers
—(the) path of the 9
Form 111
Formal cause 220 (ftn. 1)
Fortuitous originists (adhicca-samuppannika) 252
Four schools of Buddhists—
—(as) mentioned in the Chinese Tripitaka 242f.
Fruit 58
Future time 106

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya 481
—date of 482
—(the) prince of Indian schoolmen . 481
Gajapati Pratāparudra . 482
Gāndhāra . 265, 266, 331
Gaṇeśa Upādhyāya . 153
Gaṅgā (Padmā) . 346
Gaṅgā Deva . 331
Gaṅgeśa . 396, 405ff , 522
—date of 406 (ftn. 7), 407
—Portuguese account of .. 486f
—succession of pupils from 406 (ftn. 7)
—Gāṅgeya Deva 350

Gangtok—
—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's journey to . 531
—hospitality of a lady to Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa at . 532f
Garbhapāda . 337
Gautama . 21
Gauḍa .. . 341, 526
Gaurī Kānta Sārvabhauma . 478f

Gautama (see Gautama Medhātithi)—
—(in) Avesta Gaotema 21
—believed to be the author of the Nyāya Sūtra 48

Gautama—
—birthplace of .. . 1
—Buddha .. 1
—(as) described in the Rāmāyaṇa 1
—(his) doctrine embodied in the Nyāya sūtra of Akṣapāda (see Akṣapāda) . 2

Gautama—
—Gotamaka, his followers .. 2
—(his) identification with Akṣapāda 4
—(and) Medhātithi the same person . .. 18
—mentioned in old Persian scripture XL
—Naciketas . .. 19
—Nodhā .. . 19
—(his) theory of reasoning 20
—(his) theory of soul .. 20
—(his) wife Ahalyā . .. 17f.
—(his) work on Ānvīkṣikī .. 20

Gautama-Medhātithi (see above)—
—age of 21
—(his) doctrines as reproduced in the Caraka Saṃhitā.. .. 23ff
—family and tribe of 19
—(the) founder of Ānvīkṣikī .. 17ff.
—(and) Gautama or Gotama the same person (see Ahalyā)
—mentioned in the Mahāb
—(his) Nyāya
—terms unknown to
Gautamī vidyā
Generality (sāmān
Genus or type
Gestures
—as means of kno

God—
—(the) giver of f
—proof of the exis
—path of
Gopāla ..
Gopīnātha Mauni
Gotama (see Gauta

Page

Intercourse—
—whose character is general 412f, 429, 430f
—whose character is knowledge 413
Interrogation . 33
Intervention .. 113
Intrinsic inseparable connection (antar-vyāpti) .. 177
—Deva Sūri on .. 202
Invalid knowledge .. 409ff
—Mīmāṃsakas on 410
Invariable concomittance (see Inseparable connection) 376, 384, 390
—Buddhist views on 400f
—comprehensiveness of .. 429
—conclusive definition of 424
—defined by the 'Lion' and the 'Tiger' 423
—five provisional definitions of 421
—knowable . 400f
—means of apprehending .. 426ff
—nature of .. 140
—objectionable definitions of . 424
—of special forms 426
—of the Buddhist condemned . 378
—right means of apprehending . 428
—unknowable . 398ff
Inversion, Deva Sūri on . 201
Invocation of Blessings . 408
Invocation, kinds of 408
Irrelevancy . . 34
Īśvarabhanga (non-existence of God) criticised by Jayanta .. 150
Īśvara Sena .. 307 (ftn 2)
I-tsing 306

Jagaddala .. .. 346 (ftn. 3)
Jagaddhara 522
Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra .. 469f
Jayāditya 335
Jaina Āgamas 172
Jaina Logic 168
—conciliatory character of .. 221f
—not conflicting with the Brāhmaṇas .. . 221f.
—permanency of 24

Page

Jainas . 158, 273
—canonical scriptures 160f
Jaina sects . 159
Jainism—
—persecution suffered by .. 222f
—rights and privileges of the laity of 223
—royal patronage enjoyed by 222
—support of the Jaina community received by 223
—unperturbed by the Mahomedans . .. 223
Jalandhara . 349
Jambudvīpa . 332
Janaka . 12, 13
Jānakīnātha Śarmā . 466
Jātukarṇya, probably a compiler 50
Jātukarnya Vyāsa . 50
Jayadeva 455, 524
Jayanta 137 (ftn. 1).
—author of the Nyāya mañjarī 146f
—criticises the doctrines of Kalyāṇa Rakṣita and Dharmottara . 149f
—(his) criticism of Sphota-vāda .. 149
—(his) criticism of the doctrines of apoha, kṣaṇa-bhaṅga, Īśvara-bhaṅga, etc. .. 149f
—date of . 147
—(his) explanation of verbal knowledge .. . 147f.
—life of . .. 146f.
—(his) reproach of the Buddhists 150
—(his) review of some Buddhistic doctrines . . 150
Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana . 477f.
Jayarāma Tarkālankāra .. 483
Jaya Simha Deva .. 199
Jaya Simha Sūri 206, 371, 372
Jehāngīr .. . 479
Jehāri . .. 337f, 342, 349
Jinadatta Sūri .. 152, 154
—date of .. .. 152 (ftn. 3)
Jinas .. 159, 274 (ftn. 3), 338
Jina Bhadra Gaṇikṣamā Śramaṇa 174, 161
Jina Bhatta 210
Jina Bhatta Sūri 390

Page
Kirti—
—time of . 137
Kirtivijaya . 216
Klog-skya-śes rab-brtrya . 313
Knowledge (viññāna) . 227
Knowledge 3
—base . 243
—distinguished from work)
—divisions of . 227 (ftn) 2
—from particular standpoint (Naya) 218
—(a) function of the intellect 112
—general grounds of . 409
—kinds of 245, 389, 411
—objectified . 245
—potential . 245
—practical functions of . 418
—presentative 245
—(a) quality of the soul 98
Konkana 338
Kṛpārāma 479
Kṛṣṇa Bhatta Āḍa .. . 486
Kṛṣṇa Dāsa Sārvabhauma Bhattacārya . 468
Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvagīśa 384f.
Kṣamākalyāṇa . . 390
Kṣaṇa-bhanga (the momentary existence)—
—criticised by Jayanta . 149
Kṣirodadhi (khiroi) . .. 17
Kṣitiśacandra Roy .. . 526
Kubja Viṣṇu Vardhana 273 (ftn. 1)
Kukutasiddha 518
Kumāra Gupta 267
Kumārajīva . .. 252
Kumāra Kalasa . 343
Kumāra-lābha .. 248 (ftn 7)
Kumāra-pañha . 114 (ftn. 1)
Kumāra Śrī 336
Kumārila Bhatta 138, 183, 273 351
Kumārila and Dharmakīrti .. 304
Kumudacandrācārya 198
Kauṇḍa kunda .. 169 (ftn.)

Labrang 533f
—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's journey to 530

Page
Labrang—
—monastery of 342 (ftn 4), 344 (ftn 4)
Lachimā Devī 460
Laghusamantabhadra 197f
Lakṣaṇa Bhatta . 374
Lakṣmaṇa Sena 350, 523 (ftn 3)
—court of 524
—successors of 424
Lalitacandra 321
Laugākṣi Bhāskara 395
Law of Extension 328
—application of 285
Lha-dvan blo 319f
Liang Emperor Wu fi . . 301
Licchavi Dynasty 335
Likeness 113
—Gangeśa on 443
—Mīmāṁsakas on . 443
Limitation of the proposition (pratijñā-vibhakti) - 166
Limitation of the reason 166
Logic (sophism) 229
—called Nīti or Nyāya 240
—called pre-eminently the Ānvīkṣikī 6
Logical theories of Aristotle migrated from Alexandria into India 511ff

Logical works—
—brought to Nadia from Mithilā 462
Logic and Logicians—
—in the Lankāvatāra 244
Logic of Mithilā and Nadia . 218
Lohācārya II .. 169 (ftn 8)
Lokanātha .. . 339
Lokāyata 5, 6, 9
Louis De La Vallée Poussin—
—on the Buddhistic doctrine of the soul . .. 126 (ftn. 2)

Mādhavācārya 247 (ftn. 5), 248 (ftn. 3), 249 (ftn. 1, 6), 274 (ftn), 306, 308 (ftn. 3), 341, 397f.
Mādhava Tarkasiddhānta .. 526

Page
Jina Mitra 347, 348
Jinendrabuddhi 123
Jinesvara Sūri 197
Jīvita Gupta I 311
Jñānacandra 313
Jñānagarbha 250
Jñānapāda or Jñāna Deva 374 343
Jñāna Śrī Bhadra 342
—same as Jñānaśrī Bhadra 342 (ftn. 1)
Jñāna Śrī Mitra 211 (ftn. 3) 341
Jñātiputras 244
Judicial Council of monks (saṃgha) 231
—judge or umpire in 231 f
—member of 231

Kākatiya Dynasty . 340
Kālāśoka 228, 346
Kālidāsa 273
Kalinga 305
Kalyāṇa Candra 156
Kalyāna Rakṣita 143, 328
Kamala Rakṣitā 350
Kamala Śīla 327, 352, 516
Kāmbojas 351
Kāmeśvara Dynasty 521
Kaṇāda 305
—system of 304
Kaṇāda Gupta 304
Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa 466
—traditionary account of 466 (ftn. 3)
Kāñcī . 117, 272 512
Kāñcīpura . 117, 302, 351
Kaniṣka 26 (ftn 3), 50, 241, 242, 349 352
—date of 241 (ftn 1)
Kanoj .. . 335
Kanva .. . 45
Kanva Dynasty .. 251 (ftn 3)
Kapila—
—date of 10
—(his) doctrine of matter and soul 9f
Kapilas 278
Karna Deva .. . 350
Karnāta Dynasty 521
Karṇāṭaka Kṣatriya race 350

Page
Karatoyā .. 248
Kāryakāraṇabhāva—
—and Ārambhavāda . . 27
—as part of the Vedānta Philosophy . 27
Kāṣṭhasaṅgha 1 2 (ftn.)
Kāśyapa .. 43
—hermitage of 32, 43
Kauśāmbī 117 (ftn. 2) 253, 256, 323
Kauśika . .. 222
Kavīndra .. 336
Keśava Miśra .. 3 8
—life of .. 381
Kevala 169 (ftn. 1)
Khache jñāna Śrī .. 329
Khajjuttarā 112 (ftn. 2)
Khri-sron-deu-tsan 332
King Amoghavarṣa 223, 349
King Bhasa .. 322
King Candra Gupta .. 222
King Cinghana . 336
King Dpal lha-tsan po 250
King Harihara .. 331
King Jayacandra 406, 408 (ftn. 6)
King Jaya Siṃha .. 205
King Jitāra . 210
King Kaniṣka . 512
King Khri-sron-deu-tsan 323, 327
King Kema . .. 222
King Lalitacandra 320
King Lalitāditya . 324
King Muktāpīḍa . 147
King Muñja .. 197
King Nemicandra . 252
—date of 252 (ftn. 4)
—genealogy of 252 (ftn. 4)
King Poros. . 252
King Riga ldan-rgyal po .. 299
King Śrī Harsa or Harsavardhana 123
King Sron-tsan-gan-po .. 305
King Tribhuvantilaka .. 358
King Vimalacandra of Bengal, Kāmarūpa and Tirhut 338, 342 (ftn. 6)
Kirti (see Dharmakirti) .. 386

Page

Kīrti—
—time of . 137
Kirtivijaya .. 216
Klog skya-śes-rab-brtrys 313
Knowledge (vijñāna) 227
Knowledge . 3
—basic . 243
—distinguished from work)
—divisions of .. 227 (ftn.) 2
—from particular standpoint (Naya) 218
—(a) function of the intellect . 112
—general grounds of . . 409
—kinds of .. 245, 389, 411
—objectified .. 245
—potential . 245
—practical functions of . 418
—presentative . 245
—(a) quality of the soul . 98
Konkana . 336
Kṛpārāma . 479
Kṛṣṇa Bhatta Āde . 486
Kṛṣṇa Dāsa Sārvabhauma Bhattacārya .. . 463
Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvagīśa . 384f
Kṣamākalyāṇa . . 390
Kṣaṇa-bhanga (the momentary existence)—
—criticised by Jayanta . 149
Kṣrodadhi (khiroi) .. 17
Kṣtīścandra Roy 526
Kubja Viṣṇu Vardhana 273 (ftn. 1)
Kukutasiddha 516
Kumāra Gupta 267
Kumārajīva . .. 252
Kumāra Kalasa .. 343
Kumāra-lābha . 248 (ftn. 7)
Kumāra-pačha .. 114 (ftn. 1)
Kumāra Śrī 336
Kumārila Bhatta 138, 183, 273. 351
Kumārila and Dharmakīrti .. 304
Kumudacandrācārya 198
Kauṇḍa kunda .. 169 (ftn.)

Labrang . .. 533f.
—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's journey to 530

Page

Labrang—
—monastery of 342 (ftn 4), 344 (ftn 4)
Lachimā Devī 400
Laghusamantabhadra 197f
Lakṣaṇa Bhatta . 374
Lakṣmaṇa Sena 350, 523 (ftn 3)
—court of 524
—successors of 424
Lalitacandra 321
Laugākṣi Bhāskara 395
Law of Extension 328
—application of 285
Lha-dvan-blo 319f
Liang Emperor Wu ti 301
Licchavi Dynasty . 335
Likeness 113
—Gangeśa on 443
—Mīmāṃsakas on .. 443
Limitation of the proposition (pratijñā-vibhakti) 166
Limitation of the reason 166
Logic (sophism) 229
—called Nīti or Nyāya 240
—called pre-eminently the Ānvīkṣikī . . 6
Logical theories of Aristotle migrated from Alexandria into India 511ff
Logical works—
—brought to Nadia from Mithilā . 462
Logic and Logicians—
—in the Laṅkāvatāra 244
Logic of Mithilā and Nadia 218
Lohācārya II .. 169 (ftn. 6)
Lokanātha 339
Lokāyata .. 5, 6, 9
Louis De La Vallée Poussin—
—on the Buddhistic doctrine of the soul .. 128 (ftn. 2)

Mādhavācārya 247 (ftn. 5), 248 (ftn. 3), 249 (ftn. 1, 6), 274 (ftn.), 306, 308 (ftn. 3), 341, 397f
Mādhava Tarkasiddhānta .. 526

Page

[illegible] 610
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
Mithilā [illegible]
—college of [illegible]
—[illegible] history of [illegible]
—[illegible] of [illegible]
—[illegible] accounts of [illegible]
Mithilā School of Logic [illegible]
—principal logicians of [illegible]
Modern School of Hindu Logic [illegible]
Modern School of Nyāya [illegible]
Moggaliputta Tissa [illegible]
[illegible] 234
Monastery of [illegible] [illegible]
Monastery of Nālandā [illegible]
[illegible] (ftn. [illegible]), 315 (ftn. 3), 3[illegible]
(ftn. 3), 320 (ftn. 2), 329 (ftn. 2)
336 (ftn. 1)
Monastery of Sam-ye (see Monastery of [illegible])
Monastery of [illegible] 323
Monastery of Vikramaśilā 333
Mudita Bhadra 336
Mudgala 316
Mukta kumbha 333
Munisundara Sūri 331
Muscular movement 218
Mu-tig-btsan-po 370
Mutual non-existence 331
—Deva Sūri on 154
Mye-ńan-med 203

Nadiā— 332
—college at
—Mahomedan conquest of 464
—nucleus of a university at 524
—raised to the status of a town under the Sena kings 524
—situation of 523f
—traces of the Pāla kings in 523
Nadiā School of Logic 523
—principal logicians of 461ff
—chair of Astronomy at 461ff
—chair of Logic at 527
525f

Nadiā University— Page
—chair of Smṛti at [illegible]
—Tantra studies at [illegible]
Nāgabodhi [illegible]
Nāgārjuna [illegible]
[illegible]
—age of [illegible]
—(his) criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of Pramāṇa [illegible]
—legend about [illegible]
—(his) letter to Udayana [illegible]
—(his) logical theory of examples (nidarśana) criticised by Vātsyāyana
—(his) Mādhyamika kārikā mentioned neither by Vātsyāyana nor by Uddyotakara by name
—philosophical works of 118 (ftn.
—(his) references to the logical doctrines of Akṣapāda 253 (ftn.
—Tibetan name of .. 251
—(his) Vigrahavyāvartanī kārikā 252
—(his) works on Tantra 252 (ftn. 4)
Nāgas 256
Nāgasena 113 (ftn. 2), 334
Nāgeśa 334
Nag-tshul-khrims-rgyal-wa 320
Naiyāyikas 132, 146, 244
also called Yaugas 154 (ftn. 2)
—are Śaivas .. 154, 155
—characteristics of 155
Nālandā 261, 265, 272, 273, 303, 320, 323, 327, 334, 335, 352
—as a University 515
—celebrated men of 515
—Dr. Spooner's observation of 515
(ftn. 5)
—earliest scholars of 514
—Fa-hian's visit to 514
—Hwen-Thsang's visit to 514
—I-tsing's visit to 515
—kings building monasteries at 514
—monks at .. 514f
—royal recognition of .. 515

Page

Nālandā—
—Saṅghārāmas or monasteries at 514
—situation of 514
—Tibetan account of 516
—University of (see University)
252, 302, 303, 352
Nāma Deva 374
Nanken 301
Nānyadeva 521
Nārada 498
—(an) expert in Nyāya Śāstra 43
—legends about 44, 44 (ftn 2)
—(as a) logician doubtful
—(his) other works 45
—(the) real 45
—represents the philosophical culture of the first cent A D 44
—shrouded in mystery 44
—(his) skill in syllogistic reasoning 43
—(his) visit to Śvetadvīpa 44f
—(his) works in Smṛti 45
Nārada Smṛti—
—represents the theories of Smṛti and Nyāya of the early centuries of Christ 45 (ftn. 2)
Nārāyana 153
Naropā 341, 342
Narrative description 108
Nature of the universal proposition—
—as understood by Dharmakīrti and Aristotle 509
Navadvīpa—
—university of 405
Naya (method) of description or mood of statements 161, 161 (ftn. 4), 170f
—five kinds of 170f
Nayapāla 343, 344, 353
Nedumāran Pāṇḍya 222
Negation—
—absolute 97 (ftn 1)
—of correlation 97 (ftn 1)
—of identity 97 (ftn 1)
—of the opposite 132, 287

Page

Negative reason 437
Negative things 394
Nemicandra Kavi 207
—details about 207 (ftn 2)
Neo-Brahamanic age 355
Nilakaṇṭha 16 (ftn 1), 391²
Ñi-ma-ɡlas (a Tāntric teacher) 322
Nine reasons (see wheel of reasons) 283
—illustration of 284
—logic of 299
—(a) table of 284
Nine Sacred Works (Navadharmas) 242 (ftn 3) 243
Nirgranthas 305
Nirgrantha putras 244
Nirukta kāras 138 (ftn 1)
—criticised by Vācaspati Miśra 138
Nirvāṇa 255
Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate perception)—
—defined 137
Non activity—
—grounds for 410
Non-analytical Naya (Nigama) 170
Non-being 253
Non-censurable 33
Non-equipollent concomittance 399
Non-erratic 55
Non existence 56, 96., 370
—as a separate entity 415
—counterpart of 416
—Deva Sūri on 203
—included in inference 97
—kinds of 97, 164, 419f., 416
—(a) means of right knowledge 96
—not a means of right knowledge 96
—of the general form 425
—perception of 416
—subdivision of, according to Deva Sūri 203
—(as a) thing 97 (ftn. 1)
—whose counterpart is qualified by a Nature already in a different Locus 423
Non-ingenuity 59

Non-material cause *Page*
Non-perception 383
—eleven kinds of 281
—invalidity of 311
—irregularity of 414f
Non-reason (see fallacy) three kinds of 59
Nose 34 39f
Nṛga 57
Nṛsiṃha Deva and his successors 134
Nṛsiṃha pañcānana 521
Numbers doctrine of things fixed in 482
Nyāya (the science of true reasoning) 14f
—adopts Pramāṇa alone 8
—called Gautamīvidyā and Akṣapāda-darśana 402
—causes of its present disregard 50
—(in) Chinese 492f
—competition for the chair of 40 (ftn 2)
—encouraged by the British Government 526
—included among the fourteen principal sciences 490ff
—included in Ṣaḍdarśana by Jaina writers 382
—included in Ṣaḍdarśana by the Brāhmanic writers 15 f
—in the sense of logic not known to Pāṇini and Patañjali 153
—introduction of this word 41
—Mādhavācārya on 40
—Mahābhārata full of references to 41
—meaning of 39
—mentioned in the Veda and Cikitsā 40
—origin of the name of 39
—Pāṇini derives the word in the sense of justice 40
—patronised by the Mahārāja of Nadiā 4 41 (ftn 4)
—popularity of 488
—Portuguese account of 32 155f
—Portuguese interest in 489
—recognised as a branch of Orthodox Learning 4497 152ff

Nyāya— *P*
—rise of vernacular detrimental to 4
—(in the) sense of Logic first in the Mahābhārata 42
—(in the) sense of logic in the Caraka Saṃhitā 41
—signifies just or justice in Artha Śāstra 41 (ftn 6)
—spread of the study of 39
—supported by reasoning and scripture 39
—supports the Veda 39
—technical meaning of 40
—tenets of 39
—used in the sense of logic from about the first cent A D 42
—three causes for its popularity 155f
—(in) Tibetan 8
—Vātsyāyana on 40f
—very popular about the 2nd cent. A D 42
—Viśvanātha on 41
Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika amalgamated 390
Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika categories impossible to assimilate 402
Nyāya bhāṣya earliest commentary on 115
Nyāyabhūṣana 338
Nyāya category of Pramāṇa incorporated in the Vaiśeṣika 384
Nyāya doctrine of tātparya (intention) 148
Nyāya līlāvatī commentaries on 387f
Nyāya philosophy 279
—incorporates the Vaiśeṣika 373
—why termed Akṣapāda darśana 3..
Nyāya ratnāvalī (a prakaraṇa by Vallabhācārya) 387
Nyāya-sāra (a manual of logic by Bhā Sarvajña 338ff
—commentaries on 371f
Nyāya Śāstra (see Ānvīkṣikī) 39
—antiquity of 41f
—early teachers of 42f
—first regular work on 44

Page

Nyāya Śāstra—
—science of right judgment or true reasoning .. 40f
—science of syllogism and of inference .. 41
—technical terms of, as used in the Caraka Saṁhitā . 43
—(in) Tibetan 40 (ftn 3)
Nyāya Siddhānta Dīpa (manual of logic by Śaśadhara) .. 396f
Nyāya sūtra (see Nyāya Śāstra) 46
—arrangement of categories in . 52
—author of . 47f
—Bhāṣya (commentary) on 46
—contains the principles both of logic and philosophy 46
—criticised by Nāgārjuna . 50
—Gautama and Akṣapāda both authors of 49
—(as) Gotama sūtra 48
—not the work of one person 46
—authorship of .. 498
—passage quoted from later Buddhist works in 46
—reviews doctrines of various periods . 46
—subject matter of 49, 50ff
Nyāya theory of Pramāṇa criticised by Nāgārjuna . 256
Nyāya-vidyā emanated from the mouth of Brahmā .. 38f
Nyāya works found by Portuguese missionaries .. 489
Nying-ma-pa . . 533

Object of knowledge (see prameya) . .. 375
—kinds of .. . . 370f.
Object of right knowledge .. 97
Objects of sense distribution of . 100
Occasional signification . 470
Odantapura Sarvāstivāda school of 342
Old man respect for . . 30
Opponent how to argue with . 30f.
—how to vanquish 30

Page

Opposing the proposition 85
Opposition 113
Opposition to the counter-proposition . 166f
Ordinary Intercourse of Particularity 430
Originating cause 33
Overlooking the censurable 89f

Padmanābha Miśra 381
Padma saṁbhava 327, 352
Pain . 55
Pakṣadhara Miśra 406 (ftn 7), 455f

Pāla Dynasty—
—kings of 349
—of Bengal and Behar 517f
Pāla kings dates of 517f

Pāli Buddhist Literature—
—logical topics in 227
—origin of 225f
Pallava Dynasty kings of 350
Pallavas . 273 (ftn 1)
Pamiangchi 535
—Dr Vidyābhuṣana's reception on the way to . . 537f
—monastery of . 538
Pañcaśikha 10
Panchen-shwa dmar . 271
Paṇḍita Candra father of Jayanta 147
Paṇḍita Dīpānkara . 318
Paṇḍita's red cap .. 271
Pāṇini . 11
Parahita .. 345
Parahita Bhadra .. 340
Paramahamsa .. 210
Paramārtha . 267, 301f.
Parīkṣā (see examination) 28

Pariṣad (council)—
—constituents of .. . 22
—(a) council of debate .. 22
—various names of . . 22
Parivrājaka Karuṇānanda .. 303
Parokṣa and Pratyakṣa senses of, according to Umāsvāti and early Jaina writers . . 170

Page

Present time—
—indication 106
Presumption 33, 56, 370
—Mimāmsakas on 435
—not valid 96
—(a) special kind of inference 96
—validity of 91
Prior non existence 97, 97 (ftn 1)
Probability 56, 370
—(a) special kind of inference 96

Production of fruits—
—time of 102

Prof. H Ui—
—on the date of the Nyāya sūtra 50 (ftn 2)
Prof L. Suali—
—on the date of the Nyāya sūtra 50 (ftn 2)
Probis—
—eight kinds of 264
—subdivisions of 386
Proposition 32, 60f, 106, 290, 312 361, 436f
Protector and Protégé 113
Ptolemy Philadelphos 332
Pudgalavāda 127 (ftn)
Pudgalavādins 127 (ftn)
Puggalavādins .35

Punarvasu Ātreya—
—(his) dissertation on the senses 11f
—(the) original author of the Caraka Saṃhitā 11
Purpose 33 59f
Puragupta 227, 49
Puṣpapura 26 (ftn 2)

Qualification or Particularity (Viśeṣaṇatā) 130
Quality (guṇa) 31
—kinds of 81
Questioning the validity of the example 167
Quibble 31, 65
—in respect of a genus 65
—in respect of a metaphor 65

Page

Quibble—
—in respect of a term 65
—three kinds of 65

Rabhasa Nandi 194
Rāghava Bhatta 358, 339 (ftn 1)
Rāghava Rāya 482 (ftn 1)
Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra 220 (ftn 5), 481

Raghunandana 527
Raghunandana Dāsa Miśra 458
Raghunātha Nāyaka 485
Raghunātha Śāstri 487
Raghunātha Śiromaṇi 405, 456 (ftn 2), 463ff, 525
—date of 465
Raghuvratin 305
Rājacūḍāmaṇi Makhin 485
Rājā Ballāla Sena 153
Rājā Bhairava Siṃha 456
Rājagṛha 349
Rājā Rāghava 480
Rājā Rāmakṛṣṇa 477
Rājā Sanātana 337
Rājaśekhara 134, 213
Rāmabhadra 459, 522
Rāmabhadra Siddhānta Vāgīśa 480
Rāmacandra Kavibhāratī 540
Rāmacandra Vidyāvāgīśa 465f
Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya Cakravarty 466f.
Rāmānuja 351
Rāmapāla 346
Rāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa 477
Rāmadeva Ciranjīva 433
Rāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa 483
Rāmarudra Vidyānidhi 327
Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Kṛṣṇarāja I or Śubhatuṅga 222
Ratnākara Śānti 335, 315f., 352
Ratnakīrti 132, 134, 335f, 336, 371
—identification of 342 (ftn. 4)
Ratnaprabhā 142, 211
—particulars about 212 (ftn. 2)
—spiritual descent of 212

Page
Ratnavajra 339f
Ravi Gupta 322
—date of 333
Reason (hetu) (see middle term) 32, 32 (ftn. 2), 108, 166, 190, 258, 284f, 290, 301, 437
—and the minor premise 503
—affirmative 288, 503
—different phases of 150f
—kinds of 288, 437
—negative 288, 503
—unproved in respect of constant accompaniment 440
—unproved in respect of invariable concomitance 440
—unproved on the part of its locus 439
—unproved on the part of the major term 440
—unproved on the part of the reason 440
—unproved with regard to its own nature 441
Reasoning (casuistry) 223, 230, 429
—form of 290
—processes of 429
—theory of 5
Reasons—
—distinguished from Anviksiki and Atmavidya 5
—theory of 5, 2
Receipt [illegible]
Reciprocal non-existence [illegible]
Recognition [illegible]
—as function of a conscious agent, the soul 112
—and common perception [illegible]
—and perception [illegible]
[illegible] 191
[illegible] 14
[illegible]
[illegible] 3
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 11

Page
Rejoinder (uttara) 32
—causing entanglement or defeat on the disputant (niggaha) 230
—by the respondent (patikamma) 234
Relation of Identity 480
Relation—
—fundamental conceptions of 233
Relative non-existence 314
Renouncing the proposition 90
Repetition 34, 88f
Resources for the accomplishment of an action 27
Respondent accused or defendant (cuditaka) 231
—three classes of [illegible]
Royal weapon [illegible]
[illegible]
Right knowledge 134, 174, 3[illegible], 3[illegible]
—objects of [illegible]
—two kinds of [illegible], 174
[illegible]
[illegible] (ftn. 3)
Rin-chen-grags 330
Rituals [illegible]
—three subdivisions of 130
[illegible]
Rock 4[illegible]
Rucidatta [illegible] (ftn. 3), 457
[illegible]
Rudra Nyāyavācaspati [illegible]
[illegible]
Rudra Vācaspati [illegible]
Rumour [illegible]
—not a separate means of knowledge [illegible]
—(a) special kind of verbal testimony [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Page
Sahaja Sarvajña . 384
Saint Tirujñana Sambandar 222
Śakābda .. 241
Śākala .. . 266
Śakrāditya .. 515
Śaktisvāmin 147
Śākyabodhi 320
Śākya hod . 343
Śākya muni 313
Salvation (see emancipation) . 359
Sāmantabhadra 182f, 333, 339
—age of . 183
—(his) Āptamīmāṃsā 184f
Sambhāṣā (see Vāda vidhi and debate) . .. 26f
—method of . 28f
Sambhāṣā-praśaṃsā (see debate-utility of) . 28f
Sambhāṣā-vidhi (see Vāda-vidhi and Ānvīkṣikī)—the principal topic of .. 27
Sambhūtivijaya .. 164 (ftn 4)
Sāmkhya . 5, 6, 10, 243, 278
—same as Upaniṣad and Vedānta .. . 244 (ftn 1)
Sāmkhya Philosophy—
—the oldest work of 295 (ftn 1)
Samprati . 222
Sam-ye .. . 323 (ftn 3)
Śaṅkara Svāmin . 302, 502 (ftn 4)
Sangha 304
Sangha-bhadra . 248 (ftn 2), 2 6
—a contemporary of Vasubandhu 267 (ftn.)
Sanghamittā .. 352
Sangharāma .. 248, 265
Sang ing . 535
Ś . 351
. . 351
i (ftn. 1), 400 (ftn
, 456 (ftn
. tc
, in .
..

Page
Śānta Rakṣita 271, 323, 327 352 517
Śāntideva 126 (ftn 2)
Śānti Sūri 197
Sapta-bhanga Naya (sevenfold paralogism, see Syādvāda) 167f
—particulars about 167 (ftn 2)
Śaraha 251
Śarngapāṇi 398
Sarva-darśana samgraha 388
Sarvajña 342
Sarvajña Deva 340f, 357
Sarvajña Mitra 322 337
Sarvajña Śrī Rakṣita 289
Sarvajña Viṣṇu 398
Sarvāstivāda 247
Sarvāstivāda sect 265
Śaśadhara 390
Śaśāṅka Narendra Gupta 340
Śa-skya monastery of Western Tibet 299 300
Śātavāhana (see Sadvāha) 251 (ftn 2) 340
Sautrāntika 135, 248
—criticised by Jayanta 150
—explanation of 248 (ftn 3)
—founder of . 248
Sautrāntikas—
—philosophical principles of 248
—sects belonging to 247
Savikalpaka (determinate perception)—
—definition of 137
Sāyana . 397
Saying too little 88
Saying too much 88
Scheme—
—for the reduction of sixteen categories into one .. 359
—of incorporation of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika 375, 382 387, 389, 393, 394
Scholarly debate . 240
School of Gaṅgeśa 391
School of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi .. 392

Page
Scripture (Āgama) . 189
—definition of 175
Seish . 268
Self-consciousness 418
Sen-dkar 337
Senses 55, 57f, 411, 417
—Ātreya's doctrine of 12
—five characteristic of knowledge corresponding to 100
—five in number 99, 100
—five objects of 100
—forms of 100
—grounds of their being five 100
—material 99
—materials of 100
—(as) modifications of touch 99, 99 (ftn 1)
—objects of 57
—processes of . 100
—sites of , 100
Sentiments 57
Separation 113
Ser-skya-wa 278
Ses-paḥi-dge gnas 275
Śes rab-ḥbyun-gnas sbas 336f
Settlement of cases—
—by a majority 230
—by an undertaking 230
—covering over with grass 230
—for the insane 230
—from recollection 230
—in presence 230
—seven rules for 230
—with the prospect of further inquiry 230
Seven categories of the Jaina philosophers 168
Sevenfold paralogism (syādvāda 185
Shāhiya Dynasty 350
Shāhjehān 479
Sha lu 270
—monastery of . 353
Shapur 20
Shifting the proposition 65
Shifting the reason 35, 36

Pag
Shifting the topic .. 35, 66f
Shi-wa htsho .. 32
Shu cheo 321, 322, 328, 329, 340
Sh' yen-tuh-cia . 251 (ftn. 2)
Siddharsi . 147 (ftn. 4)
Siddhasena Divākara 268 (ftn. 2)
alias Kṣapaṇakara 173 ff., 268 (ftn 2)
—date of 173, 505 (ftn. 9)
—first Jaina writer on systematic logic 173
—founder of Mediaeval Logic 158
—(his) Nyāyāvatāra 174
—particulars about . 173
—(a) pupil of Vṛddhavādi Sūri 173
Siddhasena Gaṇi . 182
—a contemporary of Devardhi Gaṇi Kṣamā Śramaṇa .. 182
Sign (see middle term, reason) 113, 377, 383
Signification (of a word) . 450
Signification (of letters) .. 131f.
Sikkim—
—Buddhism in 535
—monasteries in . 534f.
Śila . 335
Śilabhadra 302, 303
Śila Saṃgama . 510 (ftn. 6)
Silence . . 89
Siṃha .. 335
Siṃha Giri or Siṃha Sūri 182, 182 (ftn 3)
Siṃhavaktra , . 278
Siṃha Varman 349
Similar employment 113
Śiromaṇi—
—satirised by Yaśovijaya .. 13
Śivanātha Vidyāvācaspati . 526
Six Systems . .. 208
Six winged disputation .. 62f.
Skanda Gupta . 267f, 349
Skin 57
Smell . . 57
Sde-thaa monastery of .. 344
Soma Śarmā—
—father of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda

Page
Sophists .. 227
Soul 161, 393
—(an) abstract conception of 4
—compared to a charioteer 3
—compromise between the two ideas of .. 4
—(a) concrete substance 4
—connection with a body 57
—destiny of 3
—Deva Sūri's views of .. 204
—different from body 3, 98
—different from mind 98
—different from the senses 93
—(the) enjoyer 7
—existence of 57
—evolution in the doctrine of 2
—good work of 3
—ideas of 4
—identical with the senses 97
—individual 371
—individuality of 99
—(in the) Kathopanisad 3
—kinds of 371
—Lokāyata doctrine of 9
—marks or signs of 57
—pre-existence of 99
—(as consciousness) produced by the combination of elements 9
—qualities of 57
—(puruṣa)
—sāṁkhya doctrine of 10
—(in the) Śatapatha Brāhmana 2
—(the) seat of knowledge (cognitions) 98
—science of (Ātmavidyā) 4
—seeing 6
—supreme 371
—theory of .. 5
—two ideas regarding 4
—(in the) Upaniṣads 3
—(spirit) (in the) Vedas 2
—yoga doctrine of 11
Sound 57
—according to the Nyāya Sūtra .. 109
—artificial properties attributed to 110

Page
Sound—
—destroyed and not concealed 445
—cognised by the senses 109f
—having a beginning .. 109
—merely a manifestation of itself 109
—nature of 109
—non-eternal 109
—non-eternity of 448
—(a) product 109
—reasons for its being non-eternal 109f
—substratum of 110
—traditionary teaching of 110

Speech—
—Buddhists on 445
—canons of a sound .. 12f
—defect of 260
—excellence of 260
—(a) means of valid knowledge 444, 445
—opportune 260
Sphota (the outburst of a conglomerate sound) 131
Sphotavāda (theory of phonetic explosion)—
—Jayanta's examination of 148f
Śrī Candra 210, 211
Śrīdhara 213, 329
Śrī Harṣa 330, 335, 349, 406 (ftn. 6)
Śrī Kantha 151
Śrī Kṛṣna Nyāyālankāra 483
Śrīlabdha 248
Śrīparvata or Śrīśaila 251 (ftn. 4)
Śrīprerumātur 351
Śrī Śūnya Śrī Mitra 336
Sron-tsan gam po 352
Śrughna 124 (ftn. 1)
Śruta .. 169 (ftn. 1)
Śruta Sāgara Gaṇi .. 215
Śrutya Prāmāṇya (denial of the authority of the Veda) criticised by Jayanta .. 149f
Statement of the Conclusion .. 60
State of being the locus or the minor term .. 433
Sthavira Ratnākara .. 520

R
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Refl
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[illegible]
— with the prospect of further un-
[illegible] 230
Seven categories of the Jama pl[illegible]
[illegible]
Sevenfold para[illegible]
[illegible]

Page
[illegible]

Page
Tarka-bhāṣā—
—incorporates the Vaiśeṣika categories 381
Tarkakaumudī (a manual of logic by Laugākṣi Bhāskara) 395
Tarkāmṛta (a manual of logic by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra) 393f
Tarka Saṃgraha (a manual of logic by Annam Bhatta) 388ff
—commentaries on 390f
Tarka Śāstra—the science of diabetes 402ff
Tarkavidyā (see Vāda-vidyā and Ānvīkṣikī) 7, 8 37

Tārkika—
—(as) indispensable member of a legal assembly 38
Tārkika-rakṣā (a treatise by Varadārāja) 374ff
Tārkikas 244
—Vyāsa against . 37
Tashi lhum po . . 270
Tashiding 535

Tashi Lāmā—
—and his party 528
—departure of . 529
—his reception of the Prince of Wales . 529
—his visit to Buddha Gayā .. 529
—in Calcutta . . 529
—in India . .. 628f
—reception accorded to . 528
Taste 57
Tathāgata 125
Tattva-cintāmaṇi (the earliest work on Tarka Śāstra) .405ff.
—popularity of . .. 454

Taxila—
—antiquity of .. . 494
—as the great seat of Hindu learning and culture . . 495
—Greek regime at 494f
—mutual exchange of Hindu and Greek culture at .. . 495
—Persian conquest of.. .. 494

Page
Taxila—
—Persian influence on 494
—political history of 494
Technicality 450
Technicalities of Logic in the Mādhyamika kārika 255
Teesta Bridge 530
Temple of Pārśvanātha 324 (ftn 3)
Temple of Śāntinātha 329
Tenet or conclusion 33, 59
—four kinds of 33, 59

Terms—
—five definitions of 403
—meanings of 403
—of scientific argument . 24
Terms technical 23, 403f
—(used in the) Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads
—(used in the) Manusaṃhitā 23
—constituting the tantra-yukti 25
—(used in the) Rāmāyaṇa 23
Thān Dynasty 343 (ftn 1), 260
Thas-paḥi ḥbyun-gnas sbas 346

Theory of Condition (upādhi)—
—Vācaspati Miśra on 140

Theory of cause and effect—
—Vacaspati Miśra on 140
Theory of Impermanence (kṣaṇika vāda) 121

Theory of perception as set forth by Dignāga—
—controverted by Uddyotakara .. 126
Theory of Proof . . 268
Theras . 226, 246
Theravāda . 226
Theravādin . .. 235
Thesis (see proposition) 200, 312
—fallacies of . 290f, 312
—two kinds of ..

Things—
—kinds of 394
Third Buddhist Council .. 234
Thogs-med 265
Thon mi-sam-bhota 352

[illegible]

[illegible] 11
[illegible] 13
[illegible] 117
[illegible] 60 (fn. 2)
[illegible] 136
[illegible] 171, 181, 184
— [illegible] 162 (fn. 2)

[illegible] 11, 114, 133
[illegible] 37
[illegible] 261
— [illegible] 264

Page

Tarka-bhāṣā—
—incorporates the Vaiśeṣika categories 381
Tarkakaumudī (a manual of logic by Laugākṣi Bhāskara) 395
Tarkāmṛta (a manual of logic by Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra) 393f
Tarka Saṃgraha (a manual of logic by Annam Bhatta) 388ff
—commentaries on . 390f
Tarka Śāstra—the science of diabetes . . 402ff
Tarkavidyā (see Vāda-vidyā and Ānvīkṣikī) - 7, 8 37

Tārkika—
—(as) indispensable member of a legal assembly . 33
Tārkika-rakṣā (a treatise by Varadārāja) . .374ff
Tārkikas . 244
—Vyāsa against . . 37
Tashi lhum po 270
Tashiding 535

Tashi Lāmā—
—and his party . 528
—departure of 529
—his reception of the Prince of Wales .. 529
—his visit to Buddha Gayā .. 529
—in Calcutta . .. 529
—in India . 528f
—reception accorded to 528
Taste 57
Tathāgata . - 125
Tattva-cintāmaṇi (the earliest work on Tarka Śāstra) ..405ff
—popularity of . .. 454

Taxila—
—antiquity of . .. 494
—as the great seat of Hindu learning and culture . .. 493
—Greek regime at 494f
—mutual exchange of Hindu and Greek culture at 493
—Persian conquest of.. .. 494

Page

Taxila—
—Persian influence of 494
—political history of 494
Technicality 450
Technicalities of Logic in the Mādhyamika kārikā 255
Teesta Bridge 530
Temple of Pārśvanātha 324 (ftn 3)
Temple of Śāntināthа 329
Tenet or conclusion . 33, 59
—four kinds of . 33 59

Terms—
—five definitions of 403
—meanings of 403
—of scientific argument 24
Terms technical 23, 403f
—(used) in the) Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads
—(used in the) Manusaṃhita 23
—constituting the tantra-yukti 25
—(used in the) Rāmāyaṇa 23
Thān Dynasty 343 (ftn 1), 266
Thas-paḥi hbyuṅ gnas ẑbas 346

Theory of Condition (upādhi)—
—Vācaspati Miśra on 140

Theory of cause and effect—
—Vacaspati Miśra on 140
Theory of Impermanence (Kṣaṇika vāda) 121

Theory of perception as set forth by Dignāga—
—controverted by Uddyotakara .. 126
Theory of Proof . . 266
Theras 226, 240
Theravāda 226
Theravādin . .. 235
Thesis (see proposition) 200, 312
—fallacies of . 290f, 312
—two kinds of . .. 264

Things—
—kinds of 394
Third Buddhist Council 234
Thogs med . . 205
Thon mi-sam-bhota 332

Page

Three characteristics of the middle term—
—and the middle term in a syllogism 507f
Three Times . 106
Tilakācārya 212
Tilopā 340
Tipitakas 226
Tirhut 350
Tīrtha 276[3], 303[4], 304, 305, 308, 315
Tīrtha dialecticians 272
Tīrtha grāma 540
Tīrthakas 261, 339, 342
Tīrthankaras 158
Tīrtha system—
—doctrines of 304
—followers of 304
Tol (a Sanskrit school) 525 (ftn 1)
Tongue 57
To-to-go-mo—
—Dr Vidyābhūṣana receives an address at 540
Touch 57
Tradition . 33
Transcendent Intercourse 430
—kinds of 412f
Transcendent perception 412ff
—consequence of 181
—process of 412f
Transcendental direct valid knowledge 175, 201
—subdivisions of 201
Transcendental truth 254
Transmigration—
—belongs to the soul 101
—(the) path of 3, 57, 58
Triangular perception 418
Trilocana 358, 369 (ftn 1)
—date of . 134
—(a) writer on Vaiśeṣika philosophy 134
Trilocana the Junior 374
Trimalaya . . 303
Trividha paraḥ (see respondents)—three classes of . 29

Page

Tsin Dynasty 243 (ftn. 1)
Turuṣkas .. 350
Tutārī 386
Udayakara . 141
Udayana 155, 209 (ftn) 348, 351, 386, 396, 399
—author of the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā pariśuddhi 141
—better known as Ācārya . 142
—combats the Buddhist 142
(his) contention of the Buddhist doctrines . 146
—(his) criticism of the doctrine of apoha, kṣaṇabhaṅga, etc. 143
—(his) Kusumāñjali 143
—opposes Kalyāṇa-rakṣita and Dharmottara .. 143
—(his) victory over the Buddhists causes his death . 142
—(his) works 141
—(his) work Ātmatattva vidyā . 145f
Uddyotakara 119 (ftn.) 127 (ftn), 155, 273, 306, 348
—attacked by Abhayadeva Sūri 221 (ftn. 2)
—author of the Nyāyavārtika 123
—(his) controversy with the Buddhists 125
—criticises Dignāga . .. 129
—criticises Nāgarjuna .. 128
—(his) criticism of the Buddhist denial of the soul . .. 125
—criticism of the theory of perception as held by Dignāga 129
—date of . 123, 124
—(his) defence of the Nyāya-Sūtra and the Nyāyabhāṣya 237 (ftn 2)
—(his) definition of Inference . 130
—(his) explanation of perception.. 130
—(his) main object to write the sub-commentary 125
—(his) Nyāya theory of signification of words . .. 131
—on Dignāga's theory of perception .. 277 (ftn. 1)

Page

Uddyotakara—
—(as a) rescuer of the Nyāya 123
—residence of . 124
—(his) theory of sufferings 132f
—(his) theory of verbal knowledge 131
—various names of . 124
Udyāna (Kabul) 340, 332²
Ujjayinī .. . 301
Umāsvāti 161 (ftn 4, 5), 164
—(his) doctrine of right knowledge 169f
—(his) explanation of Naya (mood of statements) . 170f
—life of . 168f
—known as Vācaka Śramana, Nāgara-vācaka and Umāsvāti Vācakācārya 168
—(his) particulars about 168 (ftn. 3)
Umā Svāmin (same as Umāsvāti) 168 (ftn 3)
Uncertain .. 33
Uncertainty—
—Deva Sūri on 201
Unintelligible . .. 87
Union 412 414
United-inherent-inherence 412
United inherence 412, 414
Universal non-existence . 416
Universal proposition—
—discovery of .. 295 (ftn. 2)
University of Nadia (see Nadia)—
—foundation of . .. 464
University of Nālandā (see Nālandā) 271
University of Vikramaśilā (see Vikramaśilā) .. 271
Unnameable .. 53
Unproved reason .. 439
Upāṅga 160
Upaniṣads . . 134
Upendra 258
Uttara Tantra . 24 (ftn. 2)

Vācaspati Miśra 120 (ftn 3), 155, 183, 209 (ftn.), 247 (ftn. 2), 273, 292 (ftn.), 339, 348, 522

Page

Vācaspati—
—author of the Nyāya Vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā 133
—(his) condemnation of the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures 141
—criticises Dharmakīrti 136
—(his) criticism of Dharmakīrti's division of the point of defeat (Nigrahasthāna) 136
—(his) criticism of Dignāga's definition of kārya-sama (balancing the effect) 135
—(his) criticism of the Niruktakāra's 138
—(his) explanation of determinate and indeterminate perceptions. 137f
—(on the) name Pakṣila Svāmī 115 (ftn 2)
—opposes Dignāga 135
—place and time of 133
—(his) reference to the four Buddhist schools 135
—supports the Brahmanic interpretations of the Nyāya sūtra 133
—(his) theory of cause and effect 140f
—(his) theory of condition 140
—(his) theory of right and wrong knowledge . 138ff
—Trilocana, the preceptor of .. 134
—works of .. 134
Vācaspati Miśra, the junior 151, 459f.
Vaccagotta 417 (ftn. 3)
Vāda (discussion) . 51
—subject of .. . 51
Vāda-mārga (see debate-course of) 31
Vāda maryādā (see debate-limits of) . .. 31
Vāda-vidhi (see Ānvīkṣikī)—the principal topics of 27
(also see Sambhāṣā and debate) 28
Vāda-vidyā (see Tarka-vidyā) .. 7
Vādopāya (see debate-expedients of) .. . .. 30f.
Vāgīśvarkīrti 338
Vaibhāṣika 135

Page
Vaiśeṣikas 241 247
—criticised by Jayanta 150
—explanation of 247 (ftn 5)
—fundamental principal work of 247
Vaibhāṣika School of Philosophy—
—sects belonging to 246
Vaiśālī 349
Vaiśeṣika Philosophy 27 278 303
—incorporated into the Nyāya 373
—incorporates the Nyāya categories 386
Vaiśeṣika principles—
—adopted in Nyāya 402
Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine of apoha (exclusion) 132 (ftn 1)
Vajrāsana (Buddhagayā) 339, 343
Vajra varāhī 340
Valedictory description 108
Validity of knowledge 405f
—consciousness of 409
—derived from its general grounds 408
—derived through the instrument 409
—Gaṅgeśa on 409
Valid knowledge (see right knowledge) 218, 375f, 408f
—consequence of 181, 192
—Deva Sūri on 200ff
—defined by Māṇikya Nandi 189
—how derived and known . 408f
—kinds of . 189, 310, 201
—objects of . 192
—of the Buddhist condemned 375f
Vallabhācārya 374f, 386f
—founder of a Vaiṣṇava Sect . 387
Vallāla Sena 350
Vāmana 267
Vana Pāla 329
Vandin (a famous sophist) 13
Varadarāja 373ff, 399 (ftn 1)
Varāha Mihira 165, 165 (ftn 2), 173
Vararuci 334
Vardhamāna 151, 386, 406 (ftn 7), 405, 454f
Vārendra 322, 333 334 (ftn 2) 335 337
Vasanta Sena . . 322

Page
Vasubandhu 116, 266ff, 272, 348
—age of . . 116
—biography of 267
—works of .. 267
Vāsudeva 372, 406 (ftn 7), 456
Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma 405, 456 (ftn 2), 461
Vasudhara Rakaṭa .. 229
Vātāpi .. 349
Vātsīputrīya sect 135, 272
Vātsyāyana 46, 106 (ftn. 1), 155, 348
—age of 116f
—author of the Nyāya bhāṣya . 115ff.
—birthplace of .. 117
—criticises Nāgārjuna . 117f
—(his) criticism of the doctrine of momentariness . 121
—(his) criticism of the Mādhyamika doctrine of inter relation .. 117
—(his) criticism of the Mādhyamika doctrine of voidness (śūnyatā) .. 118
—(his) criticism of Nāgārjuna's logical theory of examples .. 119
—(his) criticism of the syllogism of ten parts 121f
—(his) criticism of the Yogācāra doctrine of Vijñāna (knowledge) 120
—(his) definition of perception criticised by Dignāga .. 278
—designated as Drāmila 117
—followed Nāgārjuna and the Laṅkāvatāra .. 118
—(his) idea of emancipation 122
—(his) idea of God .. 122
—on mind as a sense-organ 280 (ftn 1)
—(his) other name Pakṣila Svāmin 115
—precede's Dignāga and Vasubandhu .. 116
—(his) references to previous commentators . 115 (ftn 3)
—(in) Uddyotakara's Nyāya Vārttika .. . 115 (ftn. 1)
Vaṭṭagāmaṇi .. . 226
Vedānta 4
Vedāntins 273

Veda .. 1
—(its) authority established 107
—faultless .. 107
—faulty . 107
—refers to unbelievers 9
—(its) reliability established 108
—subject-matter of 2
—two main divisions of 108
Vedic speech—
—classification of 108
Vengi . 273 (ftn 1), 274
Verbal knowledge (śabda) 444 470ff
—cause of 473ff
—different from perception and inference 470f
—different from recollection 471
—Mīmāṁsakas on .. 473f.
—Naiyāyikas on 471
—process of 444, 471
—Vaiśeṣikas on 471
Verbal Naya (śabda) 171
—three kinds of 171
Verbal suffix . . 453
Verbal testimony (Āgama śabda) 175 192, 444
—Deva Suri on 201
—Dignāga on 287f
—distinct from inference 95 446
—distinct from perception 446
—included in inference according to the Vaiśeṣikas . 446
—included in perception according to the Buddhists . 445
—instrumental causes of 44
—kinds of . . 370
—(a) mere inference . 94f
—Mīmāṁsakas on .. 408
—special cause of . 409
Vidyādhara Ācārya Aśoka . 334
Vidyānanda .. 183 (ftn. 2)
—age of .. . 187
—identical with Pātrakeśari 187, 188 (ftn. 1)
—works of 187
Vidyānivāsa .. . 392
Vidyāpati 456, 522
Vidyāvācaspati 476 (ftn 1)
Vijaya Sena Sūri 212, 350, 521
Vijaya Siṁha 216
Vijñāna-vāda 135
—in Tibetan 245 (ftn 1)
Vijñāna-vādins or yogācāras 146
Vikramāditya 173 222, 267
Vikrama Saṁvat or Śaka era 329 (ftn 3)
Vikrama Śilā 336, 342, 352
—decay of 525
—Mahomedan attacks on 520 (ftn 2)
—situation of . 519 (ftn 6)
—university of 337, 338, 340, 341, 342 343, 345 350, 519f

Vikramaśilā University—
—destruction of 520
—gate-keepers of 520
—head of 519
—scholars of . 520
Vimalacandra 320
Vinaya Vijaya 216
Vindhyavāsin 211
Vinita Deva 320f
Viṣṇu Svāmin 374
Viśvanātha 151
Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana . 392
Viśvanātha Siddhānta-pañcānana 479f
Viśveśvara Jyotiṣārṇava 527

Vyāsa—
—signifies a compiler .. . 50
Vyomācārya . 386

Western Calukya Dynasty 273 (ftn 1)
Wheel of reasons (see table of nine reasons) . 285 298
—analysis of 298
Whole 105, 333
—beyond its parts 105
Word .. 33, 56, 334
—compound (see compound) 452
—conventional . .. 451
—connotes the genus .. . 111
—denotes the individual . 111
—does it denote 'apoha' (exclusion) 132

Page

Word—
—etymological 451
—etymological conventional 451
—etymologo-conventional 451
—four kinds of 33
—how it signifies a thing 131
—presents the form 111
—signification of 111
—species of 451
—two kinds of 56 110f
Words and their meanings 106f
—Jayanta on 147f
—their connection conventional 107
—their connection natural 106
Wrangler 63
Wrangling 62, 63
Wrangling and Cavil—
—use of 104
Wrong knowledge or error 138f
—nature of 138f

Yādava Dynasty 386
Yajñapati 406 (ftn 7)
Yama (the lord of death) 2
Yamāri 343f
Yaśovijaya Gaṇi 217
—his references to other philosophers 219

Page

Yaśovijaya—
—his references to works on philosophy 219
—his reviews of other writers 218
—life of 217
—particulars about 218 (ftn 3)
—spiritual descent of 217 (ftn 2)
—works of 218f
Yośodharma Deva 173
Ye-śes-dpal-bzaṅ po 342
Yoga 5, 6, 11, 274 (ftn 3)
Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra 274 (ftn 3)
Yogācāra Buddhists 138
Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins 148, 249, 278
—criticised by Jayanta 150
—explanation of 249 (ftn 1)
—founds of 249
—in China, Tibet and Nepal 249 (ftn 1)
Yogācāra-darśana 245
Yogācāra doctrine of Vijñāna (knowledge)—
—criticised by Vātsyāyana 124f
Yogins 279

Za hor 323
Zarmana Chegos 352
Zla-wa-dge bsñen 333f

INDEX OF BOOKS.

Page

Abhede dhikkāra 459
Abhidharma jñāna prasthāna-śāstra . . 242
Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā 242 (ftn 2), 247
Abhidhamma Piṭaka 226, 227 (ftn 2), 242, 334
Abhidhammatthasangaha 227 (ftn 2)
Abhidhāna Cintāmaṇi 205
Abhidharmakośa 127 (ftn)
Abhidharma-vibhāṣā 242[1]
Abhisamayālankāra kārikā 262[1], 262 (ftn 5)
Ācārānga Sūtra 165
Ācārya mata rahasya vicāra . 479
Adhikaraṇa Candrikā .. 484
(*) Ādi kriyā viveka . 467
Ādipurāṇa 170 183
Advaitaratnakoṣa . 108 (ftn 2)
Ain-i Akbari 201 (ftn. 1)
Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 23, 23 (ftn 6)
Akalanka stotra . 185
Akbar . 221 (ftn 1)
Ākhyānamaṇikośa . 210
Ākhyātavāda . 465, 482
Ālambana-parīkṣā . 300, 301, 322
Ālambana-parīkṣā-ṭīkā . 321[3]
Ālambana parīkṣā-vṛtti . 301
Ālambana pratyayadhyāna-śāstra 300 (ftn 3)
Ālambana Pratyayadhyāna Vyākhyā .. . 303
Alankāra pariskāra 479
Alankāra sāra sthiti .. . 477
Āloka 458, 460, 465, 467, 468, 478
Amarakoṣa .. 7 (ftn 1)
Ānanda lahari-tarī .. 478, 479
Ānanda-vardhana .. .. 45[1]
Ancient Geography of India 514 (ftn. 2, 4)

Page

Ancient India by Rapson 494 (ftn 1)
Ancient Indian Education 525 (ftn 1)
Ancient Indian Logic 348 (ftn 1)
Anekānta-jaya patākā 221 (ftn 2)
Anekānta jaya patākā-ṭīkā 209 (ftn. 2)
Anekārtha samgraha 205
Anguttaranikāya III 21 (ftn 2), 26 (ftn 1) 227 (ftn 2)
Antarvyāpti 343 (ftn 3)
Anumāna cintāmani-dīdhiti ṭīkā 482
Anumāna dīdhiti 408 (ftn 2)
Anumāna-dīdhiti prasāriṇī 468
Anumāna dīdhiti-viveka 468
Anumāna khaṇḍa-ṭīkā 460, 522
Anumānaloka-prasāriṇī 468
Anumāna Sutta 229
Anumiti-parāmarśa vāda 481
Anyāpoha-vicāra kārikā 143, 150, 329
Apaśabda-khaṇḍana . 466
Apoha-nāma prakaraṇa 143, 150, 330
Apoha-siddhi 133 (ftn 4), 134, 339 (ftn. 3), 345, 371
Āpta mīmāmsā 18[1], 184, 185, 186
Āpta-mīmāmsālankāra 166
Āpta-parīkṣā . 187
Archæological Discoveries at Taxila 493 (ftn. 3)
Archæological Survey of Western India 49 (ftn 2), 496 (ftn 1), 515 (ftn 5)
Arda-Viraf-Nāma .. 20 (ftn. 4)
Arabic Literature 511 (ftn 3), 512 (ftn. 2)
Aristotle by Grote 505 (ftn. 1), 510 (ftn. 3, 4,) 511 (ftn. 4)
Arrian . 496 (ftn. 1)
Artha Śāstra . 24, 117
Ārya-koṣa . 323 (ftn 7)
Ārya Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva Suhṛllekha .. 251 (ftn. 2)

Page

Ārya-Tārā antarbali vidhi 331 (ftn 1)
Aśoka by V. A. Smith 236 (ftn 1)
Aṣṭasāhasrī 145, 197
Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā 242 (ftn 2)
Aṣṭasāhasrī viṣamapada tātparyaṭīkā 145 (ftn 3)
Aṣṭasāhasrī vivaraṇa 441
Aṣṭasāhasrī vṛtti 214
Aṣṭaśatī 145 (ftn 2)
Atharva veda Saṃhitā 2 (ftn. 2)
Ātmakhyāti 123 (ftn 6)
Ātma tattva viveka 142, 143, 369, 465
Ātma tattva viveka dīdhiti ṭīkā 463
Ātma tattva viveka kalpalatā 452
Avacchedakatva nirukti 465
Āvaśyaka laghu vṛtti 212
Āvaśyaka niryukti 181
Āvaśyaka sūtra 165, 210
Avayavi nirākaraṇa 333 (ftn 1)
Āyurdaya bhāvanī 467
Āyurveda saṃhitā 27

Bālāvatāra-tarka 337
Bauddha-dhikkāra 143
Bauddha dhikkāra-ṭīkā 450
Bauddha-dhikkāra rahasya 467
Bauddha-dhikkāra-śiromaṇi 465
B B R A S (Journal) 408 (ftn 6)
Bodā-vṛtti 303
Berlin Catalogue by Weber 358 (ftn 3)
Bhagavad gītā 4 (ftn 2)
Bhāgavata-purāṇa 23 (ftn 4, 6)
Bhagavatī-sūtra 161, 161 (ftn 4)
Bhāmatī 127 (ftn)
Bhāmatī ṭīkā 134
Bhartṛhari and Kumārila by K. B. Pāthak 186 (ftn 3), 188 (ftn 2, 3, 7)
Bhāṣāpariccheda 392f., 392 (ftn 1), 480 (ftn 1)
Bhāṣāratnam 468 (ftn 2)
Bhāskarodaya 39
Bhāskarodaya ṭīkā 393
Bhāṣya (Patañjali's) 41 (ftn 5)
,, (Vātsyāyana's) 55

Page

Bhāṣya-vṛtti 234
[illegible] 443
Bhāvārthadīpikā 174
Bhāvavilāsa 477
Bheda prakāśa 428 (ftn. 2) 434
Bheda ratna prakāśa 452
Bhikṣu Sūtra 263
Bhrama pramathana yukti hetu siddhi 251
[illegible] 477
Bhūṣaṇa Sāra 230 (ftn 6)

Bilingual Index of Nyāya-bindu, introduction 307 (ftn 4), 302 (ftn 2)
Bis wa hjug paḥi-tog ge 337
Bkaḥ hgyur 11 (ftn. 3) 352, 530

Bodha siddhi 141
Bodhicaryāvatāra ṭīkā 126 (ftn. 2)
Bodhisattva caryā nirdeśa 243, 262
Brahmajāla sutta 20, 21 (ftn. 4), 227 (ftn 4)

Brāhmaṇa Sarvasva 524
Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 155 (ftn. 1), 495 (ftn 7)

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 3 (ftn 3)
Bṛhad jñāna kośa 324 (ftn. 3)

Brief notes on the modern Nyāya system of Philosophy by MM Mahescandra Nyāyaratna 403 (ftn 1)

Bstan-hgyur, Bstod pa 253 (ftn)
Bdes pahi sprin-byig 215 (ftn 1)
Bstan-hgyur 7 (ftn 7), 8 (ftn 7),
54 (ftn 5), 55 (ftn 1), 241 (ftn 1),
249 (ftn 4), 251 (ftn 2), 256,
256 (ftn 2), 257, 262 (ftn 5), 270,
276 (ftn 1), 289 (ftn 1) 299^2,
300^2, 301 (ftn 1), 301^2 306 (ftn
7), 307 (ftn 3, 4), 308 (ftn 1),
309 (ftn 1, 2) 310 (ftn 3), 318
(ftn 2, 3), 319 (ftn 1, 2, 3), 320
321^4, 322^2 323^2, 324^1, 325^6, 328
(ftn 4), 329^4, 330^4 331^2 332,
336^1, 337^1, 337 (ftn 3), 338 340^2,

Page

341², 342, 341 (ftn 6), 343⁴, 343 (ftn. 2), 344², 345², 346, 352, 530, 538²

Buddha by Rockhill 246 (ftn. 2), 322 (ftn 7)

Buddha Deva 495 (ftn 3), 496 (ftn 1)

Buddhism by Schlagintweit 249 (ftn 1, 5)

„ by Wassilief 248 (ftn 6)

Buddhist India by Rhys Davids 242 (ftn 4), 248 (ftn 3)

Buddhist Records by Beal 124 (ftn 7), 173 (ftn 5), 241 (ftn. 1), 243 (ftn 3), 247 (ftn. 1), 248, (ftn 2 7, 8), 249 (ftn. 4), 251 (ftn. 1), (261 (ftn. 2), 265 (ftn. 2, 7), 266 (ftn 1), 274 (ftn. 3), 302 (ftn 5), 303 (ftn 1), 496 (ftn 1), 314 (ftn. 6)

Buddhi-vāda . 482

Caitanya Candrāmṛta 484

Caitanya Caritāmṛta . 462 (ftn 1)

Candrāloka . 455

Cāndra Vyākaraṇa 334 (ftn. 3), 335

Can-shwo (or here) tso-li-sun 302 (ftn. 1)²

Caraka Saṃhitā 9 (ftn 4), 20, 26 (ftn 5), 31 (ftn 3)⁴, 42 (ftn 2), 51⁴, 221, 499 (ftn 1), 500⁴, 501², 512

Catalogue by Eggeling 392 (ftn. 3)

C Tripitaka

2), 243 .

; (I

301

3,

Page

Chandonuśāsana vṛtti 205

Chandoratnākara 343 (ftn 1)

Chinese Tripitaka 26, 243

Chos-byun 305 (ftn 1), 517

Chos-dan chos can gtan la-dwal-pa 337

Cintāmaṇi 404

Citradvaita siddhi 394

Cittarūpa 438

Commentary on the Ṛgveda by Sāyana 45 (ftn 3)

Comparative studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity by B N Seal 44 (ftn 3)

Cūrṇika of Nandī sūtra 161 (ftn 2)

Darśana sara 185

Dānakāṇḍa . 392

Dānakhanda 477

Darpaṇa 458

Darśana siddhi (or Samyaktva prakaraṇa) 206

Daśabhūmīśvara 242 (ftn 3)

Daśapadārtha 503

Daśa-śruta-skandha-sūtra 165

Daśa-vaikālika-niryukti 164, 165⁴

Daśa-vaikālika niryukti-ṭīkā 208 (ftn 4)

Daśa-vaikālika-sūtra .. 164

Dāyabhāga ṭīkā 484

De Interpretatione 512

De-kho na ñid- bsdus - pahi - dkah - hgrel .. . 328

De-kho-no ñid- bsdus pahi Tshig-?wi byas pa . 324

adra and his Nyāyāvatāra .. 211 (ftn. 1)

stha-tattva . 153

hātmya 522

ipurāṇa . 145 (ftn. 4)

amma saṅgaṇī 227 (ftn. 2)

ādharma-viniścaya . 337

arma-dhātu stava (ftn.)

ama tn. 2)

tn. 6)

(ftn. 3)

Page

Dialogue of the Buddha by Rhys Davids . 9 (ftn 5)
Dictionary of Religion 254 (ftn 2)
Didhīti 478², 481
Dīdhiti-rahasya 467
Dīdhiti-ṭīkā 469 481
Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse by Weber . 197 (ftn 3, 4)
Digambara Pattāvalī 168 (ftn 3)
Dīgha Nikāya 227 (ftn 2), 500 (ftn 1)
Dinakarya-prakāśa tippanī 483
Dīpikā 388
Ditthivās 161 (ftn. 3)
Ḏmigs pa-btiag pa 301
Ḏmigs pa brtag-paḥi ḫgrel bśad 321
Ḏpag bsam ljon-bzan 274 (ftn 1) 320 (ftn 4), 322 (ftn 3), 323 (ftn 2), 327 (ftn 1), 328 (ftn 3), 329 (ftn 1), 333 (ftn 5), 335 (ftn 1), 336 (ftn 2), 338 (ftn 3), 340 (ftn 2, 4), 341 (ftn 2), 342 (ftn 1, 3, 5, 6), 344 (ftn 2), 348 (ftn 1), 353 (ftn 1)
Dravya-bhāṣya-ṭīkā (or Padārtha tattvanirṇaya) 470
Dravya-kiraṇāvali-prakāśa 455
Dravya-padārtha . 455
Dravya parīkṣā 407 (ftn)
Dravya sāra-saṃgraha 481
Dṛṣṭivāda 161, 161 (ftn 3)
Durgotsava tattva 476 (ftn 1)
uṣ brum brtag-pa 301
aita-nirṇaya 460, 461
śāraya mahākāvya . 205
vātriṃśat-dvātriṃśikā 174
vātriṃśikā 212
vyardha śatikā 118 (ftn 3)
wan-phyug ḇig-paḥi-tshig ḇkur-yas pa 329

y History of India by Smith 221 1), 267 (ftn 3), 301 (ftn. 3), 349 (ftn 1) 496 (ftn. 1)
History of the Dekkan by R. Bhandarkar 156 (ftn 4), 231 (ftn. 2)

Page

Edicts of Aśoka . 49 (ftn 2)
Eka ṣaṣṭhyalaṅkāra prakāśa 471
Encyclopædia Britannica 511 (ftn 5), 512 (ftn 1, 3 4)
Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics 227 (ftn. 1)
Epigraphia Indica 221 (ftn 1)
Explanation of the Can lun 302 (ftn 1)

Fa-hian 514 (ftn 4)
Fa hian and Sungyun by Beal 248 (ftn 3)
Fān pien-sin lun . . 239
Filosofia Indiana 26 (ftn 4), 119 (ftn)

Gacchotpatti prakaraṇa 208 (ftn 4)
Gadādhari pañcavāda 487
Gaṇapātha 41 (ftn 5)
Gaṇḍa vyūha 242 (ftn 3)
Gandhahasti mahābhāṣya . 152
Gāthāsāhasrī 208 (ftn 1, 4)
Gaurī digambara prahasana . 459
Gautama dharma sūtra 7 (ftn 3), 8 (ftn 4) 48 (ftn 4)
Gautama sūtra-vṛtti . 392
Geschichte des Buddhismus by Schiefner 246 (ftn 2), 248 (ftn 5 7 8), 249 (ftn 4), 251 (ftn 4, 5), 252 (ftn 2, 4), 261 (ftn 3), 265 (ftn 4), 274 (ftn 1), 274 (ftn. 3), 303 (ftn 3), 307 (ftn 1), 319 (ftn 4), 320 (ftn 1, 2, 4), 322 (ftn 3), 328 (ftn 3), 329 (ftn 1), 333 (ftn 5), 336 (ftn 2), 337 (ftn 1), 338 (ftn 2, 3), 339 (ftn 7), 340 (ftn 2, 9), 341 (ftn 2), 342 (ftn 5, 6), 343 (ftn 4), 344 (ftn 2, 3), 348 (ftn 1), 514 (ftn. 3), 517 (ftn 2), 519 (ftn 2), 520 (ftn 2)

Gītā . 522
Gīta Govinda . 522, 524
Gbe bam-lklag paḥl thabs .. 241
Gopāla-līlāmṛta . .. 484
Grimm's Phonetic Law of the Indo-European Languages 1 (ftn. 1)

Page

G̱sl̥ase-la-ḫ̥stag-paḫi-tshig bḫur-byas pa .. 329
G̱shan-sel wa 330
G̱tan-Tshigs kyi-de-kho-na ñid-ḫ̥stan pa .. 337
G̱tan-tshigs kyi ḫkhor lo-gtan-la-dwab-pa 299
G̱tan tshigs-kyi thigs pa 318
G̱tan tshigs-kyi thigs pa ugya cher ḫgrel wa . 321
G̱tan tshigs thigs-paḫi-ḫgrel wa 332
Guide to Taxila by Marshall 494 (ftn 2)
Guna-didhiti-vivṛti 478
Guṇa rahasya 469
Guna Śiromaṇi prakaśa 467
Guna-vivṛti-viveka 468
Gurugītā . 153
Gurvāvalī Sūtra 164 (ftn 4)
Gyen-min gshiḫ-sin lḫi lun 300

Harṣā-carita . 123 (ftn 4)
Hastābala 250
Hayaśirṣa-Pañcarātra 153 (ftn 3)
Ḫbrel-pa ḫṛtag paḫi-rgya cher-leś ad-pa .. 321
Ḫbrel-pa ḫṛtag paḫi-rges su-ḫeran-wa . . 345
Ḫbrel-pa grub-pa . 345
Ḫbrel-wa ḫṛtag pa .. 319
Ḫbrel wa-ḫṛtag-paḫi ḫgrel wa 319
Hetu-cakra 300 (ftn. 1)^{2}
Hetu-cakra-hamaru . 299 (ftn. 1)
Hetu-dvāra-śāstra . 299 (ftn. 1)
Hetu-vidyā nyāya-praveśa śastra . 302
Hetu vindu . 321, 332
Hetu vindu ṭikā . 321
Hetu vindu-vivarana . 318, 332
Hetu-tattva-upadeśa .. . 337
Hhien-yāñ Stan-ciāo-ben . 266
Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan 262 (ftn 3), 265 (ftn. 1), 267 (ftn 5), 289 (ftn 1), 302 (ftn. 1), 505 (ftn 2)
Historical Record of the Jainas 199 (ftn 1), 200 (ftn. 2)
History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature by Max Muller 22 (ftn 2) 25 (ftn 2)

History of Indian Literature by Weber 10 (ftn 5), 48 (ftn 4), 498 (ftn 5)

History of Logic by Dr Robert Adamson 52 (ftn 1)
History of Mithilā during the pre-Moghal period 521 (ftn 1)
History of Navya Nyāya in Bengal and Mithilā by M Chakravarty 454 (ftn 1), 455 (ftn 1)
History of Navya Nyāya and Smṛti 521 (ftn 1)
History of Sanskrit Literature by Macdonell 1 (ftn. 1), 10 (ftn 2), 380 (ftn 4)

History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic 26 (ftn 3) 357 (ftn. 3)
Hṛg-gton pha-rot-grub-pa 330
Hwenthsang's Life by Beal 251 (ftn 4)

Illustration of the Literature and religion of the Buddhists 242 (ftn 3)
Imperial Gazeteer of India 523 (ftn 1)
Indian Antiquary 116 (ftn. 4), 198 (ftn. 3), 199 (ftn. 1), 200 (ftn 1, 2), 206 (ftn 1), 209 (ftn. 3) 214 (ftn 3), 267 (ftn 3)^{2}, 322 (ftn 6), 335 (ftn. 2), 406 (ftn 0), 505 (ftn 3)
Indian Logic—Medieval school by Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa 406 (ftn 5)
Indian Paṇḍits in the Land of Snow 517 (ftn. 3), 519 (ftn
Indian Thought 403 (ftn
Indo-Aryans 518 (ftn 2), 523 (ftn.
Inscription of Rudradamana 49 (ftn. 2)
Introduction à l'Étude des Traites Medicaux Sanskrites 252 (ftn 6)

Introduction to the Kūṭadabba-Sutta by Rhys Davids 9 (ftn. 5)
Introduction to the Pañca-siddhāntikā .. .. 174 (ftn 1)

Page

Dialogue of the Buddha by Rhys Davids 9 (ftn 5)
Dictionary of Religion 234 (ftn 2)
Didhiti 475, 481
Didhiti-rahasya 467
Didhiti-ṭīkā 469, 481
Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse by Weber 197 (ftn 3, 4)
Digambara Paṭṭāvalī 108 (ftn 3)
Digha Nikāya 227 (ftn 2), 509 (ftn 1)
Dinakarya-prakāśa ṭippanī 453
Dīpikā 358
Diṭṭhivāda 161 (ftn 3)
Dmigs pa-brtag-pa 301
Dmigs pa brtag-pahi hgrel bśad 321
Dpag bsam ljon bzaṅ 274 (ftn 1), 320 (ftn 4), 322 (ftn 3), 323 (ftn 2), 327 (ftn 1), 328 (ftn 3), 329 (ftn 1), 333 (ftn 1), 333 (ftn 1), 330 (ftn 2), 334 (ftn 3), 340 (ftn 2, 4), 341 (ftn 2), 342 (ftn 1, 3, 5, 6), 344 (ftn 2), 345 (ftn 1), 353 (ftn 1)
Dravya-bhāṣya-ṭīkā (or Padārtha tattvanirṇaya) 470
Dravya-kiraṇāvalī prakāśa 453
Dravya-padārtha 455
Dravya-parīkṣā 477 (ftn)
Dravya-sāra-saṃgraha 461
[illegible] 451, 461 (ftn 3)
[illegible] 474 (ftn 1)
[illegible] 301
[illegible] 459, 461
[illegible] 2
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Early History of I[illegible]
[illegible]

Early His[illegible]
[illegible]

Edicts of Aśoka 49 (ftn 2)
Eka-ṣaṣṭhy-alaṅkāra prakāśa .. 47
Encyclopædia Britannica 511 (ftn 3), 512 (ftn 1, 3, 4)
Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics 227 (ftn 1)
Epigraphia Indica 221 (ftn 1)
Explanation of the Can lun 302 (ftn 1)

Fa hian 314 (ftn 6)
Fa hian and Sung yun by Beal 244 (ftn 3)
Fān pien-sun lun .. 2
Filosofia Indiana 26 (ftn 4), 119 (ftn)

Gacchotpatti prakaraṇa 204 (ftn 4)
Gadādhari pañcavāda . 457
Gaṇapāṭha 41 (ftn 5)
Gaṇḍa-vyūha 242 (ftn 3)
Gandhahasti mahābhāṣya , 152
Gāthāsahasrī 206 (ftn 1, 4)
Gaurī digambara prahasana 461
Gautama dharma-sūtra 7 (ftn 3), 8 (ftn 1), 44 (ftn 4)
Gautama sūtra-vṛtti 372
Geschichte des Buddhismus by Schiefner 246 (ftn 2), 249 (ftn 5, 7, 8), 249 (ftn 4), 251 (ftn 4, 5), 252 (ftn 2, 4), 261 (ftn 3), 262 (ftn 4), 274 (ftn 1), 276 (ftn 1), 301 (ftn 3), 307 (ftn 1), 314 (ftn 4)

Page
Kāvyavilāsa 483
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍādhāra 522
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya 406 (ftn 6), 459
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya-dīdhiti 465
Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa prakāśa 455
Khaṇḍana khaṇḍoddhara 460
Kharatara gaccha pattāvalī 164 (ftn 1), 208 (ftn 4)
Khorda Avestā 20
Khuddaka Nikāya 229
Kiraṇāvalī 141 478
Kiraṇāvalī-bhāskara 381
Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa 455
Kiraṇāvalī prakāśa dīdhiti 465
Kiraṇāvalī prakāśa parīkṣā 457
Kiraṇāvalī prakāśa rahasya 467
Kirātārjunīya 380
Klon-rdol gsuṅ-hbum 517 (ftn 3), 520 (ftn 1)
Kosakāraka Śāstra 248
Kriyāratna samuccaya 214
Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi 133 (ftn 4), 134, 143, 150, 330, 331, 339 (ftn 3, 6)
Kṣaṇabhaṅga siddhi vyākhyā 331
Kusumāñjali 17, 141 143 155 (ftn 3), 373 (ftn 1), 462
Kusumāñjali kārikā-vyākhyā 465
Kusumāñjali prakāśa 457
Kusumāñjali prakāśa-parīkṣā 457

Laghīyastraya 185, 194
Laghu dīpikā 374, 380
Laghuvṛtti 214 (ftn 1)
(The) Logic of the Arabians 510 (ftn 5)
Lakṣaṇāratī 380
Lakṣaṇamālā 378 (ftn 1)
Lakṣmīdhara .. 477
Lalitavistara 242 (ftn 3), 243 (ftn 1)
Lamaism by Waddell 271 (ftn 1), 323 (ftn 3), 327 (ftn 1), 520
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 110^2, 118 (ftn. 3), 121, 121 (ftn. 2), 242 (ftn 3), 243 (ftn 3), 249, 249 (ftn $3)^2$
Le Buddhisme d'aprés les Sources Bramaniques 308 (ftn. 7), 30 (ftn 3)
Lecture on the Story of Hemacandra by Peterson (in the Bombay Gazette Aug 29, 1895) 205 (ftn 1)
Līlāvatī-prakāśa 455
Līlāvatī viveka 455
Lhan-cig dmigs pa nes pa 136
Life of Buddha by Rockhill 11 (ftn 3)
List of Antiquities in Madras by Sewell 251 (ftn 3), 273 (ftn 1)
Logic of nine reasons and fourteen fallacies 300 (ftn 1)
Loka prakāśa 216 (ftn 1)

Mādhava-campu 484
Madhyama hṛdayakārikā 250
Mādhyamika kārikā 250
Mādhyamika philosophy 334
Madhyama pratītya samutpāda 250
Mādhyamika Sūtra 110^2 118 (ftn 3)
Mādhyamikāvatāra ṭīkā 250
Mādhyamika vṛtti 120 (ftn 2) 250
Madhyāntavibhāga Śāstra 262 (ftn 4)
Mahābhārata 7 (ftn 5, 9), 8 (ftn), 12 (ftn 1), 13 (ftn 1) 16 (ftn 2) 18 (ftn 1), 20, 23 (ftn 4 7, 8, 10 11 12, 13) 42 (ftn 2), 71 114 (ftn 1), 244 (ftn 1), 407 521
Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali 129 (ftn 3)
Mahāpadāna Suttanta 300 (ftn 1)
Mahāsamaya Sūtra 249
Mahāvagga 49
Mahāvaṃsa 225 (ftn 2), 226 (ftn. 1, 4), 246 (ftn 2) 248 (ft
Mahāvastu 26 (ft
Mahāvyutpatti 7 (ftn 7), 11 (ftn. 1), 25 (ftn 1), 40 (ftn 3), 43 (ftn 2), 47 (ftn 1), 54 (ftn 2) 55 (ftn. 1)
Mahāyānābhidharma - saṃyukta saṅgīti śāstra 265
Mahāyāna samparigraha-śāstra .. 265
Majjhima Nikāya 229 (ftn. 1) 239 (ftn. 1)

Makaranda .. 469
Mālatīmādhava 251 (ftn 4), 522

Page

Introduction to Ṣaddarśana Samuccaya 210 (ftn 1)
Introduction to the Sragdharā-stotra 252 (ftn 6)
Iśvarabhanga kārikā 143, 150, 329
I tsing 241 (ftn 2), 247 (ftn 1, 2), 275 (ftn 2), 289 (ftn 1), 299 (ftn 1), 300 (ftn 3), 301 (ftn 2), 302 (ftn 5), 303 (ftn 2) 306 (ftn 2, 5), 320 (ftn 5), 335 (ftn 3), 515 (ftn 3)
Jaiminīya Nyāya mālā vistara 397
Jaina Inscription 221 (ftn 1)
Jaina Logic by Dr Vidyābhūṣana 331 (ftn 5)
Jaina Sthānānga Sūtra . 51
Jainistic Notices 210 (ftn 4) 211 (ftn 1)
Jalada 457
Jambudvīpa Samāsa 169 (ftn)
Jātakas 495 (ftn 3), 496 (ftn 1)
Journal Asiatique 26 (ftn 3), 499 (ftn 1)
Journal of the American Oriental Society 50 (ftn 2), 116 (ftn 1) 120 (ftn 3), 201 (ftn 4)
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 232 (ftn 1) 241 (ftn 1), 249 (ftn 6), 253 (ftn), 262 (ftn 1), 272 (ftn 1) 323 (ftn 3), 324 (ftn 2), 334 (ftn 3), 342 (ftn 2) 343 (ftn 1) 348 (ftn 1), 407 (ftn 1) 454 (ftn 1) 480 (ftn 1), 481 (ftn 2)
J B B R A S 183 (ftn 3) 187 (ftn 5) 88 (ftn 1, 2, 3 7) 199 (ftn) 241 (ftn 1), 273 (ftn 7) 306 (ftn 3), 316 (ftn 1 3)
Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta 227 (ftn 2), 319 (ftn 1) 242 (ftn 1), 246 (ftn 2) 247 (ftn 5) 248 (ftn 3, 3), 249 (ftn 1 6), 253 (ftn 1 2), 324 (ftn 3) 327 (ftn 1), 337 (ftn 2), 319 (ftn 2)
Journal of the Pali Text Society 226 (ftn 4) 251 (ftn 2)
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 7 (ftn 9), 26 (ftn 1), 267 (ftn 3), 3·4 (ftn 1), 495 (ftn 1), 510 (ftn 1), 126 (ftn 2), 225 (ftn 2), 220 (ftn 2), 241 (ftn 1, 2), 242 (ftn 2 (243 (ftn. 3), 246 (ftn. 2) 267 (ftn), 267 (ftn 2), 515 (f
J A S G B I . 497 (f
J R S B 18 (ftn 3), 19 (f
Jyotiṣa sāra sangraha ..
Jyotiṣa tattva . ..

Kādambarī kathā sāra 147 (f
Kalpa Sūtra 159 (ftn 1), 164 (ftn 1), 165, 172 (f
Kalpataru ..
Kalyānakānḍa 342 ft
Kamala śila tarka . 324 (ft
Kāmandakīya Nītisāra 23 (ftn
Kāma Śastra
Kāminī kāma kautuka
Kanādarahasya muktā hāra ..
Kanāda Sūtra
Kangyur
Kankhā vitaraṇī 232 (ftn
Kaṇṭakoddhāra ..
Kārakadyartha nirnayatikā
Kāraka vāda ..
Kāraka vivarana ..
Karaka vyūha
Kārikās
Kārya kārana bhāva-siddhi
Kāśika-vṛtti
Kathākoṣa .. 148 (ftn
Kathānirṇaya ..
Kathāvatthu 235 (ftn 1), 233 (ftn
Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa 234 (ftn
Kauśika Sūtra of the Atharva veda . 10 (ftn
Kathopaniṣad 3 (ftn. 4), 23, 23 (ftn
Kautilya . 23 (ftn
Kāvyānuśāsana vṛtti ..
Kāvya prakāśa rahasya
Kāvya-prakāśa saṅketa 207 (ftn
Kāvya-prakāśa-tilaka

Page
Kāvyavilāsa 483
Khaṇḍanakhandādhāra 522
Khaṇḍanakhandakhādya 406 (ftn 6), 439
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya-dīdhiti 465
Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa prakāśa 455
Khaṇḍana khaṇḍoddhara 460
Kharatara-gaccha paṭṭāvalī 164 (ftn 1), 208 (ftn 4)
Khorda Avestā 20
Khuddaka Nikāya . 229
Kiraṇāvalī 141, 478
Kiraṇāvalī bhāskara 381
Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa 455
Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa dīdhiti 465
Kiraṇāvalī prakāśa parīkṣā 457
Kiraṇāvalī prakāśa rahasya 467
Kirātārjunīya 380
Klon rdol gsun bbum 517 (ftn 3) 720 (ftn 1)
Kosakāraka Śāstra 248
Kriyāratna samuccaya 214
Kṣaṇabhaṅga siddhi 133 (ftn 4), 134, 143, 150, 330, 331, 339 (ftn 3, 6)
Kṣaṇabhaṅga siddhi-vyākhyā 331
Kusumāñjali 17, 141 143, 155 (ftn 3), 373 (ftn 1), 462
Kusumāñjali kārikā-vyākhyā 465
Kusumāñjali prakāśa 457
Kusumāñjali prakāśa-parīkṣā 457

Laghīyastraya 185 194
Laghu dīpikā . 374, 380
Laghuvṛtti . 214 (ftn 1)
(The) Logic of the Arabians 510 (ftn 5)
Lakṣaṇāratī 356
Lakṣaṇamālā . 378 (ftn 1)
Lakṣmīdhara . 477
Lalitavistara 242 (ftn 3), 243 (ftn 1)
Lamaism by Waddell 271 (ftn 1), 323 (ftn 3), 327 (ftn 1), 320
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 116ᵈ, 118 (ftn 3), 121, 121 (ftn. 2), 242 (ftn 3), 243 (ftn. 3), 249, 249 (ftn 3)ᵉ
Le Buddhisme d apres les Sources Brahmaniques 300 (ftn. 7), 30 (ftn 4,
Lecture on the Story of Hemacandra by Peterson (in the Bombay Gazette, Aug 29, 1895) 205 (ftn 1)
Līlāvatī prakāśa 455
Līlāvatī viveka 455
Lhan-cig dmigs pa nes pa 336
Life of Buddha by Rockhill 11 (ftn 3)
List of Antiquities in Madras by Sewell 251 (ftn 3), 273 (ftn 1)
Logic of nine reasons and fourteen fallacies 300 (ftn 1)
Loka prakāśa 216 (ftn 1)

Mādhava campu 483
Madhyama hṛdayakārikā 250
Mādhyamika kārikā 250
Mādhyamika philosophy 334
Madhyama pratītya samutpāda 250
Mādhyamika Sūtra 116ᵈ 118 (ftn 3)
Mādhyamikāvatāra ṭīkā 250
Mādhyamika vṛtti 126 (ftn 2) 250
Madhyāntavibhāga Śāstra 262 (ftn 4)
Mahābhārata 7 (ftn 3 9), 8 (ftn) 12 (ftn 1) 13 (ftn 1) 16 (ftn 2), 18 (ftn 1), 20, 23 (ftn 4 7, 8 10, 11, 12, 13) 42 (ftn 2), 51, 114 (ftn 1), 244 (ftn 1), 407 521
Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali 120 (ftn 3)
Mahāpadāna Suttanta 300 (ftn 1)
Mahāsamaya Sūtra 249
Mahāvagga 4
Mahāvaṃsa 225 (ftn 2) 230 (ftn. 3 4) 240 (ftn. 2), 248 (f
Mahāvastu 26 (ftn
Mahāvyutpatti 7 (ftn 7), 11 (ftn. 1), 23 (ftn 1), 40 (ftn. 3), 43 (ftn. 2), 47 (ftn 1), 54 (ftn 2), 55 (ftn. 1)
Mahāyānābhidharma - saṃyukta saṅgīti śāstra . . 263
Mahāyāna samparigraha-śāstra 263
Majjhima Nikāya 229 (ftn. 1) 239 (ftn 1)
Makaranda .. 463
Mālatīmādhava . 231 (ftn 4), 522

Page
Mallinātha's commentary on the Meghadūta 273 (ftn 5)
Maṇimekalai 387 (ftn 2)
Maṇi vyākhyā 466 (ftn. 2)
Manual of Buddhism by Hardy 225 (ftn 1)
Manusaṃhitā 7 (ftn 2, 8), 8 (ftn 1), 23 (ftn 4, 5, 9 11, 12), 36
Manyāloka ṭippanī 463, 464
Matsyapurāṇa 20, 42 (ftn 1)
Medieval School of Indian Logic 221 (ftn 1), 504 (ftn 1), 505 (ftn 4), 506 (ftn 1) 508 (ftn 1), 514 (ftn 1) 517 (ftn 1), 519 (ftn 1)
Meghadūta 273 (ftn 2), 522
Mem de l'Ann des Inscriptions et belles letters 489 (ftn 3)
Milinda pañha 240
Mīmāṃsā sarvasva 524
Mīmāṃsāvārtika 132 (ftn 1)
Mookerjee's Magazine 464 (ftn 1)
Muir's Sanskrit Texts 2 (ftn 2, 3)
Muktāvalī 403 (ftn 1)
Muktāvalī ṭīkā 482
Muktivāda 482
Mūlamadhyama vṛtti 250
Mūlamadhyamaka vṛtti akutobhaya 250
Muṇḍakopaniṣad 4 (ftn 2)

Nadīā Kāhinī 527 (ftn 1)
Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra 240
Naiṣadha-carita 153, 407 (ftn. 2)
Naiyatakālika 477
Nāmamālā 205
Nandi Sūtra 161 (ftn 1)
Naṅ gi khyab-pa 343
Nañvāda 465, 482
Nañ-vāda ṭīkā 479
Navadvīpa mahimā 527 (ftn 1)
Navadvīpa pañjikā 527
Navīna nirmāṇa 451
Nighaṇṭu śeṣa 205
Nīlakaṇṭha ṭīkā 391
Nirukta 341

Page
Nirupama stava .. 253 (ftn 1
Niṣkaṇṭakā . 330
Nīti-cintāmaṇi .. 322
Notices of Sanskrit MSS by H Śāstrī 459 (ftn 1), 460 (ftn 1), 461 (ftn 1, 2), 466 (ftn 2)
Notices of Sanskrit MSS by R Mitra 460 (ftn 1), 461 (ftn 1), 462 (ftn 2), 478 (ftn), 466 (ftn 2)*
Notices of Sanskrit MSS in Bengal (467 (ftn 2)
Nyāsa .. , 323
Nyāya .. 302 (ftn. 1)
Nyāya bhāṣya 52 (ftn 1), 67, 97 (ftn 1), 115, 115 (ftn 3), 116 (ftn 2), 117 (ftn 4), 119 (ftn 1), 121*, 155, 155 (ftn 2), 302, 409 (ftn 3), 504
Nyāya bhūṣaṇa . 308, 371
Nyāya-bindu piṇḍārtha . . 330
Nyāya bindu pūrvapakṣa saṃkṣipta 327
Nyāya bindu ṭīkā 194, 195, 222, 321, 329 (ftn 3, 5), 330
Nyāya bodhinī .. 390, 391, 400
Nyāya-cakra . .. 193
Nyāya candrikā .. 391
Nyāyadarśa or Nyāya sārāvalī .. 470
Nyāya dīpikā .. 215, 400, 467
Nyāya dvāra tarka śāstra 289 (ftn. 1)
Nyāyālokasiddhi or Nyāyasiddhyāloka 336
Nyāya kalikā .. 371
Nyāya-kandalī .. 329 (ftn 1)
Nyāya kaṇikā .. 134, 160
Nyāya karṇikā .. 216, 217 (ftn 1)
Nyāya khaṇḍa khādya 218, 219 (ftn 4), 408 (ftn 2)
Nyāya koṣa 46 (ftn 6), 498 (ftn 6)
Nyāya kumuda candrodaya or Candrodaya . . 184
Nyāyakusumāñjali 390, 408 (ftn 2) 437*
Nyāyakusumāñjali-kārikā vyākhyā 463, 479 481

Page

Nyāyakusumāñjali-prakāśa 455
Nyāya kusumāñjali prakāśa makaranda 457
Nyāya-kusumāñjali tarka 371
Nyāya-kusumāñjali ṭīkā 373 (ftn 1)
Nyāya kusumāñjali-viveka 468
Nyāyalaṅkāra 151
Nyāya-līlāvatī 386, 387f, 459
Nyāya-līlāvatī-dīdhiti 388
Nyāya-līlāvatī-dīdhiti-vyākhyā 470
Nyāya-līlāvatī kaṇṭhābharaṇa 388, 459
Nyāya līlāvatī prakāśa 386, 388 455
Nyāya-līlāvatī prakāśa dīdhiti-rahasya 467
Nyāya-līlāvatī prakāśa dīdhiti-viveka 468
Nyāya-līlāvatī prakāśa-rahasya 467
Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa viveka 388
Nyāya līlāvatī prakāśa vyākhyā 457
Nyāyamañjarī 132 (ftn 1), 147 (ftn. 3, 4, 7), 148 (ftn. 1), 149, 150, 153 (ftn 4)
Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī 218
Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa 151, 454
Nyāyānusāra Śāstra 245
Nyāyapariśiṣṭa 141, 388, 455
Nyāyapariśiṣṭa prakāśa 388, 455
Nyāyapradīpa 218, 385
Nyāyapraveśa 210, 221, 289 (ftn 1)^{2}, 295 (ftn 1), 300 (ftn 1^{2}, 2), 302, 315 (ftn. 3), 316 (ftn 3)^{2}
Nyāyapraveśaka Sūtra 208
Nyāyapraveśa tarka-śāstra 289 (ftn. 1), 302, 302 (ftn 4)
Nyāyapraveśa-ṭippana 210
Nyāyapraveśa-vṛtti 210
Nyāyarahasya 218, 469^{2}
Nyāyarahasya-dīpikā 161 (ftn. 2, 3)
Nyāya-ratnāvalī 484
Nyāyārtha-laghubodhinī 390
Nyāya-saṃkṣepa 480
Nyāya-saṃgraha 384 221 (ftn. 1), 356, 357^{2}, 359, 366 (ftn. 1), 367 (ftn. 1), 369 (ftn 1), 371ff, 372 (ftn 2)
Nyāyasārapada pañjikā 371
Nyāyasāra-ṭīkā 371
Nyāyasāra vicāra 372
Nyāya-sarvasva 524
Nyāya Śāstra 107 (ftn 1)
Nyāya siddhānta dīpa 396f
Nyāya siddhānta dīpa ṭīkā 397
Nyāya-siddhānta mālā 478
Nyāya-siddhānta mañjarī 404 466, 483
Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī bhūṣā 482
Nyāya Sūtra 16 (ftn 1), 20, 84 (ftn 1), 97, 101 (ftn 1), 105, 106 (ftn 1), 109, 109 (ftn 1), 112 (ftn. 1), 114 (ftn 1), 115^{3}, 116, 117 (ftn 5) 136 (ftn 1), 154 (ftn 1) 155, 221, 280 (ftn 1)^{5}, 283 (ftn 1, 2), 288 (ftn 3), 301, 302, 302 (ftn 1), 315 (ftn 1), 348, 356 359^{2}, 370 460^{2}, 478, 497^{2}, 499 502^{2} 503^{2}, 504
Nyāya-sūtradhāra 522
Nyāya Sūtra in the Indian thought 40 (ftn 4)
Nyāya sūtra vṛtti 17, 41 (ftn 2), 52 (ftn 1) 479
Nyāya sūtroddhāra 480
Nyāyatantra bodhinī or Nyāya bodhinī 480
Nyāya tātparya-dīpikā 221 (ftn 1) 357 (ftn 1), 371, 372 (ftn 2)
Nyāyavārtika 57, 97 (ftn. 1), 119 (ftn 1), 124, 125, 130 131^{2}, 132, 132 (ftn 1), 133, 138, 155 273 (ftn. 3), 277 (ftn 1), 287 (ftn 2), 288 (ftn 1), 348, 498 (ftn 3), 504 (ftn 2), 505
Nyāyavārtika tātparya ṭīkā 97 (ftn 1), 120 (ftn 3), 131, 134 (ftn. 6), 135, 135 (ftn 2, 3), 138, 140^{2}, 155, 273 (ftn 4), 282 (ftn), 283 (ftn 1), 284 (ftn.), 348, 498 (ftn. 3), 505
Nyāya-vārtika tātparya-pariśuddhi 454
Nyāyāvatāra 122 (ftn. 1), 166, 173, 173 (ftn. 1)^{2}, 174, 200, 206 (ftn. 4),

Page
208 (ftn 4), 221 331 (ftn 8), 565 (ftn 4), 507
Nyāyāvatāra tippana 211
Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti 179, 180, 211, 206 (ftn 4)^2, 208 (ftn 4^2), 331
Nyāya-bindu 309 (ftn 2)^2 316 (ftn 2), 317 (ftn 1), 327, 329, 340, 508
Nyāya-viniścaya 185 198, 200
Nyāya viniścaya vṛtti 198
Nyāya-vṛtti 151^2

On Yuan Chwang 242 (ftn 1), 248 (ftn 4), 249 (ftn 1 9), 251 (ftn 1), 261 (ftn 1) 262 (ftn 4), 265 (ftn 3), 266 (ftn 1), 272 (ftn 2), 515 (ftn 1, 4)
Organon 502^2, 503^2, 506

Padakṛtya 391
Padārtha-candra 460
Padārtha khandana 480
Padārtha khandana-vyakhyā 477, 480, 481
Padhārtha-maṇi mālā 478
Padārtha-tattva 526
Padārtha-tattvāloka . 480
Padārtha-tattva nirūpana or Padārtha khanda 465
Padārtha-tattva-vivecana prakāśa 469
Padārtha viveka-prakāśa 469
Padārtha-viveka-ṭīkā 485
Padma Caritra 195
Padmapurāna 10, 20, 42 (ftn. 5), 497, 497 (ftn 2), 498 (ftn 4)
Pag sam jon zang 516 (ftn 1), 517^2, 517 (ftn 2), 519 (ftn 2)
hāvatthuppakarana 51
Mahāvagga 11 (ftn 3)
tra 179 (ftn. 2)
tavijaya 459
23 (ftn 8), 303, 323
by Goldstucker 41 (ftn. 4)
suddhi 330
vyākhyā 397

Page
Parāśara Upapurāṇa . 356
Paribhāṣā-darpaṇa . . 384
Parīkṣā-mukha pañjikā . 198
Parīkṣā-mukha śāstra 193 (ftn. 5, 7)
Parīkṣa-mukha-sūtra 185, 188, 193, 194, 198 200
Pariśiṣṭa Parvan 169 (ftn 1)
Parivāra 229 (ftn 3)
Pārtha Sārathi's Gloss on Kumārila Bhatta's Vārtika on the Sūtra of Jaimini . 273 (ftn. 6)
Pārtha-vijaya . 134
Paśupati paddhati 524
Paticca-samuppāda 227
Pātimokkha of the Vinaya Piṭakam 229 (ftn 3), 232 (ftn 1), 271
Paṭṭāvalī of the Kharataragaccha 160 (ftn 5), 172 (ftn 1), 209 (ftn 3), 214 (ftn 3)
Paṭṭāvali of the Sarasvatī gaccha 169 (ftn 1)
Pavanadūta 524
Persia by Dr K. Geldner 20 (ftn 4)
Phyi rol don grub-pa ces bya wahi-tshig-bhur . 328
Pingala prakāśa . 490
Piṭakas 272, 304
Pitṛbhakti taraṅgiṇī 459
Pitṛmedha Sūtra .. 48 (ftn. 4), 498
Points of controversy by Shwe Zan Aung 235 (ftn 1), 239 (ftn 1)
Posterior Analytics 503, 509^2, 517
Prabandhacintāmaṇi 152 (ftn. 3), 173 (ftn 4), 195 (ftn 1)
Prabhākara caritra . 195
Prabhāvaka-caritra 173 (ftn. 3), 208 (ftn 4)
Prācīna-lekha-mālā . 400 (ftn. 6)
Pradeśa vyākhyā ṭippanaka .. 210
Prajñāpanā Sūtra . 161 161 (ftn. 4)
Prajñāpāramitā . 210, 516
Prakaraṇārya vācā śāstra 265, 506
Prakāśa 153, 469
Pramāṇa cintāmaṇi .. 405
Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā . 205 (ftn 2)

Page

Pramāṇa naya-tattva lokālankāra 170 (ftn), 193, 200, 211, 213
Pramāṇa nyāya-praveśa (or Nyāya-praveśa nāma, Pramāṇa-prakaraṇa) 300 (ftn 1), 302
Pramāṇa parīkṣā 187, 330
Pramāṇa-samuccaya 116 (ftn. 2), 274 (ftn. 2), 275^{1}, 284 (ftn 1), 299, 307 (ftn 2), 508 (ftn 2)
Pramāṇa-samuccaya vṛtti 299, 300
Pramāṇa - śāstra - nyāya - praveśa (or Pramāṇa-śāstra nyāya-praveśa nāma) .. 300 (ftn 1)
Pramāṇa vārtika 198, 222 319, 323, 344^{2}
Pramāṇa-vārtikā-kārikā 307, 308
Pramāṇa vārtikālankāra 336, 344
Pramāṇa-vārtikālankāra tīkā 339, 344
Pramāṇa-vārtika pañjikā .. 319
Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā-tīkā 320
Pramāṇa-vārtika tīkā 198, 222, 344
Pramāṇa vārtika-vṛtti 323
Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana 128
Pramāṇa-vihetana 128 (ftn. 4), 257, 258
Pramāṇa-vihetana - ṭipaṇaka - vṛtti (or Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana - sambhāṣita-vṛtti) 257, 257 (ftn. 1)
Pramāṇa-viniścaya .. 308 (ftn. 3), 331
Pramāṇa-viniscaya tīkā 330, 342 (ftn 2)
Prāmāṇya-vāda-dīdhiti-tīkā 482
Prameya kamala mārtanda 188, 193
Prameya-nibandha-prakāśa 455
Prameya-ratna-koṣa .. 206, 406 (ftn. 2)
Prameya-ratna-mālā . . 198
Prameya-tattva-bodha . 455
Praśamarati 169 (ftn.)
Prasanna Rāghava . 455
Praśnopaniṣad 22 (ftn. 3)
Pratibandha-siddhi 345
Pratyakṣāloka . 456 (ftn 2)
Pratyakṣāloka-sāramañjarī . 479
Pratyeka buddha caritra . 212
Prāyaścitta . 185
Prior Analytics 504, 505^{2}, 506, 509, 510, 512
Pūjā prakaraṇa 169 (ftn)
Pustaka-pāṭhopāya .. 341

Questions of King Milinda 113 (ftn.), 240 (ftn 1 3, 4)

Raghuvaṃśa 380
Rāmāyana 7 (ftn 4), 8 (ftn. 5) 23 (ftn 5, 6, 9, 12, 13), 51, 521
Rāmapāla-carita 246 (ftn 3)
Rasika sarvasva 522
Ratnakaraṇḍaka 183
Ratnākarāvatārikā 213
Ratnākarā vatārikā pañjikā 213 (ftn 1)
Ratnakoṣa 406 (ftn 2)
Ratna koṣa vāda rahasya 482
Ratnakoṣa-vicāra or vāda 479
Ratnāvalī 251 (ftn 4)
Ratnāloka-dhāranī 29 (ftn 1)
Report on Sanskrit MSS by Peterson 168 (ftn 3), 181 (ftn 1), 182 (ftn 3), 186 (ftn. 3), 194 (ftn 4), 195 (ftn 1, 2, 5, 7), 196 (ftn 1, 2), 197 (ftn. 1, 2, 5), 198 (ftn 2), 199 (ftn 1, 2), 200 (ftn 1) 205 (ftn 1, 2, 3), 206 (ftn 3, 4') 207 (ftn 1' 2, 4, 5), 208 (ftn. 1, 2, 3), 209 (ftn 3'), 210 (ftn 1, 2, 3, 5), 211 (ftn 1, 4), 212 (ftn 1, 2 3^{2}), 213 (ftn 3), 214 (ftn 2), 215 (ftn 1) 218 (ftn 3), 329 (ftn 5) 457 (ftn 5), 466 (ftn 3), 47
Report of Sanskrit MSS by R G Bhandarkar 160 (ftn 2), 164 (ftn 3), 165 (ftn 2), 173 (ftn 4), 183 (ftn. 3), 185 (ftn. 1), 197 (ftn 4), 198 (ftn 3), 201 (ftn 1), 206 (ftn 2), 207 (ftn 3), 214 (ftn 3), 381
Report II by Weber 212 (ftn. 2), 213 (ftn 4), 214 (ftn. 3]
Report of the Archaeological Survey .. 519 (ftn 6)
R̲gyal dwan-blo-gros .. 323
R̲gyu dan-ḫbras-bubi-no-wo grub-pa . . 341
R̲gyud gshan-grub-pa . . 319
R̲gyud gshan-grab-pahi-ḫgrel-bśad 322
Rhetoric .. 500, 501^{2}, 509

Page

208 (ftn. 4), 221, 331 (ftn. 8), 363 (ftn. 4), 507
Nyāyāvatāra ṭippana 211
Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti 179, 180, 211, 206 (ftn. 4), 208 (ftn. 4), 331
Nyāya bindu 307 (ftn. 2), 316 (ftn. 2), 317 (ftn. 1), 327, 329, 340, 504
Nyāya viniścaya 187, 188, 200
Nyāya viniścaya vṛtti 194
Nyāya vṛtti 151

On Yuan Chwang 242 (ftn. 1), 248 (ftn. 4), 249 (ftn. 1, 6), 251 (ftn. 1), 261 (ftn. 1), 262 (ftn. 4), 263 (ftn. 3), 266 (ftn. 1), 272 (ftn. 2), 515 (ftn. 1, 4)
Organon 502, 503, 506

Padakṛtya 531
Padārtha-candra 460
Padārtha khaṇḍana 460
Padārtha khaṇḍana-vyākhyā 477, 480, 481
Padhārtha maṇi mālā 478
Padārtha-tattva 526
Padārtha-tattva śloka 460
Padārtha tattva nirūpana or Padārtha khaṇḍa 465
Padārtha tattva vivecana prakāśa 469
Padārtha viveka-prakāśa 469
Padārtha viveka ṭīkā 485
Padma Caritra 435
Padmapurāṇa 10, 20, 42 (ftn. 5), 497, 497 (ftn. 2), 498 (ftn. 4)
Pag-sam-jon zang 516 (ftn. 1), 517², 517 (ftn. 2), 519 (ftn. 2)
Pāli-kathāvatthuppakaraṇa 51
Pāli Mahāvagga 11 (ftn. 3)
Pañcatantra 179 (ftn. 2)
Paṇḍitavijaya 459
Pāṇini 23 (ftn. 8), 303, 323
Pāṇini by Goldstucker 41 (ftn. 4)
Paraloka siddhi 330
Parāśara smṛti vyākhyā 497

Page

Parāśara Upapurāṇa .. 334
Paribhāṣā-darpaṇa . . 394
Parīkṣā mukha pañjikā . 194
Parīkṣā mukha śāstra 148 (ftn. 3, 7)
Parīkṣa-mukha-sūtra 183, 189, 195, 194, 198, 200
Parusta Parvan 153 (ftn. 1)
Parivāra 229 (ftn. 3)
Pārtha Sārathi's Gloss on *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Vārtika on the Sūtra of Jaimini* 273 (ftn. 6)
Pārtha vijaya 134
Paśupati paddhati . 324
Paticca samuppāda 227
Pātimokkha of the Vinaya Piṭakam 229 (ftn. 3), 232 (ftn. 1), 271
Paṭṭāvali of the Kharataragaccha 160 (ftn. 5), 172 (ftn. 1), 209 (ftn. 3), 214 (ftn. 3)
Paṭṭāvali of the Sarasvati gaccha 169 (ftn.)
Pavanadūta 514
Persia by Dr *K. Geldner* 23 (ftn. 4)
Phyi rol don-grub-pa ṅes byed wahtsing bhur .. 35
Pingala prakāśa 450
Piṭakas 272, 304
Pitṛbhakti taraṅgiṇī 459
Pitṛmedha Sūtra .. 48 (ftn. 4), 498
Points of controversy by Shwe Zan-Aung 233 (ftn. 1), 239 (ftn. 1)
Posterior Analytics .. 503, 509², 517
Prabandhacintāmaṇi 152 (ftn. 3), 173 (ftn. 4), 193 (ftn. 1)
Prabhākara-caritra . .. 195
Prabhāvaka-caritra 173 (ftn. 3), 208 (ftn. 4)
Prācīna-lekha-mālā .. 406 (ftn. 6)
Pradeśa vyākhyā ṭippanaka . 210
Prajñāpanā Sūtra .. 161, 161 (ftn. 25
Prajñāpāramitā .
Prakaranārya vācā śāstra
Prakāśa ..
Pramāṇa cintāmaṇi
Pramāṇa-mimā

Page

Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha 41 (ftn. 3), 48, 126 (ftn. 2), 127 (ftn.), 186 (ftn 5), 167 (ftn 1), 168 (ftn 2), 198, 247 (ftn. 5), 249 (ftn. 3) 249 (ftn 1, 6), 306 (ftn. 7), 308 (ftn 3), 377 (ftn.), 397, 399 ff, 407 (ftn. 2), 454 (ftn 3) 455
Sarvajña-siddhi kārikā 329
Sarvānukramaṇikā . 45
Sarvārtha-siddhi 168 (ftn. 1)
Śāstra on the Meditation of the three worlds .. 301 (ftn 2)
Śāstra vārtā samuccaya 221 (ftn. 2)
Śataka-śāstra .. 261
Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 3 (ftn. 3), 4 (ftn. 1), 19 (ftn 4)
Śata-śāstra-vaipulya-vyākhyā 303
Ṣaṭ-cakra-krama-dipikā 469
Ṣel-wa grub-pa . 345
Siddhānta-candrodaya 390
Siddhāntamuktāvali . 392
Siddhāntamuktāvalī ṭīkā 483
Siddhānta rahasya . 467
Śikṣā-samuccaya . 126 (ftn 2)
Site of Ancient Palibothra 589 (ftn 6)
Śivajñānasiddhiyār . 387 (ftn 2)
Six Buddhist Nyāya Texts 339 (ftn. 3)
Six Nyāya Tracts by H. P Śāstri 322 (ftn. 4), 333 (ftn. 1)
Six Systems of Indian Philosophy 146 (ftn 1)
Skad cig ma-ḥjig grub-paḥi - rnam hgrel 331
Skad-cig ma-ḥjig pa grub pa 330
Skandapurāṇa 8 (ftn. 3), 497 (ftn. 2)
Śloka-vārtika .. . 187
Smṛti-saṁskāra vāda .. . 482
Smṛti-sarvasva .. 524
Smṛti-viveka . .. 524
So-sor thar pa . . 232 (ftn. 1)
Sragdharā Stotra, Introduction to . 322 (ftn. 5, 6), 334 (ftn 1)
Sragdharā-stotram . 357 (ftn. 2)
Sragdharā-stotra-ṭīkā 519
Śripaṭṭāvalī-vācanā . 160 (ftn. 5)
Śrutiparīkṣā 143 150 328
Statistical Account of Bengal 523 (ftn 2)
Sthānāṅga Sūtra 161 (ftn 5), 167 (ftn 1) 170 (ftn) 221
Sthira siddhi dūṣaṇa 339
Surbodhā 126
Subodhinī 480
Sukṛta Saṁkirtana 152 (ftn 3)
Sukṛta Saṁkirtana 208 (ftn 2)
Sum paḥi chos byun 241 (ftn 1) 242 (ftn 1)
Surata kalpataru 491
Sūrya prajñapati-sūtra 165
Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra 165, 221
Sūtrālaṅkāra ṭīkā 262 (ftn 4)
Sūtra piṭakas 334
Sūtra Upadeśa 242
Sutta Piṭaka 226, 227, 229$^{?}$, 242
Suvarṇa prabhāsa 242 (ftn 3)
Suvartha tattvāloka or Kāraka-cakra 480
Sva prakāśa rahasya vicāra or Bhaṭṭa mata-siddhānta vicāra 479
Svarūpa-sambodhana 185
Svayambhū Stotra 183
Syādvādakalika 213
Syādvāda-ratnākara 198
Syādvāda ratnākarāvatārikā 329, 331

Takakusu 515 (ftn 2)
Tangyur 506 (ftn 3), 519 (ftn 5), 533, 534, 535
Tantra 516
Tantrayukti 51
Tapāgaccha paṭṭāvalī 159 (ftn 1), 161, 208 (ftn 4)
Tāraikaviṁśatikāṅga-sūtra Saṅkṣe-pa 518 (ftn 5)
Tārā-triratna Stotram 519 (ftn 5)
Tarka bhāṣā 215 218, 346, 373, 381 ff, 478
Tarka bhāṣā bhāva 384
Tarka bhāṣā prakāśa .. 381
Tarka bhāṣā prakāśikā 384^{2}, 385^{1}

Page

Rigs pa grub paḥi sgron ma 336

Rigs paḥi sbyor-wa 340

Rigs paḥi thigs pa 309

Rigs paḥi thigs paḥi don bsdus pa 340

Rigs paḥi thigs paḥi phyogs-sna ma-ḥdor bsdus pa 327

Rigs paḥi thigs paḥi rgya cher ḥgrel wa 329

Rigs paḥi thigs pa rgya cher ḥgrel-wa 321

Rigveda Samhitā 2 (ftn 1), 9 (ftn 1), 19 (ftn 3)

Rnam par rig pa tsam ñid du grub-pa 343

Roruki 207, 208, 209, 505

Roshuka 267

Roshiki 267

Rsibhāsita sūtra 165

Rsimandala prakarana vṛtti 163

Rtog geḥi skad 348

Rtsod pa-ḥdzog paḥi tshig tshur byas-pa 250

Rtsod paḥi rigs pa 318

Rtsod paḥi rigs paḥi ḥgrel pa don rnam par ḥbyed pa 323

Rtsod paḥi rigs paḥi ḥgrel-wa 321

Śabda-kaustubha 148 (ftn 1)

Śabdāloka-viveka 464

Śabdanirnaya 461

Śabda-prāmānya vāda rahasya 452

Śabda śakti prakāśikā 470, 490

Śabda śakti-prakāśikā ṭīkā 485

Sacred Literature of the Jainas 161 (ftn. 3)

Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya 154 (ftn. 3) 2[illegible] (ftn. 4), 2[illegible] (ftn. 1), 214 (ftn. 1), 222, 373 (ftn. 1)

Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya vṛtti 155 (ftn. 2, 3), 214, 221 (ftn. 4), 371, 373 (ftn. 1)

[illegible] Darśana or Jainas 243 (ftn. 3)

[illegible] 521 (ftn. 1)

[illegible] 479

[illegible] 341

Śākta krama 478

Śakti-vāda 482, 483

Śālistambha sūtra 126 (ftn. 2)

Samādhi rāja 242 (ftn. 3)

Samāja guhya .. 518

Samantapāsādikā 232 (ftn. 1), 267 (ftn.)

Sāmānya-dūsana dik prasāritā 333 (ftn. 1)

Sāmānya lakṣana 328

Samaya prābhṛta 195 (ftn. 6)

Samarāiccakahā 209 (ftn.)

Samāsa-vāda .. 490

Samayabhedoparacana cakra . 320

Sambandha parīkṣā 194, 221, 319, 321, 345

Sambandha parīkṣānusāra 345

Sambandha parīkṣā ṭīkā .. 321

Sambandha parīkṣā-vṛtti . 319

Sambandhoddyota 194, 221

Samkṣepa Śārīraka .. 453

Sāmkhya Kārikā 10 (ftn. 1), 274 (ftn. 4), 293 (ftn. 1)

Sāmkhya tattva kaumudī . 134

Sammati tarka 221 (ftn. 2)

Sammati tarka sūtra 173, 197

Samyutta Nikāya . 127 (ftn.)

Saṅgīta sarvasva [illegible]

Śankara bhāṣya on the Vedānta sūtra 8 (ftn. 7)

Saptapadārthī . [illegible]

Santānāntara siddhi of Tantrān tara siddhi 318, [illegible]

Santānāntara siddhi ṭīkā .. [illegible]

Sapta bhaṅgī taraṅgiṇī 167 (ftn. 3)

Saptadaśa bhūmi-śāstra yogācārya 243, 2[illegible], 2[illegible] (ftn. 1), 2[illegible], [illegible]

Sapta padārthī 388

Sāramañjarī [illegible]

Sāra saṃgraha [illegible] (ftn. 1)

Sarasvatī [illegible] (ftn. 1)

Sārasaṃgraha ṭīkā . [illegible]

Sārabhauma [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

Page

Sarvadarśana Samgraha 41 (ftn 3), 48, 126 (ftn. 2), 127 (ftn.), 188 (ftn 5), 187 (ftn 1), 168 (ftn 2), 198, 247 (ftn 5), 248 (ftn. 3) 249 (ftn 1, 6), 306 (ftn. 7), 308 (ftn 3), 377 (ftn.), 397, 398 ff , 407 (ftn 2), 454 (ftn 3) 455
Sarvajña-siddhi-kārikā 328
Sarvānukramanikā 45
Sarvārtha siddhi 168 (ftn 1)
Śāstra on the Meditation of the three worlds 301 (ftn 2)
Śāstra vārtā samuccaya 221 (ftn 2)
Śataka-śāstra 261
Śatapatha Brāhmana 3 (ftn 3), 4 (ftn 1), 19 (ftn 4)
Śata śāstra vaipulya vyākhyā 303
Ṣat cakra-krama-dipikā 469
Ṣal-wa-grub-pa 345
Siddhānta candrodaya 390
Siddhāntamuktāvali 392
Siddhāntamuktāvali tikā 483
Siddhānta rahasya 467
Śikṣā samuccaya 126 (ftn 2)
Site of Ancient Palibothra 589 (ftn 6)
Śivajñānasiddhiyār . 387 (ftn 2)
Six Buddhist Nyāya Texts 339 (ftn 3)
Six Nyāya Tracts by H P Śāstri 322 (ftn 4), 333 (ftn. 1)
Six Systems of Indian Philosophy 148 (ftn 1)
Skad cig-ma-ḥjig grub-paḥi - ṛnam - ḥgrel . 331
Skal-cig ma-ḥjig pa-grub pa 330
Skandapurāna 8 (ftn. 3), 497 (ftn 2)
Śloka-vārtika . 187
Smṛti samskāra-vāda . 482
Smṛti-sarvasva 524
Smṛti-viveka
So-sor-thar pa
Sragdharā St
to

Page

Śrutiparīkṣā 143 150 328
Statistical Account of Bengal 523 (ftn 2)
Sthānānga Sūtra 161 (ftn 5)*, 167 (ftn 1), 170 (ftn) 221
Sthira-siddhi-dūṣana 339
Surbodhā 526
Subodhini 480
Sukṛta Samkirtana 152 (ftn 3)
Sukṛa Samkirtana 208 (ftn 2)
Sum paḥi chos byun 241 (ftn 1), 242 (ftn 1)
Surata kalpataru 391
Sūrya prajāpati-sūtra 163
Sūtra-kṛtānga-sūtra 165, 221
Sūtrālankāra tikā 262 (ftn 4)
Sūtra pitakas 334
Sūtra Upadeśa 242
Sutta Pitaka 226, 227, 229*, 242
Suvarna prabhāsa 242 (ftn 3)
Suvartha-tattvāloka or Tāraka cakra .. 480
Sva prakāśa-rahasya vicāra or Bhatta mata-siddhānta vicāra 479
Svarūpa-sambodhana 185
Svayambhū Stotra 183
Syādvādakalika 213
Syādvāda-ratnākara 198
Syādvāda ratnākarāvatārikā 329, 331

Takakusu 515 (ftn 2)
Tangyur 508 (ftn 3), 519 (ftn. 5), 533, 534, 535
Tantra - . 516
Tantrayukti . 51
Tapāgaccha pattāvali 159 (ftn. 1), 161, 208 (ftn. 4)
Tārakavimśatikānga-sūtra Sankse-pa . 518 (ftn 5)
519 (ftn 5)
346, 373,
381 ff , 478
.. 384
.. 381
385*

Page
Rigs pa grub paḫi sgron ma 336
Rigs paḫi sbyor wa 340
Rigs paḫi thigs pa 309
Rigs paḫi thigs paḫi don bsdus pa 340
Rigs paḫi thigs paḫi phyogs sna ma sdor bsdus pa 327
Rigs paḫi thigs paḫi rgya cher ḫgrel wa 329
Rigs paḫi thigs pa rgya cher ḫgrel wa 321
Rigveda Samhitā 2 (ftn 1) 9 (ftn 1), 10 (ftn 2)
Rnam par rig pa tsam ñid du grub-pa 343
Ronki 267 268, 269 505
Ronshin 267
Ronsluki 267
Ṛsibhāsita sūtra 165
Ṛsimandala prakarana vṛtti 165
Ṛtog-geḫi skad 346
Ṛtsod pa-bzlog paḫi tshig bhur byas-pa 256
Ṛtsod paḫi rigs pa 318
Ṛtsod paḫi rigs paḫi ḫbrel pa don rnam par ḫbyed pa 323
Ṛtsod-paḫi rigs paḫi ḫgrel wa 321
Śabda-kaustubha 148 (ftn 1)
Sabdāloka-viveka 468
Śabdanirnaya 460
Śabda pramānya vāda rahasya 482
Śabda śakti prakāśikā 470 480
Śabda śakti prakaśikā tīkā 485
Sacred Literature of the Jainas 161 (ftn 3)
Ṣaddarśana samuccaya 154 (ftn 3) 208 (ftn 4)², 209 (ftn 1)², 214 (ftn 1), 222, 371 (ftn 1)
Ṣaddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti 151 (ftn 2, 3), 214, 331 (ftn 6), 371², 371 (ftn 1)
Saddharmapundarika 242 (ftn
Sadukti karnāmṛta 524 (ftr
Sad yukti muktāvalī
Sahāvalambha niścaya
Śākta krama
Śakti vāda
Śālistambha sūtra 126
Samādhi rāja 242
Samāja guhya
Samantapāsādikā 232 (ftn 1), 26
Sāmānya-dūṣana dik prasāritā 333 (ft
Sāmānya laksana
Samaya-prābhṛta 195 (ftn
Samaraiccakahā 209 (ft
Samāsa-vāda .. 4
Samayabhedoparacana cakra 32
Sambandha parīkṣā 194, 221 319, 321, 345
Sambandha parīksānu-sāra 343
Sambandha parīkṣā-tikā .. 321
Sambandha parīksā-vṛtti 319
Sambandhoddyota 194, 221
Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka 459
Sāṃkhya Kārikā 10 (ftn 1), 274 (ftn 4), 293 (ftn. 1)
Sāṃkhya tattva kaumudī 134
Sammati tarka 221 (ftn 2)
Sammati tarka sūtra 173, 197
Saṃyutta Nikāya 127 (ftn
Saṅgīta sarvasva 242
Śankara bhāṣya on the Vedānta sūtra 6 (ftn. 7)
Saptapadārthī 356
Santānāntara siddhi or Tantrāntara siddhi 319, 322
Santāntara siddhi-tīkā 322
Sapta bhangī taranginī 167 (ftn 2)
Saptadaśa bhūmi-śāst
ra
249 1), 203
Sapta padārtha 406
amañjarī 344
Samgr (ftn 1)
atī 5 (ftn 1)
mg
bl
a1

Page
rthakalpa . 159 (ftn 1), 160
rthika works .. 289
ranslation of the Mahāvamsa 226 (ftn.), 226 (ftn. 1, 2), 234 (ftn. 1)
ranslation of the Nyāya praveśa
-by Hwen thsang ..
-by I tsing .
ranslation of the Vinaya Te
Rhys Davids ..
Travels of Fa hian and Sum by Beal . 252 (ftn 3)
Tripitaka . .. 272
Triṣaṣṭi-śalāka puruṣa-caritra 205
Trisūtri-nibandha vyākhyā 458, 459
Tshad-ma ḅṛtag pa . 330
Tshad maḥi ḅstan ḅcos-rig pa-la ḥjug pa 300
Tshad maḥi Mdo-kun las-ḅtus-pa 276
Tshad me-kun las ḅtus pa 276
Tshad-ma kun las ḅtus paḥi ḥgrel-wa .. . 299
Tshad-ma-rigs par ḥjug paḥi-sgo 289
Tshad-ma-rnam-ḥgrel gyi dkah-ḥgrel . .. 319
Tshad ma rnam ḥgrel-gyi ḥgrel-bśad . .. 320, 344
Tshad-ma-rnam ḥgrel-gyi ḥgrel-wa 308
Tshad ma-rnam-ḥgrel gyi lshing . 307
Tshad ma rnam ḥgrel gyi ḥgrel pa 323
Tshad ma-rnam-ḥgrel gyi rgyan . 336
Tshad ma rnam ḥgrel-gyi-rgyan-gyi ḥgrel-bśad 338
Tshad-ma rnam-ḥgrel-rgyan gyi ḥgrel bśad 344
Tshad ma rnam-nes kyi ṭīkā , 331
Tshad ma-rnam-par-ḥjoms pa-ḥdor-bśad paḥi ḥgrel , 257
Tshad-ma rnam parnes pa , 309
Tshad ma-rnam parnis paḥi ḥgrel-bśad , .. . 342

Ueber das Lebens des Jaina Mönches Hemacandra , 205 (ftn 1)
Ujjvala 384
University of Nadia (see Nadia) 521 (ftn. 1)

Page
Upalivada Sutta 229
Upamiti-bhava-prapañca-kathā 147 (ftn 4)
Upanisads by F Max Muller 45 (ftn 4)
485
Upamānacintamani-ṭīkā
183
504
119
211
165
182 (ftn 3)
Uvāsagadasāo
479
Vādabuddhivicāra
196 197?, 124
Vāda mahārnava
321², 324
Vādanyāya
Vadanyāya-vṛtti vipañcitārtha 323, 324
321
Vādanyāya vyākhyā
484
Vāda pariccheda
124 (ftn 1)
Vada vidhi .
328
Vāhyārtha siddhi kārikā
517 (ftn 4)
Vaiduryakarpo
Vaiśesika philosophy by Prof H Ui 40 (ftn 2), 256 (ftn 2), 301 (ftn 1), 302 (ftn. 1)
484
Vaiśeṣika śāstrīya padārtha-nirūpana 356, 499
Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 459
Vaiśesika-sūtropadeśa
Vaiyakarana-bhusana-sara 132 (ftn 1), 148 (ftn 1)
148 (ftn. 1)
Vakyapadiya 380 (ftn 5)
Vamsa Brahmana 45 (ftn. 1)
Varāhapurāna
Vārtika on the Nyāya Sūtra 259 (ftn)
Vātsyāyana, author of the Nyāya-
118 (ftn 4)
bhāsya 498 (ftn 7)
Vāyupurāṇa 459
Vedi-vinoda . 245
Vibhāsā-śāstra 266 (ftn. 2)
Vibhāṣa-vinaya 208 (ftn. 4)
Vicarāmṛta-samgraha 169 (ftn. 2)
Vicāra ratna samgraha
Vicāra-sāra-prakarana 159 (ftn. 1),
208 (ftn. 4)
159 (ftn. 1)
Vicāra-śreṇī

Page
Tarkabhāsā praveśikā 381
Tarkabhāsā-tīkā 485
Tarka-candrikā (Prabhā) 391
Tarkadīpikā 385, 391^{2}
Tarkakaumudī 395
Tarkāmrta 393 (ftn 1), 393f 470
Tarkanyāya or Vāda nyāya 31^{8}
Tarka phakkikā 390
Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā 214
Tarka-samgraha 324 (ftn 3), 387 (ftn 1), 388 ff
Tarka-samgraha-candrikā 391^{2}
Tarka samgraha-dīpikā 390
Tarka samgraha-dīpikā prakāśa 391^{3}
Tarka samgraha, sanku 391
Tarka samgraha taranginī 391
Tarka samgraha tattva prakāśa 391
Tarka samgraha tīkā 390^{2}, 391^{4}
Tarka samgraha vākyārtha nirukti 391
Tarka-samgraha vyākhyā 391
Tarka-samgrahopanyāsa 391^{2}
Tarka Śāstra 268^{4}, 301, 505
Tarkatīkā 331
Tārkika rahasya 373^{2}, 374ff
Tārkika raksā 399 (ftn 1)
Ta shan o-phi-tā matsā tai hen 266
Tathāgata guhyaka 292 (ftn 3)
Tattvacintāmani 155 208 376 (ftn 4), 388, 405, 406 (ftn 1, 2, 3 4, 5, 6), 454 (ftn 4), 456, 461, 462 465, 466, 484
Tattvacintāmani darpana 485
Tattvacintāmani dīdhiti 405
Tattvacintāmani-dīdhiti-gudhārtha-vidyotana 478
Tattvacintāmani-dīdhiti parīksā 477
Tattvacintāmani dīdhiti-prakāśikā 470, 479 482
Tattvacintāmani-dīdhiti prasārinī 468
Tattvacintāmani-dīdhiti tīkā 483
Tattvacintāmani gudhārtha-dīpikā 481
Tattvacintāmani-mayūkha 459 470
Tattvacintāmani-prakāśa 454, 457, 466, 485
Tattvacintāmani-rahasya (Phakkikā or Māthurī) 467
Tattvacintāmani tīkā 479^{7}, 450
Tattvacintāmani tīkā vicāra 479
Tattvacintāmani-vyākhyā 482
Tattvacintāmanyāloka 455
Tattvacintāmanyāloka-kantakoddhāra 461
Tattvacintāmanyāloka prakāśa 460
Tattvacintāmanyāloka tīkā 482
Tattva-cintāmanyāloka rahasya 467
Tattvacintāmanyāloka viveka 478
Tattva prabodhinī 385
Tattvārtha 187
Tattvārtha-bodhavidhāyinī 197
Tattvārtha-dīpikā 391
Tattvārtha-śloka vārtika 187 (ftn 4)
Tattvārtha-tīka 182, 182 (ftn 1)
Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra 168 (ftn 1) 169 (ftn), 182^{4}
Tattvārtha dīpika 182^{2}
Tattvārtha-sāra 195
Tattvārtha-vārtikālankāra 168 (ftn, 1), 169 (ftn)
Tattvārtha vārtika vyākhyānālankāra 185
Tattvasamāsa 324 (ftn 3)
Tattvasamgraha 222, 324 (ftn 3)^{4}, 326 (ftn), 328
Tattvasamgraha dīpikā tippanī 433
Tattvasamgraha kārika 324
Tattvasamgraha pañjikā 328
Taxila by Law 496 (ftn 1)
Thems cad mkhyen pa grub-pahi-tshig bhur 323
Thos pa brtag pahi-tshig bhur-byas pa 323
Tibetan Catalogue by Cordier 262 (ftn 2)
Tibetan Dictionary 630
Tibetan Grammar 390 (ftn 1), 323 (ftn 3)
Tīkā (on Tarkasamgraha) 391^{4}
Tipitaka 226, 227, 282
Tippanaka 195
Tīrthacintāmani 459

Page
Tīrthakalpa .. 159 (ftn. 1), 169
Tīrthika works .. 269
Translation of the Mahāvamsa 226 (ftn.), 226 (ftn. 1, 2), 234 (ftn 1)
Translation of the Nyāya praveśa
—by Hwen thsang .. 300 (ftn 2)
—by I tsing .. 300 (ftn 2)
Translation of the Vinaya Texts by Rhys Davids . 232 (ftn 1)
Travels of Fa-hian and Sung yun by Beal . 252 (ftn. 3)
Tripiṭaka . .. 272
Triṣaṣṭi-śalāka purusa-caritra 205
Trisūtrī-nibandha-vyākhyā 458, 459
Tshad ma brtag pa . 330
Tshad maḥi-bstan bcos-rig-pa-la ḥjug pa . .. 300
Tshad maḥi ṃdo-kun-las-bhus-pa 276
Tshad-ma-kun-las btus pa 276
Tshad ma kun-las-btus-paḥi bgrel-wa . . 299
Tshad ma-rigs par-ḥjug paḥi sgo 289
Tshad-ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi dkah ḥgrel 319
Tshad ma-rnam ḥgrel-gyi ḥgrel-bśad .. 320, 344
Tshad-ma-rnam-ḥgrel gyi ḥgrel wa 308
Tshad ma-rnam-ḥgrel gyi lehung 307
Tshad ma rnam ḥgrel gyi ḥgrel-pa 323
Tshad-ma-rnam ḥgrel gyi rgyan 326
Tshad ma-rnam-ḥgrel-gyi-rgyan gyi-ḥgrel-bśad . 338
Tshad-ma rnam-ḥgrel-rgyan-gyi ḥgrel bśad . 344
Tshad ma-rnam-nes kyi ṭikā 331
Tshad ma-rnam-par-ḥjoms pa-sdor bsad paḥi-ḥgrel . 257
Tshad ma rnam-parnes-pa . 309
Tshad ma-rnam-parnis paḥi-ḥgrel-bśad . . 342

Ueber das Lebens des Jaina Mönches Hemacandra 205 (ftn 1)
Ujjvala . , .. 364
University of Nadia (see Nadia) 521 (ftn. 1)
Upāli vada Sutta 229
Upamiti-bhava prapañca katha 147 (ftn 4)
Upaniṣads by F Max Muller 45 (ftn 4)
Upamānacintamani tīka 485
Upasakādhyayana 183
Upayakauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra, 259, 504
Upāyakauśalya Sūtra 119
Utpāda siddhi prakarana 211
Uttarādhyayana Sūtra 165
Uvāsagadasāo 162 (ftn 3)

Vādabuddhivicāra 479
Vāda mahārnava 196 1977, 124
Vādanyaya 321² 324
Vādanyāya vṛtti vipañcitartha 323, 324
Vadayāya vyākhyā 321
Vāda pariccheda 484
Vada vidhi . 124 (ftn. 1)
Vahyārtha siddhi karikā 328
Vaiduryakarpo 517 (ftn 4)
Vaiśeṣika philosophy by Prof H Ui 40 (ftn 2), 256 (ftn. 2), 300 (ftn 1), 302 (ftn. 1)
Vaiśeṣika śāstrīya padartha-nirūpana 484
Vaiśesika Sūtra 356, 499
Vaiśeṣika-sūtropadeśa 459
Vaiyakaraṇa-bhusana sara 132 (ftn 1), 148 (ftn 1)
Vākyapadīya 148 (ftn. 1)
Vamsa Brāhmana 380 (ftn. 5)
Varāhapurana 45 (ftn. 1)
Vārtika on the Nyaya Sūtra 259 (ftn.)
Vātsyayana, author of the Nyāya-bhāṣya 116 (ftn 4)
Vāyupurana 498 (ftn 7)
Vedi-vinoda .. 459
Vibhāṣā-śāstra 248
Vibhāṣa-vinaya 266 (ftn. 2)
Vicārāmṛta-samgraha 208 (ftn. 4)
Vicāra ratna-samgraha 169 (ftn. 2)
Vicāra-sāra prakaraṇa 159 (ftn. 1), 208 (ftn. 4)
Vicāra-śreṇī 159 (ftn. 1)

Page

Vidagdha mukha maṇḍana-vitīkā 479
Vidhi vāda 482
Vidvānamoda-taranginī 483
Vidyāmatra siddhi - śāstra vyā-khyā 303
Vienna Oriental Journal 195 (ftn. 3)
Vigraha vyāvartanī-kārikā 257^2
Vijñapti-mātra siddhī 343
Vinaya pitaka 225 (ftn 3), 226, 229 (ftn 3)^2, 242
Vinaya-vibhāsā 241
Viśālāmalavatīmānca pramāna-samuccaya-tīkā 323
Visayata vāda 482
Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya 181
Viṣṇupurāna 42 (ftn 3), 456, 497
Viśvasāra-tantra 153
Vītarāga stuti 212
Vivādacandra 466
Vivādaśamana śāstra 257
Vivarana-prameya saṃgraha 397 (ftn 1)
Viveka-vilasa 153, 154
Vṛhadgaccha 212
Vṛhatsvayambhūpurana 519

Page

Vṛndāvana vinoda kāvya 477
Vṛtta ratnavalī 483
Vṛtti on Ganadharasārdhaśata-kam 160 (ftn
Vyāptipañcaka 407 (ftn. 1)
Vyavahāra sūtra 165
Vyutpatti-vāda 482
Vyutpatti-vada vyākhya 483

Wassilief 306 (ftn 1)

Yajñavalka Samhitā 8 (ftn 6), 23 (ftn 5, 11), 42 (ftn 6), 152 (ftn 1), 498
Yast 20 (ftn 3)
Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra 504
Yogācāra philosophy 303
Yoga Śāstra 205
Yukti-muktāvali 384
Yukti-prayoga 340
Yuktyanuśasana 183
Yuka Pon 263 (ftn 3)

Zend Avesta 489 (ftn 3)
Zu-shih-ben 268

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Page

Abhayadeva Sūri 190
Abhayatilakopādhyāya 151
Abhinanda 147 (ftn 2)
Ācārya Dignāga 270ff
Akalanka Deva 168 (ftn 1)
Akhandānanda 406 (ftn 2)
Amaracandra Sūri 207
Amṛtacandra Sūri 195
Ānanda Sūri 207
Ananta Nārāyana 390
Ananta Śrī 341
Anantavīrya 188 (ftn 6), 198
Annam Bhatta 388, 390
Arcata 331f
Ārya Āsanga 265f
Ārya Deva 250, 261f
Aśoka 332f

Bāla Candra 384
Bāna 123[2]
Bhadrabāhu 122 (ftn 1)
Bhāsa 20
Bhāsarvajña 155
Bhāskara Bhatta 384
Bhatta Rāghava 372
Bhavya 250
Bhavyarāja 330[4], 336
Bhīma Sena Dīkṣita 477
Bhumī Bhatta 384
Blo-ḷdan śeṣ-rab 262 (ftn 5), 309, 330[4], 331 336[2]

Brahmanemi Datta 188 (ftn 4)
Buddhaghosa 232 (ftn. 1), 267 (ftn)
Buddha Pālita 250
Byan-chub śeṣ rab 338

Candra Gomin 333ff
Candraja Simha 391
Candra Kīrti 128 (ftn. 2), 250
Candraprabha Sūri 166 (ftn 1), 206, 406 (ftn 2)

Page

Candra Sena 205 (ftn 3), 211
Caraka 50
Choṣ kyi brtson ḥgruṣ 342
Choṣ kyi rin chen 300
Ci-cia-ye 259
Cinna Bhatta 381, 384

Ḍad-pa Śes-rab 300
Dāna Śīla 340
Devabhadra 211
Devardhi Gani 172
Devasena Bhattaraka 195
Deva Sūri 198ff
Devendrabhadra 328
Devendrabuddhi 319f, 348
Ḏge-Śeṣ sis-gyan 300
Ḏge waḥi-blo-groṣ 307, 318, 320[2]
Dharma bhūṣana 215, 273 (ftn 7)
Dharmakīrti 124, 153 136 (ftn.), 303ff, 340, 345
Dharmapāla 302
Dharmottara 150, 329ff.
Dhoyī 524
Dignaya 42, 135
Dīpānkara Rakṣita 338
Ḏpal-brtsegs-rakṣita 321, 322, 328
Ḏpal mchog dan-poḥi-rdo-rje 337
Ḏpal ldan-blo-gros 323
Ḏpal rtseges rakṣita 328
Ḏpal trsegs 319
Dr J Jolly 45 (ftn. 2)

Gadādhara 406 (ftn. 2)
Gangādhara Bhatta 391
Gangeśa Dikṣita 365
Gangeśa Upādhyāya 135, 404, 405ff
Gaurī Kānta 390, 385
Gautama 48 (ftn. 4)
Govardhana Miśra 385, 390
Grogṣ ḥbyor-śeṣ rab 328, 331
Gser-gyi-go-cha 300

Page

Guṇākara Śrībhadra 323
Gunaratna 151, 214, 331
Guṇḍu Bhatta 384

Hanumat 391
Haribhadra Sūri 152, 154, 160 (ftn 6), 206 (ftn 4) 208f
Harirāma 400 (ftn 2)
Ḥbro-sen-kar 324
Hemacandra Sūri 205
Hema (or kanaka) Varma 300
Hwon-thsang 300 (ftn 2) 302

Īśvara Kṛṣṇa 274 (ftn 4), 295 (ftn 1)
I tsing 300 (ftn 2)

Jābāla 9
Jagadīśa Bhatta 391
Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra 393
Jagannātha Śāstrin 391
Jānakīnātha Cuḍāmaṇi 404
Janārdana Vyāsa 478
Jayadeva 524
Jayānanta 250, 256
Jayanta 371
Jayasimha Sūri 372
Jayasoma Sūri 164 (ftn 2)
Jaya Tīrtha 371
Jetāri 337
Jina 338
Jinabhadra Gaṇi 181
Jinadatta Sūri 152, 154
Jina Mitra 321, 328, 340
Jinaprabha Sūri 159, (ftn 1), 169
Jinendrabodhi 323, 348
Jñāna Candra 213
Jñāna Garbha 250, 319, 321, 329
Jñāna Pūrṇa 374, 380
Jñāna śrī Bhadra 318, 342
Jñānaśrī Mitra 341

Kalyāna Candra 198
Kalyāna Rakṣita 150, 326f , 348
Kamala Śīla 324 (ftn. 3), 327f , 348
Kapila 91

Page

Katyāyana 41 (ftn 4)
Kātyāyanī putra 242, 247
Kaunda Bhatta 132
Kauṇḍinya Dīkṣita 385
Kauṭilya 24
Ka wa-dpal-ḅrtsegs 256
Keśava Bhatta 385
Keśava Miśra 373, 381ff., 478
Khu ṇdo-gde-dpal 256
Kṛṣṇa 250
Kṣamākalyāna 390
Kumārajīva 261, 267
Kumāra kalasa 337, 341
Kumāra Śrībhadra .. 324
Kumārila Bhatta 138 (ftn 1), 273
Kundakundācārya 195 (ftn. 6)

Laugākṣi Bhāskara .. 395, 478
Laghu Sāmantabhadra 185 (ftn 3), 197
Lha ḷla ma-ahi-wa-ḥod 323

Mādhavacarya 198
Mādhava Deva 384
Mādhavapadābhirāma .. 391
Māhopādhyāya Dharma-sāgara Gani 164 (ftn 4)
Maitreya 262
Maladhāri Śrī Rājaśekhara Sūri 153, 154, 155
Mallasena Sūri 212
Mallavādin 194
Mallinātha 273, 373 (ftn. 1), 380
Mammata 478
Maṇibhadra 214 (ftn 1)
Māṇikyanandi 185, 188
Mathurānatha Tarkavāgīśa 368
Meru Śāstri, 391
Meru Śāstri Godbole .. 391
Merutunga 159 (ftn. 1)
Mokṣakara Gupta 346
Muktakumbha 331
Mukunda Bhatta 391
Mukunda Bhatta Gāḍgil 391
Munisundara Sūri .. 168 (ftn)
Murāri 391
Murāri Bhatta .. 384

Page
Nāga Rakṣita 337
Nāgārjuna ..50, 250, 256, 334
Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa 384
Nārāyaṇa 153
Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa 384
Nemicandra Kavi 207, 210
Nīlakaṇṭha 391

Padmanābha Miśra 381
Pakṣadhara Miśra 407 (ftn 3)
Paṇḍita Amara Gomin 262 (ftn 3)
Parahita Bhadra 309
Paramārtha 207, 208, 301f
Pārśvadeva Gaṇi 210
Pārthasārathi Miśra 273
Paśupati 524
Patañjali 41 (ftn 4, 5)
Pattābhirāma 391
Prabhā Candra 193, 208 (ftn 4), 273 (ftn 7)
Pradyumna Sūri 173, 190
Prajñākara Gupta 331f, 344
Prajñākaramati 126 (ftn 2)
Prajñā Varma 321
Pūjyapāda Svāmin 108 (ftn. 1)

Rabhasa Nandi 194
Raghunandana 153 (ftn 3)
Raghunātha Śiromaṇi 388, 406 (ftn 2)
Rāja Śekhara 134, 147 (ftn. 6) 213
Rāma Linga 384
Ramānātha 391
Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭa 391
Ratnākara Śānti 342
Ratnakīrti 133, 338
Ratnaprabha Sūri 166 (ftn. 1), 211, 331
Ratna Vajra 339
Ravi Gupta 322f, 348
Rdo-rje-rgyal mtshan 323
Romavilva Venkaṭa Buddha 384

Śākya bodhi 320, 348
Śākya-ḥod 337f, 341, 343
Śākya Siṃha 322
Samanta Bhadra 182ff, 185

Page
Saṅghabhadra 248
Śaṅkara Miśra 388
Śaṅkarānanda 344
Śaṅkara Svāmin 289 (ftn 1), 320
Śānta Rakṣita 323f 348
Sānti Bhadra 336, 343
Śāntyācārya 147 (ftn 4)
Sarvajñātma Muni 459
Śaśadhara 390
Śeṣ rab 323
Sha-ma-dge-bsñen-sin rgyal 299
Siddharṣi 147 (ftn 4)
Siddhasena Divākara 173ff
Siddhasena Divākara-vyākhyānaka 206 (ftn 4)
Siddhasena Gaṇi 168 (ftn 3), 182
Śīlabhadra 303
Śivāditya Miśra 318 (ftn 1), 406
Śrī Candra 210
Śrīdhara Dāsa 524 (ftn 1)
Śrīkantha 151
Śrīkṛṣṇā Dhūrjati Dīksita 390
Śrīnivāsa 391
Śrī Śītāprabha 336
Śrī Śubhūti Śānta 340
Śrutasāgara Gaṇi 215
Ston-gshon 300
Subandu 123
Śubhakara Gupta 340
Subhūti-śrī-Śānti 307, 320
Śuklaratna Nātha 391
Śūlapāṇi 524
Surendrabodhi 340
Sureśvarācārya 306

Thān jāo 259
Thasam-tsan 300
Tilakācārya 206 (ftn. 5), 212
Tin-ne-ḥdsin-bzan po 340
Tsab-ñi-ma grags 330

Udayana 386
Umāpati 624

Vācaspati Miśra 131, 133ff
Vācaspati Miśra—the Junior 151, 303

Page
Vadhulavenkata Guru 391
Vaidyanatha Gadgil 391
Vairocana 336
Vande-dpal brtsegs .. 322
Vande-nam ṃkhaṣ 319, 321
Vande-ye-śeṣ sde 321, 340
Varadā rāja 373ff.
Vardhamāna 151, 388, 406 (ftn. 2)
Vasubandu 124 (ftn. 1), 266ff., 300, 371
Vātsyāyana 40 (ftn. 1), 52 (ftn. 1)
Vidyānanda 156, 273 (ftn. 7), 306
Vijayasimha Gaṇi 371
Vijñāna Bhikṣu 244 (ftn. 1)
Vimala Dāsa 167 (ftn. 2)

Vimokṣa Prajña .
Vināyaka . .
Vinaya Vijaya ..
Vindhyeśvari Prasād ..
Vinita Deva .. ..
Viśuddha Simha 319, 322,
Viśva Karmā .. .
Viśvanātha 51 (ftn. 1), 151,
Viśvanātha Nyāya pañcānana ..

Yamāri .. ..
Yaśovijaya Gaṇi ..
Yayanta .
Yuan Chwang .

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.

Page

Abhidhāna cintāmaṇi—
—वात्स्यायनो मल्लनाग 117 (ftn 2)

Abhisamayālankara kārikā—
—धर्मज्ञानान्वयज्ञान 263 (ftn 2)
—पूर्वेण बाधिधीयक्षाः 262 (ftn 6)
—स्वप्नादिमेव धर्मेषु 263 (ftn 1)

Ācara-dinakara—
—कुमुद दिङ्नाय कालिय 161 (ftn 1)

Address of Udayana—
—ऐश्वर्यमदमत्त सन् 142 (ftn 3)

Ādipurāṇa—
—धम्राग्र माधयास्त 194 (ftn 3)
—भट्टाकलङ्क श्रीपाल . 188 (ftn 1)

Alankāra-sara sthiti—
—कर्णिकर्त मणिवाद् व्याख्या 477 (ftn 2)

Amarasvāmi-carita—
—स्तौमि श्रीहरिभद्र त 209 (ftn. 3)

Ānandalaharī-tarī—
—यो नानाविधमातृकर्कनिपुण 478 (ftn. 1)

Anekānta jaya-patākā—
—उत्कृष्ट वादिमुख्येन 209 (ftn. 2)
—यथोक्त वार्तिकानुसारिणा 209 (ftn. 2)

Anekāntajaya patākā-tīkā—
—यथोक्त वार्तिकानुसारिणा सुभगुप्तेन 346 (ftn 2)

Antarvyāpti—
—पक्षाक्षिप्तमर्थेन समाप्तम् 343 (ftn. 3)
—इह सत्त्वमर्थक्रियाकारित्व 343 (ftn 3)

Anumana-dīdhiti-gūḍhārtha-vidyotana—
—श्रीविश्वेशमहेश्वरतनुभव 477 (ftn. 1)

Anumāna-dīdhiti prasāriṇī—
—विचारस्तु अनुमानालोक 468 (ftn. 1)

Anumāna khanda—
—इति न्यायसिद्धान्तसारादिभिः 466 (ftn. 3)

Anumānaloka-darpana—
—जनकविषयजन्मा राजसम्मानपात्र 457 (ftn. 5)
—ज्येष्ठा महादेवभगीरथ 458 (ftn 1)

Apohasiddhi—
—कृतिरियं महापण्डित 338 (ftn. 3)
—नाकारस्य न बाह्यस्य 338 (ftn. 4)
—नास्माभिरपोहशब्देन विधिरेव 339 (ftn 4)
—यच्चात्र न्यायभूषणेन 339 (ftn 1), 358 (ftn 1)
—यत्तु त्रिलोचन । अपलमोत्तादिना 134 (ftn 3)
—यदप्यवोचद् वाचस्पति 339 (ftn 2)

Aptamīmāṁsā—
—अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि 182 (ftn 5)
—भावैकान्ते पदार्थानाम् उपयोगाय सर्वथा 184 (ftn. 1)
—स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्त 183 (ftn. 1)

Āptamīmāṁsālankṛti ṭīkā—
—येनाचैव कुनीति हरिसरित 183 (ftn 2)

Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya—
—त्रयी वार्ता दण्डनीति 5 (ftn. 1)
—धर्माधर्मौ त्रय्याम् अर्थानर्थावान्वीक्षिकी नया 7 (ftn. 6)
—प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानाम् 38 (ftn 4)
—ब्राह्मं विप्रतिपद्यान .. 41 (ftn. 6)
—सत्त्वमुक्त्वा सत्येषु 42 (ftn 1)
—सांख्यं योगो लोकायत 5 (ftn. 4)
—आन्वीक्षिकी त्रयी वार्ता 5 (ftn. 2)

Aṣṭasāhasrī—
—यथोपपत्तेरपि पुन . 187 (ftn. 1)
—प्रज्ञाकरस्येदं यत्र समयप्रतीतेन स्यात् 187 (ftn. 2)
—यदुक्तं धर्मकीर्तिनाप्यतद्रूप परासन 187 (ftn. 1)

Page

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[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
—[illegible] [illegible]
—[illegible] 332 (ftn. 4)
—[illegible] 333 (ftn. 2)
[illegible]
—[illegible] 152 (ftn. 2)
Bhāgavata
—[illegible] 47 (ftn. 2)
—[illegible] 49 (ftn. 5)
Bhāgavatapurāṇa
—[illegible] 10 (ftn. 4)
—[illegible] 6 (ftn. 5)
Bhagavatī sūtra
—[illegible]
162 (ftn. 1)
Bhāmatī
—[illegible] 134 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible]
306 (ftn. 6)
—[illegible] 153 (ftn. 1)

Page

[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
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[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 442 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 442 (ftn. 1)
Caraka Saṁhitā
—[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
—[illegible]
[illegible] 28 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 25 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 28 (ftn. 2)
Caturviṁśati prabandha—
—[illegible] 211 (ftn. 4)
Commentary on Tarkasaṅgraha
—[illegible] 373 (ftn. 1)
Commentary on Uṇādisiddhipra-karaṇa—
—[illegible] 203 (ftn. 3)
Dāna kāṇḍa—
—[illegible] 292 (ftn. 3)
Daśa vaikālika niryukti—
—[illegible] 166 (ftn. 1)
Daśa vaikālika ṭīkā—
—[illegible] 200 (ftn. 5)

Page

Daśa-vaikalika-vṛtti—
—बालस्त्रीवृद्धमूर्खाणा 160 (ftn 6)
Deopara Vijaya Sena Inscription—
—स मान्यवीरविजयीतिगिर कवीना 521 (ftn 3)
Devipurāna—
—षष्ठी हपामनुप्राप्य 154 (ftn 4)
Dhanukha Inscription—
—आसीत् पण्डितमण्डलाग्रमणितो 406 (ftn. 7)
Dharmābhyudaya Mahā-kāvya—
—आनन्दसूरिरिति तस्य बभूव शिष्यो
आद्यश्चिरमिशुकाविति विदिताज्ञ 207 (ftn 4)
—विद्यानोपनिषद्विषयाद्वयौ 208 (ftn 3)

Gacchotpatti prakirṇaka—
—पयवइ पयनीइ 208 (ftn 1)
Gadādhari karikā—
—शीहष्ण शुक्लरामस्य 486 (ftn. 1)
Gandharva-tantra—
—गोतमप्रोक्तशास्त्रार्थनिरता 17 (ftn 3), 36 (ftn 3)
Gautama Dharma Sūtra—
—राजा सर्वस्येष्टे ब्राह्मणवर्जं प्रत्यवकृत्य
विद्वो नमयेत् 37 (ftn 5)
Gautama-sūtra-vṛtti—
—एषा मुनिप्रवरगौतमसूत्रवृत्ति 392 (ftn 5)
Gloss on Bhavānanda-tikā—
—नत्वा पदाम्भोजयुगं शिवस्य 486 (ftn. 2)
—श्रीमत्पुरुषोत्तमापमायक 86 (ftn. 2)
Gotama-stotra—
—श्रीमन्त मनवेन्दु वेदं रहित यामो-
ऽभिराम क्रिया .. 160 (ftn 4)
Guru-śiromaṇi-prakāśa—
—यन्मूलमेव दुष्कृतानि तयो शतानि 467 (ftn)
Gurvāvali Sūtra—
—वर्षदिन पूर्वस्ता द्वितीय श्रीपूज-
भद्रश्च ददातु तस्मै 164 (ftn. 5)
—श्रुभावपि बहुपदकरौ 164 (ftn. 4)

—येनाद्वितयतुरक्षौति मुवादिक्लौक्षा
शिष्या मदनोऽभवन विदिता 109 (ftn 2)
—रसरसमनुमितवर्षे १४६६ 214 (ftn 4)

Harsa carita—
—कवीनामगलद्दर्पो 124 (ftn 4)
Havaśīrṣapañcarātra—
—गोतमस्य कणादस्य 153 (ftn 3)

Introductory verses to Sankara Miśra's works—
—अधीतमध्यापितमर्जितयशो 458 (ftn 3)

Jaina Harivaṃśa Purāṇa—
—अथ मन्नविसम्यत 159 (ftn 3)
Jambudvipa samāsa—
—इति सिताम्बराचार्यस्य 169 (ftn)
Jyotirvidābharana—
—धन्वन्तरि क्षपणकोऽमरसिंह 174 (ftn 2)

Kādambari—
—रजोजुषे जन्मनि सत्त्ववृत्तये 194 (ftn 1)
Kalpasūtra-subodhikāvṛtti—
—प्रतिष्ठानपुरे वराहमिहिरभद्रबाहु 165 (ftn 3)
Kātantra—
—भूतकर्त्तरि 19 (ftn 5)
Kathavatthuppakarana—
—सो च समयम् तथा तत्थ 234 (ftn 2)
Kathāvatthuppakarana attha-kathā—
—एव तेन, भुञ्जेन निमन्ते 234 (ftn 2)
Kathopaniṣad—
—ज्ञानमथन्त्वनुसमा मात्रा भवति
नैनम . 19 (ftn. 1)
Kāvyālankāra sūtra vṛtti—
—साभिप्रायत्व यथा सोऽयं सम्प्रति चन्द्र
गुप्ततनय 207 (ftn 1)
Khuddakapātha of the Pāli Sutta-piṭaka—
—एक नाम कि ? षडुपादानकथा 114 (ftn. 1)
Kriyāratna-samuccaya—
—काले षड् रसपूर्णे १४६६ 214 (ftn. 5)

Page
—यदक्षपाद प्रवरो मुनीनां 47 (ftn 3), 125 (ftn 1), 273 (ftn 3)
—यदपि वादविधौ . 124 (ftn 1)
—लिङ्गलिङ्गीसम्बन्ध 510 (ftn. 2)
—स्मृत्यनुगृहीतो लिङ्ग परामर्शोऽनुमानम् 130 (ftn 1)
Nyāya vārtika tātparya ṭīkā—
—यत्र सुबन्धुना प्रतिज्ञाद्य 128 (ftn 2)
—यद् भगवता अक्षपादेन 47 (ftn 4), 115 (ftn 2)
—अक्षाभि
—आप्तवाक्याविसंवाद 288 (ftn 1)
—आह असाधनाङ्गवचनम् 136 (ftn 2)
—तस्माद् यदुक्तं कीर्तिना 137 (ftn 2)
—त्रिलोचन गुरून्नीतमार्गानु 134 (ftn. 2), 137 (ftn 5)
—न सुखादिप्रमेयं वा 280 (ftn 1)
—नित्यानित्यप्रयत्नोत्तममध्यम 285 (ftn 1)
—प्रमेयकृतकानित्यकृत . 285 (ftn)
—यथाह निरस्तकारः ; निर्विकल्पकबोधेन . 138 (ftn 1)
—यद्यपि भाष्यकृताकृतव्युत्पादनम् 133 (ftn 1)
—यवच्छायात्मक पद साक्षात् 137 (ftn 4)
—सम्प्रति दिङ्नागस्य लक्षणम् 129 (ftn 2)
—साधर्म्यानुमानात् कार्य 136 (ftn)
Nyāya vārtika-tātparya ṭīkā-pariśuddhi—
—मातः सरस्वति पुनः पुनरेष नत्वा 141 (ftn 1)
Nyāyāvatāra—
—अन्न यत्रैव साध्यस्य 268 (ftn. 2)
—आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लङ्घ्य 175 (ftn. 1)
—साध्याभ्युपगम पक्ष 507 (ftn.)
—स्वनिश्चयवदन्येषां . 286 (ftn 2)
Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippana—
—ननु अर्थक्रिया सामान्यमेव 211 (ftn 3)
Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti—
—अवयवार्थतया कात्स्न्यमध्यमीत्कृता 166 (ftn 1)
—प्रमाणेत्यादि अनेन च . 206 (ftn. 6)
Page
Nyāya-vindu—
—उक्तमभेदेन पुनर्विशेषेण 318 (ftn. 1)
—तत्र च तृतीयोऽपि 316 (ftn. 1)
—त्रिरूपं हेतुरुक्तः । तावतैव 317 (ftn 2)
—त्रीण्येव च लिङ्गानि 508 (ftn 3)
—त्रैरूप्यं पुनर्लिङ्गस्य 202 (ftn 1)
—विरुद्धाव्यभिचारी अपि 358 (ftn 3)
—स्वयमिति वादिना 124 (ftn 2)
Nyāya-vindu ṭīka—
—अयं च विरुद्ध आचार्य 316 (ftn 1)
—अयन्ति ज्ञानि वचनप्रबन्ध 330 (ftn. 1)
—विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यपि 316 (ftn 3)
Padārtha-candra—
—श्रीचन्द्रमिव रूपतेर्दयिता 460 (ftn 1)
Padārtha tattva vivecana-prakāśa—
—इति श्रीरामभद्र सार्वभौम 469 (ftn 2)
Padārtha-viveka ṭīka—
—अभेदभावनोद्रेकाद् 486 (ftn)
—राम श्रीजयसिंहस्य 486 (ftn.)
Padmapurāṇa—
—अङ्गानि चतुरो वेदान् 38 (ftn 7)
—कणादेन तु सम्प्रोक्तं 17 (ftn 1), 48 (ftn 1)
Pañcasiddhāntikā—
—सप्ताश्विवेदसंख्यं शककालम् 174 (ftn 1)
Pāṇḍavapurāṇa—
—अकलङ्कोऽकलङ्क च 186 (ftn 1)
—समन्तभद्रो भद्रार्थो 182 (ftn 4)
Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī—
—अध्यायन्यायोद्यावसंहाराश्च 41 (ftn 4)
—कठचरकाल्लुक् . 25 (ftn. 2)
—छन्दसि पुनर्वस्वोरेकवचनम् 11 (ftn. 4)
—क्रतुकथादि सूत्रान्तात् ठक् 41 (ftn 4)
Pañjikā on Syādvāda-ratnākarā-vatārikā—
—स्याद्वादरत्नाकर इत्यपि 193 (ftn. 4)
Parāśara Saṃhitā—
—अक्षादिनाप्रयो येऽन्ये . 22 (ftn. 5)
Parīkṣāmukham saṭīkam—
—हेमैव प्रियपुत्रश्च .. 198 (ftn. 2)

Index of Quotations

Page

—[illegible] 150 (ftn 2)
—[illegible] 150 (ftn 1)
Nyāyalīlāvatī
—[illegible] 210
[illegible] (ftn 2)
—[illegible] 210 (ftn 1)
Nyāyamañjarī 210 (ftn 3)
—[illegible] fr
—[illegible] 47 (ftn 1)
—[illegible] 137 (ftn 1)
—[illegible] 20 (ftn 2)
—एतेन [illegible] 322 (ftn 4)
—[illegible] 137 (ftn 3)
—[illegible] 151 (ftn 1)
—[illegible] 129 (ftn 3)
—यदाह नारद [illegible] 44 (ftn 1)
—यदपि उच्यते-[illegible] 147 (ftn 3)
—[illegible] जयन्त इति य [illegible] 147 (ftn 1)
—[illegible] 94 (ftn 1)
Nyāya praveśa pañjikā—
—[illegible] 210 (ftn 2)
Nyāya-saṃkṣepa—
—न्यायवाचस्पते [illegible] 480 (ftn 4)
Nyāyasāra—
—अन्ये तु [illegible] 358 (ftn 5)
—[illegible] 358 (ftn 4)
—[illegible] 153 (ftn 4), 360 (ftn 1)
Nyāyasāra pada-pañjikā—
—[illegible] 371 (ftn 2)
Nyāyasāra-vicāra—
—[illegible] 372 (ftn 1)
Nyāya siddhānta-dīpa—
—इति महोपाध्याय 396 (ftn 1)
—[illegible] 393 (ftn, 2)

Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī
—[illegible]
[illegible]
—[illegible]
Nyāya-sūtra
—[illegible]
—[illegible]
—[illegible]
—[illegible] 46 (ftn. 2), 119 (
—[illegible] 121 (
—[illegible] 121 (
—[illegible] 50 (
—[illegible] 49 (ftn.
—[illegible] 47 (ftn.
—[illegible] 46 (ftn.
—[illegible] 46 (ftn 1),
—[illegible] 121 (ftn 1)
—[illegible] 118 (ftn 1)
Nyāya sūtra-vṛtti—
—[illegible] 49 (ftn. 3)
Nyāya-vārtika—
—[illegible] 268 (ftn 2)
—अपरे तु मन्यन्ते [illegible] 129 (ftn 1)
—[illegible] 125 (ftn. 2)
—इति [illegible] 124 (ftn. 4, 5)
—[illegible] 119 (ftn 1)
—एतेन [illegible] 128 (ftn. 4)
—[illegible] 124 (ftn 6)
—[illegible] 120 (ftn 1)
—[illegible] 128 (ftn 3)
—[illegible] 511 (ftn 2)
—[illegible] 128 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 511 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 125 (ftn 3)
—[illegible] 115 (ftn 1), 123 (ftn 1)

Page

—यदक्षपाद प्रवरो मुनीनां 47 (ftn. 3), 125 (ftn. 1), 273 (ftn 3)
—यद्यपि वादविधौ . 124 (ftn 1)
—लिङ्गलिङ्गीसम्बन्ध 510 (ftn. 2)
—स्मृत्यनुगृहीतो लिङ्ग परामर्शोऽनुमानम् 130 (ftn 1)

Nyāya vārtika tatparya ṭikā—
—अत्र सूत्रकृता प्रतिज्ञादय 128 (ftn. 2)
—अथ भगवता अक्षपादेन 47 (ftn 4), 115 (ftn 2)
—अस्माभि
—आप्तवाक्याविसंवाद 288 (ftn 1)
—आह प्रमाणमाप्तवचनम् 136 (ftn 2)
—तस्माद् यदुक्त कीर्तिना 137 (ftn 2)
—त्रिलोचन गुरून्नीतमार्गानु 134 (ftn. 2), 137 (ftn. 5)
—न सुखादिप्रमेय वा 280 (ftn 1)
—नित्यानित्यप्रथमोत्तममध्यम 285 (ftn 1)
—प्रमेयत्वानित्यत्व 285 (ftn)
—यथाह निरस्तकार । निर्विकल्पकबोधेन .. 138 (ftn 1)
—यद्यपि भाष्यकृताकृतव्युत्पादनम् 133 (ftn 1)
—समवायात्मक पद साक्षात् 137 (ftn 4)
—सम्प्रति दिङ्नागस्य लक्षणम् 129 (ftn 2)
—साध्येनानुमानात् कार्य . 136 (ftn.)

Nyāya vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā-pariśuddhi—
—नात परमपि पुन पुनरेव मत्वा 141 (ftn 1)

Nyāyāvatāra—
—अन्त व्याप्तैव साध्यस्य 268 (ftn. 2)
—आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लङ्घ्य .. 175 (ftn. 1)
—साध्याभ्युपगम पक्ष .. 507 (ftn)
—स्वनिश्चयवदन्येषां .. 286 (ftn. 2)

Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippana—
—ननु कार्यक्रिया सामान्यमेव 211 (ftn. 3)

Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti—
—अवयवापेक्षया जघन्यमध्यमोत्कृष्टा 166 (ftn. 1)
—प्रमाणेत्यादि अनेन च . 206 (ftn. 6)

Page

Nyāya-vindu—
—उक्तरूपभेदेन पुनर्विशेषेण 318 (ftn. 1)
—सत्त्व च तृतीयोऽपि 316 (ftn. 1)
—त्रिरूपे हेतुरुक्त । तावतैव 317 (ftn 2)
—त्रीण्येव च लिङ्गानि 508 (ftn 3)
—त्रैरूप्य पुनर्लिङ्गस्य 202 (ftn 1)
—विरुद्धाव्यभिचारी अपि 358 (ftn 3)
—स्वयमिति वादिना 124 (ftn 2)

Nyāya-vindu-ṭikā—
—अय च विरुद्ध आचार्ये 318 (ftn 1)
—जयन्ति जाति व्यसनप्रबन्ध 330 (ftn. 1)
—विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यपि 316 (ftn 3)

Padārtha-candra—
—श्रीचन्द्रसिंह नृपतेर्दयिता 460 (ftn 1)

Padārtha tattva-vivecana-prakasa—
—इति श्रीरामभद्र सार्वभौम 469 (ftn 2)

Padārtha-viveka ṭika—
—अभेदभावनोद्रेकाद् 486 (ftn)
—राज्ञ श्रीजयसिंहस्य 486 (ftn.)

Padmapurāna—
—अङ्गानि चतुरो वेदान् 38 (ftn 7)
—कणादेन तु यत्प्रोक्त 17 (ftn 1), 48 (ftn. 1)

Pañcasiddhāntikā—
—सप्ताश्विवेदसंख्य शककालम 174 (ftn 1)

Pandavapurāna—
—अकलङ्कोऽकलङ्क स 186 (ftn. 1)
—समन्तभद्रो भद्रार्थो 182 (ftn. 4)

Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī—
—अध्यायन्यायोद्याव संहाराश्च 41 (ftn. 4)
—कठचरकाल्लुक् .. 25 (ftn. 2)
—छन्दसि पुनर्वस्वोरेकवचनम् 11 (ftn. 4)
—क्रतुक्थादि सूत्रान्तात् ठक् 41 (ftn 4)

Pañjikā on Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā—
—स्याद्वादरत्नाकर इत्यपि 198 (ftn 4)

Parāśara Saṃhitā—
—अमादित्यायनो मैत्रे .. 22 (ftn. 5)

Parīkṣāmukham saṭikam—
—त्रैलोक्य त्रिपदुपस्य .. 198 (ftn. 2)

Page

Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra
[illegible] 133 (ftn. 2)
[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 2)
[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 1)
[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 1)

Pārśvābhyudaya
—[illegible] 12 (ftn. 2)

Pārśvanātha carita
—[illegible] 197 (ftn. 2)
—[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 2)
—[illegible] 207 (ftn. 1)

Peterson's Report V—
[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 2)
—[illegible] 193 (ftn. 2)

Piṅgala prakāśikā
—[illegible] 292 (ftn. 2) [illegible] (ftn. 2)

Prabhāvakacarita
—[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 200 (ftn. 2)

Pramāṇa mīmāṁsā—
—[illegible] 184 (ftn 2) 203 (ftn. 2)

Pramāṇa naya tattvālokālaṅkāra—
—[illegible] 202 (ftn. 3)
—[illegible] 202 (ftn. 2)
—[illegible] 203 (ftn. 1)

Pramāṇasamuccaya—
—[illegible] 279 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 135 (ftn. 4)
—[illegible] 281 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 283 (ftn. 3)
[illegible] 277 (ftn)

Page

—[illegible] 277 (ftn. 1)
[illegible] 243 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 273 (ftn. 1)
[illegible] 242 (ftn. 2)

Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra—
[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 2)

Pramāṇasamuccaya
—[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 3)

Prameya kamala mārtaṇḍa—
—[illegible] 174 (ftn. 2)
[illegible] 174 (ftn. 2)

Prameya ratnakośa—
—[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 4)

Prameya ratnamālā
—[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 6)

Prasanna Rāghava—
—[illegible] [illegible] (ftn. 1)

Praśastapāda-bhāṣya—
—[illegible] 273 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 292 (ftn. 1)
—[illegible] 279 (ftn. 1)

Praśasti of Pāṇḍavacaritra—
—[illegible] 211 (ftn. 2)

Pratimā Nāṭaka—
—[illegible] 18 (ftn. 2)

Pratyakṣāloka—
—[illegible] 407 (ftn. 3), [illegible] (ftn. 1)

Rāmāyaṇa
—[illegible] 23 (ftn. 2)
—[illegible] 18 (ftn. 2),
—[illegible] 17 (ftn. 6)
—[illegible] 9 (ftn. 3)

Ratnākarāvatārikā ṭippaṇa—
—[illegible] 198 (ftn 1), 213 (ftn. 5)
—[illegible] 213 (ftn [illegible])

Page

Ratnāvali—
—न चाभावोऽपि निर्वाण 255 (ftn 1)
Ratnāvatārikā—
—तथा च जयन्त अक्षपादहृदयम् 147 (ftn 5)
Rock Edicts on the ruined walls of the ancient part of Simraon—
—नन्देन्दुबिन्दुविधुसम्मितशाकवर्षे 521 (ftn 2)
Śabdāloka—
—पितुर्ज्ञानपतेरत्र व्याख्यान 486 (ftn)
—यतामस्मिन् गहने प्रबन्धे 485 (ftn 4)
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā—
—इति गुरुन्यायरहस्ये .. 460 (ftn. 4)
Ṣaḍdarśana samuccaya—
—कणादो नैयायिकानां नित्यबुद्धि समाश्रय . 154 (ftn 2)
—जयन्ताचार्यरचितो . 147 (ftn 6)
—जैन सांख्य जैमिनिय .. 153 (ftn 1)
—प्रत्यक्ष कल्पनापोढम् . 209 (ftn 1)
—भासर्वज्ञो न्यायसारलकं 357 (ftn. 5)
—बौद्ध नैयायिक सांख्य .. 152 (ftn. 2)
Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya vṛtti—
—एषां तर्कपन्थन्यायसूत्र 151 (ftn. 2, 3)
Ṣaḍdarśana-vṛtti—
—भासर्वज्ञप्रणीते न्यायसारे 357 (ftn. 4)
Syadvāda ratnākara—
—यदत्र मक्षिपसिद्धौ 147 (ftn. 6)
Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dikprasārikā—
—व्यापकनित्यमेकश्च . 333 (ftn 3)
Sāmkhya-bhāṣya—
—एकमेवाद्वितीय तत्त्व . 244 (ftn 1)
Sāmgatva-prakāśa—
—तथा श्लोकवार्तिके विद्यानन्दापर. 188 (ftn 1)
Saptapadārthī—
—तन्त्रैव शास्त्रप्रकरणयो . 456 (ftn 1)
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha—
—तदुक्त ज्ञानश्रिया यत् सत् तत् क्षणिक यथा . . 341 (ftn 3)
—तार्किकरक्षायां च धर्मस्य सदसद्रूप 374 (ftn. 2)

—ननु प्रमाणादि पदार्थ षोडशके 398 (ftn 2)
—न याति न च तत्रासीद् 274 (ftn)
—श्रीमन्न्यायपदुम्भाब्धि 397 (ftn 3)
—श्रीशार्ङ्गपाणितनय 396 (ftn 1)
—क्षमाक्षमाविनाभावा 399 (ftn 1)
Satīka Utpāda siddhi prakaraṇa—
—द्वादशवर्षशतेष श्रीविक्रमतो 211 (ftn 4)
(A) Saying—
—शङ्करवाचस्पत्यौ 453 (ftn 3)
Siddha Hema Śabdanuśāsana bṛhat-ṭīkā—
—अनुमानवादिन तार्किका 195 (ftn 4)
Siddha jayantī-carita ṭīkā—
—यत्प्रज्ञाप्रसरनिशायिनि तथा प्रालेय शैलोऽज्वाल 160 (ftn 3)
Skandapurāṇa—
—गौतम स्वेन तर्केण 17 (ftn 2), 48 (ftn 2) 37 (ftn 1)
Ślokavārtika—
—तत्रानुमानमेवेद .87 (ftn 3)
—शब्दानुमानयोरैक्य चैकान्तविषयाश्रयात् . 288 (ftn)
Ślokavārtika ṭīkā—
—परार्थानुमानम् 282 (ftn. 1)
Śrāddha prati kramaṇa sūtra vṛtti—
—विख्याततपत्याख्या जगति हरिभि माश्रहत कनितुष्टै 214 (ftn 2)
Sragdharā stotra ṭīkā—
—श्रीमद्विक्रमशीलदेवमहाविहारीय 519 (ftn 4)
Sthānāṅga Sūtra—
—चउव्विहे वाद पन्नत्ते 163 (ftn 1)
—छव्विहे विवादे पन्नत्ते 163 (ftn 2)
—दसविहे दोसे पन्नत्ते 163 (ftn 3)
—पमाणे चउव्विहे पन्नत्ते 161 (ftn 5)
Subodhinī—
—इति नवद्वीपीय महामहोपाध्याय 480 (ftn 3)
—गिरिरिव दुर्धर 480 (ftn 3)

[illegible]

[illegible]

Tarkakaumudī
—[illegible] 353 (ftn. 1)

Tarkāmṛta
—[illegible] 334 (ftn. 1)

Tarkasaṃgraha
—[illegible] 358 (ftn. 3)
—[illegible] 353 (ftn. 4)
[illegible] 231 (ftn. 3)

[illegible]

Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka—
—[illegible] (ftn. 2)

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra—
—[illegible] 169 (ftn. 2)
—[illegible] 170 (ftn. [illegible])

Page

—तैजसवद् अपवादेऽपुं सूचनमात्रा 170 (ftn 2)

—यथाविधाः प्रवृत्तेन विपरता कारणं
मात्राविधा यावत् 168 (ftn 3)

—यथा यौगिकादि प्रज्ञ 171 (ftn 1)

—यथा वा प्रवचनानुसारेणात्मा .प्रवर्तते 170 (ftn)

Tattvārtha ṭīkā—

—ननु चाहुरभोऽव्यय 182 (ftn 2)

Triloka Sāra—

—पपदन वद पपमाण 139 (ftn 1)

Trisūtrī (nibandha-vyākhyā)

—प्रकाशकत्वेनेष्टान . 458 (ftn 2)

Udānam—

—यात्र यथा यस्यदा लोके 229 (ftn 2)

Upadeśa mālā ṭīkā—

—जिन चौलुक्यनृप सूरिगुरुपि इति
विशेषविनाश . 199 (ftn 2)

Upadeśa mālā viśeṣa Vṛtti—

—वाखानचन्द्राणि जिनवाचा 206 (ftn 4)

Upadeśa mālā vṛtti—

—चौरङ्गाय सूरिभि प्रभवति 212 (ftn 1)

Upāsakādhyayana—

—देवागमनमतौ विनाश जिनवित
प्रवादत्वेनाम 183 (ftn 2)

Page

Uttarādhyayana bṛhadvṛtti

—यथा भद्रबाहुं सुविधि 197 (ftn 4)

Vaiśeṣika Sūtra

—बाह्येन्द्रियमनात्य प्रतिकर्षात् 279 (ftn 1)

Vaiśeṣika Sūtropaskāra—

—सांख्यं वैशेषिक मतं 458 (ftn 4)

Vākyapadīya—

—न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके 187 (ftn 3)

Vāsavadattā—

—न्यायस्थितिमिवोद्योतकर 123 (ftn 2)

Vedānta Sūtra—

—[illegible] 37 (ftn 2)

Vicāra sāra prakaraṇa—

पुव्वे स च तरिपमह 173 (ftn 2)

Viṣṇu purāṇa

—सप्ताशावित ते कुट 44 (ftn 2)

—यादिवैदपुर्वे प्रसङ्गमपदे 456 (ftn 3)

Vṛhatsvayambhū purāṇa—

—शरायस्याँ मयूर्यो च 519 (ftn 4)

Yājñavalka Saṃhitā—

—अयन्तु परमो धर्मो . 6 (ftn 2)

—चत्वारो वेद धर्मज्ञाः 22 (ftn 6)

—पुराणन्यायमीमांसा 38 (ftn 5)

INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS.

Page
Akevala jñāna (defective knowledge) .. 161 (ftn 5)
Akṛtābhyāgama (gain of unmerited action) . 99, 101
Akṣapāda darśana (the philosophy of Akṣapāda) 43
Akhyāti (non-manifestation) 134
Agni (fire god) 10
Aṅkābhidhāna (dictionary of numbers) 16 (ftn. 1)
Ajīva (soul less) 168
Aja bhāga (the unborn part) 2
Ajñāna (ignorance) 84, 269
Anuloma sambhāṣā (congenial debate) 29
Anulomatta (propitiating the authority) 163
Anuvāda (re-inculcation) . 105†
Atikrāntāvekṣaṇa (retrospection) 25
Aticchandas (a kind of metre) 15
Ativyāpti (being too wide) 403
Atīta kāla (mistimed) .. 35
Atīta vākya (irrelevant talk) 264
Atideśa (extended application) 25
Attā (soul) . 127 (ftn)
Atyantābhāva (absolute negation) 97 (ftn 1), 189, 203, 394
Adṛṣṭa (desert) 143†, 143 (ftn 1)†, 144
Adoṣodbhāvana (allegation of an unmerited action) 136
Adrikalpa (like a rock) . 273
Adharma (demerit) 371, 389
Adhika (saying too much) 84, 261, 269
Adhikaraṇa (subject) .. 25
Adhikaraṇa (hypothetical dogma) 59
Adhikaraṇa (cases for settlement) 229†
Adhikaraṇa (locus) .. 415
Adhikaraṇa - samatha - dhamma (rules for the settlement of cases) 230†

Page
Adhikaraṇa siddhānta (conclusion accepted hypothetically) 259
Adhicca samuppannika (fortuitous originate) 229
Adhyātma vidyā (spiritual science) 4
Adhvaryu (priest) 14
Anadhyavasāya (uncertainty) 201
Anadhyavasita or Anupasaṁhāra (non tried) 306
Ananubhāṣaṇa (silence) 84 261 269
Ananvaya (unconnected) 179, 297, 314
Ananuyojya (non-censurable) 43
Anāgatāvekṣaṇa (anticipation) 25
Anāpanna (not guilty) 231
Anārya (non saintly) 359
Anitya (non-eternal) 284 285†
Anitya-sama (balancing the non-eternal) 87
Anindriya nibandhana (not through sense-organs) . 201
Anirvacanīya khyāti (manifestation of the undefinable) 189
Aniścita (uncertain) 293
Anugata dharma (common property) 403^{2}
Anugama (generalisation) 403 429
Anutpatti-sama (balancing the non-produced) 87, 268 269
Anupalambha (voidness of the world) . 146
Anupalabdhi (imperceptible) 190, 203, 258, 281, 311, 332, 433, 539
Anupalabdhi-sama (balancing the non perception) .. 87
Anupalabdhi hetu (relation of negation) . . 318
Anupalabhya prāmāṇya vāda (invalidity of non perception) . 414
Anupasaṁhārī (non exclusiveness) 438
Anubhava (experience) 389^{3}, 395

Page

Anubhūti (apprehension) 393[1]

Anumata (assent) . 25

Anumāna (inference) 23[1], 27[2], 28, 32 33 30 34, 130 162[1], 169, 175[1], 189 192, 201 209 (ftn 1), 215, 219 221 229, 310 259, 264, 265, 266, 259, 277, 280, 298, 348 358 360, 361 361[1] 376[1], 383 387[1], 389, 390, 393[1], 394[1], 395 394, 407 440

Anumana khanda (chapter on inference) 419

Anumana parikṣā (examination of inference) 327

Anumana bhasa (semblance of inference) 293

Anumiti (inferential knowledge) 154, 389[1], 397, 419, 433, 510

Anumiti nirūpana (determination of inferential knowledge) 419

Anumeya (inferred) 282

Anuyoga (interrogation) 33, 234

Anuyogī (a thing in a particular relation to another) 403[1]

Anuyogita (quality of being in a particular relation) 403

Anuyojya (censurable) 33

Anuloma (regular form) 275

Anubandha (adjunct) 27

Anuvādadhikarana (a case in which *one party accuses another party* of the violation of a rule of good conduct) 229

Anuvijjaka (judge or umpire) 231[2]

Anuvyavasaya (self consciousness) 418 445, 471, 472, 474

Anuvyavasaya vāda (doctrine of self-consciousness) 418

Anustubh (a kind of metre) 275

Anekanta (uncertain) 25

Anaikānta (erratic) 438

Anaikāntika (uncertain) 178, 313, 365

Antarvyāpti (intrinsic inseparable connection 177, 178, 202, 268 (ftn. 2)

Andhakāra-vipratipatti (controversy on darkness) 397

Page

Anyathākhyāti (reverse manifestation) . .. 132, 140

Anyathākhyāti (invalid knowledge) 404

Anyathāsiddhi (conditionality) 393 (ftn. 1), 403

Anyamata parikṣā (examination of contemporaneous philosophical doctrines) 49, 51, 497

Anyāpoha (mutual non-existence) 144

Anyendriyātītārtha - darsana - *puruṣa-parikṣā* (*examination* of the soul which sees things beyond the range of senses) . .. 327

Anyonyābhāva or Anyāpoha (mutual non-existence) 184, 394

Anvaya (affirmation) .. 361

Anvaya-vyatireki (affirmative-negative) 130, 361

Anvaya vyatirekī anumāna (affirmative-negative inference) .. 434

Anvaya-vyāpti (affirmative inseparable connection) 361

Anvayī udāharana (homogeneous example) .. 259

Anvayi (exclusively affirmative) 130, 191, 56[1], 437

Anvita-śakti vādimata (opinion of those who hold the power of connected words) 397

Anvitābhidhāna-vāda (expression of the connected) . 147

Ap (water) .. . 393[1]

Apakarsa-sama (balancing the deficit) .. 67, 261

Apadeśa (specification) .. 25

Apara ātmā (individual soul) .. 371

Apavarga (exception) 25, 375, 382

Apavarga nirūpana (nature of emancipation) .. . 397

Apasiddhanta (deviating from the tenet) .. 84, 269

Apārthaka (incoherent) 64, 117, 150, 269 261

Apūrva vādah (doctrine of merit and demerit) .. 449

Page
Apekṣā (inter-relation) 117, 118 (ftn 3)
Apoha (negation of the opposite) 132², 143², 146, 149, 276, 287, 339², 345
Apratipatti (not understanding an argument) 136
Apratibhā (non-ingenuity) 84, 261 269
Apratibhāna (non-ingenuity) 137
Apradarśita vyatireka (fallacy of separation unshown) 180
Apradarśitānvaya (fallacy of connection unshown) . 179, 315
Apramā (error) 138, 389, 395² 409², 410
Aprayojaka (inadmissible) 399 (ftn 1)²
Aprāpta kāla (inopportune) 65, 84, 261, 269
Aprāpti sama (balancing the mutual absence) 67, 261, 268, 288
Abādhita viṣayatvam (object of the sign not being incompatible) 379
Abhāva (non-existence) 56, 95, 97, 97 (ftn. 1), 170, 184², 203, 219, 370, 386, 389², 393², 394², 395, 397, 402, 415
Abhāva vāda (doctrine of non-existence) .. 415
Abhinibodha or Mati (knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind) 161 (ftn. 5)
Abhihitānvaya vāda (connection of the expressed) 147
Abhyanujñā (admission) .. 35
Abhyupagama (implied dogma) .. 39
Abhyupagama siddhānta (conclusion assumed) . .. 239
Abhrānta (devoid of error) .. 310
Amūḍha-vinaya (settlement for the insane) 230
Ayukta (erroneous) 359
Ayogi pratyakṣa (ordinary perception) 208
Artha (object) .. 373, 375, 382
Artha vāda (description) .. 106
Arthasya smaraṇam (recollection of a thing) 144

Page
Arthāntara (shifting the topic) 35 84 269
Arthāpatti (presumption) 23, 33 56 95, 370 397, 433² 451
Arthāpatti sama (balancing the presumption) 67 269, 289
Arhat (one freed from all faults or obstructions) 201
Alaukika pratyakṣa (transcendental perception) 412
Avagraha (distinguishing) 201, 201 (ftn 1)
Avacchinna (determined) 404
Avacchedaka (that which determines) 404
Avadhi (knowledge of things beyond the range of perception) 161 (ftn 5), 169 (ftn. 1)
Avadhi jñāna (limited knowledge) 201
Avayava (member of the syllogism) 49, 51, 52, 60, 103 203, 330, 359², 377³, 258², 333 497, 502³, 374, 373, 341, 436² 457 (ftn 1)
Avayavin (whole) . 103, 339
Avarṇya sama (balancing the unquestionable) 67, 261 265, 289
Avasarpaṇī kāla (period of involution) 164
Avāya (arriving at) . 201
Avijñātārtha (the unintelligible) 84, 261, 279
Avidyā (ignorance) . 271 367²
Avinābhāva (pervasion) 159, 201, 376², 408, 509
Aviśeṣa sama (balancing the non-difference) 67, 266
Avyatireki (unseparated) 199
Avyaya (indeclinable) 119 (ftn. 1)
Avyayībhāva (indeclinable compound) 142
Avyāpti (non-pervasive) .. 364
Avyāpti (being too narrow) .. 414
Avyāptyabhidhāna (non-pervasive example) 349

Page

Asakkaittā (taking some time in making oneself ready) 163
Asiddha (unproved) 362
Asti (it is existence) 184
Aśvinikumāras (the twin gods) 14
Asat (absent) . 284^{8}
Asat khyāti (manifestation of the unreal) 139
Asatah sajjāyate (effect springs up from nothing) 140
Asat pratipaksatvam (there being no counterbalancing sign) 378
Asamavāyi kārana (non-material cause) 383, 390
Asādhanānga vacana (improper reason) 136
Asādhārana (not general) 294, 438
Asiddha (unproved) 178, 293, 313, 438, 439^{2}
Asiddhi (absence of proof) 438
Asu (breath, life) 2
Aham (ego) .. 245
Ahamkāra (ego) 245 (ftn 2)^{8}
Ahetu (fallacy) 34, 51^{4}
Ahetu sama (balancing the non-reason) . 67, 201, 268

Ākānksā (expectancy) 447
Ākānksā vādah (expectancy) 447
Ākaśa (ether) 105, 219, 265
Āksepa (refutation) 43
Ākhyāta (verbal suffix) 447, 453
Ākhyātavāda (doctrine of verbal suffix) .. 453
Āgama (verbal testimony) 162, 170, 189, 192^{2}, 201, 203, 215, 219, 221, 259, 268 265, 358, 359, 360, 370^{1}, 37 tn. 1)
a oir
nat
v
63
9

Page

Ātman (soul) 2, 3 278
Ātma-khyāti (manifestation of the soul) 138
Ātma-vidyā (the science of soul, 43
Ātma sambandha (concerning one's self) 264
Ātmā (soul) 4, 5 148, 204, 126^{2}, 127 (ftn)^{4} 219^{2}, 371^{2} 375^{2}, 382, 386, 393^{3}, 394

Ādityas (a group of gods) . 15
Ādeśa (substitution) 111
Ādheya śakti (power of the content) .. 397
Ānvīksikī (the science of logic) 1, 4^{4}, 38, 39, 40^{2}, 152
Ānvīksikī vidyā (the science of logic) 49, 50^{2}
Āpattādhikarana (case in which a monk has actually transgressed an established rule of good conduct) 229
Āpanno (guilty) . 231
Āpta vākya (reliable assertion) .. 450
Āptopadeśa (reliable assertion) 27, 28, 51

Ābhāsa (fallacy) 188, 192, 203
Ārya (reliable person) 50
Āryas (the civilised) . 107
Ārsa (saintly) . 359
Ālambana (objects of thought) . 322
Ālaya (ego) 245 (ftn. 2)^{1}
Ālaya vijñāna (the abiding cognition, or ego) 146, 245, 245 (ftn 1)
Āśankā (questioning the validity of the instance) 167
Āśankā pratisedha (meeting the question) . 167
Āśraya līna (supportless) 309
Āśrayāsiddha (unproved in respect of the abode) 303, 439
Āśrayaika deśāsiddha (unproved in respect of a part of the abode) 303
Āsattih (contiguity) .. . 447^{1}
Āsrava (action) .. 168
Āsana (seat) .. . 213

Page

Āharaṇa (complete example) 163, 221, 234
Āharaṇa taddeśa (limited example) 163[2]
Āhnika (diurnal portion) . 46

Itaretara (mutually aggregative compound) .. . 452
Itaretarābhāva (mutual non existence) 203
Indra (lord of gods) . .. 142
Indriya (senses) . 41, 375, 382
Indriya nibandhana (through sense-organs) . - 201
Indriya parīkṣā (examination of the sense-organs) .. . 326
Iṣṭa-vighāta-kṛtviruddha (implied contradiction) .. . 315

Īśvara (God) .. 122, 143, 155
Īśvara parīkṣā (examination of God) .. . 325 (ftn)
Īśvara bhanga (non-existence of God) 150
Īśvarānumānam (inference of God) 442
Īhā (inquiring) 201

Ukthādi-gana (a group of words beginning with Uktha) 41, 41 (ftn 5)
Ucchanna-pracchannavāda (doctrine of the sound as destroyed or concealed) . 448
Uccheda-vāda (annihilationism) . 228
Utukkhāna (naming the season) 233
Utkarṣa sama (balancing the excess) 67, 261
Uttara (rejoinder) .. 27, 32, 51
Uttara (posterior) .. 190, 191[2]
Uttara-pakṣa (reply) . .. 25
Uttara-vahinī (flowing towards the north) . .. 519 (ftn 6)
Utpatti (origination) 219
Utsarpaṇī kāla (period of evolution) 158
Udaka (water) . .. 233
Udāharaṇa (example) 60, 119, 121, 191, 221, 239, 264[2], 266, 268, 359, 368, 437[2], 502[3], 504[2]

Page

Udāharaṇābhāsa (fallacious example) . .. 368
Uddeśa (enunciation) 25, 53
Uddhāra (citation) . . 25
Upadeśa (instruction) 25
Upanaya (application) 27, 32, 60, 119[2], 119 (ftn 1), 120, 122, 176, 191, 202, 203, 234, 236, 266, 370, 437[4], 437 (ftn 1), 501, 502, 510
Upanyāsopanaya (anecdote used as an example) . 163
Upapatti sama (balancing the demonstration) 67, 268
Upamāna (comparison) 25, 50 51, 54, 125, 162, 170, 221, 259 265, 266, 268, 287, 359, 384[2], 387[2], 389, 393[2], 394[2], 407, 443, 450
Upamāna khaṇḍa (section of comparison) 443
Upamiti (comparative knowledge) 389[2], 443

Upaniṣad kalpita ātma parīkṣā (examination of the Upaniṣad-doctrine of the soul) 326
Upalabdhi (perception) .. 190
Upalabdhi sama (balancing the perception) 67, 289
Upasarga (prefix) 453
Upasarga vāda (doctrine of prefixes) 453
Upādhi (condition) 140[3], 376, 376 (ftn 4), 378, 384, 399[2], 399 (ftn 1), 400, 428, 431
Upādhi mana (conditional) 399 (ftn 1)
Upadhi vada (doctrine of the conditional middle term) 431
Upaya (favourable condition) .. 27
Upālambha (attribution of censure) 35
Upāsaka (devotee) 304, 334, 335, 332
Upasanā (prayer) . 2
Uposatha (Buddhist sabbath) 232[2], 233[3]
Ubhaya parīkṣā (examination of both) 326
Ubhaya vikala (defective in both) 369

Page

[illegible] 13

[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] 23

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] (... of the ...) [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] (cotton) 23
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] (theory of the earth ...) [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] (a case presented through analogy) [illegible]
Om namaḥ Śivāya (hail, obeisance to Śiva) [illegible]
Ovāla (arrangement) [illegible]

Aupamya (comparison) 27, 32, 33, 31
Aupaniṣadakalpitātma parīkṣā (examination of the soul according to the upaniṣads) 323 (ftn.)
Aupādhika (conditional) 3[illegible]4
Auṣadha (medicine) 34

Kathā (discourse) 31, 62, 233, 270, 37[illegible]
Kapila kalpitātma parīkṣā (examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul) 325 (ftn. 1), 326
Karaṇa (instrument) 27[illegible], 382[illegible], 300, 443
Karma (work) 3
Karma (rituals) 2[illegible]
Karma (action) 27, 32, 279, 287, 326[illegible], 375, 382, 387[illegible], 388, 389, 393[illegible], 394[illegible], 395

Page

[illegible] 12[illegible], 2[illegible], 2[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] (... between karma and ...) 2[illegible]
[illegible] (... of the meaning of the ...) 2[illegible]
[illegible] 12[illegible], 12[illegible], [illegible], 32[illegible]
[illegible] 143
[illegible] (cause) 447
[illegible] (actual perception) [illegible]
Kāraṇa (cause) [illegible], 3[illegible], 2[illegible], 3[illegible]
[illegible] (... of causality) 2[illegible]
Kāraṇa doṣa (defect of argument) 143
Kāraṇa virodhi kāryopalabdhi (perception of effect contrary to the cause) 312
Kāraṇa viruddhopalabdhi (perception contrary to the cause) 312
Kāraṇānupalabdhi (non perception of the cause) 312
Kārya (action) 27
Kārya (causality) 134
Kārya (effect) 159, 190, 191, 140, 256, 290, 311, 332, 382, 3[illegible] [illegible]
Kārya kāraṇa (causal relation) .. 1[illegible]
Kārya kāraṇa bhāva (causality) . 431
Kārya phala (effect) . 27
Kārya yoni (material cause) .. 27
Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi (perception contrary to the effect) . 311
Kārya sama (balancing the effect) 67, 133, 135 (ftn. 4), 268, 289
Kārya hetu (relation of effect) .. 313
Kāryānupalabdhi (non perception of effect) .. 311
Kāryābhinirvṛtti (the aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of an action) . 280, 271
Kāla (time) 27, 106, 219, 393

Page

Āharaṇa (complete example) 163, 221, 234
Āharaṇa-taddeśa (limited example) 163^{2}
Āhnika (diurnal portion) . 46

Itaretara (mutually aggregative compound) .. . 452
Itaretarābhāva (mutual non existence) 203
Indra (lord of gods) 142
Indriya (senses) .. .1, 375, 382
Indriya nibandhana (through sense-organs) . .. 201
Indriya parīkṣā (examination of the sense-organs) 326
Iṣṭa-vighāta-kṛtviruddha (implied contradiction) .. . 315

Īśvara (God) .. 122, 143, 165
Īśvara parīkṣā (examination of God) .. .. 325 (ftn.)
Īśvara bhanga (non-existence of God) 150
Īśvarānumānam (inference of God) 442
Īhā (inquiring) 201

Ukthādi gaṇa (a group of words beginning with Uktha) 41, 41 (ftn 5)
Ucchanna-pracchannavāda (doctrine of the sound as destroyed or concealed) .. . 448
Uccheda-vāda (annihilationism) . 228
Utukkhāna (naming the season) .. 233
Utkarṣa sama (balancing the excess) . .. 67, 261
Uttara (rejoinder) . 27, 32, 51
Uttara (posterior) . 190, 191^{4}
Uttara-pakṣa (reply) .. .., 25
Uttara vahinī (flowing towards the north) .. 519 (ftn. 6)
Utpatti (origination) . .. 219
Utsarpaṇīkāla (period of evolution) 158
Udaka (water) .. . 233
Udāharaṇa (example) 60, 119, 121, 191, 221, 259, 264^{2}, 266, 268, 359, [illegible]

Page

Udāharaṇābhāsa (fallacious example) .. . 368
Uddeśa (enunciation) .. 25, 53
Uddhāra (citation) .. 25
Upadeśa (instruction) 25
Upanaya (application) 27, 32, 60, 119^{2}, 119 (ftn 1), 120 122, 176, 191, 202, 203, 234, 236, 266, 370, 437^{2}, 437 (ftn 1), 501, 502, 510
Upanyāsopanaya (anecdote used as an example) .. 163
Upapatti sama (balancing the demonstration) . 67, 268
Upamāna (comparison) 25, 50, 51, 54, 125, 162, 170, 221, 259, 265, 266, 268, 287, 359, 384^{2}, 387^{2}, 389, 393^{2}, 394^{2}, 407, 443, 450
Upamāna-khaṇḍa (section of comparison) . . , 443
Upamiti (comparative knowledge) 389^{2}, 443

Upaniṣad kalpita ātma parīkṣā (examination of the Upaniṣad-doctrine of the soul) 326
Upalabdhi (perception) .. 190
Upalabdhi sama (balancing the perception) .. 67, 289
Upasarga (prefix) . 453
Upasarga vāda (doctrine of prefixes) , . 453
Upādhi (condition) 140^{3}, 376, 376 (ftn. 4), 378, 384, 399^{2}, 399 (ftn 1), 400, 428, 431
Upādhi māna (conditional) 399 (ftn. 1)
Upādhi vāda (doctrine of the conditional middle term) .. 431
Upāya (favourable condition) .. 27
Upālambha (attribution of censure) 35
Upāsaka (devotee) 304, 334, 335, 339
Upāsanā (prayer) 2
Uposatha (Buddhist sabbath) 232^{2}, 233^{3}
Ubhaya parīkṣā (examination of both) 326
vikala (defective in both) 309

Page

[illegible]

Jñānakarmasamuccaya (aggregate of knowledge and action) 387
Jñāna kāṇḍa (section on knowledge) [illegible]
Jñāna [illegible] [illegible]
Jñāna lakṣaṇa (intercourse whose character is knowledge) 415
[illegible] (example) 163
Ṭol (school) 323 (fn. 1)
Takka (Prākṛ.) (debate) 162, 227
Takki (argumentationist) 21, 227
Takkika (logician) 227, [illegible]

Page

[illegible]

Tarkaṇa (argument) 17, [illegible]
[illegible] (covering mud with grass) 239
[illegible] (the three baskets of Buddhist teachings) [illegible]
Tiryak [illegible] .. 152
Tīrthaṅkara (builder of a landing place in the sea of existence) .. 134
Tuṣānala (penitentiary rite of putting an end to one's life in a slow fire) .. 142
Tūṣṇīm bhāva (speechlessness) .. 132
Tṛṣṇā (lust) .. 371
Tejas (light) .. [illegible]
Trayī (the three Vedas) .. [illegible]

Page

Trasarenu (triad or tertiary compound) 106^{2}
Tripitaka or Pitakatraya (three baskets of Buddhist teachings) 226
Triputī - pratyaksa - vādin (supporter of triangular perception) 418
Trividha parah (three classes of respondents) . . 29

Damsana (*Prak*) (philosophy) 5 (ftn 5)
Darśana (Philosophy) 5 5 (ftn 5), 6, 152
Daśāvayava-vākya (syllogism of ten parts) 166
Dassana (*Pali*) (philosophy) 5 (ftn 5)
Dik (space) 303^{2}
Digambara-parikalpita ātma - parīksā (examination of the Digambara Jaina doctrine of the soul) 326
Dīnāra (the Roman coin *denarius*) 45 (ftn 2)
Dusta-vākyānusarana (adoption of a fallacious reason) 259
Duḥkha (pain) 132, 371, 375^{2}, 382
Duḥkha-satya (misery as a pain) 127 (ftn.)
Dūṣaṇa (refutation) .. 181, 298, 315
Dūsaṇābhāsa (semblance of a refutation) . . 181, 298
Dṛṣṭānta (familiar instance) 27, 32, 52, 59, 128, 128 (ftn. 4), 167, 170^{2}, 177, 191^{2}, 203, 258^{2}, 265, 268 (ftn. 2), 286, 290, 359, 374, 375, 381, 501^{2}
Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacy of example) . .. 178, 193
Deva-ṛṇa (debt to gods) 102 (ftn 1)
Deśa (place) .. 27, 219
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Dravya (cause) . .. 171
Dravya padārtha parīkṣā (examination of the meaning of the word substance) 320
Dravyāstikāya (a group of substance) 216

Page

Dvandva (aggregative compound) 452
Dvātrimśadākāra - śrauta - yutaya (the thirty two forms of set argument) . 42
Dvigu (numeral compound) . 452
Dvividha-sambhāsā (two kinds of debate) 29
Dvyanuka (dyad or binary compound) 106, 442

Dhammatā (law) 500 (ftn 1)
Dharma (duty) 38
Dharma (predicate) 190, 290
Dharma (doctrine) 305′
Dharma (merit) 371
Dharma putra (foster son) 208
Dharmin (subject) 290
Dhātu (root) 447, 453
Dhātu vadah (doctrine of roots)
Dhāraṇā (recollecting) 201
Dhāraṇī (mnemonics) 304
Dhvamsa (destruction) 219

Naya (method of comprehending things from particular standpoints) 168, 174, 181^{2}, 182, 203^{2} 215, 216^{2}, 218
Nayatma-svarūpa-nirnaya (determination of the nature of one-sided knowledge) . 200
Nayābhāsa (fallacy of Naya) 203
Nava dharma (nine sacred works) 242 (ftn 3)
Nāntarīyaka (non-co-presence) 504
Nāma (name) 129 (ftn $3)^{2}$, 171
[illegible] 447
[illegible] 161
[illegible] 14
[illegible] 184
Niḥśreyasa (summum bonum) . 84
Nigamana (conclusion) 27, 32, 42, 60, 119^{2}, 167, 176, 191, 202, 203, 237, 266, 268, 370, 437^{2}, 501, 502
Niggaha (=Sans nigraha) (defeat) 234, 234 (ftn. 2), 236

Page

Nigraha (defeat) 51
Nigraha dosa (defect of understanding) 163
Nigraha sthāna (point of defeat) 35, 44, 51^{3}, 52, 65, 66, 136, 136 (ftn 1) 150, 212, 258, 259, 264, 268, 269, 356, 357, 359, 370, 374, 375, 379, 381
Nitya (eternal) 285^{4}
Nitya sama (balancing the eternal) 67, 269
Nidāna (the introductory part of the Pātimokkha) 233
Nidarśana (example) 25
Nindā (deprecation) 108
Nimitta (efficient cause) 383
Nimitta karana (instrumental cause) 390
Niyoga (injunction) 25
Niranuyojyānuyoga (overlooking the censurable) 84
Niranuyojyānuyoga (censuring the non censurable) 264
Nirarthaka (meaningless) 84, 261, 269
Nirartha-khandana (rejoinder on the ground of meaninglessness) 268
Nirukti (explanation) 487 (ftn 1)
Nirjara (destruction of the consequences of action) 168
Nirnaya (ascertainment) 23^{4}, 52, 62, 258, 359, 370, 374, 375, 381
Niryukti (commentarie) .. 105
Nirvacana (etymological explanation) 25
Nirvāna (Buddhist emancipation) 159^{2} 159 (ftn. 1^{2}, 2), 160^{2}, 160 (ftn 1)
Nirvikalpa (indeterminate) 55
Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) 134, 137^{4}, 138^{2}, 138 (ftn. 1), 179, 360, 383, 390, 418
Nirvikalpaka-vāda (doctrine of indeterminate perception) .. 418
Nirvikalpaka vipratipatti (controversy about indeterminate perception) 397

Pa

Niścita (sure) 376 (ftn 4), 3
Nihksepa (imposition) . 2
Niti or Nyāya (logic) 240^{2}, 240 (ftn
Naigama (non analytical method of description) 161 (ftn 4), 170^{2}, 181, 2
Naigamābhāsa (fallacy of the Naigama) . 2
Nairātmya-vāda (doctrine of non-soul) 127 (ftn
Naiyāyika (logician) 41 (ftn 5), 24
Nyāya (logic) 20, 38, 39^{2}, 40^{2}, 152, 240^{2}, 240 (ftn. 3^{4}), 49
Nyāya (syllogism) 41 (ftn 2), 430
Nyāya tattva (categories of logic) 39
Nyāya pūrvānga (first part of logic) 41 (ftn 2)
Nyāya-vidyā (science of logic) . 78
Nyāya-vaiśesika-parikalpita purusa parīksā (examination of the Nyaya and Vaiśesika doctrine of soul) 328
Nyāya śāstra (science of logic) 39, 40, 110
Nyāya-sūtra (science of true logic) 5
Nyāya-svarūpa (essential form of a syllogism) 41 (ftn. 2)
Nyāyāvayava (members of a syllogism) 42, 289, 289 (ftn 3)
Nyāyāśraya .. 41 (ftn. 2)
Nyāyottaranga (the last part of logic) . .. 41 (ftn. 2)
Nyāyya (reasonable) . 41 (ftn 3)
Nyūna (saying too little) 84, 261, 269

Pakkha (*Prak.*) (party) . 162
Paksa (party) . 162
Paksa (minor term) 176^{4}, 177, 193, 202, 208, 208 (ftn 2), 253, 291, 312, 341, 506
Paksatā (nature of the minor term) 433^{2}, 487 (ftn. 1)
Paksa-dharma (law of extension of the minor term) 251
Paksa-dharma-cakra (wheel of reasons put in order) .. 250 (ftn. 2)

Page

Pakṣa-dharmatā (essential nature of a syllogism) 361, 377, 390

Pakṣa-prayoga (use of the minor term) . 203

Pakṣābhāsa (fallacy of the minor term) 170, 177, 193, 200 (ftn. 1), 312

Pakṣah anumāna-bādhitah (minor term being incompatible with inference) 441

Pakṣaḥ pratyakṣa bādhitaḥ (minor term being incompatible with perception) 440

Pakṣah śabda bādhitah (minor term being incompatible with verbal testimony) 441

Pakṣah sādhya grāhaka-pramāṇa-jātīya pramāṇa-viruddhaḥ (minor term being incompatible with the evidence which is analogous to the evidence that establishes the major-term) .. 441

Pakṣah hetu grāhaka pratyakṣa bādhitaḥ (minor term being incompatible with perception which establishes the middle term) 441

Pakṣaḥ hetu-grāhakānumāna bādhitah (minor term being incompatible with inference which establishes the middle term) 442

Paṅkaja iti padānām yogarūḍhitva kathana (etymologo-conventional use of a word as mud born) . . 397

Paṅkti (a kind of metre) 14

Paccanika-niggaho (adverse controversy) 237

Pañcāvayava (five parts of a syllogism) 286

Pañcāvayava vākya (speech of five parts) 43

Pañjikā (commentary) . 213

Paṇḍita (scholar) .. 240

Paṭikamma (rejoinder) . 235

Page

Paticca samuppāda (=Sans *Pratītya samutpāda*, doctrine of mutual dependence) 227 (ftn 2)

Paṭiññā (=Sans *Pratijñā*) (proposition) 234 234 (ftn 2)

Paṭiññāya kāretabbam (settlement by an undertaking) 230

Patta (sacred chair) 199

Pattakallam (in season) 233

Pathamo niggaho (first defeat) 237

Pada (word) 110^2, 149

Pada-sphoṭa (word explosion) 148, 149

Padārtha (category) 25, 381, 387 389, *393*

Padīpa (lighting a lamp) 238

Pamāṇa (valid knowledge) *161*

Para-ātmā (supreme soul) 371

Paratantra (conditional) 245 245 (ftn 1)

Parama nyāya (conclusion) 42

Paramātmā (supreme soul) 143

Paramāṇu (atom) . 105

Paramārtha (transcendental) 254, 255

Paramārtha sat (absolutely real) 310

Para sambandha (concerning others) 264

Parāmarśa (consideration) 384, 390^2, 420 433^2, 435, 510, 511^2

Parāmarśānurūpānumāna (syllogistic inference) 511

Parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others) 175, 192 202, 276 282, 307, 309, 310, 312 359^2, 361, 435

Parikalpita (false) 245, 245 (ftn

Pariccheda (chapter) 184,

Pariniṣpanna (perfect) 245 245 (ftn 1, 2)

Paribhāṣā (technicality)

Pariṣad (council of debate) 7, 22, 24, 29^2 263

Pariharaṇa-doṣa (avoidance of charges) . . 163

Parihāra (avoidance of defeat) .. 35

Parīkṣā (examination) 26, 27, 28^2, 51 43, 90

Page

Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) [illegible] (ftn 1) [illegible] 213
Parokṣa jñāna (indirect knowledge) 219
Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa ([illegible] of an opponent) 41
Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa (overlooking the censurable) [illegible]
Paryāyākhya (group of attributes) 216
Parvata (a celestial sage) 14
Pātimokkhuddesa (recitation of the code of monastic laws) 233
Pāramārthika (transcendental) 175 201 [illegible]
Pāramārthika avasthā (transcendental condition) 4
Pāramārthika pratyakṣa (transcendental perception) 170 (ftn 1)
Pāramārthika pratyakṣa pramāṇa (transcendental perception) 181
Pārisuddhi (purity) 233
Pāriṣad (council) 22
Pāśupata (follower of Paśupati) [illegible]
Pitṛ ṛṇa (debt to our progenitors) 102 (ftn 1)
Pitṛ yāna (path of the forefathers) 3
Puggala (soul) 235
Putreṣṭi (sacrifice for the sake of a son) 107
Pudgala (burden bearer) 126, 127 (ftn)
Pudgala-vāda (doctrine of the burden-bearer) 127 (ftn)
Punarukta (repetition) 84 255, 269
Purākalpa (narration) 108
Puruṣa (soul) 10, 243 (ftn 2)^{2}
Puruṣa parīkṣā (examination of the soul) 126
Pubba-karaṇa (preparation) 232, 232 (ftn 1) 233
Pubba-kicca (preliminary acts) 232 (ftn 1), 233^{2}
Pūrva (prior) 190^{2}, 191
Pūrva pakṣa (question) 23 424

Pūrvavat (a priori) 28, 115 (ftn 1), [illegible]
P[illegible] 22[illegible]
Pauṣa amāvāsyā (the last day of the month of Pauṣa)
Prakaraṇa (expository treatise)
Prakaraṇa sama (begging the question) 26 63 67 [illegible]
Prakāśa (chapter)
Prakṛti (primordial matter)
Prakṛti (illustration)
Pratijñā (proposition) 27 32, 61 121 168 [illegible] 263, 264, [illegible]
Pratijñāntara (shifting the proposition) 41 [illegible]
Pratijñā vibhakti (limitation of the proposition) 164
Pratijñā virodha (opposing the proposition) 41 [illegible]
Pratijñā saṃnyāsa (renouncing the proposition) 41 137 [illegible]
Pratijñā-hāni (hurting the proposition) 31 41 84, 261, 266, 269
Prati tantra (dogma peculiar to some school) 59
Pratitantra siddhānta (conclusion accepted by a particular school) 259
Pratidṛṣṭānta sama (balancing the counter-example) 67, 201, 268
Pratiyogī (counter-part) 403^{2}, 414
Pratilomatā (making the authorities hostile) 163
Prativādī (opponent) 104, 379
Pratiṣedha (negation) 190
Pratiṣṭhāpanā (counter-demonstration) 27, 32, [illegible]
Pratyakṣa (perception) [illegible], 28, 32, 33, 50, 84, 125, 126, 130, 134, 150, 161 (ftn 5), 162, 169^{2}, 170, 171^{2}, 188, 189, 201, 209, (ftn 1), 215, 221, 239, 264, 265 266, 276, 277, 279, 298, 300, 307, 309, 310, 348, 358, 359^{2}, 360 383^{2}, 387^{2}, 389^{2}, 390, 393^{2}, 394^{2}, 395, 407, 411

Page

Pratyakṣa kāraṇa-vāda (causes of perception) . 416
Pratyakṣa-jñāna (direct knowledge) 219
Pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-parīkṣā (examination of the definition of perception) .. 327
Pratyakṣa-vyavasthā (system of perception) . 309
Pratyakṣa-svarūpa-nirṇaya (determination of the nature of perception) . 200
Pratyakṣābhāsa (fallacy of perception) .. 192, 298
Pratyanuyoga (re-interrogation) 33
Pratyabhijñāna (recognition) 189 201, 215
Pratyabhijñānābhāsa (fallacy of recognition) 193
Pratyaya (inter-relation) 117, 118 (ftn 3)
Pratyuccāraṇa (repetition) . 25
Pradeśa (determination) from a statement to be made) . 25
Pradhāna (Primordial matter) . 325
Pradhvaṃsābhāva (posterior non-existence) 97, 97 (ftn. 1), 184, 203, 394
Pramā (right knowledge) 138^{2}, 389, 394, 395^{2}, 408^{5}, 411
Pramāṇa (means of right knowledge) 23, 28, 43, 49, 50, 51^{4}, 52, 84, 84 (ftn. 1), 113, 155, 158^{4}, 161, 162^{2}, 168, 169, 174^{3}, 181^{5}, 182, 189^{5}, 200, 201^{5}, 201 (ftn 1), 203, 212^{2}, 218^{5}, 256^{3}, 257^{11}, 258, 259, 276^{2}, 277^{2}, 307^{2}, 309, 330, 348, 357^{4}, 358, 359^{4}, 381, 386^{6}, 387^{2}, 389^{3}, 393^{3}, 394, 395^{2}, 402^{6}, 408, 497, 499
Pramāṇa-catuṣṭaya prāmāṇya-vādaḥ (doctrine of the validity of the four means of knowledge) .. 453
Pramāṇa-śāstra (science of right knowledge) 159

Page

Pramāṇa sāmānya lakṣaṇa (general characteristics of valid knowledge) 213
Pramāṇa-siddhi (establishment of proof) 307
Pramāṇa svarūpa (characteristics of valid knowledge) 188
Pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya (determination of the nature of valid knowledge) 200
Pramāṇāntara-parīkṣā (examination of other kinds of valid knowledge) 327
Prameya (object of knowledge) 23 49, 51^{2}, 52 56, 97, 113 158^{3}, 257^{2}, 258, 284, 357^{2}, 359, 370 373^{2}, 374, 375, 381
Prayojana (purpose) 23, 29, 33, 52, 59, 122, 258, 359, 374 375, 361
Pralaya (dissolution of the world) 105
Pralāpita (irrelevant talk) 137
Pravṛtti (exertion) 27, 375, 382, 410
Pravṛtti-vijñāna (continuous flow of momentary cognitions) 146, 245^{4}, 245 (ftn 1)
Prasanga (connected argument) 25
Prasanga-samā (balancing the infinite regression) 67, 268, 289
Praśāstṛ dosa (defeat arising from the authorities) 163
Prāgabhāva (prior non-existence) 97, 97 (ftn. 1), 189, 203, 394
Prāna (breath) 2
Prāpti sama (balancing the co-presence) 67, 261
Prābhākarāh (the Mīmāṃsakas) ..
Prāmānya vāda (the doctrine of the validity of knowledge) . 408
Pretyabhāva (condition after death) . . 375, 382
Phala (result) 188, 375, 382, 511
Phala pramāṇa svarūpādyābhāsa nirṇaya (determination of the consequences and fallacies of knowledge) . . 200

Page

Bandha (bondage) 168
Bahir vyāpti (extrinsic inseparable connection) 177 178 202
Bahuvrīhi (attributive compound) 452
Bādhā (incompatibility) 438
Bādhita (incompatible) 367 (ftn 1) 438, 440[2]
Buddhi (intellect) 52 112 375[2] 382, 387[2] 389[4], 403[1] 305
Brahman (the pervading essence) 4
Brahma-pariṇāma vāda (doctrine of the transformation of Brahman) 52
Brahma-vidyā (divine science) 4
Brāhmaṇa (ritual) 108
Bhāgāsiddha (unproved in respect of a part) 362
Bhāra (burden) 127 (ftn)
Bhāva (entity itself) 171 184, 394[2]
Bhāṣya (commentary) 110, 121
Bhikkhu-gaṇanā (counting the number of monks) 233
Bhūmi (stage) 249
Bhavaitta (creating divisions) 163
Bhaitta (serving the authorities) 163
Bhaiṣajya (medicine) 34
Bhrama (error) *138, 409*
Bhrānta (erring) 273
Bhrānti (blunder) 273

Mangala (benedictory portion) 324 (ftn 3)
Mangala-vāda (invocation of blessings) *408*
Mangalācaraṇa (invocation of blessing) 397
Matānujñā (admission of an opinion) 84, 261 269
Mati (knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind) 169 (ftn 1)
Mati kamma (*deliberation*) 231
Mati bhanga doṣa (defeat arising from the failure of the disputants memory) 163

Page

Madhyama (middle) 249
Manas (*mind*) *110, 201, 278, 280* (ftn. 1), 375[2], 382, 393[2]
Manah (*intelligence*) 2
Manaḥ-paryāya (knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others) 161 (ftn 5) 169 (ftn 1), 201
Manas tattva-nirūpana (*determination of the nature of the mind*) 397
Manonutva-vāda (atomic nature of mind) 417
Mano viññāna (mental perception) 227
Mantras 15
Marut (air) 393[4]
Mahāpratihāra (the great gate-keeper) 322
Mahābhadra kalpa (the very blessed cycle) 225
Mahāyāna (the Great vehicle) 211[5]
Mithyā-jñāna (error) 138
Mīmāṃsaka-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā (examination of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the soul) 326
Mukti (emancipation) 359
Mokṣa (emancipation) 57, 122, 123, 168 181, 359, 370, 371
Mleccha (non-Aryan) 56, 107

Yajña (sacrifice) 316
Yatnaja (product of effort) 283
Yathārthānubhava (right experience) 394
Yama (the god of death) 14
Yava (grain) *107*
Yukta (right) *351*
Yukti (continuous argument) 23, 27, 29
Yuga-pradhāna (foremost man of the age) 164
Yūpa (stake) *15*
Yebhuyyasikā (settlement by a majority) 229
Yoga (union of words) 25
Yoga (concentration) 246, 249
Yoga rūḍha (etymologo-conventional) 451

Page
Yogācāra (practice of meditation) 249
Yogācāra or Vijñāna-vādin (a sect of Buddhist philosophers *who maintain that cognitions* alone are real) . 146
Yogin (contemplative) 359
Yogi-pratyakṣa (contemplative perception) . . 360
Yogyatā (consistency) 447^2
Yaugika (etymological) 451
Yaugika-rūḍha (etymological conventional) . . 451

Rudra (a sect of gods) 15
Rūḍha (conventional) . 451
Rūpa (form) . 126^2, 389
Rūpa (matter) 238

Lakkhaṇāyutti kathā (definition *of terms*) 238
Lakṣaṇa (definition) 53
Lakṣaṇa-doṣa (defect of definition) 163
Lakṣaṇā (implication) 450, 451^2
Laghu-ṭīkā (light commentary) 211
Liṅga (sign) 175, 190, 290, 377^2, 383, 508
Liṅga-parāmarśa (remembrance of *a sign; a syllogism from a* sign) 130 (ftn. 1), 435, 510, 511
Liṅga-parāmarśādi-nirūpaṇa (determination of the consideration of the sign, etc.) . 397
Liṅgasya *trai-rūpyam* (three characteristics of the middle term) 291 (ftn 1)
Lekhaka (writer) .. . 379
Lokāyata (casuist) . 240 (ftn. 3)
Laukika (personal) . *175, 359*
Laukika-pratyakṣa (ordinary-pratyakṣa)

Vacana-śodhana (clearing the meaning of terms) 238
Vajra (thunderbolt) .. 272
Vanya (wild) .. 484 (ftn. 1)

Page
Varṇa sphoṭa (letter-explosion) 148
Varṇya-sama (balancing the subject) .. 34, 67, 289
Vartamāna (present time) 106 (ftn 1)
Vasu (a sect of gods) 15
Vastu-doṣa (defect of the subject) 163
Vastu-prativikalpa vijñāna (objectified knowledge) 245
Vāk-chala (quibble in respect of a term) 260
Vākovākya (grammar, rhetoric or *debate)* *43, 45 (ftn. 5)*
Vākya (sentence) 143
Vākya-doṣa (defect of speech) 34 259
Vākya-praśaṁsā (excellence of speech) 34, 259
Vākya-sphoṭa (sentence-explosion) 148, 140
Vākya-śeṣa (context) 25, 459
Vājapeya (a sacrifice) *14*
Vāda (discussion) 23, 31 49 51^5 52, 62^2, 104, 204, 229, 258, 359, 370, 374, 375, 378, 379, 381
Vāda maryādā (limits of debate) 31
Vāda-mārga (course of debate) 27^4, 31, 61
Vāda-vidyā (art of discussion) 7, 26, 27, 28
Vāda-viśadī-karaṇa (elucidation of debate) 259
Vādī (disputant) 195, 204, 379
Vādi-prativādi-nyāya-nirṇaya (*determination of the right procedure* of a disputant and his opponent) . .
Vādopāya (expedients of debate)
Vāyu-pratyakṣatvādimata-khaṇḍana *(refutation of the perceptibility of air)* .. . 397
Vārttā (commerce) .. . 6
Vātsīputra-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā (examination of the Vātsīputra *doctrine of the soul)* 326
Vāhyārtha-parīkṣā (examination of external objects) 327

Page

[illegible] ([illegible] [illegible] external reality) 343
[illegible] (doctrine of the external world) [illegible]
[illegible] ([illegible] of external things) 210
[illegible] [illegible] 21
[illegible] [illegible] 22
[illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] 209
[illegible] [illegible] 111
[illegible] [illegible] 64, 79
[illegible] [illegible] of opponents) 79
Vigṛhya-sambhāṣā (hostile debate) 79
Vijñāna (knowledge) 120 129 243
Vijñāna-vāda (idealism) 120 129 (fn. 3) 230 249
Vijñānavādin see Yogācāra) 145
Vijñāna (knowledge) 227 227 (fn. 3)
Vitaṇḍā (cavil) 23 31 51 52 62, 63, 240 (fn. 3), 246 247 339 370, 374 375 379 381
Vitarka (speculation) 162
Vidyā (knowledge) 347
Vidhāna (arrangement) 23
Vidhi (injunction) 104 120 449
Vidhi-vāda (doctrine of injunction) 449
Vipakṣa (counter proposition) 166, 253 254 361 433
Vipakṣa pratiṣedha (opposition to the counter-proposition) 166
Vipakṣa asattvam (non-existence of the sign in heterologues) 378
Viparīta-khaṇḍana (contrary rejoinder) 208
Viparīta-vyatireka (of contrary separation) 160
Viparīta vyāpti (inverse pervasion) 309
Viparīta-vyāptyabhidhāna (example with inverse pervasion) 309
Viparītānvaya (of inverted connection) 179, 297, 315
Viparyaya (reversion) 25, 201, 359

[illegible] [illegible] on the basis of [illegible]) 214
[illegible] (misunderstanding an argument) 146
Vibhakti (case-ending) 442
Vibhāṣā (commentary) 247
[illegible] [illegible] 142
[illegible] ([illegible]) 209, 211, 229
Viruddha (contradictory) 13 174, 202 294, 313, 343, 434 437
Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi (perception of the opposite effect) 311
Viruddhāvyabhicārī (non-erroneous contradiction) 316, 324, 364
Virodha (contradiction) 426
Vivarta-vāda parīkṣā (examination of the doctrine of evolution) 327
Vivādādhikaraṇa (case pertaining to differences of opinion) 229
Vivṛti (lucid gloss) 431
Viśeṣa (particularity) 27, 32, 135, 137 279 292 373, 392, 357, 388, 389, 393, 394, 399, 402
Viśeṣaṇatā (qualification or particularity) 133, 412, 415, 416
Viśeṣaṇāsiddha (unproved in respect of the adjective) 362
Viśeṣa vyāpti (invariable concomitance of special forms) .. 426
Viśeṣyāsiddha (unproved in respect of the substantive) 362
Viṣama-vyāpti (non-equipolent concomitance) .. 399
Viṣaya (object of knowledge) 185, 192
Viṣaya kāṇḍa (section on subject) 394
Viṣaya svarūpa nirṇaya (determination of the nature of objects of knowledge) .. 200
Vīmāṃsā (casuistry) . 227
Vīmāṃsī (casuist) 21, 227
Vṛtti (commentary) 214
Vṛtti (indication) . 449
Vṛhatī (a kind of metre) .. 15
Vedas . .. 14

Page

Vedanā (feeling) 126[2], 238

Vaidharmya (heterogeneous) 176, 191, 264, 287, 290, 368 502

Vaidharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacy of the heterogeneous example) 179, 180, 297

Vaidharmyavat (negative inference) . . . 312

Vaidharmya sama (balancing the heterogeneity) 67, 266, 289

Vyakti (individual) . .. 219

Vyatireka (relating to things) 192

Vyatireka (negative) .. 361

Vyatireka-vyāpti (invariable separation) 180, 361

Vyatirekī (exclusively negative) 130, 191, 286, 287, 437

Vyatirekī udāharaṇa (heterogeneous example) .. 259

Vyadhikaraṇa - dharmāvacchinnābhāva (non-existence whose counter part is qualified by a nature abiding in different locus) 423

Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha (unproved on account of abiding in a different locus) . 362

Vyabhicāra (erraticalness) . 434

Vyartha-viśeṣaṇāsiddha (unproved on account of the adjective being useless) .. . 363

Vyartha viśeṣyāsiddha (unproved on account of the substantive being useless) 363

Vyavasāya (ascertainment) .. 33

Vyavahāra (practical method of description) 161 (ftn. 4), 181, 216, 450

Vyavahārābhāsa (fallacy of the practical) 203

Vyākaraṇa (grammar) .. 450

Vyākhyāna (description) .. 25

Vyāghāta pradarśana (showing absurdity) 263

Vyāghra (tiger) . . 393

Vyāghra-śiśuka (tiger cub) . 207

Vyāpaka (pervader) .. 189, 220

Pa

Vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi (perception contrary to the container) 31

Vyāpakānupalabdhi (non-perception of the pervader) 31

Vyāpāra (operation) . 443, 51

Vyāpti (invariable concomittance) 140, 177[2], 179, 189[1], 292, 361, 376, 384, 390, 396, 404, 406 (ftn 5), 421, 454, 509, 51

Vyāpti-graha (indication or the process of ascertaining the middle term and the major term) 21

Vyāpti grahopāya (means of apprehending invariable concomittance) 42

Vyāpti-grahopāya-siddhānta (conclusion as to the means of apprehending invariable concommittance) 42

Vyāpti-nirūpaṇa (determination of invariable concomittance) 39

Vyāpti-pañcakam (five provisional definitions of invariable concomittance) 421, 487 (ftn. 1

Vyāptyanugama (comprehensiveness of invariable concomittance) 42

Vyāptyasiddhi (unproved in respect of invariable concomittance) . 44

Vyāpya (pervaded) 189, 190[2], 191,

Vyāpyatvāsiddha (unproved in respect of accompaniment) ..

Vyāvahārika (practical) 170, 171, 1

Vyāvahārika-daśā (practical condition) .. . ..

Vyoma (ether) . ..

Vrata (religious vow) 164,

Śakti (strength) . . 171

Śakti (potentiality) .. .. 450[4]

Śakti nirūpaṇa and upādhi (ascertainment of power and condition) 397

Śakti-vāda (doctrine of potentiality of word) . 443

Page

ya (sāpti) (capacity of the ex
mple to warrant the conclusion) 122
ta (strong) 171
hita (suspected) 163, 274 (ftn. 4)
ra (body) 273, 282
da (sound) 109, 444
da (verbal testimony) 58, 123
252, 237, 270 (ftn. 1), 34, 242,
243^{1}, 324, 437, 441, 443, 470
da (verbal method of descrip
on) 161 (ftn. 4), 170, 171, 193, 316
da (word) 33, 51, 54, 264^{1}
da khaṇḍa (book of verbal tes
mony) 444
da nirūpaṇam (definition of ver
al testimony) 444
da pramāṇa (verbal testimony
s a means of valid knowledge)
327, 444
da-prāmāṇya-vāda (speech as
eans of valid knowledge) 445
da bodha (verbal knowledge)
443^{2}, 470
da-Brahma parīkṣā (examina
on of Brahma the presiding
ity of sound) 326
dasya śravaṇam (hearing of a
ord) 444
dānityatā-vāda (doctrine of
he non-eternity of sound) 448
dābhāsa (fallacy of verbal tes
mony) 204
dārtha (words and their mean
gs) 106
dārtha-parīkṣā (examination
the meaning of the word
ound) 327
ākā-parīkṣā (probe-examination)
461, 522, (ftn. 1)
a śṛṅga (hare horn) 424
hās (spiritual genealogy) 25, 168
ra (scripture) .. 23^{1}
traja-śabda (spiritual testi
ony) 175

Page

Śūnyatā (voidness) 22, 118 (ftn. 3),
245 (ftn. 2), 254, 255
Śūnya-vāda (doctrine of voidness)
118 (ftn.), 262
Śeṣavat (a posteriori) 24, 118 (ftn. 1), 260, 478
Śaivas (followers of Śiva) . 154
Śrāvaka (layman) . 223
Śravaṇa (audition) 253
Śrāvikā (laywoman) .. 223
Śruta (knowledge of things acquired through reasoning and study) 161 (ftn. 3), 162 (ftn. 1)
Śruta kevalin (one versed in the 14 pūrvas of the Dṛṣṭivāda) . 164
Śruti parīkṣā (examination of scripture) . 327
Śrutyaprāmāṇya (denial of the authority of the Veda) 143, 149

Ṣaṭ pakṣī kathā (six winged disputation) . 82
Ṣaḍ-darśana (six systems of philosophy) . 152^{4}, 153
Ṣaḍ-darśana vicāra (criticism of the six systems of philosophy) .. 153
Ṣaṭ-lakṣaṇa-vyākhyā (explanation of six characteristics) . 332

Sakala (perfect) . .. 201
Sakala-tārkika-cakra-cūḍāmaṇi (the crest gem of the circle of all logicians) . .. 185
Saṅgha (council) .. 230^{2}, 231^{2}, 232
Sat (present) .. .. 234^{1}
Sataḥ sajjāyate (effect pre-exists in its cause) . .. 141
Sat-pratipakṣa (counter-balance) 438^{2}, 439

Sativinaya (settlement from recollection) .. .. .. 230^{2}
Sadasat (partly present and partly absent) .. .. 234^{4} 14
Sadyaska (a kind of sacrifice) . 398
Sandigdha (doubtful) ..

Page

Sandigdha-viśeṣaṇā-siddha (unproved on account of the adjective being doubtful) 363
Sandigdha-viśeṣyā siddha (unproved on account of the substantive being doubtful) . 303
Sandigdhā-siddha (unproved on account of the reason being doubtful) . 363
Sandhāya (peacefully) 29
Sannikarṣa (intercourse) 130, 411
Sapakṣa (homologue of the reason) 283, 284, 361, 433
Sapakṣe sattvam (existence of the sign in the homologue) .. 378
Saptabhangī-naya (sevenfold paralogism) .. , 203, 212, 221
Sabhā (council) 22, 27
Sabhā-pati (president) 204, 379
Sabhya (member) 204, 379
Samabhirūḍha (subtle verbal method of description) 161 (ftn 4), 171[4], 181, 216
Samabhirūḍhābhāsa (fallacy of the subtle) 204
Samayocita-vākya (opportune speech) .. 259
Samavāya (inherence) 27, 32, 130, 134, 219, 287, 333, 375, 382, 383[1], 387[4], 389[4], 393[4], 394[4], 395, 402, 412, 413, 414 449 (ftn. 1), 508
Samavāya-vāda (doctrine of inherence) 414
Samavāya-śabdārtha parīkṣā (examination of the meaning of the word 'co-existent cause') .. 327
Samavāyābhāva (absolute non-existence) 184
Samavāyi-kāraṇa (material cause) 382, 390
Samaveta-samavāya (inherent inherence) 130, 412, 413
Sama-vyāpti (equipotent concomitance) 399
Samāna-tantra (allied system) . 373

Page

Samāropa (superimposition) 201
Samāropita (charged) 140
Samāsa (compound) 452
Samāsa-vādaḥ (doctrine of compound words) 452
Samāhāra (unified aggregative compound) 452[2]
Samiti (council) 22
Samuccaya (aggregate) 25
Samkramaṇa-doṣa (diversion to other subjects) 163
Samketa (signification) 450
Samkhyaikānta (final signification of numbers) 114
Samkhyaikānta-vāda (doctrine of the fixity of things signified by numbers) 16 (ftn. 1)
Samgāmāvacara bhikku (member of a council) .. .. 231[2]
Samgraha (collective method of description) 161 (ftn 4), 170, 171, 181, 216
Samgrahābhāsa (fallacy of the collective) . 203
Samjñā (sensation) . 120[2]
Sambhava (probability) 25, 56 95, 170, 370, 387
Sambhava (the originating cause) 33
Sambhāṣā (method of debate) . 28
Sambhāṣā praśamsā (utility of debate) .. .
Sambhāṣā-vidhi (method of debate) 28,
Sammajjanī (cleansing the ground) .
Sammukhābhinaya (settlement in presence) 230
Samyukta-viśeṣaṇatā (united particularity) . .. 416
Samyukta samavāya (conjoined inherence) . 130, 412, 413, 414
Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya (conjoined inherent inherence) 130, 412
Samyoga (conjunction) 130, 412[4]
Samvara (restraint) .. . 168
Samvṛti (veil) .. . 145

Page

Saṃvṛti ([illegible]) [illegible]

Saṃvṛti ([illegible]) [illegible]

Saṃśaya (doubt) [illegible]

Saṃśaya-[illegible] ([illegible]) 31

Saṃśaya-vyudāsa ([illegible] questions) 122

Saṃśaya-sama (balancing the doubt) 24, 67, [illegible] 259

Saṃsad (council) 22

Saṃsarga-bodha (knowledge of the mutual connection of things) 444

Saṃsargābhāva (negation of correlation) 97 (ftn 1) 324

Saṃsāra (path of transmigration) 3

Saṃsāra-santati-parīkṣā (examination of continuity of the world) 127

Saṃskāra (impression) 126

Saṃhitā (hymn) 108

Sarva tantra (dogma of all schools) 39

Sarva tantra siddhānta (conclusion accepted by all schools) 259

Sarva-deva nāyaka (the leader of all deities) 322

Savikalpa (determinate) 55

Savikalpaka (determinate) 134, 137^2, 138, 139 (ftn 1), 179, 300, 383, 393

Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa (determinate perception) 383

Savikalpaka-vāda (doctrine of the determinate) 419

Savyabhicāra (erratic) 33, 63, 438

Savyabhicāra (undistributed middle) 260

Śāśvata-vādā (eternalists) 228

Sahakāri-kāraṇa (causality) 134

Sahacāra (simultaneous) 190, 191^2, 427

Sahaja śakti (natural power) 397

Sādṛśya (likeness) 443

Sādhaka (theory of proof) 266, 514

Sādhana (medicine) 34

Sādhana (middle term) 180^2, 190, 290

Sādhana vikala (defective as to the middle term) 32

Sādhanāvyāvṛtta (example of excluded middle term) 32

Sādharmya (homogeneousness) 179, [illegible]

Sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta (affirmative example) [illegible]

Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacy of the homogeneous example) 171, 256 (ftn 1)

Sādharmya-vat (positive inference) [illegible]

Sādharmya-sama (balancing the homogeneity) 67, 256, 259, [illegible]

Sādhāraṇa (general) 23

Sādhu (monk)

Sādhya (major term) 173, 178, 179, [illegible] (ftn 2), [illegible]

Sādhya vikala (example defective in the major term) 32

Sādhya sama (counter-questioned) 63, 67, 256, [illegible] 259

Sādhyāsiddha (unproved as the part of the major term) 40, 23

Sādhvī (nun)

Sāmānya (generality) 27, 55, 138, 193, 279, 287^2, 295, 333, 373, 355, 357^2, 358, 359, 393^2, 394^2, 395, 402, 457 (ftn 1)

Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa (commonly seen) 56, 116 (ftn 1) 201, 499

Sāmānyato-'dṛṣṭa (not commonly seen) 57

Sāmānya lakṣaṇa (like any one of its kind) 310

Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa (intercourse whose character is general) 415, 429

Sāmānya lakṣaṇa siddhānta (conclusion about the intercourse whose character is general) 430

Sāmānya-viśeṣa (general particular) 177

Sāmānya-viśeṣa-śabdārtha parīkṣā (examination of the meaning of

Page
Vedanā (feeling) 120², 238
Vaidharmya (heterogeneous) 176, 191, 264, 287, 290, 368, 503
Vaidharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacy of the heterogeneous example) 179, 180, 297
Vaidharmyavat (negative inference) .. 312
Vaidharmya-sama (balancing the heterogeneity) . 67, 208, 289
Vyakti (individual) .. 219
Vyatíreka (relating to things) .. 192
Vyatireka (negative) .. . 361
Vyatireka-vyāpti (invariable separation) . 180, 361
Vyatirekī (exclusively negative) 130, 191, 286, 287, 437
Vyatireki-udāharaṇa (heterogeneous example) .. 253
Vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinnābhāva (non-existence whose counter part is qualified by a nature abiding in different locus) 423
Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha (unproved on account of abiding in a different locus) .. 222
Vyabhicāra (erraticalness) .. [illegible]
Vyartha-viśeṣaṇāsiddha [illegible] on account [illegible]

Page
Vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi (perception contrary to the container) .. .. [illegible]
Vyāpakānupalabdhi (non-perception of the pervader) .. [illegible]
Vyāpāra (operation) .. [illegible]
Vyāpti (invariable [illegible] 140, 177², 179, [illegible] 384, 390, 395, 434, [illegible]
Vyāpti-graha (induction or the process of ascertaining the middle term and the major term) .. [illegible]
Vyāpti-grahopāya (means of apprehending invariable concomitance) .. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Index of Sanskrit Terms

	Page
Saṁvṛti (illusory)	303
Saṁvṛti (conventional)	224
Saṁśaya (doubt) 23, 33, 51, 52, 64, 103, 123, 201, 248, 329, 374, 375, 381	
Saṁśaya-vidhi (method of debate)	31
Saṁśaya-vyudāsa (dispelling all questions)	122
Saṁśaya-sama (balancing the doubt) 31, 67, 250, 261, 268, 243	
Saṁsad (council)	22
Saṁsarga-jñānaḥ (knowledge of the mutual connection of things)	444
Saṁsargābhāva (negation of correlation) 97 (ftn 1)	394
Saṁsāra (path of transmigration)	3
amsāra-santati parīkṣā (examination of continuity of the world)	327
mskāra (impression)	126¹
hitā (hymn)	108
rva tantra (dogma of all schools)	50
rva-tantra siddhānta (conclusion accepted by all schools)	259
a-daṇḍa nāyaka (the leader of daṇḍas)	322
alpa (determinate)	33
lpaka (determinate) 134, 138, 139 (ftn 1), 179, 300,	383, 390
paka-pratyakṣa (determinate perception)	383
aka-vāda (doctrine of the determinate)	419
āra (erratic)	33, 63, 438²
āra (undistributed middle)	260
dā (eternalists)	228
raṇa (causality)	134
multaneous)	190, 191², 427
(natural power)	397
ness)	443
ry of proof)	266, 514
hoine)	34
lle term)	180³, 190, 290

	Page
Sādhana vikala (defective in the middle term)	363
Sādhanāvyāvṛtta (example of excluded middle term)	363
Sādharmya (homogeneousness) 176, 191, 264², 267, 269, 304, 302	
Sādharmyodāharaṇa (affirmative example)	302
Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacy of the homogeneous example)	178, 298 (ftn. 1)
Sādharmya-vat (positive inference)	312
Sādharmya sama (balancing the homogeneity)	67, 258, 259
Sādhāraṇa (general)	293, 438
Sādhu (monk)	223
Sādhya (major term) 173, 176², 177², 178², 179, 180³, 189, 264, 268, 268 (ftn 2), 282, 283, 290, 377, 383	
Sādhya vikala (example defective in the major term)	368
Sādhya sama (counter-questioned)	63, 67, 256, 260, 268, 289
Sādhyāsiddha (unproved on the part of the major term)	443
Sādhvī (nun)	223
Sāmānya (generality) 27, 32, 138, 192, 279, 287², 295, 333, 375, 382, 387², 388, 389, 393², 394², 395,	402, 487 (ftn 1)
Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa (commonly seen)	56, 116 (ftn 1), 280, 499
Sāmānyato-'dṛṣṭa (not commonly seen)	56
Sāmānya lakṣaṇa (like any one of its kind)	310
Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa (intercourse whose character is general)	412, 429
Sāmānya lakṣaṇa siddhānta (conclusion about the intercourse whose character is general)	430
Sāmānya-viśeṣa (general particular)	177
Sāmānya-viśeṣa-śabdārtha parīkṣā (examination of the meaning, of	

Page

the words 'generality' and 'particularity') 327
Sāmānya-śabdārtha parikṣā (examination of the meaning of the word 'generality') .. 320
Sāmānyābhāvah (non existence of the general form) . 425
Sāmprata (suitable) 171[8]
Sāmvyavahārika (practical) 201
Sāmvyavahārika pratyaksa (practical perception) 170 (ftn 1)
Sāvaka (layman) 229
Siddha-sādhana (demonstration of what has already been established) 230
Siddhānta (conclusion) 27, 32, 33, 52, 59, 258, 259, 264, 359, 374, 375, 381, 504
Siddhānta laksana (conclusive definition) 424
Siddhārtha (inseparable meaning) 397
Simha (lion) 398
Simha-vyaghrokta laksana (definition as given by the Lion and the Tiger) 396 400 (ftn 5)
Simha-vyaghrokta vyāpti-laksana (definition of invariable concomitance given by the Lion and the Tiger) 423
Simha-śiśuka (lion cub) 207
Sukha (pleasure) . 280
Suddhika-samsandana (simple comparison) .. . 237
Suvarna taijasa-prakarana (section on gold as a fiery thing) . 397
Sūtrānta or suttānta (original text) 248[5]
Sota-viññāna (auditory perception) 227
Skandhas (aggregates of beings) 126[2], 127 (ftn)[2]
Stuti (valediction) .. . 108
Sthāpanā (demonstration) 28, 42, 43, 51, 171, 500[4]
Sthira padārtha parikṣā (examination of the permanence of entities) 326

Pag

Sthira bhāva parikṣā (examination of permanent entities) 325 (ftn)
Sthūla-hasta (rugged hand) 273
Sparśa (tangible) 285
Sphota (outburst of a conglomerate sound) 131, 132[4], 148[4], 149[4]
Sphota-vāda (doctrine of phonetic explosion) 131[5]
Smarana (recollection) 201
Smarana-pratyabhijñāna-tarkanumāna-svarūpa-nirnaya (determination of the nature of recollection, recognition, argumentation, and inference) 200
Smaranabhasa (fallacy of recollection) 193
Smrti (scripture) 23
Smrti (memory) 112[2], 189, 215, 393[2], 395
Syad asti (may be, it is) 184
Syād-nasti (may be, it is not) 184
Syad-vāda (see Sapta-bhangi naya) 184, 219
Syad vāda śruta (perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints) 181
Svatah pramanya vada (doctrine of self-evidence) 326 (ftn), 32*
Svabhāva (relation of identity) 140, 191[4], 258, 280, 311, 337 403,
Svabhāva-parikṣā (examination of nature) . .
Svabhāva viruddhopalabdhi (perception contrary to identity) . 31,
Svabhāva hetu (relation of identity) 318
Svabhāvānupalabdhi (non perception of identity) . 311
Svarūpa (specific individual) 129
Svarūpāsiddha (unproved in respect of nature) 362, 439
Sva-laksana (like itself) . 310
Sva samjñā (special term) . 25
Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own self) 175, 192, 202, 276, 280, 307, 309[2], 310, 359[4], 381, 435[4]

Page

Hāra (bearer) 127 (*ftn*]

Hīnayāna (the little vehicle) 241

Hetu (middle term or reason) 5, 22, 27^{2}, 28, 32, 32 (ftn 1), 60, 121, 162^{2}, 166, 175, 176^{2}, 177^{2}, 178^{2}, 190, 190^{2}, 193, 202^{2}, 263, 264^{2}, 265, 266, 268^{2}, 264 (ftn 2), 284, 286, 290, 291, 377, 437^{2}, 500, 502, *503, 504*

Hetu (means of knowledge) 51, 161, *162, 189*

Hetu (cause) 240 (ftn 3)^{2}, 404

Hetu cakra (wheel of reasons) 299 (*ftn* 2)

Hetu-dṛṣṭānta (reason and example) 276

Hetu-doṣa (committing fallacies) 163

Hetu prayoga (use of the middle term) 203

Hetu vāda (theory of reasons) 23

Page

Hetu-vādin (logician) . 39

Hetu vidyā (logic) 240 (ftn 3)

Hetu-vibhakti (limitation of the reason) . . 198

Hetu-śāstra (logic) 7, 37, 40

Hetvantara (shifting the reason) 33, 84, 289

Hetvartha (implication) 23

Hetvasiddhi (unproved on the part of the reason) 440

Hetvābhāsa (semblance of a reason) 51^{2}, 52, 63, 84, 137, 178, 193, 238, 253, 269, 283 (ftn 1), 313, 339, 362, 374, 375, 379, 381, 393 (ftn 1), 438^{2}

Hetvābhāsa sāmānya nirukti (general definition of fallacy) . 438

Hetvābhāsānām asādhukatā sādhakatva nirūpaṇam (determination of the serviceableness of fallacies) . . 441

TIBETAN INDEX.

[illegible] given as are referred to in some specific Tibetan connection Only those works are quoted of which the Tibetan versions are mentioned Indian pandits collaborating in Tibetan translation, but whose Tibetan names are not given, are excluded On the contrary the names of Tibetan interpreters have all been given A list of Indian translator-pandits may be found on p 353 Also excluded are the details contained in appendices H, I and J except a very few items. A list of errata, as far as observed, but only in Tibetan words, or connected with them, is added The plan of the index is as follows —

I Logical terms—Tibetan, Sanskrit, English

II. Initial words of Tibetan quotations.

III. Books
  1 Titles of Logical Books—Tibetan, Sanskrit, English.
  2. id —Sanskrit only
  3 References to (a) the Tanjur
    (b) the Kanjur
  4. References to other Tibetan works
  5. References to other Indian works
  6. References to 'Tibetan books' in general
  7. Modern books quoted

IV Proper names.
  1 Tibetan.
  2. Indian
  3 Modern authors

V. Place names
  1. Tibetan spelling
  2. English spelling

VI. Residuals
  1. Tibetan.
  2. English

VII Errata.

J v. M.

I LOGICAL TERMS

Page

[illegible] parikalpita, fanciful or erroneous [illegible] 243 n 1

[illegible] saṃvṛti satya, conditional truth 234 n 2

[illegible] ālaya vijñāna, knowledge which constitutes the basis or foundation of all the basic knowledge 243 n 1

[illegible] puruṣa parīkṣā, examination of the soul 328

[illegible] or [illegible] viśeṣa, particularity 257

[illegible] vyāpti, universal invariable inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term [illegible]

[illegible] sāṃkhya or kapila [illegible]

[illegible] avayava siddhānta or tabulated tenet member 34 n 2 [illegible]

[illegible] prayojana, motive, purpose 34 n 2 [illegible]

[illegible] 231

[illegible] 316

[illegible] parīkṣā, examination of the doctrine of [illegible] 327

[illegible] examination [illegible] 326

[illegible] 34 n 2

[illegible] 327

[illegible]

Page

[illegible] or [illegible] sādhana, hetu liṅga, middle term reason, mark [illegible]

[illegible] or [illegible] sādhya, anumeya, major term, syllogism 242

[illegible] sādhyasamā 243

[illegible] see [illegible]

[illegible] pratyakṣa, perception 33 n 1, 270, 277 n 1, [illegible], 307, 309

[illegible] pratyakṣa lakṣaṇa parīkṣā, examination of the definition of perception 317

[illegible] pratyakṣa vyavasthā, system of perception [illegible]

[illegible] pratyakṣābhāsa, fallacy of perception [illegible]

[illegible] siddhānta, avayava, member of syllogism, tenet, syllogism 34 n 2 [illegible]

[illegible] nigrahasthāna, a reason why one may be declared unfit to continue the controversy, point of defeat 34 n 2

[illegible] or [illegible] dharma or sādhya, predicate or major term [illegible]

[illegible] contradiction 313 314

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Page

ཆོས མི མཐུན མཚུངས vaidharmya-samā .. 289

འཇིག རྟེན རྒྱུད པའི བརྟག པ samsārā-santati-parīksā, examination of the continuity of the world 327

རྗེས དཔག *see* རྗེས སུ དཔག anumāna, inference 280, 298

རྗེས དཔག ལྟར སྣང anumānābhāsa, fallacy of inference 298

རྗེས སུ འགྲོ བ ཕྱིན ཅི ལོག པ viparītānvaya, fallacy of inverse connection . 297

རྗེས སུ འགྲོ བ མེད ananvaya, absence of connection .. 297

རྗེས སུ དཔག *see* རྗེས དཔག

རྗེས སུ དཔག པ བརྟག པ anumānaparīksā, examination of inference 327

བརྗོད པ jalpa, wrangling 54 *n* 2

བརྗོད མཚུངས varṇyasamā 288, 289

ཉེར འཇལ upamāna, comparison 287

གཉིས ཀ བརྟག པ ubhaya-parīksā, examination of both [nature and sense-organs] . . 326

གཏན ཚིགས hetu, reason, middle term 258, 286

གཏན ཚིགས *or* བསྒྲུབ པར བྱེད hetu, linga, sādhana, middle term, reason, mark 290

གཏན ཚིགས ལྟར སྣང [བ] hetvābhāsa, fallacy of the middle term 293 *n* 1, 258

གཏན ཚིགས དང དཔེ hetu-dṛṣṭānta, reason and example .. 276

གཏན ཚིགས (ཀྱི) ཚུལ གསུམ lingasya trairūpyam, three characteristics of the middle term .. 291 *n* 1

གཏན ཚིགས རིག པ hetu śāstra, hetu vidyā, science of reasoning . 7 *n* 7

གཏན ལ ཕབ པ nirṇaya .. 258

གཏན ལ དབབ པ nirnaya, demonstration, ascertainment .. 54 *n* 2

རྟགས mark 298

རྟོག གེ tarka, corroborating a proposition by showing that its denial is impossible, *reductio ad absurdum*, confutation, 54 *n* 2, 258

རྟོག གེ རིག tarka-vidyā, art of debate . 7 *n* 10

ལྟ བ darsana philosophy 5 *n* 5

ལྟག གཅོད jati, analogue, far fetched analogue, . 258, 276, 288

ལྟག ཆོད jāti, evasive answer analogue . 54 *n* 2

སྟོང པ ཉིད śūnyatā [śūnya vada], the absolute, the void 254 *n* 2

བརྟན པའི དངོས པོ བརྟག པ sthira padār tha parīksa, examination of the permanence of entities 326

ཐལ བ མཚུངས prasanga samā . 289

ཐུན མོང sadhāraṇa, the too general 293

ཐུན མོང མ ཡིན asādharaṇa, the not general enough 294

ཐེ ཚོམ samśaya, doubt 54 *n* 2, 258

ཐེ ཚོམ མཚུངས samśaya samā 289

ཐོས པ བརྟག པ sruti-parīksā, examination of śruti or scripture 327

དུས གསུམ བརྟག པ kālatraya parīkṣā, examination of the three times 327

དོན རྟོགས མཚུངས arthapatti sama 289

དོན དམ པའི བདེན པ paramārtha satyā, transcendental truth 254 *n* 2

འདུ ཁྱད samavāya, inherence . 287

འདུ བའི ཚིག དོན བརྟག པ samavāya-śabdārtha-parīksā, examination of the word 'co-existent cause' 327

ནམ མཁའི གོས ཅན གྱིས ཀུན ཏུ བརྟགས པའི བདག བརྟག པ digambara parikalpita-ātma parīkṣā, examination of the Digambara Jaina doctrine of the soul .. .

གནས མའི བུས བདག བརྟག པ Vātsiputra-kalpita-ātma-parīksa, examination of the Vātsiputra doctrine of the soul . .. 326

རྣམ རྟོག མཚུངས vikalpa-samā .. 289

I LOGICAL TERMS

Page

ཀུན་བརྟགས parikalpita, fanciful, erroneous false 245 *n* 1

ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ samvṛti satya, conditional truth 254 *n* 2

ཀུན་གཞི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ ālaya-vijñāna knowledge which constitutes the basis or foundation of all, the basic knowledge 245 *n* 1

སྐྱེས་བུ་བརྟག་པ puruṣa parīkṣā, examination of the soul 328

ཁྱད་ *or* བྱེ་བྲག viśeṣa, particularity 287

ཁྱབ vyāpti universal, invariable inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term 282

གྲངས་ཅན་པ (see སེར་སྐྱ་པ) sāṅkhya or kāpila 278

གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ avayava siddhānta established tenet, member 54 *n* 2, 239

དགོས་པ prayojana, motive purpose 54 *n* 2, 253

འགལ་བ viruddha the contradictory 294

འགལ་བ་མི་འཁྲུལ་པ viruddhāvyabhicāri non erroneous contradiction 316

འགྱུར་བར་སྨྲ་བ་བརྟག་པ vivartavāda parīkṣā, examination of the doctrine of evolution 327

འགྲོ་བ་རང་བཞིན་དུ་སྨྲ་བ་བརྟག་པ jagat svabhāva vāda parīkṣā examination of the theory that the world is self existent 326

རྟགས་ལྟར་སྣང་བ hetvābhāsa fallacious middle term fallacy 54 *n* 2

སྒྲ་ཡི་དོན་བརྟག་པ śabdārtha parīkṣā, examination of the meaning of the word 'sound' 327

སྒྲ་ལས་བྱུང་བ see ཡིད་ཆེས་ཚིག

སྒྲ་ཚངས་པ་བརྟག་པ śabda Brahma-parīkṣā, examination of Brahma, the presiding Deity of Sound 328

སྒྲུབ་བྱ་ *or* ཆོས sadhya or dharma, major term or predicate 290

Page

སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད *or* གཏན་ཚིགས sādhana, hetu, linga, middle term, reason, mark . 290

སྒྲུབ་བྱ *or* དཔག་བྱ sādhya, anumeya, major term, syllogism 282

སྒྲུབ་བྱ་མཚུངས sādhya-samā . 299

ངག་དོན *see* ཡིད་ཆེས་ཚིག

མངོན་སུམ pratyakṣa, perception 55 *n* 1, 276, 277 *n* 1, 294, 307, 300

མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་བརྟག་པ pratyakṣa lakṣaṇa parīkṣā, examination of the definition of perception . .. 327

མངོན་སུམ་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ pratyakṣa-vyavastha, system of perception 309

མངོན་སུམ་ལྟར་སྣང pratyakṣābhāsa, fallacy of perception . 298

ཆ་ཤས siddhanta, avayava, member of syllogism, tenet, syllogism 54 *n* 2, 239

ཚད་པའི་གནས nigraha sthāna, a reason why one may be declared unfit to continue the controversy, point of defeat 54 *n* 2

ཆོས *or* བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ dharma *or* sadhya, predicate *or* major term 290

ཆོས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ལྡན་ཅི་ལོག་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་པ iṣṭa vighāta kṛt-viruddha, implied contradiction . 313, 316

ཆོས་ཅན *or* ཕྱོགས dharmin *or* pakṣa, subject *or* minor term . 290

ཆོས་མཐུན་པ sadharmya, homogeneous . . . 290

ཆོས་མཐུན་དཔེ་ལྟར་སྣང་བ sadharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa, fallacies of the homogeneous example .. 298

ཆོས་མཐུན་མཚུངས sadharmya samā 298

ཆོས་མི་མཐུན་པ vaidharmya, heterogeneous . .. 297

ཆོས་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ལྟར་སྣང་བ vaidharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa, fallacy of the heterogeneous example

Page

ཆོས་མི་མཐུན་མཚུངས vaidharmya samā .. 289
འཇིག་རྟེན་རྒྱུད་པའི་བརྟག་པ saṁsāra-santati-parīkṣā, examination of the continuity of the world 327
རྗེས་དཔག see རྗེས་སུ་དཔག anumāna, inference 280 298
རྗེས་དཔག་ལྟར་སྣང anumānābhāsa, fallacy of inference 298
རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་པ viparītānvaya, fallacy of inverse connection 297
རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་མེད ananvaya, absence of connection 297
རྗེས་སུ་དཔག see རྗེས་དཔག
རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་བརྟག་པ anumānaparīkṣā, examination of inference 327
བརྗོད་པ jalpa, wrangling 54 n 2
བརྗོད་མཚུངས varṇyasamā 288, 289
ཉེར་འཇལ upamāna, comparison 287
གཉིས་ཀ་བརྟག་པ ubhaya parīkṣā, examination of both [nature and sense-organs] 326
གཏན་ཚིགས hetu, reason, middle term 258, 286
གཏན་ཚིགས *or* བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད hetu, linga, sādhana, middle term, reason, mark 290

Page

position by showing that its denial is impossible, *reductio ad absurdum*, confutation, 54 n 2, 258
རྟོག་གེ་རིག tarka vidyā, art of debate .. 7 n 10
ལྟ་བ darśana, philosophy .. 5 n 5
ལྟག་གཅོད jāti, analogue, far fetched analogue, .. 218, 276, 288
ལྟག་ཆོད jāti, evasive answer, analogue .. 54 n 2
སྟོང་པ་ཉིད śūnyatā [śūnya-vāda], the absolute, the void . 254 n 2
བརྟན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བརྟག་པ sthira padārtha-parīkṣā, examination of the permanence of entities 326
ཐལ་བ་མཚུངས prasanga-sama . 289
ཐུན་མོང sadhāraṇa, the too general 293
ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན asādhāraṇa, the not general enough . 294
ཐེ་ཚོམ saṁśaya, doubt . 54 n 2, 258
ཐེ་ཚོམ་མཚུངས saṁśaya-samā .. 289
ཐོས་པ་བརྟག་པ śruti-parīkṣā, examination of śruti or scripture 327
དུས་གསུམ་བརྟག་པ kālatraya-parīkṣā, examination of the three times 327
དོན་རྟོགས་མཚུངས arthāpatti samā 289
དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ paramārtha satyā, transcendental truth

Page

རྣམ་པར་རྩོད་པའི་མཐའ vitaṇḍā 258
རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་སྨྲ་བ *see* རྣལ་འབྱོར་པའི་ལྟ་བ vijñāna vāda (yogācāra-darśana), the doctrine of idealism 245 *n* 1
རྣམ་བཞིན svabhāva, identity 258
རྣལ་འབྱོར་པ yogin, yogācāra . 278
རྣལ་འབྱོར་པའི་ལྟ་བ *see* རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་སྨྲ་བ yogācara darśana, yogācāra [in Tibet yogācārya], practice of meditation 245 *n* 1, 249, 249 *n* 1
དཔག་བྱ *or* བསྒྲུབ་བྱ anumeya *or* sādhya, predicate *or* major term 282
དཔེ dṛṣṭānta, example 54 *n* 2, 128 *n* 4, 258, 286
དཔེ་བརྗོད dṛṣṭānta, example 290
སྤྱི sāmānya, generality 287
སྤྱི་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་གི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ sāmānya viśeṣa-śabdārtha-parīkṣā, examination of the words 'generality' and 'particularity 326, 327
སྤྱིའི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ sāmānya śabdārtha parīkṣā, examination of the meaning of the word 'generality' or genus' . 326
སྤྱོད་པ་པས་བརྟགས་པའི་བདག་བརྟག་པ mīmāṃsaka kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, examination of the mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the soul . 326
ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་བརྟག་པ vāhyārtha-parīkṣā, examination of external objects 327
ཕྱོགས *or* ཆོས་ཅན pakṣa *or* dharmin, minor term or subject . 290
ཕྱོགས་ཆོས pakṣa-dharma, law of extension of the middle term . 283
ཕྱོགས་ལྟར་སྣང pakṣābhāsa, fallacy of thesis . . 290 *n* 1
ད་མཚུངས་པ prāpti-samā . 258
བྱེ་བྲག *or* ཁྱད viśeṣa, particularity 287
དབང་པོ་བརྟག་པ indriya parīkṣā, examination of the sense-organs 326
དབུ་མ mādhyamika .. 249
འབྲས་བུ kārya, effect 258, 280, 311, 332
འབྲས་བུའི་གཏན་ཚིགས kārya hetu, relation of effect and cause . 318
འབྲས་མཚུངས་པ kārya-samā .. 259
མ་སྐྱེས་མཚུངས་པ anutpatti samā .. 289
མ་གྲུབ asiddha, the unproved . 293
མ་ངེས་པ aniścita, the uncertain . 293
མ་བརྗོད་མཚུངས་པ avarṇya-samā .. 289
མ་ཕྲད་མཚུངས་པ aprāpti-samā .. 288
མི་དམིགས་པ anupalabdhi, non-perception .. 258, 281, 311, 332
མི་དམིགས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས anupalabdhi hetu, relation of negation .. 318
དམིགས་པ་མཚུངས་པ upalabdhi-sāma [*sic*] , .. 280
སྨྲ་བའི་མཐའ vāda . . 258
རྩོད་པ anvīkṣikī, vāda, logic, discussion . .. 7 *n* 1, 54 *n* 2
རྩོད་པའི་མཐའ jalpa . .. 258
ཚད་མ pramāṇa, source of right cognition, means of right knowledge 54 *n* 2, 258
ཚད་མ་གྲུབ་པ pramāṇa siddhi, establishment of pramāṇa .. 307
ཚད་མ་[ག]ཞན་བརྟག་པ pramāṇāntara-parīkṣā, examination of other kinds of valid knowledge 327
ཞན་སེལ་བ apoha, negation of the opposite .. .. 276, [287]
ཚར་གཅད་པ nigraha sthāna .. 258
ཚིག་གི་དོན་བཅུ་དྲུག ṣoḍaśa padārthāḥ, the sixteen categories [in Akṣapāda's Nyāya-sutra] 54 *n* 2
ཚིག་དོར chala, quibble 54 *n* 2, 258
མཚན་ཉིད་དྲུག་བཤད་པ ṣaḍ lakṣaṇa-vyākhyā, explanation of six characteristics .. . 333
རྫས dravya, substance 287
རྫས་ཀྱི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ dravya padārtha parīkṣā, examination of the meaning of the word 'substance' . .. 326

Page

གཞན གྱི དོན གྱི རྗེ[ས [དཔག parārthānumāna, inference for the sake of others . .. 276, 282
གཞན གྱི དོན གྱི རྗེས སུ དཔག པ parārthānumāna, inference for the sake of others . 309
གཞན གྱི དོན གྱི ཚིག parārtha-vākya, words for the sake of others 307
གཞན དབང paratantra, dependent on others, conditional 245 *n* 1
གཞན གྱི དབང པོ ལས འདས པའི དོན མཐོང བ ཅན གྱི སྐྱེས བུ བརྟག པ anyendriyātitārtha-darśana puruṣa-parikṣā, examination of the soul which sees things beyond the range of senses 327
གཞན སེལ བ apoha, negation of the opposite 287, [276]
གཞལ བྱ prameya, object of right cognition, object of right knowledge .. 54 *n* 2, 258
ཡིད ཆེས ཚིག *or* སྒྲ ལས བྱུང བ *or* ངག དོན śabda, credible word *or* verbal testimony . . 287
ཡོངས གྲུབ pariniṣpanna, complete in itself, perfect . 245 *n* 1
ཡོན ཏན guṇa, quality 287
ཡོན ཏན གྱི ཚིག གི དོན བརྟག པ guṇa-śabdārtha parīkṣā, examination of the meaning of the word 'quality' 320
རང [གི]དོན [གྱི]རྗེས [སུ]དཔག [པ] svārthānumāna, inference for one's self .. 276, 280, 307, 309
རང བཞིན svabhāva, identity 280, 311, 332
རང བཞིན གྱི གཏན ཚིགས svabhāva-hetu, relation of identity .. 318
རང བཞིན བརྟག པ svabhāva-parīkṣā, examination of nature . 326
རང ལས ཚད མ བརྟག པ svataḥ prāmāṇya parīkṣā, examination of self-evidence .. 327

Page

རིགས བསྟན བཅོས nyāya śāstra, science of right judgment of true reasoning 40, 40 *n* 3
རིགས པ nyāya true reasoning 8 *n* 7
རིགས པ ཅན naiyāyika 287, 287 *n* 3
རིགས པ ཅན དང བྱེ བྲག པས ཀུན ཏུ བརྟགས པའི སྐྱེས བུ བརྟག པ nyāya vaiśeṣika-parikalpita puruṣa parīkṣā, examination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines of the soul 326
རིགས པའི བསྟན བཅོས *see* རིགས བསྟན བཅོས
རིགས པའི ཡན ལག nyāyāvayava, the (five) parts or members of a syllogism, syllogism 42 *n* 9, 239 *n* 3
ལས karma action 287
ལས ཀྱི ཚིག གི དོན བརྟག པ karma śabdārtha parīkṣā, examination of the meaning of the word 'karma' 326
ལས དང འབྲས བུའི འབྲེལ པ བརྟག པ karma-phala sambandha-parīkṣā, examination of the relation between karma and its effect . 326
འཇུག པའི རྣམ པར ཤེས pravṛtti vijñāna, knowledge as received, presentative knowledge which produces the external world drawing us toward it . 245 *n* 1
སུན འབྱིན dūṣaṇa, refutation . 298
སུན འབྱིན ལྟར སྣང བ dūṣaṇābhāsa, fallacy of refutation 298
སུན འབྱིན དུ རྒོལ བ vitaṇḍā, cavil or reducing a proposition *ad absurdum* without caring to establish one's own view 54 *n* 2
སེར སྐྱ པས ཀུན ཏུ བརྟགས པའི བདག བརྟག པ kapila parikalpita ātma parīkṣā, examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul .. 326
སེར སྐྱ བ *see* གྲངས ཅན པ Kāpila or Sāṅkhya .. 278
ཨུ པ ནི ཥཊ ཀྱིས བརྟགས པའི བདག བརྟག པ Upaniṣad kalpita ātma-parīkṣā, examination of the Upaniṣad doctrine of the soul. . 326

II TIBETAN QUOTATIONS

Page

ཀུན་མཁྱེན་འཁྲུལ་བྲལ 345 n 4
ཀྱི་མ་འཕགས་པ 331 n 4
གང་གིས་འབྲལ་བ 345 n 2
གང་གིས་གསུང་རབ 338 n 1
གང་ཚེ་དོན་དང 278 n 1
གལ་ཏེ་ཆོས་ཀྱི 305 n 2
མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་པ 277 n 1
མངོན་སུམ་དང་ནི 276 n 4
རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུའི 376 n 5
སྒྲ་ལས་བྱུང་བ 287 n 3
སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་ནི 289 n 2
མཁས་པ་དགའ་བ 258 n 1
འཁྲུལ་པའི་དུ་བ 299 n 3
ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་ཆུས་པ 258 n 2
ཇི་སྐད་རྟོག་གེ 244 n 4
རྗེས་དཔག་རྣམ་གཉིས 280 n 2
རྗེས་དཔག་ཚུ་དང 288 n 2
ཉེར་འཇལ་བཞིན་དུ 287 n 2
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན 317 n 2
གཏན་ཚིགས་བསྒྲུབ་པའི 286 n 1
རྟགས་ནི་འཁྲུལ་པ 281 n 1
ཐེ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱང 244 n 3
དམ་བཅས་པ་ཡང 124 n 1
དེ་ཕྱིར་དཔེ་ནི 286 n 3
དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ 252 n 1
དེའི་ཚེ་གཏོན་ཏུ 305 n 1
དེར་གང་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས 243 n 3
བདག་དང་དབང་པོ་དང་ཡིད་དང 279 n 1
ཐེད་ཚོགས་གནས་ཏུ 280 n 1
མདོར་ན་ཚོད་དུ 333 n 1
ཐམ་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་པས 306 n 7
དཔེ་རྣམ་པ་ནི 128 n 4 253 n 4
ཉི་དང་རྒྱུད་བར 279 n 1

P

ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཉིད 307
ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས 283
ཕྱོགས་རྣམས་ཀུན་གྱི 276 n
བུ་མ་སྐྱེད་མ་སྐྱེད 275 n
བྱས་ན་རྣམ་པར 244 n
བྱས་སོགས་བཞིན་དུ 237 n
བྱེ་བྲག་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་མདོ་ལས 279 n
བྱེ་མ་འདེག་ཏེན 347 n 1
བློ་ཡིས་རྣམས་སྐྱེད་པ[? = བློས] 308 n 3
བློ་ཡིས་རྣམ་པར 120 n 2
དབང་པོ་དང་དོན (སྐྱེས་པའི) 278 n 3
དབང་པོ་དང་དོན (བྱུང་བའི) 55 n 1
འབྲས་ཉིད་གཞན་གྱི 135 n 5
ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ [? རྣམས་འཁྲུལ] 307 n 4
ཚད་མར་གྱུར་པ 276 n 2
ཚུལ་བཞིན་ཏེ་བྲ 344 n 1
[བ]ཛྲ་ག་ཏུ་ལའི 346 n 3
འཛམ་གླིང་སྙིང་པོ 332 n 2
གཞན་གྱི་དོན་གྱི 232 n 1, 506 n 2
གཞལ་བྱ་བྲལ་མི 265 n 1*
ཡིད་ཆེས་ཚིག་ནི 258 n 1
རང་གི་ངོ་བོ 262 n 2
རང་དོན་ནི་ཚུལ 506 n 2
རང་བཞིན་དབང་ཟུར 325 n 3*
རང་གི་རྟོག་པ 278 n 1
རང་ལ་ངེས་བཞིན 258 n 2
རྣ་མ་བུ་བའི 346 n 1
རིགས་པ་ཅན་རྣམས 279 n 3
རིགས་པ་ཆེན་པོ 308 n 2
རིགས་པའི་ཡན་ལག 42 n 2
སློབ་དཔོན་ཆོས་མཆོག 331 n 2
སློབ་དཔོན་ཧྲི་ཀྱི་མི 332 n 3
ཤཱ་ཀྱ་རྒྱལ་བ་མོ 315 n 2

III BOOKS.

1 *Logical Works, Tibetan*

Page

སྐད་ཅིག་མ་འཇིག་གྲུབ་པའི་རྣམ་འགྲེལ kṣaṇa bhanga-siddhi vyākhyā, commentary on the kṣana bhanga-siddhi 331

Page

སྐད་ཅིག་མ་འཇིག་པ་གྲུབ་པ kṣaṇa-bhanga-siddhi, proof of the momentariness of things 331

Page

ས ཐབ བཀླག པའི ཐབས pustaka pāṭhopāya, the method of reading books 341

དང འབྲས བུའི དངོས པོ གྲུབ པ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva siddhi, establishment of the relation of cause and effect .. . 341

རྒྱུད གཞན གྲུབ པ santānāntara-siddhi, proof of the continuity of succession 319

རྒྱུད གཞན གྲུབ པའི འགྲེལ བཤད santānāntara-siddhi ṭīkā, commentary on the above . 322

ཆོས དང ཆོས ཅན གཏན ལ དབབ པ dharma-dharmi-viniścaya, determination of the minor and major terms .. 337

འཇིག རྟེན ཕ རོལ གྲུབ པ pāra loka siddhi, proof of the world beyond 330

གཏན ཚིགས ཀྱི འཁོར ལོ གཏན ལ དབབ པ or ཕྱོགས ཆོས དགུའི འཁོར ལོ hetu cakra-hamaru or pakṣa dharma cakra, the wheel of reasons put in order 299, 299 n 1, 2, 3

གཏན ཚིགས ཀྱི ཐིགས པ hetu-bindu vivaraṇa, a drop of reason 318

གཏན ཚིགས ཀྱི ཐིགས པ རྒྱ ཆེར འགྲེལ པ hetu bindu ṭīkā, detailed commentary on the above 321

གཏན ཚིགས ཀྱི དེ ཁོ ན ཉིད བསྟན པ hetu-tattva- ction on
t middle
.. 337

Page

examination of śruti or verbal testimony 328

དུས གསུམ བརྟག པ trikāla parīkṣā, examination of [the] three times 301

དེ ཁོ ན ཉིད བསྡུས པའི དཀའ འགྲེལ tattva-saṃgraha pañjikā, commentary on the tattva-saṃgraha 328

དེ ཁོ ན ཉིད བསྡུས པའི ཚིག ལེའུར བྱས པ tattva saṃgraha-kārikā, memorial verses on a summary of the tattvas 324

ནང གི ཁྱབ པ antar vyapti, internal inseparable connection 343

རྣམ པར རིག པ ཙམ ཉིད དུ གྲུབ པ vijñapti-mātra-siddhi, establishment of a mere communication of knowledge 343

ཕྱི རོལ གྱི དོན གྲུབ པ ཞེས བྱ བའི ཚིག ལེའུར vāhyārtha-siddhi kārikā, memorial verses on the reality of external things 328

ཕྱོགས ཆོས དགུའི འཁོར ལོ see གཏན ཚིགས ཀྱི འཁོར ལོ གཏན ལ དབབ པ pakṣa-dharma cakra

བྱིས པ འཇུག པའི རྟོག གེ bālāvatāra-tarka, children's introduction to logic 337

དབང ཕྱུག འགོག པའི ཚིག ལེའུར བྱས པ Īśvara-bhaṅga kārikā, memorial verses on the refutation of God 329

འབྲེལ པ གྲུབ པ pratibandha siddhi, establishment of the causal connection . . 345

འབྲེལ པ བརྟག པ sambandha parīkṣā, examination of connection . 319

པ བརྟག པའི འགྲེལ པ sambandha-ikṣā vṛtti, commentary on the
e 319

པ བརྟག པའི རྒྱ ཆེར བཤད པ sam-bandha-parīkṣā-ṭ copious
of .. 321

sam-
comment-
345

a parīkṣā,

Page

examination of the objects of thought [illegible]

[illegible] ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti commentary on the above [illegible]

[illegible] ālambana-parīkṣā-ṭīkā annotation on the above [illegible]

[illegible] vigraha-vyāvartanī kārikā memorial verses on putting down disputes [illegible]

[illegible] tarka-nyāya or vāda-nyāya method of discussion 316

[illegible] vāda-nyāya-vyākhyā commentary on the above 321

[illegible] vāda-nyāya-vṛtti-vipañcitārthā elaborate commentary on the above 323

[illegible] see [illegible] pramāṇa-samuccaya compilation on pramāṇa valid knowledge 42 n 9, 133 n 5 276

[illegible] pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti commentary on the above [illegible] 300

[illegible] pramāṇa-parīkṣā examination of pramāṇa or the sources of valid knowledge 330

[illegible] pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā explanation [illegible] difficulties in the pramāṇa- [illegible] 319

[illegible] pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti, annotation on the pramāṇa-vārtika 308 308 n 2 323

[illegible] pramāṇa-vārtika (pañjikā)-ṭīkā, annotation on the pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā 320, 344

[illegible] pramāṇa-vār- kāra, commentary on the vārtika 336

Page

[illegible] pramāṇa-[illegible] commentary on the above [illegible], 344

[illegible] pramāṇa-[illegible] summary of pramāṇa or sources of knowledge [illegible]

[illegible] pramāṇa-[illegible] commentary on the pramāṇa-[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] pramāṇa-[illegible] determination of pramāṇa or sources of knowledge [illegible]

[illegible] see above commentary on the pramāṇa-[illegible] 342

[illegible] pramāṇa-[illegible]-vṛtti or Pr'-[illegible]-vṛtti or Pr'-[illegible]-vṛtti a major commentary on Pr'-[illegible] or Pr'-[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] nyāya-praveśa door of entrance to logic [illegible]

[illegible] pramāṇa-śāstra-nyāya-praveśa, an entrance to the science of logic [illegible]

[illegible] see [illegible] etc., pramāṇa-sūtra-samuccaya compilation of aphorisms on pramāṇa valid knowledge 276, 276 n 4

[illegible] apoha-[illegible] kārikā, memorial verses on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites 329

[illegible] apoha nāma prakaraṇa, treatise on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites . 330

Page

[ཡངས་པ་དང་ དྲི་མ་མེད་པ་དང་ ལྡན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཚད་མ་ཀུན་ལས་བཏུས་པའི་ འགྲེལ་བཤད] viśālāmala-vatī-nāma pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭīkā . 323

རིགས་པ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྒྲོན་མ་ nyāyāloka-siddhi or nyāya-siddhyāloka, a lamp of logical reasoning .. 336

རིགས་པའི་ཐིགས་པ nyāya-bindu, a drop of logic .. 309

རིགས་པའི་ཐིགས་པ་རྒྱ་ཆེར་འགྲེལ་པ nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā (two different works), detailed commentary on the above .. . 321, 329

རིགས་པའི་ཐིགས་པའི་དོན་བསྡུས་པ nyāya-bindu piṇḍārtha, purport of the above 340

རིགས་པའི་ཐིགས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་སྔ་མ་མདོར་བསྡུས་པ nyāya-bindu pūrva-pakṣa-saṃkṣipta, summary of criticisms on the above 327

རིགས་པའི་སྦྱོར་བ yukti prayoga, application of reasoning 340

སེལ་བ་གྲུབ་པ apoha-siddhi, establishment of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites . 345

ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་པ་ངེས་པ sahāvalambha-niścaya, the ascertainment of objects and their knowledge arising together 336

2 *Logical Works, Sanskrit*

(Translated into Tibetan)

Page

[Abhidharma]jñāna - prasthāna-śāstra . 247 *n* 3

[Abhidharma-mahā]vibhāṣā (śāstra] . .. 247 *n* 4

Abhisamayālankāra kārikā 262, 262 *n* 5

Ālambana-parīkṣā . 300, 300 *n* 3

(*perhaps identical with* Ālambana-pratyaya-dhyāna-śāstra)

Ālambana-parīkṣā-ṭīkā 321/322

Ālambana parīkṣā-vṛtti 301, 301 *n* 1

Antar-vyāpti . 343

Anyāpoha vicāra-kārikā .. 329

Apoha nāma-prakaraṇa . 330

345

337

337

Nyāya-bindu 309, 309 *n* 2, 315, 315 *n* 2, 317 *n* 2

Nyāya-bindu-piṇḍārtha 340

Nyāya-bindu pūrva pakṣa-saṃkṣipta 327

Nyāya bindu ṭīkā 321, 329, 329 *n* 6

Nyāyāloka siddhi *or* Nyāya siddhyāloka 336

Nyāyānusāra śāstra *or* Koṣa kāraka-śāstra .. 248 *n* 1

Nyāya-praveśa *or* Nyāya-praveśo-nāma-pramāṇa-prakaraṇa, *perhaps* Nyāya-dvāra tarka-śāstra- 289, 289 *n* 1, 2; 300, 300 *n* 1, 302, 302 *n* 4, 507 *n* 2

[loka-siddhi 330

Page
Pramāṇa-śāstra-nyāya-praveśa *see* Nyāya praveśa.
Pramāṇa-vārtika (kārikā) 306 n 7, 307, 376 n 5
Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra . 336
Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭīkā 338, 344
Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā 319
Pramāṇa-vārtika (pañjikā) ṭīkā . 320
Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭīkā . 344
Pramāṇa vārtika-vṛtti 308, 323
Pramāṇa-viniścaya 308, 309, 308 n 3
Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭīkā 330/331, 342
Pratibandha-siddhi .. 343
Pustaka-pāṭhopāya 341
Sahāvalambha-niścaya 336
Sambhandha-parīkṣā 319
Sambhanda-parīkṣānusāra 345
Sambhanda-parīkṣā-ṭīkā 321
Sambhanda-parīkṣā-vṛtti 319

Pa
Santānāntara-siddhi . 31
Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭīkā .. 32
Sarvajña-siddhi-kārikā . 32
Śruti-parīkṣā .. . 32
Tarka-bhāṣā . 34
Tarka-nyāya *or* Vāda-nyāya 124 n 1, 31
Tattva-saṃgraha *or* Tarka-saṃgraha .. .. ..325 n
Tattva-saṃgraha-kārikā .. 324
Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā . 328
Trikāla-parīkṣā . 301, 301 n 2
Vāda-nyāya *see* Tarka-nyāya.
Vāda nyāya-vṛtti vipañcitārtha 322, 324
Vāda-nyāya-vyākhyā .. . 321
Vākyārtha-siddhi-kārikā . 328
Vijñapti-mātra-siddhi .. . 343
Viśālāmala-vatī-nāma-pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭīkā . . 323
Yukti prayoga 340

3A *References to the Tanjur*

Page
Tibetan Tanjur—
general 519, 530 *et seq*, 537 *et seq*
collection of . 352
mdo, on the yogācāra school 243 n 4
British Mission Copy—
in British Museum 321 n 1, 2, 323 n 1, 329 n 6, 332
India Office Copy 300 n 3, 301 n 1, 2, 302 302 n 4, 307 n 3, 308 n 1, 309 n 1, 2, 315 n 2, 3, 319 n 1, 2, 3, 321 n 3, 4, 322 n 1, 2, 323 n 1, 324 n 1, 328 n 4 330 n 2, 3, 4, 5, 331 n 1, 4, 336 n 1, 4, 337 n 3, 340 n 1, 3, 341 n 1 343 n 2, 345 n 1, 3, 5, 346 n 4
Sikkim, Labrang, Copy 299 n 1, 319 n 5 320 n 4 324 n 2, 336 n 3, 342 n 4, 344 n 4, 530–538
Single Volumes—
རྒྱུད་, ka ཀ = 1 253 n 6*
མདོ་, ka ཀ = 1 262 n 5
" tsa ཙ = 17 256 n 2
" ha ཧ = 29 128 n 4, 257, 258 n 1, 2, 4

Page
མདོ་ gi གི = 33 241 n 1, 251 n 2
" ku ཀུ = 61 342 n 6
" ce ཅེ = 95 42 n 9, 124 n 1, 135 n 5, 270, 275, 276, 276 n 1, 2, 3, 289, 289 n 1, 299, 299, n 1, 2, 300, 301, 306 n 7, 307, 307 n 4, 308, 308 n 3, 309, 316 n 3, 318, 319, 376 n 5, 506 n 2, 3, 507 n 2
" che ཆེ = 96 . 319
" je ཇེ = 97 . 320
" ñe ཉེ = 98 .. 320
" te ཏེ = 99 .. 336
" the ཆེ (misprint *che*) = 100 336
" de དེ = 101 . 338
" ne ནེ = 102 . 338
" pe པེ = 103 . 344
" phe ཕེ = 104 .. 344
" be བེ = 105 344, 344 n 1
" me མེ = 106 .. 344
" tse ཙེ = 107 .. 344
" tshe ཚེ = 108 322, 323, 334

Page
dze ཛེ = 109 . 331
we ཝེ = 110 331 n 2, 342
zhe ཞེ = 111 321, 322, 328, 329, 332, 332 n 2, 340
ze ཟེ = 112 324, 328, 328 n
29, 330, 331, 336, 336 n 1, 4, 337, 337 n 3, 338 n 1, 340

Page
341, 343, 345, 345 n 2, 4, 346, 346 n 3, 347 n 1
མདོ he ཧེ = 113 328
" ye ཡེ = 114 328
" re རེ = 115 323
" śe ཤེ = 119 324
" go གོ = 123 7 n 7, 8 n 7, 54 n 2, 55 n 1

3B. *References to the Kanjur.*

Page
བ , ga ག = 3 .. 11 n 3
ca ཅ = 5 120 n 2, 244 n 3, 4, 6

Page
collection of 352
general 530–538

4. *Other Tibetan Works.*

Page
[illegible] . 517, 520 n 1
བྱུང་ see also under Tibetan
ames s. v. Tāranātha 305 n 1, 517
དཔལ་རྩ་རྒྱུད་ mañju śrī-mūla-
antra .. .. 252 n 1
དཔག་བསམ་ལྗོན་བཟང་ see also under Modern
authors, s. v. Das, Sarat Chandra, 305
1, 2; 320 n 4, 322 n 3, 323 n 2,
27 n 1, 328 n 3, 329 n 1, 332 n 3,
. 333 n 5,

Page
334 n 4, 335 n 1, 336 n 2, 337 n 1, 338 n 3, 340 n 2, 4, 341 n 2, 342 n 1, 5, 6, 344 n 2, 346 n 1, 348 n 1, 353 n 1, 516 n 1, 517, 517 n 2, 519 n 2
བསྟན་འགྱུར་དཀར་ཆག . . 517
ཤེས་རབ་སྡོང་བུ prajñā-daṇḍa 252 n 1
བཤེས་པའི་སྤྲིང་ཡིག suhṛllekha 251 n 2
[illegible] 241 n 1; 242 n 1
སོ་སོར་ཐར་པ pātimokkha 232 n 1

5 *Other Indian Works.*

Page
marakoṣa.. .. 7 n 1, 10
ahārāja-kanika-lekha 241 n 1
ahāvyutpatti 7n7, 8n7, 11n1, 25n1, 40n3, 43n2, 47n 1, 54n 2, 55n 1

Laṅkāvatāra sūtra 120 n 2, 243 n 3, 244 n 3, 4.
Pātimokkha . 232 n 1
Suhṛllekha . . 251 n 2

6. *Tibetan Books in general*

Page
authorities on the sūtra of "the burden and the burden bearer" 127
T. accounts of Nālandā .. 516
T. books .. .. 11, 241 n 1
T. books on the Pāla dynasty of Bengal 517
Some books of T. on date of Buddha .. .. 252 n 1

Page
T. books on yogācāra .. . 249
Sanskrit books translated into Tibetan .. .. 252, 519 n 5, 6
T. literature about Madhya-deśa 304 n 1
T. translations of Vasubandhu's works 267
T. versions of Asanga's works .. 265

	Page
Dharmakirti, quoted .	124 *n* 1
Dignāga epithet of	. 272
Dīpankara, starts for Tibet	. 318
Hamsa, killed in Tibet	210
Jina Mitra, visits Tibet	340
Jñāna-siddha Bhadra, perhaps identical with Jñāna śrī Bhadra	342 *n* 1
Kamala Śīla (Śrīla), called to Tibet	. 327
Kaniska, date of	241 *n* 1
Nāgārjuna, quoted 128 *n* 4, 250	
Nāgārjuna. Tārānātha's date of	252, 252 *n* 4
Muktākumbha, name restored from the Tibetan ..	331 *n* 3
Paramahamsa, killed in Tibet	210
Ratna Vajra, *see* Ācārya.	
Sanghabhadra, existence of his work in Tibetan .	248 *n* 1
Śankara Svāmin, Tibetan knowledge of .. .	302, 302 *n* 4
(Tārānātha, see under Tibetan names)	
Tarka pungava, *see* Dignāga.	

3 *Modern Authors.*

	Page
Cordier, P , Tibetan catalogue 257	*n* 1, 262 *n* 2
Csoma de Korös, A., Tibetan Grammar	55 *n* 1, 306 *n* 1, 323 *n* 3, 517
Das, Sarat Chandra, various, 43 *n* 2, 47 *n* 1, 242 *n* 1, 274 *n* 2, 275 *n* 1, 305 *n* 1, 320 *n* 4, 323 *n* 2, 3, 324 *n* 3, 327 *n* 1, 332 *n* 3, 338 *n* 3, 348 *n* 1, 516 *n* 1, 517 *n* 2,	517 *n* 3, 519 *n* 2, 520 *n* 2, 530
Rockhill, W W , Life of Buddha	11 *n* 3, 246 *n* 2, 322 *n* 7
Ross, E D., Mahāvyutpatti, 7 *n*	7, 8 *n* 7, 40 *n* 3, 43 *n* 2, 47 *n* 1
Schiefner, A., Tārānātha, Geschichte des Buddhismus, *see* under Tibetan names *s v* Tārānātha.	
Schlagintweit, E , Buddhism, 249 *n* 1, 5	
Sherbatski, F. J , Nyāya-bindu 309	*n* 2, 329 *n* 6
Vidyābhusana, Satis Chandra, various, 7 *n* 1, 7, 10; 40 *n* 3, 241 *n* 1, 262 *n* 1, 307 *n* 4, 309 *n* 2, 322 *n* 5, 7; 324 *n* 2, 334 *n* 3,	343 *n* 1, 348 *n* 2
Waddell, L. A , Lamaism 271 *n* 1,	323 *n* 3, 327 *n* 1; 520 *n* 2
Wassiljew, W.	.. 251 *n* 1, 306 *n* 1

V PLACE NAMES

1. *Tibetan Spelling.*

	Page
བཀྲ་ཤིས་ལྷུན་པོ .	270, 353
གུ་གེ, in W. Tibet .	324
ཐོ་ལིང, [?] Tholing in	. 517
སྐྱེར་སྒང, monastery near Lhasa	344
ཐོ་ཆིང [?], in Ñari ..	.. 517
ཨ་མདོ, province, translators of 324,	337, 343
ཙནྡྲ་ཀཱུ་པ, Candra-kūpa	.. 335
སྣར་ཐང, near Tashi Lhunpo	270, 338
ཞང་ཞུང , interpreter of	. 338
སྤྱི་ཏི, interpreters of 321, 332, 338,	339, 340
(See errata)	299, 323
རྭ་སྒྲེང, Bodhisattva i of	.. 330
ཐེ་བའི་དགེ་གནས, monastery	.. 375
ཐེ་མ་བའི་དགེ་གནས monastery	

Page
ས་སྐྱ་, monastery . 289, 300
སུམ་པ་ province in Amdo .. 337
ཞིང་དཀར་, village .. . 337

Page
བསམ་ཡས་, holy monastery 323, 323 n 2, 324
སྙེ་ཐང་, Nyethang near . . 344

2 *English Spelling.*

Page
Amdo, province of Sum-pa in 337
Do-jog, Taxila 528
Labrang, in Sikkim 289 n 1, 299 n 1, 319 n 5, 320 n 4, 324 n 2, 328 n 2, 336 n 3, 342 n 4, 344 n 4, 530–536
Padangi . 530, *et seq*
Pamiyangchi 530, *et seq*, 537–539

Page
Sikkim, see Labrang 537–539
Tibet, spread of Mahāyāna in .. 241
  Buddhist Missionaries in . 352
  Enterprising monks visiting 351
  Śānta Rakṣita visits .. 517
Western Tibet, Saskya monastery in . . 289, 300

VI. RESIDUALS

1 *Tibetan*

Page
སྒོ་སྲུང་ dvāra-paṇḍita ?, gate keeper 520
རྡོ་རྗེ་ vajra, thunderbolt .. 272
པཎ་ཆེན་ཞྭ་དམར་ paṇḍita's red cap . 271

Page
སྦས་ gupta 328 n 3
ཨས་ཡེཤ་ . 531
བསྲུང་ rakṣita, protected 328 n 3

2. *English.*

Page
Illustration, likeness of Dignāga 271
Mahārājā of Sikkim, letter from 538, 539

Page
Mahārānī of Sikkim, letter from 537
Tashi Lama, visit to India 528, 529

VII ERRATA.

PAGE:	FOR	READ:
124, n 1:	Dhamakīrti,	Dharmakīrti
245, n 1:	ཡོངས་སྒྲུབ	ཡོངས་གྲུབ
252, n 1:	སྔ་འདས	ང་འདས
252 3 n 6:	Bsan-ḥgyur,	Bstan-ḥgyur
257, § 82:	teppitaka,	tippitaka
278, l. 15/16:	rje dpag,	rjes-dpag
288, n 1:	དབག་པའི་སྟོང་	དབག་པ་སྟོང
298, bottom:	Mnon-sum ltar-nan,	Mnon-sum-ltar-snan.
299, l 5.	q do,	q.do, Vol. ce.
299, bottom:	ḥgrel-wa,	ḥgrel-pa.
300, § 98:	Dge-śes	Dge-bśes.
301, § 100:	brtag pal̤is ḥgrel,	brtag-paḥi-ḥgrel pa.
301, § 101:	Dus-ḥsum,	Dus-gsum.

Page	For	R
303, n 3	you	[illegible]
307, n 4	[illegible]	[illegible]
308, n 3 l 2 fr b	[illegible]	[illegible]
309, l 8	[illegible]	[illegible]
309, n 3	man par	[illegible]
317, n 2	Sher tsetan, Shere bstsab,	[illegible]
310, § 114, § 118	id.	id.
321, passim	Htrel-wa	[illegible]
323, last line	id.	id.
323, n 3	bbrel	[illegible]
325, Tib l 4, fr b	Korus	[illegible]
326, l 26	[illegible]	[illegible]
326, l 2 fr b	Tibtan	Tibeta
327, l 12	po	pa
327, l 23	shen	[illegible]
330, § 129, l 13	drtag.	[illegible]
337, l 9 fr b	She.	The
342, § 137, last l	Bse-wa	Bra
343, l 4	tgrus	[illegible]
335, n 4, l 1	do.	da
353, n 1, l 1	[illegible]	[illegible]
517, l. 11	[illegible]	[illegible]
517, l 17	Thi-srong.	Khr
	lama.	[illegible]

Passim, See Index V I [illegible] is not the name of
great revisor Certain other irregularities have not
index enables the reader to draw his own inferences.

lcS27
31259

Page:	For:	Read:
302, n 3:	vou,	von.
307, n 4	[illegible]	[illegible]
308, n 3, l 3, fr b	[illegible]	[illegible]
309 l 5:	rnam-par	rnam-par
309, n 2:	Sher-batski, Shere-batski,	Sherbatski.
317, n 2:	id.	id.
319, § 114, § 118:	lJbrel-wa	lJbrel-pa
321, passim	id	id.
323, last line	ḥbrel,	ḥgrel.
323, n 3	Koros,	Körös.
325, Tib. l 4, fr b	[illegible]	[illegible]
326, l 26	Tibtan,	Tibetan
326, l 2 fr b	po,	pa.
327, l 12	shan,	gshan
327, l 23	dṛtag,	bṛtag
330, § 129, l. 13:	She,	The.
337, l 9 fr b	Bis-wa,	Byis pa.
342, § 137, last l	ḥgrus,	ḥgrub.
348, l 4:	do,	du.
335, n 4, l 1	[illegible]	[illegible]
353, n 1, l 1	[illegible]	[illegible]
517, l. 11	Thi-srong,	Khri-sron
517, l 17	lama,	bla-ma

Passim, See Index V I [illegible] is not the name of a country, but a great revisor Certain other irregularities have not been indicated, a index enables the reader to draw his own inferences

10527 —
28 12 59